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Intentionality :: Theories of content :: Asymmetric dependence

• Frederick Adams (online). Fodor's asymmetrical causal dependency theory of meaning.   (More)
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a causal theory of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214267.pdf
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). On a causal theory of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214267.pdf
  
• Mark Bickhard (1998). A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/processemerg.html
  
• Carl Gillett (2006). Samuel Alexander's emergentism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000153/00000002/00005470
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/3215N21P7746R538.pdf
  
• Joseph Mendola (2003). A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter “AD accounts”, hold 1) that (a) any nomic relations which obtain between, on the one hand, a mental representation and, on the other hand, various causes and possible causes of that representation which are not its content, are dependent on (b) a nomic relation between that representation and its content, but 2) that the latter nomic relation is not dependent on any of the former relations. This paper argues that AD accounts are false
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2003/00000037/00000002/art00003
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  
• Erik Myin (1993). Some problems for Fodor's theory of content.   (More)
• Steve Palmquist (1992). Unknown.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At what stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network of pulsating neurons as a “thought”? At what point does an accumula­tion of insightful thoughts deserve to be called a “new idea”? To what depth and breadth must a particular person’s ideas and other creative works extend before he or she comes to be recognized as “great”? Such questions, despite their apparent diversity, are all instances of the same underlying question: How is it possible to discern when (i.e., at what point in its historical development) an “emerging” property becomes what it can be observed to be, once it has fully emerged? This question has wide-ranging implications not only for science and the philosophy of science, but also for disciplines as diverse as logic, history, and even theology. Answering such an ambitious question in the limited space of a single essay will be impossible without strictly narrowing the scope of our discussion through several limiting assumptions

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