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  1. Husserl on Other Minds.Philip J. Walsh - 2021 - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 257-268.
    Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...)
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  2. Peter Browne on the Metaphysics of Knowledge.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2020 - In Kenneth L. Pearce & Takaharu Oda (eds.), Irish Philosophy in the Age of Berkeley: Volume 88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 215-237.
    The central unifying element in the philosophy of Peter Browne (d. 1735) is his theory of analogy. Although Browne's theory was originally developed to deal with some problems about religious language, Browne regards analogy as a general purpose cognitive mechanism whereby we substitute an idea we have to stand for an object of which we, strictly speaking, have no idea. According to Browne, all of our ideas are ideas of sense, and ideas of sense are ideas of material things. Hence (...)
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  3. Three problems of other minds.Chad Engelland - 2019 - Think 18 (51):63-75.
    The traditional problem of other minds is epistemological. What justification can be given for thinking that the world is populated with other minds? More recently, some philosophers have argued for a second problem of other minds that is conceptual. How can we conceive of the point of view of another mind in relation to our own? This article retraces the logic of the epistemological and conceptual problems, and it argues for a third problem of other minds. This is the phenomenological (...)
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  4. Science and Religion as Languages: Understanding the Science–Religion Relationship Using Metaphors, Analogies, and Models.Amy H. Lee - 2019 - Zygon 54 (4):880-908.
    Many scholars often use the terms “metaphors,” “analogies,” and “models” interchangeably and inadvertently overlook the uniqueness of each word. According to recent cognitive studies, the three terms involve distinct cognitive processes using features from a familiar concept and applying them to an abstract, complicated concept. In the field of science and religion, there have been various objects or ideas used as metaphors, analogies, or models to describe the science–religion relationship. Although these heuristic tools provided some understanding of the complex interaction, (...)
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  5. Gödel, Searle, and the Computational Theory of the Mind.Marco Buzzoni - 2018 - In Alessandro Giordani & Ciro de Florio (eds.), From Arithmetic to Metaphysics: A Path Through Philosophical Logic. De Gruyter. pp. 41-60.
    Marco Buzzoni Gödel, Searle, and the Computational Theory of the (Other) Mind According to Sergio Galvan, some of the arguments offered by Lucas and Penrose are somewhat obscure or even logically invalid, but he accepts their fundamental idea that a human mind does not work as a computational machine. His main point is that there is a qualitative difference between the principles of the logic of provability and those of the logic of evidence and belief. To evaluate this suggestion, I (...)
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  6. Two analogy strategies: the cases of mind metaphors and introspection.Eugen Fischer - 2018 - Connection Science 30 (2):211-243.
    Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies: In problem-solving, it employs analogy-maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner & Markman 1997); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden 2015). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on ‘mind’-metaphors from ordinary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in (...)
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  7. Arguments of statutory interpretation and argumentation schemes.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2017 - International Journal of Legal Discourse 1 (21):47–83.
    In this paper it is shown how certain defeasible argumentation schemes can be used to represent the logical structure of the most common types of argument used for statutory interpretation both in civil and common law. The method is based on an argumentation structure in which the conclusion, namely, the meaning attributed to a legal source, is modeled as a claim that needs that is be supported by pro and con defeasible arguments. The defeasible nature of each scheme is shown (...)
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  8. Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine.Chad Engelland - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):25-48.
    This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life, that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates our own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us (...)
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  9. A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Theodore Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  10. The Force of Sympathy in the Ethics of David Hume.Lorenzo Greco - 2012 - In Lorenzo Greco & Alessio Vaccari (eds.), Hume Readings. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 193-210.
  11. Structure-mapping: Directions from simulation to theory.Theodore Bach - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to understand simulation (...)
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  12. « Dousir » et « plaileur » l'énigme de l'attribution d'expériences.Alexandre Billon - 2010 - Philosophie 105 (2):64-90.
    Cet article aborde le problème de la justification des attributions d'expérience à autrui (problem of other minds). Je compare ce problème à d'autres problèmes sceptiques contemporains dus à Nelson Goodman et Saoül Kripke et je montre qu'il constitue un défi plus pressant et auquel il est plus difficile de répondre de manière modeste. Je propose une solution radicale à ce problème, qui repose sur l'idée, avérée empiriquement, selon laquelle nous disposons de deux formes d'empathie distinctes pour accéder à autrui. Très (...)
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  13. Something-we-know-not-what, something-we-know-not-why: Berkeley, meaning and minds.Melissa Frankel - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  14. David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds.Anik Waldow - 2009 - Continuum.
    The problem of other minds has widely been considered as a special problem within the debate about scepticism. If one cannot be sure that there is a world existing independently of one's mind, how can we be sure that there are minds - minds which we cannot even experience the way we experience material objects? This book shows, through a detailed examination of David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, that these concerns are unfounded. By focusing on Hume's discussion of (...)
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  15. Other Minds and the Argument From Analogy1.Stephen Prior - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (4):12-33.
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  16. Analogía, prudencia y abducción en la racionalidad interpretativa.María G. Navarro - 2006 - In Mauricio Beuchot (ed.), Contextos de la hermenéutica analógica. Editorial Torres Asociados.
  17. Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Karsten Stueber - 2006 - Bradford.
    In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis.Empathy, (...)
