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Metaphysics of mind :: Functionalism and behaviorism

• Logical behaviorism [9]
• Causal role functionalism [1]
• Machine functionalism [3]
• Functionalism, misc [15]

Logical behaviorism

See also: Folk psychology and theory of mind, Interpretivist approaches, Intentionalism, Causal role functionalism, Functionalism, misc.

• José Burgos (2004). Realism about behavior.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/12Burgos.pdf
  http://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/12Burgos.pdf
  
• Alex Byrne (1996). Behaviourism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking
• Daniel Dennett (online). Reintroducing The Concept of Mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _shazam!–_ the explosive generation of £100.03 of ordinary cash (minus a small quantity extracted by the bank) plus, perhaps, a few stray photons or quarks or gravity waves. He wonders: What kind of containers does the bank use to hold the anti-cash till the regular cash arrives? How are they insulated? Can you store cash and anti-cash in the same box and somehow prevent them from getting in contact? Might there be zombanks that only _seemed_ to store cash and anti-cash? How could we tell? This is a hard problem indeed!
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/2002/Dennett.html
  http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/2002/Dennett.pdf
  
• George Graham (online). Behaviorism.   (More)
• P. Harzem (2004). Behaviorism for new psychology: What was wrong with behaviorism and what is wrong with it now.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=HARBFN&free=1&u=http://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/08Harzem.pdf
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=HARBFN&free=1&u=http://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/08Harzem.pdf
  http://behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/08Harzem.pdf
  https://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/08Harzem.pdf
  
• Peter Killeen (2004). Minding behavior.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/14Killeen.pdf
  http://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/14Killeen.pdf
  
• E. Ribes-Inesta (2004). Behavior is abstraction, not ostension: Conceptual and historical remarks on the nature of psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/11Ribes.pdf
  http://www.behavior.org/journals_bp/2004/11Ribes.pdf
  
• Rowland Stout (2002). What you know when you know how someone behaves.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [1] In chapter 2 of _The Concept of Mind_, “Knowing How and Knowing That”, and especially in the section on “Understanding and Misunderstanding”, Ryle rejects two approaches to the question of the interpretation of other minds that correspond quite closely with what are now called functionalism, or theory theory, and simulation theory. There is a painful irony here that the functionalist approach to the philosophy of mind, which developed in the late 60s and 70s, has widely been regarded as completely superseding Ryle’s own approach
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/2002/Stout.pdf
  
• John Wisdom (1950). The concept of mind.   (More)

Causal role functionalism

See also: The theory theory, Conceptual role approaches, Belief theories, Logical behaviorism, Machine functionalism, Functionalism, misc.

• Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but not mad Martian pain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad pain—pain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian pain—pain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role in normal humans). After all, what it is to be in pain according to the identity theory is to be in whatever state that occupies the pain role for us
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.uleth.ca/~peter.alward/papers/MadMartianLewis.htm
  

Machine functionalism

See also: Absent qualia, Can machines think?, Computationalism, Philosophy of AI, misc, Causal role functionalism, Functionalism, misc.

• Chris Eliasmith (2002). The myth of the Turing machine: The failings of functionalism and related theses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The properties of Turing’s famous ‘universal machine’ has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. Here, I show that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing’s powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, I further argue that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, I show that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, I conclude that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/Y4U33MMEEDMG63KY.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/Y4U33MMEEDMG63KY.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/teta/2002/00000014/00000001/art00001
  
• Tom Polger (web). Computational functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An introduction to functionalism in the philosophy of psychology/mind, and review of the current state of debate pro and con. Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (John Symons and Paco Calvo, eds.)
• Alexander Pruss (ms). Functionalism and counting minds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated

Functionalism, misc

See also: Dennett's functionalism, Functionalism, Functionalism and qualia, general, Conceptual role approaches, Causal role functionalism, Machine functionalism.

• Murat Aydede (ms). Syntax, content, and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based psychologies. So STM can't be any better than the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) in its prospects for forming the foundations of a scientifically respectable psychology, whether or not RTM has the problems that Stich claims it does
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:352
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000352/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000352/00/STM.v1.html
  http://cogprints.org/352/0/STM.v1.html
  http://cogprints.org/352/
  http://cogprints.org/352/00/STM.v1.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/52/cog00000352-00/STM.v1.html
  
• George Bealer (2000). Fregean equivocation and ramsification on sparse theories: Response to McCullagh.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mmcculla/pdf/bealer.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00147
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00147
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00147
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00003
  
• George Bealer (1997). Self-consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199701)106:1<69:S>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2998342.pdf
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199701)106:1<69:S>2.0.CO;2-Y
  
• Ned Block (1978). Troubles with functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdeToz02E&sig=avmZrt9Ub4ps3LKcharVVSNVxzM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CddRmF44x&sig=Tqvdyk-jxGWt0alH36jSEMfeMJU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4BmdVfE35C&sig=AcrIRZr0b9pFXQqcKuC0IQaFJLg
  http://w3.uniroma1.it/cordeschi/Articoli/block.htm
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdbZmx63y&sig=4DDBlXlphv-VoR0AJrFQKo4M8T0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdaXlw38D&sig=MNTVF2-lGxJEB7TnQ0XhBRozPl0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4Cd9VjF62x&sig=jqL-aCHDnvd8KQBnunBbctsUzCg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdfWfx22v&sig=4_NdGEWDeTr2jjVkXfWNISGqq_Q
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdaRkB69v&sig=413d9SnCY_uZgm7mgFUF6-G9yzo
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=190704.190715
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mv2vGDT-6KIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA231&ots=4CdbTlB61x&sig=GwWZvlINsZ-BWA-JA9OOxrt852Q
  
