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Intentionality :: The status of intentionality :: Collective intentionality

• Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2007). Group intentions as equilibria.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h27172216851755p/fulltext.pdf
  
• Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Unintentional collective action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action.' Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) 'unintentional collective actions.'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782079525~fulltext=713240930
  
• Ronald Giere (2004). The problem of agency in scientific distributed cognitive systems.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: From the perspective of cognitive science, it is illuminating to think of much contemporary scientific research as taking place in distributed cognitive systems. This is particularly true of large-scale experimental and observational systems such as the Hubble Telescope. Clark, Hutchins, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour insist or imply such a move requires expanding our notions of knowledge, mind, and even consciousness. Whether this is correct seems to me not a straightforward factual question. Rather, the issue seems to be how best to develop a theoretical understanding of such systems appropriate to the study of science and technology. I argue that there is no need to attribute to such systems as a whole any form of cognitive agency. We can well understand the importance of such systems while restricting agency to the human components. The implication is that we think of these large-scale distributed cognitive systems not so much as unified wholes, but as hybrid systems including both physical artifacts and ordinary humans
• Todd Gureckis & Robert Goldstone (2006). Thinking in groups.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/rgoldsto/pdfs/Distributed Cognition.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00009
  
• Stevan Harnad (2005). Distributed processes, distributed cognizers and collaborative cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, and only those who can feel can think. There are also things that thinkers can do. We know neither how thinkers can think nor how they are able do what they can do. We are waiting for cognitive science to discover how. Cognitive science does this by testing hypotheses about what processes can generate what doing ( know-how ) This is called the Turing Test. It cannot test whether a process can generate feeling, hence thinking -- only whether it can generate doing. The processes that generate thinking and know-how are distributed within the heads of thinkers, but not across thinkers' heads. Hence there is no such thing as distributed cognition, only collaborative cognition. Email and the Web have spawned a new form of collaborative cognition that draws upon individual brains' real-time interactive potential in ways that were not possible in oral, written or print interactions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4404/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/
  http://cogprints.org/4404/1/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4765/03/distribcog.doc
  http://cogprints.org/4404/02/distribcog.doc
  http://cogprints.org/4765/02/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4404/01/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4765/01/distribcog.htm
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997/01/distribcog.pdf
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/03/distribcog.doc
  http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1381014
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:4404
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:10997
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2005/00000013/00000003/art00005
  
• Christian List (2003). Distributed cognition: A perspective from social choice theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter
• Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group agency and supervenience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must ‘supervene’ on the group members’ contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’ individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So, knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be ‘set-wise’, not ‘proposition-wise’. Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious, but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members’ corresponding individual judgments
• Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00652.x
  
• Barton Moffatt & Ronald Giere (2003). Distributed cognition: Where the cognitive and the social merge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ and ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest’. In both cases we find the cognitive and the social merged in a system of distributed cognition without any appeal to agonistic encounters. For us, results do not come to be regarded as veridical because they are widely accepted; they come to be widely accepted because, in the context of an appropriate distributed cognitive system, their apparent veracity can be made evident to anyone with the capacity to understand the workings of the system
• Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne (2006). A framework for thinking about distributed cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00003
  
• Robert Rupert (2005). Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or group mental states), challenges that might be overcome as theoretical and empirical work proceeds. Nevertheless, these hurdles are, I think, genuine and substantive, so much so that my tentative conclusion will not be optimistic. If a group mind is supposed to be a single mental system having two or more minds as proper parts,¹ the prospects for group minds seem dim—or so I will argue
• Antti Saaristo (2006). There is no escape from philosophy: Collective intentionality and empirical social science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://intl-pos.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/1/40
  
• Hans Schmid (2003). Can brains in vats think as a team?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782638375.pdf
  
• Raimo Tuomela (online). Collective intentionality and social agents.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes expressing collective intentionality and needed for the explication and explanation of social action; social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; social practices, and institutions (see e.g. Tuomela, 1995, 2000a, 2001). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, organizational processing, and distributed problem solving to the simulation of social systems
• Raimo Tuomela (1996). Philosophy and distributed artificial intelligence: The case of joint intention.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; 4) social norms and social institutions (see Tuomela, 1984, 1995). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from Human Computer Interaction, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, Organizational Processing, Distributed Problem Solving to Simulation of Social Systems and Organizations. Even if I am a philosopher with low artificial intelligence I will below try to say something about what the scope of DAI should be taken to be on conceptual and philosophical grounds. (In the later sections of the paper the central notion of joint intention will be the main topic - in order to illustrate how philosophers and DAI-researchers approach this issue.) Let us now consider the relationship between philosophy - especially philosophy of social action - and DAI. Both are concerned with social matters and in this sense seem to have a connection to social science proper. What kinds of questions should these areas of study be concerned with? In principle, ordinary social science should study all aspects of social life (in various societies and cultures), try to describe it and create general theories to explain it.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/tuomela/papers/dai.htm
  
• Jack Vromen (2003). Collective intentionality, evolutionary biology and social reality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. 1
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.eur.nl/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  https://secure-web.eur.nl/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.reputatiesophetspel.nl/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.masterinmanagement.com/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782638378~fulltext=713240930
  
• Jiajie Zhang & Vimla Patel (2006). Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://acad88.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/research/publications/zhang-patel cognition and pragramatics preprint.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00011
  

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