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Philosophy of cognitive science :: Philosophy of cognitive science, general

• Psychological laws [14]
• Psychological explanation [5]
• Explanation in cognitive science [6]
• Levels of analysis [6]
• Philosophy of psychology [14]
• Philosophy of cognitive science, misc [33]

Psychological laws

See also: Psychological explanation, Explanation in cognitive science, Philosophy of psychology, Anomalous monism, Psychophysical supervenience.

• Axel Cleeremans (1994). Attention and awareness in sequence learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: referred to as implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Implicit learning contrasts with explicit learning (exhibited for
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/77398.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/93-Cogsci.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/93-Cogsci.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/93-Cogsci.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans93attention.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans93attention.html
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/93-Cogsci.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/93-Cogsci.pdf
  
• Axel Cleeremans (1998). Implicit learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those regularities (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/98-TiCS.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-ECS.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-ECS.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-TiCS.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/98-TiCS.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans98implicit.html
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-TiCS.pdf
  http://m0134.fmg.uva.nl/edu/STUDENT_RESEARCH/OP42/98-TiCS.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/CleeremansDestrebecqzBoyer1998.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/1998/00000002/00000010/art01232
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current thinking about these three issues in a way that specifically links consciousness with adaptation and learning. Our assumptions about this relationship are rooted in further assumptions about the nature of processing and of representation in cognitive systems. When considered together, we believe that these assumptions offer a new perspective on the relationships between conscious and unconscious processing and on the function of consciousness in cognitive systems
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/cogsci/papers/axclj01.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-AXCLJ.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-AXCLJ.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-AXCLJ.pdf
  http://www.pinkmosstea.com/drivingmodel/Papers/Implicit learning and consciousness/Implicit learning and consciousness_A graded, dynamic perspective.pdf
  http://www.pinkmosstea.com/drivingmodel/heh/Papers/Implicit learning and consciousness/Implicit learning and consciousness_A graded, dynamic perspective.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=I8clvKRjea4C&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=+Implicit+learning+and+consciousness+Cleeremans&ots=6aPGD4ai8L&sig=EeM36KI_3TPTXEs9tGT0UQiWjHI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=I8clvKRjea4C&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=+Implicit+learning+and+consciousness+Cleeremans&ots=6aQDE1cf-R&sig=oaSL-PZf_kAozOio6iwjSMfHPxA
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Arnaud Destrebecqz (2005). Real rules are conscious.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 68 words Main Text: 1256 words References: 192 words Total Text: 1516 words
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X05280019
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Arnaud Destrebecqz (2003). The self-organizing conundrum. (Commentary on perruchet & vinter on The Self-Organizing Conundrum.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 59 words Main Text: 1108 words References: 114 words Total Text: 1281 words
• Arnaud Destrebecqz, Philippe Peigneux, Steven Laureys, Christian Degueldre, Guy Del Fiore, Joel Aerts, Andre Luxen, Martial van der Linden, Axel Cleeremans & Pierre Maquet (2003). Cerebral correlates of explicit sequence learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measurements, we investigated the cerebral correlates of consciousness in a sequence learning task through a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance. Results show that the metabolic response in the anterior cingulate / mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC / MPFC) is exclusively and specifically correlated with the explicit component of performance during recollection of a learned sequence. This suggests a significant role for the ACC / MPFC in the explicit processing of sequential material.  2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-CBR.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-CBR.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-CBR.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/03-CBR.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12706219&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12706219&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12706219&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09266410/2003/00000016/00000003/art00053
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09266410/2003/00000016/00000003/art00053
  
• Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the process dissociation procedure.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit or explicit knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-PBR.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-PBR.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-PBR.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/01-PBR.pdf
  http://psy.plymouth.ac.uk/research/fparm/projects/Destrebecqz & Cleeremans (2001) Can sequence learning be implicit _ process dissociation.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11495124&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11495124&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psocpubs/pbr/2001/00000008/00000002/art00016
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psocpubs/pbr/2001/00000008/00000002/art00016
  
