Other Psychophysical Theories

According to Russellian monism (RM), the quiddities which underlie the fundamental causal structure of the physical world are also responsible for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. This view has been argued to provide an attractive alternative to physicalism and dualism, but it is plagued by the so-called ‘combination problem’ – namely, the problem of explaining how the quiddities underlying the microphysical structure of a macroscopic conscious agent (e.g., a human being) combine together to constitute his or her phenomenal experiences. In (...) this paper, I will explore a type of monism that avoids the combination problem altogether. According to this view – which I shall call panquidditist monism – all causal roles, and not just the fundamental ones, stand in need of quiddities realizing them. Moreover, the quiddities that realize causal roles at one physical level should not in general be seen as grounded in, or otherwise derivative on, the quiddities that realize causal roles at lower levels. Crucial to the tenability of this view is a distinction between two varieties of grounding – one aiming to metaphysically explain the causal properties of various objects ‘from below’ (vertical grounding), the other aiming to metaphysically explaining them ‘from the inside’ (horizontal grounding). I will argue that, thanks to the distinction between vertical and horizontal grounds, panquidditist monism is well-placed to secure the advantages that RM promises – but, because of the combination problem, fails to deliver – vis-à-vis physicalism and dualism. (shrink)

Zero and one is one and two is two and three. Explaining mind, math, and music. The genesis of 'information.' Tokenization in general. Tokenization as the basis for mind, math, and music (information in general).

The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be thatmanyproperties are ever instantiated byoneobject. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the relata-specific bundle theory—the thesis that each (...) instance of compresence has a special intrinsic nature in virtue of which it necessarily bundles its specific bundle-ees—is also a species of Russellian monism, labeled by David Chalmers as ‘constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism’. The upshot of this connection is significant for the metaphysics of the mind-body problem: a credible theory of property instantiation turns out to have a built-in account of how consciousness is grounded in certain (broadly) physical systems. (shrink)

The problem of divine impassibility, i.e., of whether the divine nature in Christ could suffer, stands at the center of a debate regarding the nature of God and his relation to us. Whereas philosophical reasoning regarding the divine nature maintains that the divine is immutable and perfect in every respect, theological needs generated an ever-growing demand for a passionate God truly able to participate in the suffering of his creatures. Correlating with the different approaches of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns (...) Scotus, the paper develops an incarnation model that aims, on the one hand, to solve the dualistic problem between the divine and human natures, and on the other hand to make room for both impassible and passible elements in God, and so to make room within the patristic impassible model for genuine suffering in God. The discussion, though centered around Christ's im/passibility and passions, can easily be modified to approach the body-mind problem since the essence of the problems is the same. (shrink)

It is one of the premises of eliminative materialism that commonsense psychology constitutes a theory. There is agreement that mental states can be construed as posited entities for the explanation and prediction of behavior. Disputes arise when it comes to the range of the commonsense theory of mental states. In chapter one, I review major arguments concerning the span and nature of folk psychology. In chapter two, relying on arguments by Quine and Sellars, I argue that the precise scope of (...) commonsense psychology cannot be determined because there are no resources to distinguish claims that are commonsense from all others. I use this conclusion to evaluate Churchland’s proposal that folk psychology should be eliminated in favor of a scientific theory. I argue that, although such an elimination is possible, it is unnecessary because commonsense psychology is in part informed by scientific theories. The properties that are usually attributed to mental states, on my view, are not common sense and would re-emerge even if we replaced our current theory with a scientific one. In chapter three, I examine how this affects eliminativist arguments, such as Churchland’s proposals for how to solve the emergence of the phenomenal character of sensations. I argue that it might be the case that some phenomenal properties are the result of endorsing a particular theory, but phenomenal character as such is a permanent feature of any theory about internal states. Addressing the problem of the incorrigibility of mental states, in chapter four, I challenge Rorty’s idea that such a property is the mark of the mental and can be attributed to our mental states based on our everyday usage of mental terms. The position asserted in the dissertation is compatible with the view that any theory can be revised, but doubts are expressed concerning the likelihood for a complete replacement of the current folk-psychological theory. Taking inspiration form Sellars, in chapter five, I argue that the establishment of a conceptual framework entails a wholistic jump from no concepts to a rudimentary framework. With this leap some properties are solidified and stand in the way of elimination. (shrink)

