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Intentionality :: Propositional attitudes :: Eliminativism

• Radu Bogdan (1988). Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2215709.pdf
  
• Paul Churchland (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://roderik.net/eleminative_materialism_and_the_propistional_attitudes_referaat.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgp9YRNqZ&sig=eJdXbqbW5t_vo350wilSUd0_lz8
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=CHUEMA&free=1&u=http://roderik.net/eleminative_materialism_and_the_propistional_attitudes_referaat.pdf
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=CHUEMA&free=1&u=http://roderik.net/eleminative_materialism_and_the_propistional_attitudes_referaat.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s2lR0v1t&sig=RHtr3OySoLXzFSDMj10f5P3V9m8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s3nS_D3w&sig=OwOsHWYNvyiZEcuOda7V0nBWbXs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgo7XTFoW&sig=MFxsa6zCml4Ey1eCIQKm9HMwzOs
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2025900.pdf
  
• John Haldane (1988). Understanding folk.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7KU-NskafwEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA263&ots=jY36MaKFsR&sig=1TbQyeHOm8XxZGjpKhjnZCkGRRk
  
• David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such
• David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?: Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism.   (More)
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). In defense of folk psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m40hm4h677j5060j/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M40HM4H677J5060J.pdf
  
• William Lycan (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m5pxXK-lTtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA197&dq=A+particularly+compelling+refutation+of+eliminative+materialism+Lycan&ots=d50rE4oMDi&sig=Aq4a3zO2JqofZwbBbI17TA0SU-U
  
• Herman Philipse (1998). Shifting position?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199812)58:4<885:SP>2.0.CO;2-G
  
• Herman Philipse (1997). The end of plasticity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://dspace.library.uu.nl:8443/handle/1874/6802?mode=simple
  http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/ph/2005-0622-184535/UUindex.html
  
• Michael Pitman (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211&layout=abstract
  
• Teed Rockwell (1995). Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/379/0/BeyondEM.html
  http://cogprints.org/379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://www.california.com/~mcmf/beyondem.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:379
  
• A. Rosenberg (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible?   (More)
• Stephen Stich (1996). Deconstructing the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&se=gglsc&d=24264184
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/stich.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4paASjopW&sig=3pdNae-SMCd8Vz1nRKlJE_Pg9Ck
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4odCLhqgV&sig=5gmeXMWVhMI5N79AYF4mYvKUSS0
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/533330/1999
  
• William Tait (2002). The myth of the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called ‘the mind’. But I do mean to call into question appeals to it in analyzing cognitive notions such as understanding and knowing, where its domain is taken to be independent of what one might find out in cognitive science. In this respect, I am expressing the skepticism of Sellars in “Empiricism and the philosophy of mind” [1956], where he explodes, not only the ‘Myth of the Given’, but also, as part of that myth, theorizing about thoughts, intentions and the like, where such theorizing is regarded as something more than a nascent cognitive science, in which such entities enter as theoretical entities, in aid of accounting for our cognitive abilities. The myth is that these entities present themselves in consciousness, available to us by introspection—and, perhaps, a priori reasoning
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~wwtx/mythofthemind.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/7g4mal8ffqbqg6vr/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/7G4MAL8FFQBQG6VR.pdf
  
• Jonathan Waskan (2003). Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism.   (More)

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