• Arnaud Destrebecqz, Philippe Peigneux, Steven Laureys, Christian Degueldre, Guy Del Fiore, Joel Aerts, Andre Luxen, Martia Van Der Linden, Axel Cleeremans & Pierre Maquet (2005). The neural correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: Interacting networks revealed by the process dissociation procedure.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In cognitive neuroscience, dissociating the brain networks that ing—has thus become one of the best empirical situations subtend conscious and nonconscious memories constitutes a through which to study the mechanisms of implicit learning, very complex issue, both conceptually and methodologically
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/lm.95605
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/05-LM.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/05-LM.pdf
  http://www.learnmem.org/cgi/content/abstract/12/5/480
  http://www.learnmem.org/cgi/content/abstract/12/5/480
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16166397&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16166397&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1240060
  
• Vincian Gaillard, Muriel Vandenberghe, Arnaud Destrebecqz & Axel Cleeremans (2006). First and third-person approaches in implicit learning research.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/128/01/06-CC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/06-CC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/06-CC.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17027297&dopt=Citation
  
• Luis Jimenez, Castor Mendez & Axel Cleeremans (1996). Comparing direct and indirect measures of sequence learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively learn about the statistical structure of the stimulus material over training with the choice reaction time task, and (2) that they can use some of this knowledge to predict the location of the next stimulus in a subsequent “generation” task. However, detailed partial correlational analyses of the correspondence between performance during the reaction time task and the statistical structure of the training material showed that large effects remained even when controlling for explicit knowledge as assessed by the generation task. Hence we conclude (1) that at least some of the knowledge expressed through reaction time performance can not be characterized as conscious, and (2) that even when associations are found at a global level of analysis, dissociations can still be obtained when more detailed analyses are conducted. Finally, we also show that participants are limited in the depth of the contingencies they can learn about, and that these limitations are shared by the Simple Recurrent Network model of Cleeremans & McClelland (1991)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.22.4.948
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/95-JEPLMC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/95-JEPLMC.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/95-JEPLMC.pdf
  
• Pierre Maquet, Steven Laureys, Philippe Peigneux, Sonia Fuchs, Christophe Petiau, Christophe Phillips, Joel Aerts, Guy Del Fiore, Christian Degueldre, Thierry Meulemans, Andre Luxen, Georges Franck, Martial Van Der Linden, Carlyle Smith & Axel Cleeremans (2000). Experience-dependent changes in cerebral activation during human Rem sleep.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/learn_while_you_rest.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/learn_while_you_rest.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/learn_while_you_rest.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/learn_while_you_rest.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10903578&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicolas Schmidt, Muriel Vandenberghe, Patrick Fery & Axel Cleeremans (2006). Can amnesic patients learn without awareness? New evidence comparing deterministic and probabilistic sequence learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can associative learning take place without awareness? We explore this issue in a sequence learning paradigm with amnesic and control participants, who were simply asked to react to one of four possible stimuli on each trial. Unknown to them, successive stimuli occurred in a sequence. We manipulated the extent to which stimuli followed the sequence in a deterministic manner (noiseless condition) or only probabilistically so (noisy condition). Through this paradigm, we aimed at addressing two central issues: first, we asked whether sequence learning takes place in either condition with amnesic patients. Second, we asked whether this learning takes place without awareness. To answer this second question, participants were asked to perform a subsequent sequence generation task under inclusion and exclusion conditions, as well as a recognition task. Reaction times results show that amnesic patients learned the sequence only in the deterministic condition. However, they failed to be able to reproduce the sequence in the generation task. In contrast, we found learning for both sequence structures in control participants, but only control participants exposed to a deterministic sequence were successful in performing the generation task, thus suggesting that the acquired knowledge can be used consciously in this condition. Neither amnesic nor control participants showed correct old/new judgments in the recognition task. The results strengthen the claim that implicit learning is at least partly spared in amnesia, and the role of contextual information available for learning is discussed. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/06-Amnesia.pdf
  
