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Perception :: The nature of perceptual experience :: Sense-datum theories

• Audre Jean Brokes (2000). The argument from illusion reconsidered.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.disputatio.com/articles/009-1.pdf
  
• Andrew Chrucky (online). The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data
• Paul Coates (online). Sense-data.   (More)
• Eugen Fischer (2005). Austin on sense-data: Ordinary language analysis as 'therapy'.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2006/00000070/00000001/art00004
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore’s ‘The refutation of idealism’, material as widely cited for its discussion of ‘transparency’ and ‘diaphanousness’ as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ‘that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact’ is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00253.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  
• Michael Huemer (online). Sense-data.   (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The concept of appearance has had the historical misfortune of being associated with a Kantian or idealist program in metaphysics. Within this program, appearances are treated as "internal objects" that are immaterial and exert no causal powers over the physical world. However, there is a more mundane and innocuous notion of appearance, in which to say that x appears to y is just to say that y perceives x. In this more mundane sense of the term, an appearance is a perceived object – qua perceived. In this paper, I try and develop an account of the metaphysic of appearances in this more mundane sense. The account is developed within the framework of Trope Theory. After defining the notion of a "phenomenal trope," I construe appearances as special bundles of phenomenal tropes. I then use this account to develop an approach to the thorny issue of appearance individuation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/Appearances.pdf
  
• Michael Martin (ms). Austin's Sense and Sensibilia revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When John Langshaw Austin died in  he had published only seven papers, together with a translation into English of Frege’s _Die _ _Grundlagen der Arithmetik_. But at his death he was pre-eminent among Oxford philosophers. Memoirs of him published at or near that time mention him in the same breath as Wittgenstein, as his equal in influence and philosophical importance. This conjunction is echoed in some popular presentations of the history of mid-cen­ tury philosophy, which lump Austin and Wittgenstein together as the leaders of the ‘linguistic philosophy’ or ‘ordinary language’ phi­ losophy that dominated England at that time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/Austin Sense and Sensibilia Revisited.pdf
  
• Michael Martin (2000). Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/beyond dispute.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BrbWKLYa7SoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA195&dq=Beyond+dispute+Martin&ots=4V5y_Z2-cR&sig=M3Trb82bqxE3qieGoT6War4-980
  
• G. E. Moore (1903). The refutation of idealism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lawrence.edu/fast/ryckmant/THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(190310)2:12:48<433:TROI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(190310)2:12:48<433:TROI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2248251.pdf
  
• Patrick Spät (2008). Questioning idealism.   (More)

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