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Intentionality :: Internalism and externalism :: The status of narrow content

• Louise Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/OnFodor.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00010
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00082.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00056
  
• Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/widenarr.html
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Content by courtesy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027158.pdf
  
• Ned Block (1995). Ruritania revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1523040.pdf
  
• Joao Branquinho (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:401
  
• David Braun (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Naive Russellianism entails that substitution of co-referring names in a sentence preserves the proposition expressed. Many philosophers have objected to Naive Russellianism for reasons having to do with cognitive significance and attitude ascriptions. This paper presents Naive Russellian replies to these objections; the replies appeal to different ways of believing a single proposition. This paper also criticizes Naive Russellian replies that either appeal to pragmatics or deny the existence of ways of believing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/cogsig.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000108/F0020001/00403549
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ab2auf89b269d9kj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=403549&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/AB2AUF89B269D9KJ.pdf
  
• Curtis Brown (1993). Belief states and narrow content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00290.x
  
• David Chalmers (2002). The components of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/321/
  http://consc.net/papers/content.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/393071.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers95components.html
  http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/pub/chalmers.content.ps
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/content.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/21/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000321/00/content.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:321
  
• David Chalmers (2003). The nature of narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/narrow.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showEnhancedAbstract&doi=10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00004/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics.   (More)
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.sfs.nphil.uni-tuebingen.de/Alumni/Dissertationen/ullidiss/en_index.html
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures—or think of the rationale behind house-to-house searches by the police. I will focus on belief but our discussion is intended to apply mutatis mutandis to the other intentional states
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy/staff/Narrow content.pdf
  http://phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/jackson/FJ Narrow content.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0065-972X(200311)77:2<55:NCAROT>2.0.CO;2-Q
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content “is not real content.” On the account I offer, a concept’s narrow content consists in its bearing the right relation to the right sort of response-dependent property
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00345.x
  
• Joe Lau (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
• Ernest LePore & Barry Loewer (1989). Dual aspect semantics.   (More)
• Kirk Ludwig (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kludwig/web/users/kludwig/Abstracts/Abstract for Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216113.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person’s concepts depends in part on their socio-linguistic environment. The argument of that paper centered around the example of a subject, now often called ‘Alf’, who does not know that by definition ‘arthritis’ applies only to conditions of the joints. We are to imagine that Alf has many typical, mundane beliefs about arthritis: he believes that arthritis is a painful condition, that he himself has suffered from arthritis for years, that his arthritis in his wrist and fingers is worse than his arthritis in his ankles, and so on. One day he wakes up with a new pain and fears that his arthritis has spread to his thigh. On a twin earth, the term ‘arthritis’ is used more liberally than it is here, and applies to various rheumatoid conditions of bones and other sorts of tissue, and indeed is true of the condition that Alf has in his thigh. Twin Alf, being an inhabitant of this twin earth, has no concept of arthritis and so does not believe that his arthritis has spread to his thigh
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/staff/cognitivecontent.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (More)
• Timothy Williamson (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00125
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00125
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<389:TBOTMS>2.0.CO;2-Q
  

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