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Metaphysics of mind :: Other psychophysical relations

• Emergence [48]
• Realization [10]
• Token identity [4]
• Psychophysical relations, misc [6]

Emergence

See also: Dualism, Supervenience, Reduction.

• Harald Atmanspacher (2007). Contextual emergence from physics to cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive neuroscience addresses the relation between neurobiological and mental levels of description. For a particular class of partitions of the underlying neurobiological phase space, so-called generating partitions, the emergent mental states are stable under the dynamics. In this case, mental descriptions are (i) faithful representations of the neurodynamics and (ii) compatible with one another
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020001/art00003?crawler=true
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020001/art00003
  
• Nils Baas & Claus Emmeche (1997). On emergence and explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Emergence is a universal phenomenon that can be defined mathematically in a very general way. This is useful for the study of scientifically legitimate explanations of complex systems, here defined as hyperstructures. A requirement is that the observation mechanisms are considered within the general framework. Two notions of emergence are defined, and specific examples of these are discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/coPubl/97d.NABCE/ExplEmer.html
  http://www.fi.uib.no/AMOS/fys210/emergence/emmeche/ExplEmer.html
  http://www.inomics.com/cgi/repec?handle=RePEc:wop:safiwp:97-02-008
  
• Mark Bedau (2002). Downward causation and the autonomy of weak emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf
  http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/principia.pdf
  
• Mark Bedau (1997). Weak emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An innocent form of emergence—what I call "weak emergence"—is now a commonplace in a thriving interdisciplinary nexus of scientific activity—sometimes called the "sciences of complexity"—that include connectionist modelling, non-linear dynamics (popularly known as "chaos" theory), and artificial life.1 After defining it, illustrating it in two contexts, and reviewing the available evidence, I conclude that the scientific and philosophical prospects for weak emergence are bright
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bedau97weak.html
  http://www.reed.edu/~mab/papers/weak.emergence.pdf
  http://www.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/weak-emergence.pdf
  http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/weak-emergence.pdf
  http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/emergence/bedau.philperspect.preprint.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1997/00000031/A011s011/art00017
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1997)31<375:WE>2.0.CO;2-K
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216138.pdf
  
• Mark Bickhard (2000). Emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: * This paper was to have been written jointly with Don Campbell. His tragic death on May 6, 1996, occurred before we had been able to do much planning for the paper. As a result, this is undoubtedly a very different paper than if Don and I had written it together, and, undoubtedly, not as good a paper. Nevertheless, I believe it maintains at least the spirit of what we had discussed. Clearly, all errors are mine alone
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/Emergence27Jul97.pdf
  
• Mark Bickhard (2004). Process and emergence: Normative function and representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Emergence seems necessary for any naturalistic account of the world — none of our familiar world existed at the time of the Big Bang, and it does now — and normative emergence is necessary for any naturalistic account of biology and mind — mental phenomena, such as representation, learning, rationality, and so on, are normative. But Jaegwon Kim’s argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible, and Hume’s argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it precludes any emergence at all. I argue that both of these barriers can be overcome, and, in fact, that they each constitute reductios of their respective underlying presuppositions. In particular, causally efficacious ontological emergence can be modeled, but only within a process metaphysics, thus avoiding Kim’s argument, and by making use of non-abbreviatory forms of definition, thus avoiding Hume’s argument. I illustrate these points with models of the emergent nature of normative function and of representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o49jhXoRA48C&oi=fnd&pg=PA121&ots=0DiiVN39Mr&sig=9411DvVxojcf1jXD1GlweqQgkiA
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2003/00000014/F0030001/05143031
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2004/00000014/F0030001/05143031
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5143031&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W653372064618138.pdf
  
• Michel Bitbol (2007). Ontology, matter and emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: “Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004006/01/Emergence1.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/00000003/00009041
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/606416j4rh8qq356/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/606416J4RH8QQ356.pdf
  
