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Perception :: The contents of perception :: Conceptual and nonconceptual content

• Frederick Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on perceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [0] In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly [1998] defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf
• William Alston (1998). Perception and conception.   (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson (1998). Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the one hand, a theory of experiential content has a fundamental role in explaining how knowledge of the world can be acquired through experience. On the other hand, there are important psychological questions about the phenomenology of experiences and the conditions under which content ascriptions are made
• Bill Brewer (2005). Perceptual experience has conceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content
• Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and conceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/percepandconcepcontent.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/percepandconcepcontent.pdf
  
• Philippe Chuard (2006). Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual “through and through” "McDowell, 1994: 46; see also McDowell, 1998; Brewer, 1999:ch.5#
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v312521rj57448m3/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V312521RJ57448M3.pdf
  
• Philippe Chuard (2007). The Riches of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose you see a red ball. Unless you happen to be in a psychologist’s lab, you are unlikely to see_ just_ the red ball against, say, a white background. Rather, a myriad of objects is _simultaneously_ presented to you. For instance, you see the cricket bat beside the red ball, the table upon which they both lie, as well as what’s in the background of the table: the wall, the lamp, the bookshelf on the right, etc. Needless to say, you also see the shapes of these objects, together with the manifold of spatial relations connecting them. And for some of these objects at least, you see their particular shade$s" of colour; even the texture of their surface$s"
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020009/art00002
  
• Tim Crane (1992). The nonconceptual content of experience.   (More)
• Adrian Cussins (1993). Nonconceptual content and the elimination of misonceived composites.   (More)
• Adrian Cussins (1990). The connectionist construction of concepts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is

  _conceptualist_:

  psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism (Smolensky 1988)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.haecceia.com/FILES/c3_kings_london.htm
  
• Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2001). Shades and concepts.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/32/93/PDF/ijn_00000137_00.PDF
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/37/ijn_00000137_00/ijn_00000137_00.PDF
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/05/94/ijn_00000594_00/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000271/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000271/art00294
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00294/pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00294
  
• David Forman (2006). Learning and the necessity of non-conceptual content in Sellars's "empiricism and the philosophy of mind".   (More)
• Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Empirical concepts and the content of experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2006/00000014/00000003/art00002
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00230.x
  
• Stella Gonzalez Arnal (2006). Non-articulable content and the realm of reasons.   (More)
• York Gunther (2001). Content, illusion, partition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000102/00000002/00254434
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j7172022qp642685/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J7172022QP642685.pdf
  
• Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and nonconceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://spot.colorado.edu/~rhanna/kant_and_content.htm
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2005/00000013/00000002/art00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x
  
• Richard Heck (2007). Are there different kinds of content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions
• Walter Hopp (forthcoming). Conceptualism and the myth of the given.   (More)
• Daniel Hutto (1998). Nonconceptual content and objectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Aristotle once developed the difference between man and animal in the following way: animals can understand each other by indicating to each other what excites their desire so they can seek it, and what injures them, so they can flee from it. To men alone is logos given as well, so that they can make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore what is right and wrong. A profound thesis. -- Gadamer, "Man and Language"
• Sean Kelly (2002). What makes perceptual content non-conceptual?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: the world. ¹ Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in
• Frode Kjosavik (2003). Perceptual intimacy and conceptual inadequacy: A Husserlian critique of McDowell's internalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nlh.no/ios/Publikasjoner/s2003/s2003-17.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Z4X9bVYupWMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA49&ots=EgeYVhmZ_b&sig=YNiELV4_RjuakOuTT0pFpwNkY9w
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.   (More)
• Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of perceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/45/ijn_00000245_00/ijn_00000245_00.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r878814402m16l50/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R878814402M16L50.pdf
  
• George Pappas (2003). On some philosophical accounts of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pdcnet.org/pdf/6Pappas.pdf
  
• Ted Poston (online). Cognitive abilities and the conceptualist/nonconceptualist debate (long version).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a recent paper “Are there different kinds of content?” Richard Heck argues for nonconceptualism, the thesis that perceptual content is different in kind than cognitive content. Heck’s argument is interesting and helps to regiment and clarify the central issue between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. I defend conceptualism against Heck’s central argument. Conceptualists can utilize a number of Heck’s points to clarify and argue for their own view. Additionally, I explain how the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has been misled by conceiving of cognitive abilities as involving language-like representation. Once this picture is set aside Heck’s central argument for nonconceptualism collapses and the conceptualist claim has a much more natural and unobjectionable formulation
• Zenon Pylyshyn (ms). Visual indexes and nonconceptual reference.   (More)
• Susanna Schellenberg (2006). Sellarsian perspectives on perception and non-conceptual content.   (More)
• Robert Stalnaker (2003). What might nonconceptual content be?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<339:WMNCB>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<339:WMNCB>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522983.pdf
  
• Josefa Toribio (2002). Perceptual experience and its contents.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1389?mode=simple
  http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/research/paics/e-int/archives/2001-04-27.html
  
• Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain.   (More)
• Michael Tye (2005). On the nonconceptual content of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to fl esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and to provide a variety of motivations for the view — motivations that are broader than those that are typically adduced
• Mark Wrathall (2005). Non-rational grounds and non-conceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak_download&id_clanak_jezik=3891
  
• Wayne Wright (2003). McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and Michael Tye, have employed the notion of nonconceptual representational content.[1] Assuming that one already accepts that perceptual experience has a representational content, the most straightforward argument for embracing nonconceptual representational content is based on the fine-grained nature of experience. The rich detail of features presented in our experience outstrips the conceptual capacities of even the most sophisticated creatures, and thus one could not possess all the concepts which are used in giving a report of the representational content of her experience. This would seem to rule out the possibility of the representational content of experience being entirely conceptual in nature, leaving nonconceptual content, whatever it might turn out to be, as an option the representationalist must seriously consider
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://disputatio.com/articles/014-3.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/mcddemonconc.html
  http://www.disputatio.com/articles/014-3.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.doc
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.PDF
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.PDF
  http://www.disputatio.com/articles/014-3.pdf
  

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