Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com		All fields Surname Advanced
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Metaphysics of mind :: Supervenience :: Psychophysical supervenience

• Stevan Harnad (2000). Minds, machines and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/2601/
  http://cogprints.org/2615/01/harnad00.turing.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002615/
  http://www.ph.tn.tudelft.nl/PRInfo/reports/msg00509.html
  http://www.ph.tn.tudelft.nl/PRInfo/reports/msg00509.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/2601/01/harnad00.turing.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.turing.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.turing.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.turing.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.turing.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002615/01/harnad00.turing.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2615
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2615
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jlli/2000/00000009/00000004/00269488
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jlli/2000/00000009/00000004/00269488
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=269488&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KMW6976176319744.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KMW6976176319744.pdf
  
• Katherine Hawley (1998). Merricks on whether being conscious is intrinsic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Trenton Merricks argues against the following doctrine: Microphysical Supervenience (MS) Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. (Merricks 1998, p. 59) Imagine a person, _P_. Microphysical Supervenience entails that there is an object, the finger-complement, wholly composed of all of _P_'s atoms except those in _P_'s left index-finger. After all, when we slice off _P_'s finger, we leave atoms micro- indiscernible from those in the finger-complement, and _those_ atoms compose an object, maimed _P_. Moreover, if _being conscious_ is an intrinsic property, then Microphysical Supervenience entails that the finger-complement is conscious, for maimed _P_ is conscious. But this, argues Merricks, is "simply incredible". It cannot be the case that every large collection of _P_'s atoms forms a conscious object, for then there would be "a mighty host" of conscious objects sitting in _P_'s chair (Merricks 1998, p.63). Even if there is a finger-complement, it is not conscious. So _being_ _conscious_ does not supervene upon microphysical arrangements: if _being conscious_ is an intrinsic qualitative property then Microphysical Supervenience is false. Merricks argues that _being conscious_ is indeed intrinsic, and thus that Microphysical Supervenience _is_ false. He has two reasons for supposing _being conscious_ to be intrinsic, and I object to both of these
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199810)2:107:428<841:MOWBCI>2.0.CO;2-4
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199810)2:107:428<841:MOWBCI>2.0.CO;2-4
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/1998/00000107/00000428/art00841
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2659788.pdf
  
• C. Macdonald (1995). Psychophysical supervenience, dependency, and reduction.   (More)
• T. Sider (2003). Maximality and microphysical supervenience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2003/00000066/00000001/art00007
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00247.x
  

4 displayed