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Perception :: Perception and the mind

• Perception and thought [4]
• Perception and knowledge [17]
• Perception and action [37]
• Perception and reference [5]
• Perception and phenomenology [5]

Perception and thought

See also: Conscious thought, Beliefs, Thinking, Belief theories, Conceptual and nonconceptual content, Modularity and cognitive penetrability, Perception and knowledge, Perception and reference.

• Kathrin Glüer (2004). On perceiving that.   (More)
• Jack Lyons (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of ‘looks’. A standard view is that ‘‘how things look’’, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of one’s present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00061.x
  
• Alva Noë (1999). Thought and experience.   (More)
• James Pryor (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, “The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel.” Contrast that case to:

  (2b) believing some animal you see—an animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
  town—to be a squirrel

  I said there’s a philosophically important difference between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one difference. Let’s try to disentangle the different differences
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/new/research/papers/Acquaintance.pdf
  

Perception and knowledge

See also: Knowledge of consciousness, Perception and thought, Discriminability, The given, Epistemic and non-epistemic perception.

• Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and reason in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The question I am interested in is this. What exactly is the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of perception? The problem here, as I see it, is to solve simultaneously for the nature of this experience, and its role in acquiring and sustaining the relevant beliefs, in such a away as to vindicate what I regard as an undeniable datum, that perception is a basic source of knowledge about the mind- independent world, in a sense of ‘basic’ which is also to be elucidated. I shall sketch the way in which I think that this should be done. In section I, I argue that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs. In section II, I explain how they do so. My thesis is that a correct account of the sense in which perceptual experiences are experiences of mind-independent things is itself an account of the way in which they provide peculiarly basic reasons for beliefs about the world around the perceiver
• Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of Perception and Reason.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in making thought about the mind- independent empirical world possible? What is the role of such experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge, about the way things are in that world? What is the relation between these two roles? My central argument is intended to establish that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experience is essential to our grasp of determinate thoughts about particular things in the world around us will at the same time yield a full explanation of the fundamental role which such experience plays in the acquisition of empirical knowledge, by providing us with reasons, which we recognize as such, to endorse the most basic thoughts about mind-independent things in belief
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(200109)63:2<405:POPAR>2.0.CO;2-R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00113.x
  
• Alex Byrne (1996). Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have justified beliefs about the “external” world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/spincontrol.html
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<261:SCCOJM>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<261:SCCOJM>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522911.pdf
  
• Clotilde Calabi (2005). Perceptual saliences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QJ9PXantDdQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA253&ots=GI2GrS3tW4&sig=21Ut_v6a-mCM66m7ycOyHqjBfG0
  
• Philippe Chuard (ms). Perceptual reasons.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to Conceptualists like John McDowell and Bill Brewer, the representational content of perceptual experiences is wholly conceptual. One of the main!and only!arguments they advance for this claim has to do with the epistemological role of perceptual experiences. I focus on Bill Brewer’s "1999# version of the argument. I show why Brewer fails to satisfactorily motivate the premises of his argument, and suggest that opponents of Conceptualism could accept these premises without thereby endorsing the conclusion. Finally, I consider whether the conclusion really supports Conceptualism
• Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (online). Perception and justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Any adequate account of perceptual experience has to provide answers to the following questions: What kind, and form of, content do experiences have? What kind of mental states are they? Many, if not most philosophers of perception today agree that experiences have representational contents of the form x is F, where x ranges over material objects and F over sensible properties. I argue that such a ‘naive semantics’ for experiences has to give the wrong answer to the second question. Because of their justificatory role for, and inferential integration into, a subject’s belief system, experiences themselves have to be construed as a kind of belief. I also sketch a semantics that allows experiences to be beliefs. Pdf
• Mitchell Green (2005). "You perceive with your mind": Knowledge and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know what’s going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes from our senses. So for example the nose gives us knowledge of what things smell like, and if all goes well, also indicates whether the thing we’re smelling is healthy, tasty, or noxious. Likewise, the eyes tell us the color and shape of things, and thereby give us information about whether those things are useful, dangerous, and so on. Like everybody else, rappers know all this. Or do they? Maybe some rappers know that this isn’t really so
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.virginia.edu/~msg6m/MGreenonhiphop.pdf
  
• A. Gupta (2006). Experience and knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA181&ots=_ol-vfuyEF&sig=XnMMRNe7lqhZl_dMUgTvh0hoCXU
  
• Susan Hurley (2001). Overintellectualizing the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00115.x
  
• Pierre Jacob (online). Seeing, perceiving, and knowing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/83/ijn_00000283_00/ijn_00000283_00.htm
  
