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Intentionality :: Propositional attitudes :: Propositional attitudes, general
See also: Folk psychology and theory of mind, The language of thought, The intentional stance, Eliminativism, Beliefs, Desires, Thinking, Internalism and externalism, The status of intentionality.(EQ) If cognition is computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?This question has been haunting people working in the field since the publication of a paper by Stich in 1978 in which he gave his celebrated ââautonomy argumentââ. Then, as everybody knows, came Fodorâs notorious ââMethodological Solipsismââ in 1980, in which he argued for the formality condition: namely, thought processes are causal sequences of symbol tokenings in oneâs language of thought (LOT), and the causal processes are sensitive only to the syntactic/formal properties of its symbols. Hence, he argued against what he called a âânaturalistic psychology,ââ i.e. a psychology whose laws essentially advert to broad semantic properties of mental states they cover. The alternative, rationalist psychology, according to Fodor, was to advert only to formal characteristics of symbols, of which Fodor conceived as narrow computational roles of LOT symbols
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