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Perception :: The nature of perceptual experience :: Intentionalism

• Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/staff/brewer/pc.ejp.pdf
  http://www2-test.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/staff/brewer/pc.ejp.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00220.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2006/00000014/00000002/art00001
  
• John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/B08794103873435M.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b08794103873435m/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/00000003/00009050
  
• Kathrin Gluer (ms). Perception and justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction When it comes to perception, representationalism is all the rage. Representationalism is a claim about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: According to representationalism, phenomenal character is fully determined by the representational content of perceptual experiences (cf. Tye 2002, 45). In other words, phenomenal character, what it is like, for instance, to have an experience as of something red, is either supervenient upon or identical with that experience’s representational content. This is a bold and powerful claim. And at least its supervenience version might well be true
• Adam Pautz (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x
  
• Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/%7Emagd1129/BPhil%20Thesis.pdf
  

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