• Ned Block (1996). What is functionalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? Cartesian Dualism said the ultimate nature of the mental was to be found in a special mental substance. Behaviorism identified mental states with behavioral dispositions; physicalism in its most influential version identifies mental states with brain states. Functionalism says that mental states are constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Functionalism is one of the major theoretical developments of Twentieth Century analytic philosophy, and provides the conceptual underpinnings of much work in cognitive science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:235
  http://cogprints.org/235/0/199712008.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.html
  http://cogprints.org/235/
  
• Paul Churchland (2005). Functionalism at forty: A critical retrospective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/churchland.pdf
  
• Brie Gertler (2000). Functionalism's methodological predicament.   (More)
• Robert Koons (2003). Functionalism without physicalism: Outline of an emergentist program.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The historical association between functionalism and physicalism is not an unbreakable one. There are reasons for finding some version of a functional account of the mental attractive that are independent of the plausibility of physicalism. I develop a non-physicalist version of func- tionalism and explain how this model is able to secure genuine emergence of the mental, despite Kim’s arguments that such emergence theories are incoherent. The kind of teleological emergence of the mental required by this model is in fact fully compatible with the best available interpre- tations of physics and does not simply repeat the mistakes of vitalism. In addition, this model of teleological, emergent causation provides an attractive account of free/libertarian agency
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.newdualism.org/papers/R.Koons/Koons_NeoFunctionalism_103103.pdf
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-10-t-000068.html
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=120217
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=120217&toc=y
  http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/phl382/neofunction.pdf
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-24-t-000006.html
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=120217
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=120217&recNo=3&toc=1
  http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/neofunction.pdf
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1998). Functionalism, causation and causal relevance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: causal relevance, a three-place relation between event types, and circumstances, and argue for a logical independence condition on properties standing in the causal relevance relation relative to circumstances. In section 3, I apply these results to show that functionally defined states are not causally relevant to the output or state transitions in terms of which they are defined. In section 4, I extend this result to what that output in turn causes and to intervening mechanisms. In section 5, I examine the implications of this result for functional theories of mental states. In section 6, I distinguish between functional descriptions of properties and functional definitions of properties, and argue the former present no obstacle to mental states being causally relevant to behavior, but that this is so because they do not treat mental states as functional states. In section 7, I examine the nature of explanations that appeal to functional states or properties. section 8 identifies some difficulties that arise in thinking about specifically conscious mental states as functional states. section 9 is a brief conclusion
• William Lycan (2003). Chomsky on the mind - body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/20030401.pdf
  https://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/0631200215\001.pdf
  https://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/0631200215/001.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik (ms). Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most attempts at defining or elucidating ’weak’ or ’strong’ supervenience introduce various forms of physical indiscernibility. After glancing at some definitions, I argue that they must fail if mental events are supposed to be genuinely causally efficacious and non-epiphenomenal. Then I elucidate Davidson’s account of supervenience (’D-supervenience’), first as an abstract relation between a predicate and a set of predicates (to be illustrated by uncontroversial examples), and then as applied to the mental/physical relation. I argue that Davidson must defend that if two events are physically indiscernible in the light of a complete physical theory of the world then they must be identical in the Leibnizian sense (‘L-identity’): physical indiscernibility collapses into L-identity. It follows that mental differences between two numerically different events logically entail physical differences between them. I conclude by demonstrating how the Davidsonian account of the concept can explain some counterexamples to Moore’s approach to supervenience of moral on natural properties. The central tenet in this paper is that supervenience principles based on duplication create, rather than solve, problems in this problem area
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uvm.edu/~mmmoyer/papers/sv_apa.doc
  http://www.uvm.edu/~mmmoyer/papers/sv_apa.htm
  http://drcwww.uvt.nl/~buekens/superven.doc
  http://www.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/faculty/mandik/fgsff.htm
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/fgsff.html
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/fgsff.html
  
• Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and self-consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mmcculla/pdf/fsc.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00146
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00146
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00146
  
• David Pineda (2001). Functionalism and nonreductive physicalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sc.ehu.es/ilwtheor/archivospdf/40-monpineda.pdf
  
• Thomas Polger (online). Against the argument from functional explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is an argument for functionalism—and _ipso facto_ against identity theory—that can be sketched as follows: We are, or want to be, or should be dedicated to functional explanations in the sciences, or at least the special sciences. Therefore—according to the principle that what exists is what our ideal theories say exists—we are, or want to be, or should be committed to metaphysical functionalism. Let us call this the _argument from functional_ _explanation_. I will try to reveal the motivation for making such an argument, and sketch the kind of response that should be made by critics of functionalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-SSPP2001.pdf
  
• Thomas Polger (online). Escaping the epiphenomenal trap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I describe a feature of the debate between Functionalists and Anti-Functionalists in philosophy of mind that I call The Epiphenomenal Trap. I argue that the dialectic is a trap because neither side can resolve the central metaphysical issue as it has been put. That is because the debate typically trades in possible explanations. So long as Functionalists and Anti-Functionalists continue to debate whether functionalist explanations are possible, the central metaphysical issue cannot be resolved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://oz.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-SSPP1998.pdf
  

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