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Metaphysics of mind :: Dualism

• Interactionism [8]
• Epiphenomenalism [8]
• Psychophysical parallelism [2]
• Dualism, misc [10]

Interactionism

See also: Consciousness and dualism, The function of consciousness, Neural timing and consciousness, The interpretation of quantum mechanics, Epiphenomenalism, Psychophysical parallelism, Dualism, misc, Mental causation, Free will.

• Daniel Holbrook (1992). Descartes on mind-body interaction.   (More)
• Frank Jackson (1980). Interactionism revived?   (More)
• Ole Koksvik (2007). Conservation of energy is relevant to physicalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01124.x
  
• Thomas Ludwig (1997). Selves and brains: Tracing a path between interactionism and materialism.   (More)
• Barbara Montero (2006). What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/dltc/2006/00000060/00000004/art00003
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01073.x
  
• Thomas Natsoulas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's monist interactionism.   (More)
• Karl Popper (1955). A note on the body-mind problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638(195506)15:6<131:ANOTBP>2.0.CO;2-V
  
• Wilfrid Sellars (1954). A note on Popper's argument for dualism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638(195410)15:1<23:ANOPAF>2.0.CO;2-F
  

Epiphenomenalism

See also: The knowledge argument, Consciousness and dualism, The function of consciousness, Interactionism, Psychophysical parallelism, Dualism, misc, Mental causation, Free will.

• Daniel Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia?   (More)
• T. Huxley (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history.   (More)
• Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023SQBHRLK&sig=lpLBA75S5ZNh7nRMzwXaTu9ivhw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023ROAJROK&sig=CcwbkADsnucEzfU7Z9mCzNEYSlM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTMBEPKN&sig=nrqGrDr6BtBhIMYeNlT1uDsK6Qs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023VQEFTQN&sig=uXnKXoN7jyiZ2QHF-PfypYY9Rv8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023UUECWPJ&sig=RJi-St-b9kx018y6yResxfK4OoM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023QSAEOLR&sig=bCap_SwkCsP8FLlFAX4sdGQhYLg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023RUBEUNN&sig=6tQZIpZHouebGy9fctdarZbQivw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023UODHTOP&sig=zWAe4dwHZXfaFEM358lrTKkVSiI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTPEIONQ&sig=NEvPcMVl5uYMTylMlfuR9yPcrLo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023TSCHROO&sig=ZIpzWdtTaIUmTTyUvSPA2DqIcV4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023TMCDUQO&sig=EoFnSapBQFa9qwebq724B8Ijoag
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023QMzJQIK&sig=wU_mBShayo_GQugf6FOY2AnJ5Y4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTREJTNQ&sig=4glbZFmhSDrS05egUFkwQxDeQ_g
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(198204)32:127<127:EQ>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(198204)32:127<127:EQ>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2960077.pdf
  
• William James (1879). Are we automata?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(187901)1:4:13<1:AWA>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(187901)1:4:13<1:AWA>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2246561.pdf
  
• Paul Noordhof (2003). Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry.   (More)
• Dr Axel Randrup (ms). Conscious experience, existence and behaviour.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If consciousness has no influence on my behaviour,what shall I do with it ? In this paper it is contended, that even if neuroscience is right, if some conscious experiences such as emotional experiences have no influence on our behavior, they still constitute a significant part of our world, our existence. For understanding the significance of conscious experiences we should go beyond behaviour, biology and biological evolution. This paper and its understanding of consciousness and natural science is based on an idealist philosophy maintaining, that only conscious experience is real. Conscious experience is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it cannot be explained. Key words: Consciousness as existence; behaviour; communication; language; free will; idealist philosophy; collective conscious experience; cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4368/1/experienceexistence.html
  http://cogprints.org/4367/1/experienceexistence.html
  http://cogprints.org/4368/01/experienceexistence.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:4368
  
• Patrick Spät (2006). A pill against epiphenomenalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.abstracta.pro.br/english/journal/volume2number2/5_spat.pdf
  
• Sven Walter (online). Epiphenomenalism.   (More)

Psychophysical parallelism

See also: Interactionism, Epiphenomenalism, Dualism, misc.

