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Perception :: The science of perception

• Modularity and cognitive penetrability [6]
• Ecological approaches [6]
• Construction and inference in perception [5]
• Perception and neuroscience [3]
• Psychophysics [2]
• Gestalt theory [3]

Modularity and cognitive penetrability

See also: Modularity, The representation of high-level properties, Construction and inference in perception, Gestalt theory, Perception and thought, The given.

• William Brewer & Bruce Lambert (2001). The theory-ladenness of observation and the theory-ladenness of the rest of the scientific process.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200109)68:32.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392907
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3080944.pdf
  
• Jerome Bruner (1957). On perceptual readiness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8T90Phdu&sig=LmETP9CWFNG2Gf9uTCUOTjrwc4s
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcSpgE-WT&sig=Zx1pEHFnIysExAU0b4Y-Oj_QXik
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcRtfE0VV&sig=HqbT9fBp0uoNjVix-9VPh7eFkuI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcRneJ1WV&sig=3pCYDMawnBLOgwxxZeWYPb6QZ8U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcSvgI2XW&sig=Hi2Jm1fi4MKSPtuK2SlALEOKkaE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8S7-Pidt&sig=eYRJ1YGUR3P4ZeaR57lq2tbayTY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcPvdLZWZ&sig=c8KwNTK5MiURUSJEJK7OYJNosDc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8Rb_Weey&sig=1LLA7twrYXjTa_aMa4cZyXFnDHQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcTrgMWVT&sig=U-s20sUVpZLyokGdaq8pYHlb3tE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcQreE1VU&sig=P4UjpnkeYnp7nCFSf8-FLh29Utg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8U51Pges&sig=n8TI1kjx3B8sepmx36UWnoLJSTE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8V71Xbds&sig=Sdk0X6yvIiaV-wyREiihr_cRvLk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8Ub1Tjfv&sig=1qNmw4OA6TnDOfqI4-qTJ17HCII
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=13420288&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Paul Churchland (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198806)55:2<167:PPATNA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198806)55:2<167:PPATNA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289425
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187956.pdf
  
• William Cornwell (2004). Dr.   (More)
• Jerry Fodor (1984). Observation reconsidered.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198403)51:1<23:OR>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289162
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198403)51:1<23:OR>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187729.pdf
  
• Zenon Pylyshyn (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/index.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=30934
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99552023
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99442025
  

Ecological approaches

See also: Embodiment and situated cognition, Construction and inference in perception, Perception and action.

• Anthony Chemero (2003). An outline of a theory of affordances.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend upon meaning- conferring inferences. Instead the animal simply gathers information from a meaning- laden environment. But if the environment contains meanings, then it cannot be merely physical. This places a heavy theoretical burden on direct theories of perception, a burden so severe that it may outweigh all the advantages to conceiving perception as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1502_5
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1502_5
  
• Tony Chemero (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson’s ecological psychology. It is surely no exaggeration to say that without their theoretical work ecological psychology would have died on the vine because of the high-profile attacks from establishment cognitive scientists (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, Ullman 1981). But thanks to Turvey, Shaw and Mace’s work as theorists and, perhaps more importantly, as teachers, ecological psychology is currently flourishing. A generation of students, having been trained by Turvey, Shaw and Mace at Trinity College and/or the University of Connecticut, ecological psychology, are now distinguished experimental psychologists who train their own students in Turvey-Shaw-Mace ecological psychology. Despite the undeniable and lasting importance of Turvey, Shaw and Mace’s theoretical contributions for psychology and the other cognitive science, their work has not received much attention from philosophers. It will get some of that that attention in this paper. I will point to shortcomings in the Turvey-Shaw-Mace approach to ecological psychology, and will offer what I take to be improved versions of two important aspects of it. In particular, I will describe theories of information and of direct perception that differ from the Turvey-Shaw-Mace account
• Tony Chemero (2003). Review of ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James' radical empiricism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: James J. Gibson’s ecological theory of perception (1966, 1979) is striking in many ways. It is not merely a theory of perception, but also a theory of what the world is made up of, a metaphysics, and how we can know it, an epistemology. Furthermore, the metaphysics and epistemology Gibson describes are very unusual by present standards. Indeed, Gibson very clearly intended that his theory of perception seem old-fashioned, even pre-Modern. Witness, for example, the first chapter of Gibson’s posthumous An Ecological
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.erlbaum.com/shop/tek9.asp?pg=products&specific=0-8058-5692-7
  https://www.erlbaum.com/shop/tek9.asp?pg=search&mode=regular&ftype=Series&searchword=Resources for Ecological Psychology Series
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m1Qb4EELzNIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&sig=iCPaX8v3lU-9RWH14uKxiV36PK4&prev=http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=
  