This thesis evaluates several powerful arguments that not only deny that brain states and conscious states are one and the same thing, but also claim that such an identity is unintelligible. I argue that these accounts do not undermine physicalism because they don’t provide any direct or independent justification for their tacit assumptions about a link between modes of presentation and explanation. In my view intelligibility of psychophysical identity should not be based exclusively on the analysis of meaning. The main (...) concern then should be why expect that fully intelligible explanation must be based on the descriptions of the causal roles as modes of presentation. To this effect I propose that we examine "psychological concepts". The psychological concepts are concepts that use descriptions of the functional roles but are about qualities of our experiences. I propose to analyze them in quality space models in order to unveil why phenomenal concepts are expected to refer via descriptions of the causal or functional roles. The quality space should be understood here as a multidimensional space consisting of several axes of relative similarity and differences among the structures of ordering in different modalities of conscious experience. On my proposal it is possible that some axes in the quality space consist of their own quality spaces so we could “zoom in” and “zoom out” into the descriptions of the functional roles and see more clearly what the explanation of certain aspects of consciousness looks like when thought of in terms of psychological concepts. (shrink)

The attention schema theory explains how a biological, information processing machine can claim to have consciousness, and how, by introspection (by assessing its internal data), it cannot determine that it is a machine whose claims are based on computations. The theory directly addresses Chalmers' meta-problem of consciousness, the problem of why we think we have a difficult-to-explain consciousness in the first place.

We view the mind-body problem in terms of the two interconnected problems of phenomenal consciousness and mental causation, namely, how subjective conscious experience can arise from physical neurological processes and how conscious mental states can causally act upon the physical world. In order to address these problems, I develop here a non-physicalist framework that combines two apparently antithetical views: the materialist view of the mind as a product of the brain and the metaphysical view of consciousness rooted in an underlying (...) hidden reality. I discuss how this framework resolves the problem of mental causation while being simultaneously consistent with fundamental physical principles. I will elucidate how the framework ties in to the perspective of 'meaning' that acts as the bridge between physical neurological processes and the conscious mind. Moreover, we will see how both our awareness of the self and our representation of the external world are connected to this perspective. (shrink)

Max Weber's famous phrase the 'the disenchantment of the world' has been a catalyst for scholars from a wide array of disciplines to consider what humankind might have lost as modernity's rationality and intellectualism extinguished any widespread belief in magic, spirits, and gods. A review of these works shows that, despite Weber's pessimism, there is ample evidence of continued forms of enchantment in modernity as well as many viable strategies for reenchantment. However, while Weber's statements seemed to be centred on (...) enchantments deriving from belief in metaphysical worlds and beings, the forms of enchantment found to be compatible with modernity are based in wonder. This paper asks if a metaphysicsbased form of enchantment can be compatible with modernity. I then argue that phenomenal consciousness is a modern mystery that can serve as the metaphysical foundation for a new form of enchantment that I call fascination. (shrink)

Neurophenomenology is intended to be a remedy for the hard problem of consciousness. There are, however, serious doubts as to whether it addresses the hard problem per se or is merely meant as a way for a more practical marriage between the domain of experience and neuroscience. If the latter is true, closing the gap would, at best, result in developing better models of phenomenality and better models of neuronal activity. The technology of neurofeedback, which helps subjects to selfregulate their (...) own neural activation, is considered as a pragmatic tool to overcome some of the obstacles being faced by neurophenomenology. In this epistemological and methodological context, our aim in this paper is to discuss whether the neurofeedback paradigm can help to close the explanatory gap. In the face of doubts concerning the issue we also propose analysing NFB in terms of personal neuroscience as another perspective for linking mental and neural events. (shrink)

Standard physicalism is repudiated by Susan Schneider on the grounds that the science of physics at physicalism's foundation is individuated by mathematics, revealing that science is abstract rather than concrete. She seeks to remedy the situation for physics, though not for physicalism, with a panprotopsychist variant of panpyschism. Her approach is clever and well-developed, but I believe it suffers from at least two flaws. First, with few exceptions individuation is the wrong tool for the discovery of a thing's nature; second, (...) panpsychism and its proto variant have problems no less worrisome than those attributed to standard physicalism. Moreover, once developed it is questionable whether a surviving panpsychism is distinct from a less troubled emergentism. (shrink)