• Michael Heidelberger (2003). The mind-body problem in the origin of logical empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychophysical parallelism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the debate that has continued to this day" (Kim 1998, 1). Nonetheless, it is not at all obvious why these particular articles sparked a debate, nor why Feigl's work in particular came to play such a prominent part in it, nor how and to what extent Feigl's approach rests on the logical empiricism he endorsed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000945/
  http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/f07/heidelberger/the_mind-body.pdf
  http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/philosophie/heidelberger/the_mind-body.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/5600/1/Mind-Body_Theory_in_the_Origin_of_Logical_Empiricism.pdf
  
• Hans Jonas (1986). Parallelism and complementarity.   (More)

Dualism, misc

See also: Materialism and dualism, Consciousness and dualism, Physicalism, Emergence.

• John Beloff (ms). The mind-brain problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.scientificexploration.org/jse/abstracts/v8n4a4.php
  
• John Beloff (ms). What are minds for?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Two positions on the mind-body problem are here_ _compared:__Materialism__, which is here taken to mean the thesis_ _that mind plays no part in the determination of behaviour so that,_ _for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as_ _insentient automata, and_ _Ineractionism_ _which is here taken as its_ _contradictory._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk/~dualism/papers/light.html
  
• Jose Luis Bermudez (1996). Locke, property dualism and metaphysical dualism.   (More)
• Tim Crane (2003). Mental substances.   (More)
• Rene Descartes (2004). Meditations on First Philosophy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~fdoull/des-med.htm
  http://throne777.googlepages.com/descartes.doc
  http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/descmed.pdf
  http://www.iupui.edu/~philosop/descartesexcerptsmeditat.pdf
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/03-04/1-Summer/readings/PI-readings.pdf
  http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/phi361/descartes meds 1&2.pdf
  http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jweisber/phil103/docs/readings/Descartes_Meditations_edit2.pdf
  http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/fourth_layer/faculty_pages/jcruz/courses/descartes1&2.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yMwiTTpwasgC&oi=fnd&pg=PP5&sig=L9Uq3pwXv1DEBmaxIVU4gy7XXLI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1SA4DTXdz-oC&oi=fnd&pg=PR2&sig=n_iWux86S7g_3TCjLY1sCDNLo5I
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1SA4DTXdz-oC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=w4ffMX0VOw&sig=02OC9weRQihrv_Qe54ltvTiYT3M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1SA4DTXdz-oC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=w4eiRU6SSv&sig=dQSApau6FgbPXD9_Eg8u1XPBqA8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1SA4DTXdz-oC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=w4fgNZ0ZOv&sig=Dc2v3ydHT978D6BhL5nBJtTGNgU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yMwiTTpwasgC&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=+Meditations+on+First+Philosophy+Descartes&ots=htOaf1jlRW&sig=eRkRf_kBjNw7fZ2vDt14IVip5do
  
• Frank Dilley (2003). A critique of emergent dualism.   (More)
• Robert Francescotti (2001). Property dualism without substance dualism?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28340&layout=abstract
  
• Eric Olson (2001). A compound of two substances.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think
• Gunther Stent (2004). Epistemic dualism.   (More)
• Nick Treanor (2006). The cogito and the metaphysics of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness is not even realized by or supervenient on physical properties. Where Descartes argued he could clearly and distinctly conceive mind and body as existing separately, contemporary anti-physicalists hold that the conceivability of worlds in which actual world correlations between physical and phenomenological properties fail shows that these correlations are contingent rather than logically or metaphysically necessary. Together with Descartes, they conclude from conceivability that identity, as well as strong supervenience, is false.¹ If the argument of this paper is correct, however, then there is an argument for dualism that arises from the epistemological distinction, is grounded in the Meditations, and is yet distinct from the

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  conceivability arguments pursued both by Descartes and contemporary anti-physicalists. Furthermore, the argument is immune to the standard objections to conceivability arguments: its conclusion follows even if there are a posteriori identities between physical and phenomenal properties
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/w68800330v2n8g6v/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W68800330V2N8G6V.pdf
  

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