• Tony Chemero (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her essay “Information, Perception and Action”, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  
• Andrea Scarantino (2003). Affordances explained.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but independent of the most controversial claims of the Gibsonian movement
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001104/02/Affordances_Explained_Final_Version_May_2003.doc
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/377380
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/377380
  
• S. Ullman (1980). Against direct perception.   (More)

Construction and inference in perception

See also: The representation of high-level properties, Modularity and cognitive penetrability, Ecological approaches, Gestalt theory, Perception and thought, The given, Sensation and perception.

• Jüri Allik & Kenn Konstabel (2005). G. F. Parrot and the theory of unconscious inferences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16196051&dopt=Citation
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/jhbs.20114
  
• Richard Gregory (1974). Perceptions as hypotheses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/226W686672226774.pdf
  http://philosophy.arts.unsw.edu.au/students/resources/lecture_notes/PHIL2207/PHIL2207-Week 8.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6106237&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4622(19800708)290:1038<181:PAH>2.0.CO;2-B
  
• Gary Hatfield (2002). Perception As Unconscious Inference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider for a moment the spatial and chromatic dimensions of your visual expe- rience. Suppose that as you gaze about the room you see a table, some books, and papers. Ignore for now the fact that you immediately recognize these objects to be a table with books and papers on it. Concentrate on how the table looks to you: its top spreads out in front of you, stopping at edges beyond which lies unfilled space, leading to more or less distant chairs, shelves, or expanses of floor. The books and paper on the table top create shaped visual boundaries between areas of different color, within which there may be further variation of color or visual texture. Propelled by a slight breeze, a sheet of paper slides across the table, and you experience its smooth motion before it floats out of sight
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/9
  http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~hatfield/uncinf.pdf
  http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=ircs_reports
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1996). Explaining why things look the way they do.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible in general for us to perceive the world veridically, but instead in what the relation is between our environment and its properties, of which we have knowledge, on the one hand, and our perceptual mechanisms, on the other, that results in very many, even most of our perceptions being veridical in everyday life
• Dhanraj Vishwanath (2005). The epistemological status of vision and its implications for design.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual representation, namely, the nature of the perceptual encoding. One of the drawbacks of inverse-optics approaches has been the difficulty in defining the constraints needed to make the inference computationally tractable (e.g. regularity assumptions, Bayesian priors, etc.). These constraints, thought to be learned assumptions about the nature of the physical and optical structures of the external world, have to be incorporated into any workable computational model in the inverse-optics paradigm. But inference models that employ an inverse optics plus structural assumptions approach inevitably result in a naïve realist theory of perceptual representation. Another drawback of inference models for theories of perceptual representation is their inability to explain central features of the visual experience. The one most evident in the process and visual understanding of design is the fact that some visual configurations appear, often spontaneously, as perceptually more coherent than others. The epistemological consequences of inferential approaches to vision indicate that they fail to capture enduring aspects of our visual experience. Therefore they may not be suited to a theory of perceptual representation, or useful for an understanding of the role of perception in the design process and product
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2005/00000015/00000003/00005445
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k78g2806773198v6/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K78G2806773198V6.pdf
  

Perception and neuroscience

See also: Neural correlates of visual consciousness, Binocular rivalry, Visual pathways, Blindsight, Philosophy of neuroscience.

