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Perception :: Special topics :: Illusion and hallucination

• Bill Brewer (forthcoming). How to account for illusion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any mind-dependent such objects
• York Gunther (2001). Content, illusion, partition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J7172022QP642685.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000102/00000002/00254434
  
• David Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2004/00000120/F0030001/05143507
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x3m578hm43772833/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5143507&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X3M578HM43772833.pdf
  
• Ian Phillips (online). Illusion and content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How should the Na¨ıve Realist who eschews representational percep- tual content account for illusions? Bill Brewer has recently proposed that illusions should be treated solely in terms of post-experiential misjudgement
• Brad Thompson (online). Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism

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