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Metaphysics of mind :: Reduction :: Reduction and multiple realizability

• William Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1999). Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199906)66:2<175:MRRLCA>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199906)66:2<175:MRRLCA>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392683
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188642.pdf
  
• Ned Block (1997). Anti-reductionism slaps back.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.2 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the antireductionist consensus survives Kim’s critique. This paper was originally titled “Anti- Reductionism Strikes Back”, but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000229/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/29/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000229/00/199712002.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/AntiReductionism.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/AntiReductionism.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:229
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1997)31<107:ASB>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216126.pdf
  
• John Bolender (1995). Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not wholly a matter of metaphysics but is, at least to some degree, a matter of convention as well. The central point is that physical sciences and mental sciences have somewhat different criteria for individuating kinds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=BOLIMR&free=1&u=http://cogprints.org/4042/01/bolender1995.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4042/01/bolender1995.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:4042
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=BOLIMR&free=1&u=http://cogprints.org/4042/01/bolender1995.pdf
  
• Eric Funkhouser (2007). A liberal conception of multiple realizability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The last section presents a survey of the ontological, explanatory, and methodological consequences of this analysis of multiple realizability
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000132/00000003/00002530
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f55752008l12k763/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F55752008L12K763.pdf
  
• Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple realizability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00062.x
  
• Stevan Harnad (1995). Grounding symbols in sensorimotor categories with neural networks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too: Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by external interpreters as meaning something. However, unlike symbols in symbol systems, thoughts mean what they mean autonomously: Their meaning does not consist of or depend on anyone making or being able to make any external interpretations of them at all. When I think "the cat is on the mat," the meaning of that thought is autonomous; it does not depend on YOUR being able to interpret it as meaning that (even though you could interpret it that way, and you would be right)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3352/
  http://cogprints.org/1593/00/harnad95.iee.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3352/02/harnad95.iee.html
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=HARGSI&free=1&u=http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3352/02/harnad95.iee.html
  http://cogprints.org/1593/00/harnad95.iee.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/93/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/93/
  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=478378
  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=478378
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.iee.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.iee.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.iee.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.iee.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003352/02/harnad95.iee.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003352/02/harnad95.iee.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001593/00/harnad95.iee.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001593/00/harnad95.iee.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3352
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3352
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1593
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1593
  
• Todd Jones (2004). Special sciences: Still a flawed argument after all these years.   (More)
• Brian Keeley (2000). Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200009)67:3<444:SLFEFT>2.0.CO;2-K
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200009)67:3<444:SLFEFT>2.0.CO;2-K
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392790
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188627.pdf
  
• Max Kistler (1999). Multiple realization, reduction and mental properties.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000017/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000017/fr/
  
• Colin Klein (forthcoming). An ideal solution to disputes about multiply realized kinds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia, such explanations do not run afoul of the metaphysical problems that plague MR kinds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/20236v57p2356549/fulltext.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1993). Emergence unscathed: Kim on non-reducible types.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that the widespread assumption of the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds -- and in particular, psychological kinds -- conflicts with some fundamental constraints on both materialistic metaphysics and scientific taxonomy. Kim concludes that the multiple realizability of psychological kinds would leave them "disqualified as proper scientific kinds" (Kim 1992: 18), and that search for a scientific psychology should focus instead on more reductive or type- materialist possibilities. If correct, this would strikingly undermine a widespread assumption in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But it's not
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1993.august/mcclamrock.abs.html
  
• Michael Pauen (2002). Is type identity incompatible with multiple realization?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics and it should be acceptable for physicalism in general
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2003/00000065/00000001/art00003
  
• Thomas Polger (online). Realization and multiple realization, chicken and egg.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Which comes first, realization or multiple realization? Hilary Putnam (1960) invoked the term ‘realization’ to refer to the relation that holds between physical devices and abstract computing machines, such as Turing machines or probabilistic automata. Putnam (1967) hypothesized that the relation between brain and mind is also realization. He contrasted his hypothesis—which he dubbed “functionalism”—with the competing hypotheses that mental states are to be identified with syndromes of behavior and behavioral dispositions, or that mental states are to be identified with brain processes. Instead, functionalism proposes that mental states are to be identified with functional states of whole organisms. Importantly, Putnam regards functionalism as an empirical hypothesis, and one whose explication appeals to some technical notions, particularly to the idea of a probabilistic automaton
• Thomas Polger (online). Review of Shapiro's The Mind Incarnate.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To what degree must the brains and bodies of creatures with minds have to be similar to the brains and bodies of human beings? Since the late 1960’s, most philosophers and cognitive scientists have supposed that there a relatively few constraints on what sorts of brains and bodies can realize minds. It is widely believed that minds are multiply realizable. Of course there were always dissenters, and in recent years their grumbling has grown harder to dismiss. In _The Mind_ _Incarnate_, Lawrence Shapiro provides the first book-length study of the multiple realizability thesis. Such an examination is long overdue, and Shapiro’s treatment is sure to set the standard for the budding debate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-ShapiroTICS.pdf
  
• Thomas Polger (online). Two confusions concerning multiple realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the question of multiple realization from the explanatory context in which it is invoked. Anchoring multiple realizability in its theoretical context provides grounds for arbitrating disagreements. Doing so, I argue, favors the view advanced by Shapiro
• J. Schwartz (1992). Who's afraid of multiple realizability?: Functionalism, reductionism, and connectionism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_OXWiaT50k0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA89&ots=aBQ-wDUqY_&sig=ux7HRzgES4Gbl9rlbsyPlDW7BYE
  
• Lawrence Shapiro (2000). Multiple realizations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil951/951articles/Multiple Realizations.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200012)97:12<635:MR>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200012)97:12<635:MR>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2678460.pdf
  
• Lawrence Shapiro (online). Neural plasticity and multiple realizability.   (More)
• Lawrence Shapiro (online). The metaphysics of multiple realizability: It's like apples and oranges.   (More)
• Sven Walter (2006). Multiple realizability and reduction: A defense of the disjunctive move.   (More)

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