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  18. A defense of mill on other minds.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  19. Other Minds.Anita Avramides - 2000 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter.
    How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part of the (...)
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  20. Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy.Jane Heal - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):1-19.
  21. Review of Alex Hyslop's "Other Minds". [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):383-384.
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  22. The range principle and the problem of other minds.Paul Sagal & Gunnar Borg - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):477-91.
  23. Analogy.Todd Davies - 1985 - In CSLI Informal Notes Series, IN-CSLI-4. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    This essay (a revised version of my undergraduate honors thesis at Stanford) constructs a theory of analogy as it applies to argumentation and reasoning, especially as used in fields such as philosophy and law. The word analogy has been used in different senses, which the essay defines. The theory developed herein applies to analogia rationis, or analogical reasoning. Building on the framework of situation theory, a type of logical relation called determination is defined. This determination relation solves a puzzle about (...)
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  24. Frames of Mind: Constraints on the Common-sense Conception of the Mental.Adam Morton - 1980 - Oxford University Press USA.
    I argue that general constraints on how humans think about humans produce universal features of the concept of mind. Some of these constraints determine how we imagine other people's thinking and action through our own. I formulate this in opposition to what I call the "theory theory". I believe this was the first use of this terminology, and this work was an early version of what has come to be called the simulation theory.
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  25. Plantinga and other minds.Karl Ameriks - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):285-91.
    Alvin plantinga has presented various counterexamples to the argument from analogy for other minds. I argue that the implausibility of the counterexample inferences plantinga offers depends not on a weakness essential to the analogical argument but rather on features peculiar to the inferences he provides. My procedure is to establish a number of necessary conditions for any acceptable analogical argument and then to show plantinga's counterexamples fail to meet these conditions. I then construct an analogical argument for other minds which (...)
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  26. Analogy and the concept of behaviour.Thomas Wheaton Bestor - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):3-20.
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  27. The argument from analogy is not an argument for other mnds.Richard I. Sikora - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):137-41.
    If the argument from analogy is an argument for other minds it must rely on a single case, The correlation of your mind with your body. If instead it only attempts to show that certain sorts of experiences are associated with other bodies, It can rely on innumerable correlations of your experiences with your behavior. Having determined in this way that ostensive memories are associated with another body and that they are the kind one would expect if one mind had (...)
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  28. Analogy, induction and other minds.Theodore W. Budlong - 1975 - Analysis 35 (January):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  29. A reply to Don Locke.Alec Hyslop - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.
  30. Other Minds. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1975 - Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):190-192.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said to understand (...)
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  31. The analogical argument for knowledge of other minds reconsidered.Thomas M. Olshewsky - 1974 - American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1):63-69.
  32. God, Other Minds, and the Inference to the Best Explanation.Philip A. Ostien - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149 - 162.
    Professor Plantinga's “scandalous” conclusion thatIf my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latterrests in part on the twin claims that the best reason we have for belief in other minds is the analogical argument, and the best reason we have for belief in God is the teleological argument. The conclusion also rests on Plantinga's analyses of these two arguments, which show that both fail for (...)
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  33. Just what is wrong with the argument from analogy?Don Locke - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):153-56.
    A reply to hyslop and jackson, American philosophical quarterly, April 1972: I argue that the argument form analogy begs the question, Much as does the inductive justification of induction, Of which it is a version.
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  34. A note on Hampshire's analogy.Jules Belford - 1972 - Mind 81 (October):600.
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  35. The analogical inference to other minds.Alec Hyslop & Frank Jackson - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):168-76.
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  36. Analogy, verification, and other minds.J. W. Meiland - 1966 - Mind 75 (October):564-568.
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  37. Evidential necessity and other minds.Anne H. Narveson - 1966 - Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  38. Comment on Paul Ziff's The Simplicity of Other Minds.Alvin Plantinga - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):585-586.
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  39. Criteria, Analogy, and Knowledge of Other Minds.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (20):533 - 546.
  40. The problem of other minds.Bruce Aune - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (July):320-339.
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  41. Other minds and the egocentric predicament.Herbert Feigl - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56:980-87.
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  42. Three problems about other minds.W. W. Mellor - 1956 - Mind 65 (April):200-217.
  43. Mr Hampshire on the analogy of feeling.Erik Gotlind - 1954 - Mind 63 (October):519-524.
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  44. The analogy of feeling.Stuart N. Hampshire - 1952 - Mind 61 (January):1-12.
    In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to (...)
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  45. Hampshire's analogy.Richard Wollheim - 1952 - Mind 61 (October):567-573.
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  46. Other people's experiences.Peter Alexander - 1951 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51:25-46.
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  47. The argument from analogy and the problem of other minds.James F. Thomson - 1951 - Mind 60:336-50.
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  48. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.
    How do we know what we "know"? How did we –as individuals and as a society – come to accept certain knowledge as fact? In _Human Knowledge,_ Bertrand Russell questions the reliability of our assumptions on knowledge. This brilliant and controversial work investigates the relationship between ‘individual’ and ‘scientific’ knowledge. First published in 1948, this provocative work contributed significantly to an explosive intellectual discourse that continues to this day.
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  49. Analogy.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - In Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London and New York: Routledge.
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  50. Professor Ayer's query on 'other minds'.C. D. Rollins - 1947 - Analysis 8 (June):87-92.
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