• Daniel Laurier (2004). Reasons, contents, and experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.disputatio.com/articles/017-4.pdf
  
• Jack Lyons (online). Experience, evidence, and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can anything other than a belief confer epistemic justification on a belief? In particular, can nondoxastic experiential states do so? According to the standard taxonomy, _doxasticism _is the view that only beliefs can justify beliefs; _nondoxasticism _is simply the denial of this. The distinction between doxastic and nondoxastic theories is central to epistemology, but much of the debate surrounding it has been marred by an unnoticed ambiguity concerning the key concept of justification. Sorting out the ambiguity reveals an important division between externalist and internalist varieties of nondoxasticism and points the way toward a new argument for nondoxasticism of the externalist sort
• Christopher Peacocke (ms). Explaining perceptual entitlement.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: material that was later incorporated into The Realm of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and into a paper of the same title in The ‘Challenge’ of Externalism, ed. R. Schantz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JWw1wGFt8KUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA441&dq=Explaining+perceptual+entitlement+Peacocke&ots=MX8t3dwnkq&sig=xihg1Atq1tPr21t9LncrYzhMRgk
  
• John Pollock & Iris Oved (2005). Vision, knowledge, and the mystery link.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Imagine yourself sitting on your front porch, sipping your morning coffee and admiring the scene before you. You see trees, houses, people, automobiles; you see a cat running across the road, and a bee buzzing among the flowers. You see that the flowers are yellow, and blowing in the wind. You see that the people are moving about, many of them on bicycles. You see that the houses are painted different colors, mostly earth tones, and most are one-story but a few are two-story. It is a beautiful morning. Thus the world interfaces with your mind through your senses. There is a strong intuition that we are not disconnected from the world. We and the other things we see around us are part of a continuous whole, and we have direct access to them through vision, touch, etc. However, the philosophical tradition tries to drive a wedge between us and the world by insisting that the information we get from perception is the result of inference from indirect evidence that is about how things look and feel to us. The philosophical problem of perception is then to explain what justifies these inferences. We will focus on visual perception. Figure one presents a crude diagram of the cognitive system of an agent capable of forming beliefs on the basis of visual perception. Cognition begins with the stimulation of the rods and cones on the retina. From that physical input, some kind of visual processing produces an introspectible visual image. In response to the production of the visual image, the cognizer forms beliefs about his or her surroundings. Some beliefs — the perceptual beliefs — are formed as direct responses to the visual input, and other beliefs are inferred from the perceptual beliefs. The perceptual beliefs are, at the very least, caused or causally influenced by having the image. This is signified by the dashed arrow marked with a large question mark. We will refer to this as the mystery link. Figure one makes it apparent that in order to fully understand how knowledge is based on perception, we need three different theories..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Mystery Link.pdf
  http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Perceptual-Representation.pdf
  http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Perceptual-representation.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Pollock - Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00064.x
  
• Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija (2004). Some epistemological consequences of the dual-aspect theory of visual perception.   (More)
• Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Perceptual knowledge derailed.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities. Perceptual knowledge is subject to inner derailing: there is an inner hollow of perceptual incompetence through which the differences are too small to track. Perceptual knowledge is subject to outer derailing: there are outlying islands of perceptual competence that extend well past skeptical sinkholes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000001/05107445
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/q686364578143r31/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5107445&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Q686364578143R31.pdf
  
• Edmond Leo Wright (ms). Perception as epistemic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If a sensory field exists as a pure natural sign open to all kinds of interpretation as _evidence_ (see 'Sensing as non-epistemic'), what is it that does the interpreting? Borrowing from the old Gestalt psychologists, I have proposed a gestalt module that picks out wholes from the turmoil, it being the process of _noticing_ or _attending to_ , but the important difference from Koffka and Köhler (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1940), the originators of the term 'gestalt' in the psychology of perception ( is that the emphasis is upon the gestalt projection as motivated . Gestalt-attention of this kind is usually enforced in the first instance by pain or pleasure, and the resulting projections are placed in memory tabbed with fear or desire, such that if such a pattern recurs in the sensory field, fear or desire are triggered. In advanced animals the ability to play with the gestalt module has been evolved, because experimenting in curiosity has proved adaptive, as the exploratory behaviour in the Rat, the Raven, the Apes and _Homo sapiens_ bears out

Perception and action

See also: Consciousness of agency, Visual pathways, Embodiment and situated cognition, The representation of high-level properties, Ecological approaches, Mental acts.

• Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva noë, Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aims—for example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an “inverse optics” process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As Noë points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and the environment and involves contributions from sensory systems other than the eye. He is at pains to note that vision is not passive. His analogy with touch is to the point: touch involves skillful probing and movement, and so does vision, although less obviously and in my view less centrally so. This much is certainly widely accepted among vision scientists—although mainstream vision scientists (represented, for example, by Stephen Palmer’s excellent textbook²) view these points as best seen within a version of the inverse optics view that takes inputs as non-static and as including motor instructions (for example, involving eye movements and head movements).³ The kind of point that Noë raises is viewed as important at the margins, but as not disturbing the main lines of the picture of vision that descends—with many changes—from the pioneering work of David Marr in the 1980s (and before him, from Helmholtz). But Noë shows little interest in mainstream vision science, focusing on non-mainstream ideas in the science of perception, specifically ideas from the anti-representational psychologist J.J. Gibson, and also drawing on Wittgenstein and the phenomenology tradition. There is a sense throughout the book of revolution, of upsetting the applecart. This is a review from the point of view of the applecart
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Shortened_Noe_Review_JoP.pdf
  
• John Campbell (online). Sensorimotor knowledge and naive realism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is a pleasure to be commenting on Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception_. The book is easy to read, stylish, and sweeps through a fresh set of ideas on a fundamental topic. It seems to me that the emphasis on the sensorimotor and the embeddness of perception are entirely correct, and that they find their natural home in a broadly naïve realist view of perception. I shall focus, though, on my reservations, which have to do with a reductionist thread running through Noë’s discussion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119395227/PDFSTART
  
• Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (2001). Sensorimotor chauvinism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will be taken in a spirit of constructive questioning. Overall, we have two main reservations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/noecomm.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01290116
  
• Andy Clark (2006). That lonesome whistle: A puzzle for the sensorimotor model of perceptual experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1440?mode=simple
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1440?mode=simple
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2006/00000066/00000289/art00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00583.x
  
• Andy Clark (1999). Visual awareness and visuomotor action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1323?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  
• Andy Clark (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In _Action in Perception _Alva Noë develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.² And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models³ conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1444?mode=full
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1444?mode=simple
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1295
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1295
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/eafinal.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/clark.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/110/4/495
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3182592.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think we see much more than we actually do. In this paper I shall (briefly) rehearse the empirical evidence for this rather startling claim, and then critically examine a variety of responses. One especially interesting response is a development of the so-called ‘skill theory’, according to which there is no illusion after all. Instead, so the theory goes, we establish the required visual contact with our world by an ongoing process of active exploration, in which the world acts as a kind of reliable, interrogable, external memory (Noe, Pessoa and
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/jcsrev.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/F0020005/1276
  
• Keith Frankish (2006). Review of Consciousness in Action, by Susan Hurley.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Questions about the relation between mind and world have long occupied philosophers of mind. In _Consciousness in Action_ Susan Hurley invites us to adopt a “ninety-degree shift” and consider the relation between perception and action. The central theme of the book is an attack on what Hurley dubs the _Input-Output Picture_ of perception and action—the picture of perceptions as sensory inputs to the cognitive system and intentions as motor outputs from it, with the mind occupying the buffer zone in between. Hurley argues that this picture confuses the personal level of normatively constrained mental contents and the subpersonal level of causal processes sustaining the mind. The notions of perception and action belong to the former, those of input and output to the latter. In place of the Input-Output picture, Hurley proposes a _Two-level _ _Interdependence View_. At the subpersonal level, she points out, there are not only one-way processes from input to output but also a host of feedback loops from output to input—some internal to the central nervous system, some of wider orbit, involving proprioception, for example, or visual feedback on movement. The system as a whole can be seen as a _dynamical singularity_—a tangle of sensorimotor feedback loops centred on the organism but extending out into the world beyond. The processes at this level are the vehicles of perceptions and actions, but, Hurley insists, the two levels cannot be mapped onto each other in a simple way. Changes on the output side may affect the content of perceptions, and changes on the input side may affect that of intentions. Perception and intention are in this way _interdependent_. The point here is not the uncontroversial one that perceptions and intentions can _cause_ changes in each other. That would be compatible with the Input-Output Picture. The dependency, in Hurley’s view, is not instrumental, but _constitutive_: the contents of perceptions and intentions are each constituted by processes involving both inputs and outputs..
• Shaun Gallagher (online). Perceiving others in action / la perception d'autrui en action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a New York Times article last month, entitled “Cells that read minds,” the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolatti’s group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of understanding another person’s actions, but also language, empathy, “how children learn, why people respond to certain types of sports, dance, music and art, why watching media violence may be harmful and why many men like pornography.” Let me set aside the controversial questions about whether mirror neurons can explain all of these things, and accept that mirror neurons are clearly smart little cells. But let me ask whether Blakeslee and her scientists are expressing things in the right way
• Vittorio Gallese (2000). The inner sense of action: Agency and motor representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.up.univ-mrs.fr/wcnia/ressources/Gallese_NCC4.pdf
  http://www.anticipation.info/texte/gallese/Gallese-JCS2000.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000010/1054
  