• Gary Hatfield (1999). Mental functions as constraints on neurophysiology: Biology and psychology of vision.   (More)
• Jaakko Hintikka & John Symons (2003). Systems of visual identification in neuroscience: Lessons from epistemic logic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/367871
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS700108PDF
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/367871
  
• Ken Mogi (1997). Response selectivity, neuron doctrine, and Mach's principle in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.qualia-manifesto.com/mogimach.pdf
  http://www.sonycsl.co.jp/person/kenmogi/Mach.pdf
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/Mach.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/l72r54057309lx56.pdf
  

Psychophysics

See also: Visual consciousness, Consciousness and psychology, Gestalt theory, Perceptual qualities, Sensation and perception.

• Steven Horst (2005). Phenomenology and psychophysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber-Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of _data_ that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://shorst.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/HorstPsychophysics.pdf
  http://www.wesleyan.edu/~shorst/papers/HorstPsychophysics.pdf
  http://www.wesleyan.edu/~shorst/papers/shorst.psychophysics.spp97.html
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Horst, Steven - Phenomenolgy and Psychophysics (2000).pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000001/00005852
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/wg007jw15045555t/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/WG007JW15045555T.pdf
  
• Max Wertheimer (1923). Laws of organization in perceptual forms.   (More)

Gestalt theory

See also: The representation of high-level properties, Modularity and cognitive penetrability, Construction and inference in perception, Psychophysics, The given.

• Walter Ehrenstein, Lothar Spillmann & Viktor Sarris (2003). Gestalt issues in modern neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt psychology can now be related to modern “Gestalt psychophysics” and neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://gestalttheory.net/archive/Ess-axio.pdf
  http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/abteilungen_und_bereiche/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2003/00000013/F0020003/05121115
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p8x6061785830614/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P8X6061785830614.pdf
  
• Steven Lehar (online). Computational implications of gestalt theory: The role of feedback in visual processing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neurophysiological investigations of the visual system by way of single-cell recordings have revealed a hierarchical architecture in which lower level areas, such as the primary visual cortex, contain cells that respond to simple features, while higher level areas contain cells that respond to higher order features apparently composed of combinations of lower level features. This architecture seems to suggest a feed-forward processing strategy in which visual information progresses from lower to higher visual areas. However there is other evidence, both neurophysiological and phenomenal, that suggests a more parallel processing strategy in biological vision, in which top-down feedback plays a significant role. In fact Gestalt theory suggests that visual perception involves a process of emergence, i.e. a dynamic relaxation of multiple constraints throughout the system simultaneously, so that the final percept represents a stable state, or energy minimum of the dynamic system as a whole. A Multi-Level Reciprocal Feedback (MLRF) model is proposed to resolve the apparently contradictory concepts, by proposing a hierarchical visual architecture whose different levels are connected by bi-directional feed-forward and feedback pathways, where the computational transformation performed by the feedback pathway between levels in the hiararchy is a kind of inverse of the transformation performed by the corresponding feed-forward processing stream. This alternative paradigm of perceptual computation accounts in general terms for a number of visual illusory effects, and offers a computational specification for the generative, or constructive aspect of perceptual processing revealed by Gestalt theory
• Steven Lehar (2003). Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A gestalt bubble model.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Lehar/Referees/
  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/bubw3/bubw3.pdf
  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/bubw3/bubw3.html
  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~psych/people/faculty/tse/bladerunnerNEW.pdf
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Christine_ConsciousExperience_TICS.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=208872&jid=BBS&volumeId=26&issueId=04&aid=208871
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15067950&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=15067950&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=208840
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X03000098
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X0326009X
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X03270096
  

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