I argue that the hard problem of consciousness should be viewed from the perspective of the philosophy of science. In this context, the hard problem can be reformulated as a serious anomaly for the currently dominating research programme in the cognitive neurosciences. I cite empirical evidence from dream research to argue that for this research programme, consciousness is a phenomenon located inside the brain, but for whose constitution no plausible underlying constitutive mechanisms can at the moment be pointed out. Evidence (...) from dream research demonstrates the anomaly in a particularly clear and challenging form, and the empirical facts of dreaming also demonstrate that externalist, embodied, and enactive explanations of consciousness will not be able to solve the problem. (shrink)

Many scholars interpret the close correlation between neuronal and mental phenomena as causal in nature --with physiological events producing psychological states and processes. This interpretation is suggestive but by no means the most parsimonious or logically sound account and there is an increasing number of challenges to this view. The current article discusses these, briefly reviews alternative accounts and elaborates on one such alternative account in particular. Proposed already a century ago, we take it up here because we consider it (...) to have significant promise. We develop it into a new metaphor that we hope will prove useful in informing our understanding of --and approach to --the mind-body problem. (shrink)

The nature of consciousness continues to intrigue psychologists. Although much understanding has been progressed within the past few decades, psychological notions of consciousness continue to be based on a materialist reductionist model, which implies conscious processes are a function of neurological processes occurring in the brain. Yet, increased attention and empirical investigation of neardeath experiences poses challenges to this materialist reductionist position, and suggests consciousness may not be reliant on functioning neurological processes. This article will review the current state of (...) knowledge about NDEs, and discuss some challenges they pose to materialist reductionist models of consciousness. It will conclude by suggesting acknowledgment and acceptance of NDEs as valid phenomena worthy of advanced empirical investigation, presents an opportunity for the discipline of psychology to significantly contribute to ongoing debates about the nature of consciousness. (shrink)

I shall explore in this article the hypothesis that structures are relations between the components of complex entities. After having introduced hylomorphism, its major advantages and the major views of the nature of structures, I shall introduce the distinctions between external and internal relations and the one between symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. I shall also describe the theory of non-symmetrical relations that I accept, i.e., the O-Roles theory, as most structures seem to be external and non-symmetrical relations. Later on, I (...) shall develop my hypothesis and I shall deal with one objection, i.e., that relations necessarily come together with Bradley's vicious regress. Finally, I shall also hypothesize that complex entities are different from structures and from their structured components. In this respect, I shall defend a " simple view " of complex entities. Dwelling on this view, I shall also reply to some recent objections against hylomorphism. (shrink)

Based on the Aristotelian dynamis-energeia-differentiation, a concept issuing dynamic coherence providers as the sub-level of individual realizations. This logical sub-level is given for any kind of realizations. Based on this two-level approach, to some degree similar to the two-level approach developed by Polanyi, model of biopsychosocial interaction is established. It is suggested as the theoretical basis for a person-centered approach in healthcare, integrating science and humanitites.

About a century ago, Ernst Mach argued that Archimedes’s deduction of the principle of the lever is invalid, since its premises contain the conclusion to be demonstrated. Subsequently, many scholars defended Archimedes, mostly on historical grounds, by raising objections to Mach’s reconstruction of Archimedes’s deduction. In the debate, the Italian philosopher and historian of science Giovanni Vailati stood out. Vailati responded to Mach with an analysis of Archimedes’s deduction which was later quoted and praised by Mach himself. In this paper, (...) my objective is to show that the debate can be further advanced, as Mach indicated, by reframing it in terms of the empirical vs. the logical dimensions of mechanics. In this way, I will suggest, the debate about Archimedes’s deduction can be resolved in Mach’s favour.Keywords: Equilibrium; Experience; Thought experiment; Archimedes; Ernst Mach; Giovanni Vailati. (shrink)

Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.

