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Intentionality :: Theories of content :: Theories of content, misc

• Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick Adams (2005). Defending non-derived content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In “The Myth of Original Intentionality,” Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Defending Nonderived Content (Blind).doc
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727334011~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000006/art00001
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J44785163TH56N18.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727334011.pdf
  
• Michael Anderson & Gregg Rosenberg (online). Content and action: The guidance theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect (non-necessary) role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or normal circumstances. Moreover, because the notion of error is defined in terms of failure of action, the guidance theory meets the “meta-epistemological requirement” that representational error should be potentially detectable by the representing system itself. In this essay, we offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the problems of error and of representation of fictional and abstract entities. Being both representational and action-grounded, the guidance theory may provide some common ground between embodied and cognitivist approaches to the study of the mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.agcognition.org/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~anderson/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003953/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3953
  
• Andrew Brook & Robert Stainton (1997). Fodor's new theory of content and computation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Eq80HtunbIkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA86&ots=xjpvqDo6vs&sig=Ookx_sBmrrPL1DYMA2BfbmzClj4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0S3JeDO8I6sC&oi=fnd&pg=PA86&ots=5PBApzOgpi&sig=xj9ShFRT2gIzeTjgpvCObo4yuKw
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00011
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00057
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00083.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00057
  
• Robert Cummins (2002). Haugeland on representation and intentionality.   (More)
• Daniel Dennett (2001). Intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentionality is _aboutness_. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events
• Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/repres/Eliasmith_How neurons mean.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/repres/Eliasmith_How neurons mean.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/repres/Eliasmith_How neurons mean.pdf
  http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/Eliasmith.2000.How neurons mean.PhD.pdf
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/Eliasmith.2000.How neurons mean.PhD.pdf
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=ELIHNM-2&free=1&u=http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/repres/Eliasmith_How neurons mean.pdf
  
• Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist views of meaning and content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199407)2:103:411<249:DVOMAC>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/80566/2001/00000001/00000001/art00005
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/103/411/249.pdf
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/103/411/249
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2253740.pdf
  
• Don Garrett (2006). Hume's naturalistic theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwphl/philosophy/neurophilosophy/papers/garrett/Hume's naturalistic theory of representation.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000152/00000003/00009007
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/13974731148146r4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/13974731148146R4.pdf
  
• Mark Greenberg (2005). A new map of theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14/
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=795726
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00068.x
  
• Henry Jackman (online). Conventionalism, objectivity, and constitution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: John Haugeland has recently attempted to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality that explains how we can (collectively) misidentify objects in the world in terms of the interplay of two types of 'recognitional' skill. Nevertheless, it is argued here that his inegalitarian conception of the two sorts of skill leaves him with a quasi-conventionalist account of our relation to the world which lacks the more robust sort of objectivity that a more holistic theory could provide
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Haugeland.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/haugeland.html
  
• Henry Jackman (1998). James' pragmatic account of intentionality and truth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they come to seem as plausible as they manifestly did to James
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/James-int-truth.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/James-int-truth.html
  
• Barry Loewer (1997). A guide to naturalizing semantics.   (More)
• Gregg Rosenberg & Michael Anderson (online). A brief introduction to the guidance theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: representations. contribute to circumstances (as defined above) used
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3952/1/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3952/01/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003952/
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~anderson/papers/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.northwestern.edu/cogsci2004/papers/paper122.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003952/01/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3952
  
• Dan Ryder (2006). On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/representingkinds.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder (2004). SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   I present an account of mental representation based upon the 'SINBAD' theory of the cerebral cortex. If the SINBAD theory is correct, then networks of pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex are appropriately described as representing, or more specifically, as modelling the world. I propose that SINBAD representation reveals the nature of the kind of mental representation found in human and animal minds, since the cortex is heavily implicated in these kinds of minds. Finally, I show how SINBAD neurosemantics can provide accounts of misrepresentation, equivocal representation, twin cases, and Frege cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/SINBAD_Semantics.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2004/00000019/00000002/art00005
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00255.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00255.x
  
• Dan Ryder (ms). The brain as a model-making machine.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/660673.html
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/models.pdf
  
• Lawrence Shapiro (1997). The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality.   (More)
• Liza Skidelsky (2003). Mental content: Many semantics, one single project.   (More)
• Kenneth Taylor (forthcoming). Toward a naturalistic theory of rational intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This essay some first steps toward the naturalization of what I call rational intentionality or alternatively type II intentionality. By rational or type II intentionality, I mean that full combination of rational powers and content-bearing states that is paradigmatically enjoyed by mature intact human beings. The problem I set myself is to determine the extent to which the only currently extant approach to the naturalization of the intentional that has the singular virtue of not being a non-starter can be aggregated up into an account of rational intentionality. I have in mind a broadly defined family of accounts whose main members are the indicator/information-theoretic approach of Dretske (1988), the asymmetric dependence theory of Jerry Fodor (1987, 1990, 1994) and the teleo-semantics of Ruth Millikan (1984, 1993). Somewhat inaccurately, I will call this family of approaches the information-theoretic family. To be sure, there is only a rough family resemblance among the members of the information-theoretic family. Indeed, several intense quarrels divide the members of that family one from another, but the precise outcome of those internecine struggles is not directly relevant to the aims of this essay. ² Taken collectively, the information-theoretic family yields a compelling picture of the place of at least a crude form of intentionality -- what I call frog-like or type I intentionality -- in the natural order. Though frog-like or type I intentionality is, I think, a genuine species of intentionality, it may subsist in the absence of rational powers. It is that species of intentionality enjoyed by irritable creatures who, following Brandom (1994)
• Matthew Usher (2004). Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.psyc.bbk.ac.uk/people/academic/usher_m/06_mila_006.pdf
  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/musher/documents/06_mila_006.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2004/00000019/00000002/art00006
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  

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