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Intentionality :: Theories of content :: Conceptual role approaches

• Ned Block (1998). Conceptual Role Semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed to are not just actual, but also counterfactual: not only what effects a thought does have, but what effects it would have had if stimuli or other states had differed. The view has arisen separately in philosophy (where it is sometimes called "inferential," or "functional" role semantics) and in cognitive science (where it is sometimes called "procedural semantics"). The source of the view is Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars, but the source in contemporary philosophy is a series of papers by Harman (see his 1987) and Field (1977). Other proponents in philosophy have included Block, Horwich, Loar, McGinn and Peacocke (1992). In cognitive science, they include Woods (1981) and Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976). (See references in Block, 1987.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ConceptualRoleSemantics.html
  
• Robert Brandom (1994). Reasoning and representing.   (More)
• Ingo Brigandt (2004). Conceptual role semantics, the theory theory, and conceptual change.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change—both for the explanation of individual cognitive development and for the study of conceptual change in science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=930
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt/SPP_ESPP.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3576/1/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003576/
  http://cogprints.org/3576/01/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003576/01/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3576
  
• J. L. Dowell (2006). Making it totally explicit.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28213&layout=abstract
  
• Jerry Fodor & Ernest LePore (1991). Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression in one or another natural language; for example, they try to figure out how the temperature could be rising compatibly with the substitutivity of identicals. The philosophers, by contrast, keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what's the relation between sense and denotation; what's the relation between thought and language; whether translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain. Every now and then the philosophers and the semanticists are supposed to get together and compare notes on their respective progress. Or lack thereof
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/pub/papers/WhyMeaning.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/lepore/WhyMeaning.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1991.tb00260.x
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)3<15:WM(ICR>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)3<15:WM(ICR>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522936.pdf
  
• Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman (ms). Conceptual role semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one’s understanding of aspects of one’s own concepts consists in knowing how to use one’s symbols and being at ease with that use. Understanding expressions in other systems may involve interpreting or translating those expressions into corresponding symbols of one’s own system. Many different aspects of the way symbols are used are relevant to their meaning or content. There seem to be three main categories of uses, having to do with perceptual input, internal thinking, and output in action. Information-based or indication theories that attempt to rely only on perceptual input face difficulties that put pressure on them to rely on other aspects of conceptual role. Worries about CRS include possible circularity, how to respond to Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, and whether there are facts about conceptual role. Whether these worries can be satisfactorily addressed is a matter of current debate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/CRS.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-16
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-16/
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=800187
  
• Gilbert Harman (1982). Conceptual role semantics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/euclid.ndjfl/1093883628
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093883628&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Gilbert Harman (1987). (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/22848/1999/00000001/00000001/art00016
  
• Steven Horst (ms). Goldilocks searches for a conceptual semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a relatively breezy version of an exploration of some issues about how to provide a theory of concepts and conceptual semantics. I have also written more conventional versions of some of this material (without the Three Bears motif), though those are set in a broader context. “Logical and Psychological Views of Semantics” addresses these issues in the context of arguing that semantics can be approached from a psychological side that ought not to be “logicized” much as Frege argued that logic ought not be psychologized. “Concepts and Biology: How (not) to give a theory of concepts” devotes more time to a sketch of what the history of protoconcepts across phyla might look like, and deals with material cognate with this article in an introductory section which identifies several problems with previous approaches to concepts
• Mark Eli Kalderon (2001). Reasoning and representing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://markelikalderon.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/rr.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000105/00000002/00333698
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u5286534982v0317/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=333698&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U5286534982V0317.pdf
  
• Daniel Laurier (2005). Pragmatics, pittsburgh style.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2005/00000013/00000001/art00010
  
• Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual role and truth conditions.   (More)
• Barry Loewer (1982). The role of 'conceptual role semantics'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://projecteuclid.org/Dienst/Repository/1.0/Disseminate/euclid.ndjfl/1093870090/body/pdf
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/Dienst/Repository/1.0/Disseminate/euclid.ndjfl/1093870090/body/pdf
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093870090&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Mark McCullagh (2005). Inferentialism and singular reference.   (More)
• Mark McCullagh (2005). Motivating inferentialism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mmcculla/papers/mi.pdf
  
• John McDowell (2005). Motivating inferentialism: Comments on making it explicit (ch. 2).   (More)
• Mark Perlman (1997). The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Two-Factor conceptual role theories of mental content are often intended to allow mental representations to satisfy two competing requirements. One is the Fregean requirement that two representations, like public language expressions, can have different meanings even though they have the same reference (as in the case of morning star and evening star). The other is Putnam's Twin-earth requirement that two representations or expressions can have the same conceptual role but differ in meaning due to differing references. But I argue that the hidden agenda behind these theories is to make misrepresentation possible. A simple, one-factor conceptual role theory (like the "crude causal theory" Fodor describes) falls prey to the disjunction problem. If every use or application of a concept is meaning-determining, then there can be no misuse of that concept. Each use will partially determine its meaning, and, use which is covered in the meaning cannot be a misuse, error, or misrepresentation. I argue that the referential factor in two-factor conceptual role theories is what is supposed to make misrepresentation possible. But it fails to do so, because when the two factors do not determine the same meaning, there is no non-question-begging way to have one of them take precedence and force meaning to align with one factor and deviate from the other
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=316237CI
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000004/00135593
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l27w078265k67058/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=135593&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L27W078265K67058.pdf
  
• Daniel Whiting (online). Conceptual role semantics.   (More)
• Daniel Whiting (2007). Inferentialism, representationalism and derogatory words.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a recent paper, after outlining various distinguishing features of derogatory words, Jennifer Hornsby suggests that the phenomenon raises serious difficulties for inferentialism. Against Hornsby, I claim that derogatory words do not pose any insuperable problems for inferentialism, so long as it is supplemented with apparatus borrowed from Grice and Hare. Moreover, I argue, derogatory expressions pose difficulties for Hornsby's favoured alternative theory of meaning, representationalism, unless it too is conjoined with a similar Grice/Hare mechanism. So, the upshot of the discussion is that, contra Hornsby, focus on derogatory expressions alone does not provide grounds for deciding between competing theories of meaning, but nevertheless serves to highlight important features that any such theory must acknowledge and incorporate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a780387795~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/780387795.pdf
  

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