For those of us who are sympathetic to the research program of cognitive science, it is especially useful to face the deepest and sharpest critic of that program. Charles Taylor, who defines himself as a ‘hedgehog’ whose ‘single rather tightly related agenda’ fits into a very ancient and rather elusive debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism, may well be that critic. My ambition in this paper is to distill Taylor’s central objection to the cognitive science approach to agency and the self (...) as it is expressed throughout Human Agency and Language. After trying to set out the core of this objection, I want to remark on some rather curious aspects of the dispute of which it is a part, and then sketch, in relation to one or two examples, what I take to be the most promising line of resistance to Taylor’s attack. I conclude with a proposal as to how Taylor may – narrowly – escape one logical consequence of his position, according to which he should stop knocking the cognitive science program and instead go to work building a robot. (shrink)

partial review of Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False is used to articulate some systems-theoretic ideas about the challenge of understanding subjective experience. The article accepts Nagel’s view that reductionist materialism fails as an approach to this challenge, but argues that seeking an explanation of mind based on emergence is more plausible than seeking one based on pan-psychism, which Nagel favors. However, the article proposes something similar to Nagel’s neutral (...) monism by positing a hierarchy of information processes that spans the domains of matter, life, and mind. As depicted in this hierarchy, subjective experience is emergent, but also continuous with informational phenomena at lower levels. (shrink)

Weak panpsychism, the view that mindlike qualities are wide-spread in nature, has recently been argued for by the prominent ecofeminist Val Plumwood and has been used by her to ground an ethic of respect for nature. This ethic advocates a principle of respect for difference, the rejection of moral hierarchy and the inclusion of plants, mountains, rivers and ecosystems within the moral community. I argue that weak panpsychism cannot, convincingly, justify the rejection of moral hierarchy, as it is compatible with (...) it. Also the intentional criterion of mind, employed by weak panpsychism, which includes teleology, has the counter-intuitive implication of giving machines moral status. I cast doubt on the claims that (i) intentionality is a necessary condition for moral status and that (ii) it is sufficient for the ascription of agency. It is suggested that any account of intentionality that allows it to be predicated of mountains, rivers etc. would be widely, and correctly regarded as a reduction of that account. Finally an aesthetic reinterpretation of weak panpsychism is offered. (shrink)

The 1880s marked a fundamental change in Finnish academic philosophy as well as in Finnish intellectual life as a whole, for German Idealism, which had dominated the scholarly community, had to give way to a critical-empirical approach. The younger generation took the natural sciences as a model for the humanities, insisting on quantitative methods, repeated experiments and statistically proven laws. At the same time, they took part in a more general ideological discussion, raised by Darwinism, about the possibility of explaining (...) everything in nature and in the human being scientifically. As the Finnish botanist Fredrik Elfving stated in his polemical article in 1884, he and his contemporaries were witnessing an intellectual upheaval, comparable to the breakthrough of the Copernican system. This would finally put an end to all fallacies originating in the naïve childhood of humankind.2 In this program aimed at the elimination of all superfluous and metaphysical assumptions, the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach was used as an authority.3 In Finland, Mach's ideas were favorably received in 1889 at the latest by Hjalmar Neiglick , the Finnish pioneer of experimental psychology and psychophysical research, who had made his doctoral dissertation in 1887 in Leipzig at Wilhelm Wundt's first psychological laboratory in the world. In Finnish academic philosophy, Neiglick was the leading advocate of “eine Psychologie ohne Seele.”4 In this profoundly anti-metaphysical approach, he used Mach's Bei-träge zur Analyse der Empfindungen to defend his thesis that all abstract concepts as well as concrete ideas and recollections had to have a certain sensual correlate to occur and to be reproduced.5 His early death from typhoid in 1889, however, tragically broke off his promising career, and his reference to Mach was left without further explication. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : Alfred Fouillee's doctrine of ideas-forces approximates historically and intellectually William James’s theory of will. But Fouillee's criticism of pragmatism also has connections with Pierce's emphasis on the real and the analysis of concepts, and shows an influence of tychism approaching mysticism. -/- .