• Arnold Silverberg (2003). Psychological laws.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of the sort McDowell claims cannot be done is in fact being done, and that this work presents strong evidence that there are psychological laws. The research I discuss is that by the psychologist Norman H. Anderson and his colleagues. I also argue that the considerations McDowell presents in defense of his claims do not constitute a significant challenge to the research that Anderson and his colleagues have done. It will be noted in the article that Anderson's work is relevant not just to McDowell's writings, but also to several much discussed issues in philosophy of cognitive science: the above two issues of whether there can be a science of ordinary psychological phenomena, higher cognition, comparable to that of the natural sciences and whether such a science would present laws, and also the issue of whether in such a science, and its laws, notions of folk psychology would play crucial constitutive roles. Anderson's work presents strong grounds for affirmative answers to all of these questions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2003/00000058/00000003/05113988
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l7030wg657m773km/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5113988&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L7030WG657M773KM.pdf
  
• Wolfgang Spohn (2002). Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. This entails that de Finetti's representation theorems can be directly transformed into an account of confirmation of laws thus conceived
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2002/00000057/00000003/05096271
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xg41u208p1836553/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5096271&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XG41U208P1836553.pdf
  

Psychological explanation

See also: Folk psychology and theory of mind, Explanation in neuroscience, Psychological laws, Explanation in cognitive science, Levels of analysis, Philosophy of psychology, Propositional attitudes, general, Externalism and psychological explanation, The explanatory role of content, Mental causation.

• William Bechtel & Cory Wright (forthcoming). What is psychological explanation?   (More)
• Robert Cummins (2000). "How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rcummins/www/HomePage/Papers/PE.pdf
  http://cognet.mit.edu/library/books/mitpress/0262112493/cache/chap5.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1993). Functional analysis and etiology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Cummins (1982) argues that etiological considerations are not onlyinsufficient butirrelevant for the determination offunction. I argue that his claim of irrelevance rests on a misrepresentation of the use of functions in evolutionary explanations. I go on to suggest how accepting anetiological constraint on functional analysis might help resolve some problems involving the use of functional explanations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v61108l632573p46/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V61108L632573P46.pdf
  
• Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1989). Functional explanations and reasons as causes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If we assume that a conceptual connection does hold between reasons and action, the arguments for both theses are strikingly simple. In defense of the first thesis, all that need be added is Hume's Principle: between cause and effect only a (logically) contingent relation holds. For given Hume's Principle, and the conceptual connection (which after all is not a contingent one), it follows that no causal connection holds. In defense of the second thesis, all that need be added is one assumption and one observation. The assumption is that the covering-law model of explanation is adequate to the natural sciences; the observation is that if a conceptual connection does hold, then covering-laws are not required to explain a person's action given the presence of the relevant beliefs and desires (because the presence of the latter entail the performance of the former). Together the assumption and the observation undermine the view that one model of explanation will fit both natural science and human psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<137:FEARAC>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<137:FEARAC>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214266.pdf
  
• Josh Weisberg (2003). Being all that we can be: A critical review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some theorists approach the Gordian knot of consciousness by proclaiming its inherent tangle and mystery. Others draw out the sword of reduction and cut the knot to pieces. Philosopher Thomas Metzinger, in his important new book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity,1 instead attempts to disentangle the knot one careful strand at a time. The result is an extensive and complex work containing almost 700 pages of philosophical analysis, phenomenological reflection, and scientific data. The text offers a sweeping and comprehensive tour through the entire landscape of consciousness studies, and it lays out Metzinger's rich and stimulating theory of the subjective mind. Metzinger's skilled integration of philosophy and neuroscience provides a valuable framework for interdisciplinary research on consciousness. Metzinger's overall goal in Being No One is to defend a representational theory of subjectivity, one that reduces subjective mental processes to representational mental processes. Subjective experiences take place whe n there is a conscious perspective, an active first-person point of view. It occurs in

Explanation in cognitive science

See also: Folk psychology and theory of mind, Explanation in neuroscience, Psychological laws, Psychological explanation, Levels of analysis, Philosophy of cognitive science, misc, Externalism and psychological explanation, The explanatory role of content.

