Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com		All fields Surname Advanced
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Philosophy of cognitive science :: Philosophy of cognitive science, general :: Philosophy of psychology

• James Rowland Angell (1907). The province of functional psychology.   (More)
• Stewart Candlish (online). Testing Wittgenstein's dismissal of experimental psychology against examples.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the most notorious — and dismissive — passages in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is Part II section xiv, which begins like this: The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. Strong words. But we know that at one stage in his life Wittgenstein’s interest in psychology was sufficient for him to have done some experimental research, and that he was well acquainted with the work of at least some of the prominent psychologists active in his own lifetime. That is, his quoted remarks were not made from ignorance; and we should accordingly take them seriously enough to consider why he made them, what he had in mind, and to what extent — if any — they may have been (and, though this was all a long time ago, may still be) justified
• Peter Carruthers (2002). Human creativity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Creative-thinking.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002237/00/Creative-thinking.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2237
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2002/00000053/00000002/art00225
  http://www.bjps.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/225
  http://bjps.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/53/2/225
  
• U. Feest (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001065/00/Feest.doc
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/377379
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/377379
  
• Jerry Fodor (2003). Hume's program (and ours).   (More)
• Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/WhoseConcepts.pdf
  
• Gary Hatfield (2002). Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology first came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology finally became scientific through the influence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the first two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively influenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of artificial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogsci.bme.hu/DoCS/oktatas/kurzusok/kogtudtort/Hatfield.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000003/art00196
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00196
  
• Gary Hatfield (1995). Remaking the science of mind: Psychology as a natural science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Inventing Human Science, ed. by Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 184–231. Key words: Wolff, Bonnet, Godart, Krüger, Hartley, Priestley, history of psychology in the 17th and 18th centuries, history of experiment in psychology, psychology as a natural science, idea of a natural science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~hatfield/HatRemakeSciMind.pdf
  
• Anthony Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction.   (More)
• Teed Rockwell (ms). The effects of atomistic ontology on the history of psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.california.com/~mcmf/psych.html
  http://users.california.com/~mcmf/psych.html
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1899). Structural and functional psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189905)8:3<290:SAFP>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189905)8:3<290:SAFP>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2176244.pdf
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809)7:5<449:TPOASP>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189809)7:5<449:TPOASP>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2177110.pdf
  
• Robert Wilson (2005). Philosophy of psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the most prominent four examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/philofpsych.pdf
  
• Wilhelm Wundt (1969). Outlines of Psychology.   (More)

14 displayed