Since his death in 1942, Robert Musil has come to be recognized as one of the most significant novelists of this century. His masterpiece, the monumental and unfinished Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, presents in its merciless mirror not only the decaying culture of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the outbreak of the First World War, but also our own spiritual culture, perilously close to a far more complete destruction. One can only be grateful for this translation of the dissertation which the (...) young Musil, having left engineering for philosophy, wrote in Berlin, where he had become a student of the celebrated Carl Stumpf. A warning, however, is in order. Those expecting connections between the mature work of the novelist and this careful examination of the theories of Ernst Mach may well be disappointed. This is the rather academic work of a gifted, sober, and disciplined young philosopher, who is careful not to exceed the limits that he has set himself in this study: to provide an immanent critique of Mach's theories. (shrink)

A translation of the earlier books of Galen's On Anatomical Procedures, extant in the original Greek text, was published by Charles Singer in 1956. The remainder, surviving in an Arabic translation, is here presented in a handsomely published English translation. A welcome supplement to the meagre Loch Galen.--R. W.

A new constructivist approach to modeling in economics and theory of consciousness is proposed. The state of elementary object is defined as a set of its measurable consumer properties. A proprietor's refusal or consent for the offered transaction is considered as a result of elementary economic measurement. We were also able to obtain the classical interpretation of the quantum-mechanical law of addition of probabilities by introducing a number of new notions. The principle of “local equity” assumes the transaction completed (regardless (...) of the result) of the states of transaction partners are not changed in connection with the reception of new information on proposed offers or adopted decisions (consent or refusal of the transaction). However it has no relation to the paradoxes of quantum theory connected with non-local interaction of entangled states. In the economic systems the mechanism of entangling has a classical interpretation, while the quantum-mechanical formalism of the description of states appears as a result of idealization of the selection mechanism in the proprietor's consciousness. (shrink)

Many philosophical and scientific discussions of topics of mind-matter research make implicit assumptions, in various guises, about the distinction between mind and matter. Currently predominant positions are based on either reduction or emergence, providing either monistic or dualistic scenarios. A more-involved framework of thinking, which can be traced back to Spinoza and Leibniz, combines the two scenarios, dualistic (with mind and matter separated) and monistic (with mind and matter unseparated), in one single picture. Based on such a picture, the transition (...) from a domain with mind and matter unseparated to separate mental and material domains can be viewed as a result of a general kind of symmetry breaking, which can be described formally in terms of inequivalent representations. The possibility of whether this symmetry breaking might be connected to the emergence of temporal directions from temporally non-directed or even non-temporal levels of reality will be discussed. Correlations between mental and material aspects of reality could then be imagined as remnants of such primordial levels. Different conceivable types of inequivalent representations would lead to correlations with different characteristics. (shrink)

A perennial criticism of analytic philosophy is that it fails to engage with our deepest and most basic human concerns, and has thereby rendered itself irrelevant to the larger culture. In my own thinking about philosophy, I am inclined to dismiss this criticism; after all, different philosophers will find different issues to be interesting and important and will philosophize accordingly; surely it is not the philosopher's job to indulge a corrupted culture by anticipating what it will judge to be important. (...) And yet, a feeling of uneasiness remains; something about the criticism strikes a nerve, although I have difficulty articulating what exactly it is about analytic philosophy that is supposed to be problematic here. Now I know: what a good deal of analytic philosophy is missing is precisely what is not missing from Galen Strawson's work, as demonstrated in his remarkable Real Materialism and Other Essays, a collection of his previously published papers. These papers cover a wide variety of topics and issues, but what remains constant is the sense that something important is always at stake; it matters how these philosophical issues get resolved. This is truly philosophy that matters, but it is also analytic philosophy, and so it refutes the canard that there is something about the very nature of analytic philosophy that ensures its societal irrelevancy.I think an important source of the relevance of Strawson's work is that he so often engages with ‘common-sense views of the world’ , views that are part of what he sometimes calls ‘ordinary thought’ . Moreover, he engages with them in such a way that …. (shrink)

Mind is not some mysterious mind stuff; no such stuff exists and the universe comprises only physical matter. It is an emergent property of certain complex material entities, not brains alone but whole human beings living and coping in the physical and social world. This thesis involves three ideas: materialism, emergent properties, and intentionality. The first two belong to the mind-body problem and the status of mental properties in the material universe. The third refers to the mind-world relation, the symbiotic (...) relation between subject and object in cognition and experience. (shrink)

Carington kindly placed at my disposal, because they seem to me to illustrate some of the main themes of this book.