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Metaphysics of mind :: Supervenience
See also: Zombies and the conceivability argument, Internalism and externalism, Supervenience and physicalism, Supervenience, general.
See also: Formulating physicalism, Psychophysical supervenience, Supervenience, general.
See also: Conceptual analysis and a priori entailment, Anomalous monism, Psychophysical supervenience, Supervenience and physicalism.
To say that the A-properties or facts are supervenient on the B-properties or facts isKim (1990: 140) identifies three key features of our concept of supervenience: covariance, depend- ency and nonreducibility (where “non-reducibility” means that the supervenience of A-features on B-features is consistent with the former not being reducible to the latter).1 Explanation, sometimes required for reducibility, is absent : supervenience claims state that some patterns of property covariation hold, without explaining why they hold.2
to say that the A-facts are, in a sense, redundant, since they are already implicitly
specified when one has specified all the B-facts. A-facts are not fact ‘over and above’
the B-facts, not something ‘separate’. To state an A-fact, or ascribe an A-property, is
to describe the same reality in a different way, at a different level of abstraction, by
carving the same world at different joints. (Stalnaker 1996: 87)
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