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Philosophy of cognitive science :: Philosophy of neuroscience :: Philosophy of neuroscience, misc

• William Bechtel, Pete Mandik & Jennifer Mundale (2001). Philosophy meets the neurosciences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=S5GoWZPc_zMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=Philosophy+meets+the+neurosciences+Bechtel&ots=1S6WUfK2u6&sig=ri7W7AkCL7xsCu4ks8PPjoXWS48
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=S5GoWZPc_zMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA4&dq=Philosophy+meets+the+neurosciences+Bechtel&ots=1S6WUfK2u6&sig=rc00d3t7KsWX4JeYJKb77iX1Mbs
  
• William Bechtel (forthcoming). The epistemology of evidence in cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/teaching/mechanism/epist.evidence.pdf
  
• John Bickle & Pete Mandik (online). The philosophy of neuroscience.   (More)
• Richard Brown (2006). What is a brain state?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a759246431~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/T06P873L0724307V.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/759246431.pdf
  
• Anjan Chatterjee (2006). The promise and predicament of cosmetic neurology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/extract/32/2/110
  http://jme.bmjjournals.com/preprint/chatterjee.pdf
  http://intl-jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/extract/32/2/110
  http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=neuroethics_pubs
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16446417&dopt=Citation
  
• Christopher Cherniak (1995). Neural component placement.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8638292&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01662236/1995/00000018/00000012/art98373
  
• Christopher Cherniak (1990). The bounded brain: Toward quantitative neuroanatomy.   (More)
• Daniel Dennett (2007). Philosophy as naive anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and Wittgenstein were the authorities on the meanings of our everyday mentalistic or psychological terms. I myself am a product of that time and place (as is Searle, for that matter), and I find much to agree with in their goals and presuppositions, and before turning to my criticisms, which will be severe, I want to highlight what I think is exactly right in their approach–the oft-forgotten lessons of Ordinary Language Philosophy
• Itiel Dror & Robin Thomas (2004). The cognitive neuroscience laboratory: A framework for the science of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/40070/
  
• Chris Eliasmith (forthcoming). Computational neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Keywords: computational neuroscience, neural coding, brain function, neural modeling, cognitive modeling, computation, representation, neuroscience, neuropsychology, semantics, theoretical psychology, theoretical neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/eliasmith.computational neuroscience.handbook.pdf
  
• Vinod Goel (2004). Can there be a cognitive neuroscience of central cognitive systems?   (More)
• Jakob Hohwy (forthcoming). Functional integration and the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/y7251j235171k8g8/fulltext.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (online). Wittgenstein & James's Stream of Thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William James has been characterized as “the major whipping boy of the later Wittgenstein,” and the currency of this impression of the relation between James and Wittgenstein is understandable. Reading Wittgenstein and his commentators can leave one with the impression that James was a badly muddled “exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] was opposing.” There have been recent attempts to resist this trend, but even these tend to focus on the affinities between the two philosophers, still accepting the prevailing view that Wittgenstein was often critical of James, and that in such cases Wittgenstein was always right and James was always wrong. By contrast, by focusing on Wittgenstein’s discussion of James’s “if-feeling”, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s criticisms of James are often not as damaging, or even as extensive, as has often been assumed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/WittJames.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/WittJames.pdf
  
• Brian Keeley (2000). Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/keeley98neuroethology.html
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200009)67:32.0.CO;2-M
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200009)672.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392834
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188683.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik & Andrew Brook (2004). The philosophy and neuroscience movement.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained to deal with. After sketching the history of the movement, we explore the relationships between neuroscience and philosophy and introduce some of the specific issues that have arisen
• Georg Northoff (1999). Neuropsychiatry, epistemology, and ontology of the brain: A response to the commentaries.   (More)
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The first computational theory of mind and brain: A close look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in computability theory), (ii) a technique that inspired the notion of logic design (a fundamental part of modern computer design), (iii) the first use of computation to address the mind–body problem, and (iv) the first modern computational theory of mind and brain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~gpiccini/First Computational Theory.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l6448856423q5154/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L6448856423Q5154.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder & Oleg Favorov (2001). The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/associationism.pdf
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/sinbadsite/associationism.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000002/00358091
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=358091&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H5610641684716K1.pdf
  
• Warren Schmaus (2005). Evolutionary and neuroscience approaches to the study of cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/508107
  
• Joel Smith (2005). Review of Bennett & Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience from Aristotle to Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield. Chapter three (to which I shall return), offers the philosophical basis for much of the book. Chapters four to twelve present detailed philosophical criticisms of a wide variety of neuroscientists (and some philosophers) on a large number of topics. These include: Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Marr and Frisby on perception (particularly the primary/secondary quality distinction and the binding problem); Milner, Squire and Kandel on memory; Blakemore and others on mental imagery; LaDoux and Damasio on the emotions; Libet on voluntary movement; and Baars, Crick, Edelman, Damasio, Penrose, Searle, Chalmers, and Nagel on consciousness (with a great deal on qualia and self-consciousness). Chapters thirteen and fourteen, along with the two appendices, contain an elaboration and defence of the book’s methodology and present explicit contrasts with the Churchlands, Dennett and Searle. Bennett and Hacker maintain that whilst neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the brain, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation within an incoherent conceptual framework. Their complaints, therefore, are often not with neuroscience itself but with what might be called its philosophical self image
• Dan Stein (1999). Philosophy and cognitive neuropsychiatry.   (More)
• Paul Tibbetts (2004). The concept of voluntary motor control in the recent neuroscientific literature.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The concept of voluntary motor control(VMC) frequently appears in the neuroscientific literature, specifically in the context of cortically-mediated, intentional motor actions. For cognitive scientists, this concept of VMC raises a number of interesting questions:(i) Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or (ii) is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures?(iii) Is there any one place within the so-calledhierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could be said to originate? And (iv) in the current neurological literature how is the adjective voluntary in VMC being used? These questions are here considered in the context of how higher- and lower-levels of motor control, plan, initiate, coordinate, sequence, and modulate goal-directed motor outputs in response to changing internal and external inputs. Particularly relevant are the conceptual implications of current neurological modeling of VMC concerning causal agency
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2004/00000141/00000002/05380971
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r473711585118r37/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5380971&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R473711585118R37.pdf
  
• Marcel Weber (2005). Indeterminism in neurobiology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I examine different arguments that could be used to establish indeterminism of neurological processes. Even though scenarios where single events at the molecular level make the difference in the outcome of such processes are realistic, this falls short of establishing indeterminism, because it is not clear that these molecular events are subject to quantum mechanical uncertainty. Furthermore, attempts to argue for indeterminism autonomously (i.e., independently of quantum mechanics) fail, because both deterministic and indeterministic models can account for the empirically observed behavior of ion channels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002153/
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002153/01/Indeterminism_final.doc
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/508106
  

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