• Andy Clark (1998). Twisted tales: Causal complexity and cognitive scientific explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Recent work in biology and cognitive science depicts a variety of target phenomena as the products of a tangled web of causal influences. Such influences may include both internal and external factors as well as complex patterns of reciprocal causal interaction. Such twisted tales are sometimes seen as a threat to explanatory strategies that invoke notions such as inner programs, genes for and sometimes even internal representations. But the threat, I shall argue, is more apparent than real. Complex causal influence, in and of itself, provides no good reason to reject these familiar explanatory notions. To believe otherwise, I suggest, is generally to commit (at least) one of two seductive errors. The first error is to think that the general notion of a state x coding for an outcome y involves the state's constituting a full description of y. This is what I call the myth of the self-contained code. The second error is to think that the practice of treating certain factors as special (e.g., seeing genes as coding for outcomes in a way environmental factors do not) depends on the (often mistaken) belief that the singled out factor is somehow doing the most real work. Where the amounts of causal influence are evenly spread, it is assumed there can be no reason to treat one factor in a special way. This is what I term the Myth of Explanatory Equality. Avoiding these errors involves reminding ourselves of (1) the rich context-dependence of even standard, unproblematic uses of the notions of code, program and information content (all three make sense only relative to an assumed ecological backdrop) and (2) the difference between explaining why an event occurred and displaying the full workings of a complex causal system
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/twisted.pdf
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=596768
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1306
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/twisted.pdf
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=328380CI
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1998/00000008/00000001/00150275
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/l017014km63luk65/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l017014km63luk65/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=150275&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L017014KM63LUK65.pdf
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (1999). Stability and explicitness: In defense of implicit representation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.usc.es/~psljim/98-CJ-on-OO.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/98-CJ-on-OO.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-CJ-on-OO.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-CJ-on-OO.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-CJ-on-OO.pdf
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99251795
  
• Luis Jimenez & Axel Cleeremans (1999). Fishing with the wrong nets: How the implicit slips through the representational theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: that depart radically from classical assumptions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99402183
  
• Machiel Keestra & Stephen Cowley (forthcoming). Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language.   (More)
• Robert Wilson & Frank Keil (1998). The shadows and shallows of explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   We introduce two notions–the shadows and the shallows of explanation–in opening up explanation to broader, interdisciplinary investigation. The shadows of explanation refer to past philosophical efforts to provide either a conceptual analysis of explanation or in some other way to pinpoint the essence of explanation. The shallows of explanation refer to the phenomenon of having surprisingly limited everyday, individual cognitive abilities when it comes to explanation. Explanations are ubiquitous, but they typically are not accompanied by the depth that we might, prima facie, expect. We explain the existence of the shadows and shallows of explanation in terms of there being a theoretical abyss between explanation and richer, theoretical structures that are often attributed to people. We offer an account of the shallows, in particular, both in terms of shorn-down, internal, mental machinery, and in terms of an enriched, public symbolic environment, relative to the currently dominant ways of thinking about cognition and the world
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=328383CI
  http://www.yale.edu/cogdevlab/People/Lab_Members/Frank/Frank's papers pdfs /Frank's articles/shadowsshallows.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1998/00000008/00000001/00150286
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/w735507650219741/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=150286&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W735507650219741.pdf
  
• Cory Wright (2007). Is psychological explanation going extinct?   (More)

Levels of analysis

See also: Interlevel relations, Psychological explanation, Explanation in cognitive science, Supervenience, Reduction, Other psychophysical relations.

• Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Personal and subpersonal: A difference without a distinction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a780184915~fulltext=713240930
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Robert French (1996). From chicken squawking to cognition: Levels of description and the computational approach in psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans96from.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/96-Modeling.html
  http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/CRI-CCUB/archives/neurons/PSYBEL/cf3.ps.gz
  http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/CRI-CCUB/archives/matlab/neurons/PSYBEL/cf3.ps.gz
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of description.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T13M4NR482305V32.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1990). Marr's three levels: A re-evaluation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: the _algorithmic_, and the _implementational_; Zenon Pylyshyn (1984) calls them the _semantic_, the _syntactic_, and the _physical_; and textbooks in cognitive psychology sometimes call them the levels of _content_, _form_, and _medium_ (e.g. Glass, Holyoak, and Santa 1979)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U25752J9T525R373.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1991). Marr's three levels: A re-evaluation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Marr's account of the analysis of complex information-processing tasks as having three levels — the levels of computational theory, representation and algorithm, and hardware implementation — is reconsidered. I argue that the notion of level here runs together two distinctive sort of explanatory shifts — that of grain and that of contextual function. I then offer a revision of the account which avoids this problem, and suggest how this might play a role in the practice of theory evaluation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u25752j9t525r373/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U25752J9T525R373.pdf
  
• Allen Newell (1982). The knowledge level.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=162589
  http://www.aaai.org/AITopics/assets/PDF/AIMag02-02-001.pdf
  https://www.aaai.org/aitopics/assets/PDF/AIMag02-02-001.pdf
  http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA106556
  http://cs.uns.edu.ar/~grs/InteligenciaArtificial/Allen Newell - The knowledge level.pdf
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=N8216772AH
  

Philosophy of psychology

See also: Consciousness and psychology, Folk psychology and theory of mind, Psychological laws, Psychological explanation, Philosophy of cognitive science, misc, Propositional attitudes, The science of perception, Aspects of mind.

• James Rowland Angell (1907). The province of functional psychology.   (More)
• Stewart Candlish (online). Testing Wittgenstein's dismissal of experimental psychology against examples.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the most notorious — and dismissive — passages in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is Part II section xiv, which begins like this: The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. Strong words. But we know that at one stage in his life Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology was sufficient for him to have done some experimental research, and that he was well acquainted with the work of at least some of the prominent psychologists active in his own lifetime. That is, his quoted remarks were not made from ignorance; and we should accordingly take them seriously enough to consider why he made them, what he had in mind, and to what extent — if any — they may have been (and, though this was all a long time ago, may still be) justified
• Peter Carruthers (2002). Human creativity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Creative-thinking.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002237/00/Creative-thinking.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2237
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2002/00000053/00000002/art00225
  http://www.bjps.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/225
  http://bjps.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/53/2/225
  
• U. Feest (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001065/00/Feest.doc
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/377379
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/377379
  
• Jerry Fodor (2003). Hume's program (and ours).   (More)
• Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/WhoseConcepts.pdf
  
• Gary Hatfield (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology first came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology finally became scientific through the influence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the first two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively influenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of artificial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogsci.bme.hu/DoCS/oktatas/kurzusok/kogtudtort/Hatfield.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000003/art00196
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00196
  
• Gary Hatfield (1995). Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Inventing Human Science, ed. by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–231. Key words: Wolff, Bonnet, Godart, Krüger, Hartley, Priestley, history of psychology in the 17th and 18th centuries, history of experiment in psychology, psychology as a natural science, idea of a natural science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~hatfield/HatRemakeSciMind.pdf
  
• Anthony Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction.   (More)
• Teed Rockwell (ms). The effects of atomistic ontology on the history of psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.california.com/~mcmf/psych.html
  http://users.california.com/~mcmf/psych.html
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1899). Structural and functional psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189905)8:3<290:SAFP>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189905)8:3<290:SAFP>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2176244.pdf
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809)7:5<449:TPOASP>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809