• Rick Grush (forthcoming). Skill theory v2.0: Dispositions, emulation, and spatial perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/50478717314t6630/fulltext.pdf
  
• Susan Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan Hurley (2006). Active perception and perceiving action: The shared circuits model.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_
• Susan Hurley (online). Consciousness in action: Clarifications.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such a distinguished neuropsychologist as Marcel Kinsbourne to find added value in the result
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/D4KR70P9T4D0BUT9.pdf
  
• Susan Hurley (2001). Perception and action: Alternative views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and action are seen as instrumentallyinterdependent. It is argued here that a betteralternative is to reject both assumptions, resultingin a two-level interdependence view in whichperception and action co-depend on dynamicallycircular subpersonal relations and as a result may bemore than merely instrumentally interdependent. Thisis illustrated by reference to motor theories ofperception and control theories of action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/pa.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/hurley (2001) perception and action. alternative views.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Hurley - Perception and Action.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271323
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l015777n34g15167/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=271323&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L015777N34G15167.pdf
  
• Daniel Hutto (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000004/00009001
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m02ltj7008017271/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M02LTJ7008017271.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and perceiving objects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA241&ots=JljUmyR0Zu&sig=ng2uUGFbmB1iMyaNBn7tfnpX1Tw
  
• Pierre Jacob (2006). Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action
• Sean Kelly (2002). Merleau-ponty on the body: The logic of motor intentional activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00198
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00004
  
• Colin Klein & Gabriel Love (online). Kicking the Kohler habit.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There are a welter of conceptual questions surrounding the intuitive, com- monsense notion of perception. These questions concern the many and mul- tifarious abilities and other traits that may or may not partly or wholly constitute the capacity for perception (i.e., constitute the property of being a perceiver) according to our commonsense notion. We don’t intend to ad- dress these conceptual questions here... not directly anyway. Our concern is with an empirical question about human visual perception: What factors determine the contents and character of a person’s visual perceptions (what the person sees and how it looks to her) over some interval of time? The an- swer to this question may shed some light on the conceptual questions about perceivers generally. After all, the better one’s sense of what mechanisms and processes are at work in an uncontroversial case of perception (viz., the human visual case), the better one will be able to think clearly about more controversial cases of borderline perceivers (e.g., frogs or robots)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~cvklein/papers/KohlerPhilPsy.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782009436~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782009436.pdf
  
• William Lycan (2006). Enactive intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/noe/Lycan.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik (2005). Action-oriented representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one kind of underdetermined perception. The focus of this chapter is another kind of underdetermined perception: what I shall call "active perception". Active perception occurs in cases in which the percept, while underdetermined by sensation, is determined by a combination of sensation and action. The phenomenon of active perception has been used by several to argue against the positing of representations in explanations of sensory experience, either by arguing that no representations need be posited or that far fewer than previously thought need be posited. Such views include, but are not limited to those of Gibson (1966, 1986), Churchland
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/aor.html
  
• Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the active mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271324
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n84kr20t22441086/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N84KR20T22441086.pdf
  
• Alva Noë & Susan Hurley (2003). The deferential brain in action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/replytogray.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12757819&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000005/art00078
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661303000780
  
• Alva Noë (2006). Précis of Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. Examples are ready to hand. An object looms larger in the visual field as we approach it, and its profile deforms as we move about it. A sound grows louder as we move nearer to its source. Movements of the hand over the surface of an object give rise to shifting sensations. As perceivers we are masters of this sort of pattern of sensorimotor dependence. This mastery shows itself in the thoughtless automaticity with which we move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us. We spontaneously crane

  PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/

  our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses, or draw near to get a better look (or better to handle, sniff, lick or listen to what interests us). The central claim of what I call _the _ _enactive approach _is that our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of this sort of sensorimotor knowledge.²
• J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/oregan.noe.pdf
  http://redwood.berkeley.edu/bruno/mindmachine/oregan.pdf
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/surprisesurprise.pdf
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/surprisesurprise.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/06/index.html
  http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/kuipers/readings/ORegan-bbs-01.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/ORegan.BBS.01pdf.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12239892&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12239892&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=12239892&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=125085
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01000115
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X01630115
  
• J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2006). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.   (More)
• J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of ''''change blindness''''
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271326
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/nl361h8276502488/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=271326&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/NL361H8276502488.pdf
  
• Jesse Prinz (2006). Putting the brakes on enactive perception.  &nb