• F. C. Boogerd, F. J. Bruggeman, Robert Richardson, Achim Stephan & H. Westerhoff (2005). Emergence and its place in nature: A case study of biochemical networks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We will show that there is a strong form of emergence in cell biology. Beginning with C.D. Broads classic discussion of emergence, we distinguish two conditions sufficient for emergence. Emergence in biology must be compatible with the thought that all explanations of systemic properties are mechanistic explanations and with their sufficiency. Explanations of systemic properties are always in terms of the properties of the parts within the system. Nonetheless, systemic properties can still be emergent. If the properties of the components within the system cannot be predicted, even in principle, from the behavior of the systems parts within simpler wholes then there also will be systemic properties which cannot be predicted, even in principle, on basis of the behavior of these parts. We show in an explicit case study drawn from molecular cell physiology that biochemical networks display this kind of emergence, even though they deploy only mechanistic explanations. This illustrates emergence and its place in nature
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000145/00000001/00004421
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x565117k0u753065/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5264421&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X565117K0U753065.pdf
  
• Richard Campbell & Mark Bickhard (ms). Physicalism, emergence, and downward causation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Physicalism, in one form or another, has been one of the dominant positions in metaphysics in the latter part of the 20^th century. But what, precisely, does that position entail? That has been much debated. Rudolph Carnaps’s early attempt to show how every sentence of psychology could be translated into sentences formulated in physical language is now generally agreed to have been unsuccessful
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/physicalemergence.pdf
  http://dspace.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41068?mode=simple
  
• David Chalmers (2002). Strong and weak emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The term ‘emergence’ often causes confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts _strong_ _emergence_ and _weak emergence_. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KJF1ydg3HJQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA244&ots=NMg2zsvdtP&sig=3wKYwzjfDZlRDo4hZusLxf--ySQ
  
• Philip Clayton (2006). Emergence from physics to theology: Toward a panoramic view.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2006/00000041/00000003/art00015
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00768.x
  
• Philip Clayton (1999). Neuroscience, the person, and God: An emergentist account.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2000/00000035/00000003/art00012
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2000/00000035/00000003/art00301
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0591-2385.00301
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0591-2385.00301
  
• John Collier (online). Holism and emergence: Dynamical complexity defeats laplace's demon.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace's demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together assumes imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, and that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, but despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Vienna-Laplace.PDF
  http://star.tau.ac.il/~eshel/Bio_complexity/Physics background/Vienna-Laplace.pdf
  
• John Collier (1998). The Dynamical Basis of Emergence in Natural Hierarchies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: dynamics, causation Collier, 1988a), but if the latter, reducibility is assured because logical constructs are Introduction reducible, by definition, to their logical components. A satisfactory account of
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kli.ac.at/theorylab/jdc/papers/echoiii.pdf
  http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/echoiii.pdf
  http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/echoiii.pdf
  
• Tim Crane (2001). The significance of emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible understanding of what ‘emergent’ means, the denial is indefensible: non-reductive physicalism is committed to mental properties being emergent properties. It follows that the problems for emergentism—especially the problems of mental causation—are also problems for non-reductive physicalism, and they are problems for the same reason
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/adobedocs/Significance of emergence.pdf
  https://www.uclu.org/philosophy/adobedocs/Significance of emergence.pdf
  
• Paul Sheldon Davies (2006). The physics of downward causation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KJF1ydg3HJQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA35&ots=NMg2ztmcvK&sig=awsS44li6Oxmp0Jf-5Ih0gc4msA
  
• George Ellis (2006). On the nature of emergent reality.   (More)
• Claus Emmeche (online). Defining life, explaining emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Bibliographical Note Abstract Explaining things - introductory remarks General attitudes and the standard view Requirements for a definition Life as the natural selection of replicators Life as an autopoietic system Life as a semiotic phenomenon Downward causation Implicitly well-defined general objects Emergence as explanatory strategy: the observer reappears Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Notes References Bibliographical note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Princeton History of Science Workshop on "Growing Explanations", Princeton University, February 15, 1997; and at the meeting in the International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB) in Seattle, USA, July 16-21, 1997. Different parts were published in a modified form as 1) Emmeche (1997): "Autopoietic systems, replicators, and the search for a meaningful biologic definition of life", Ultimate Reality and Meaning 20 (4): 244-264 [the original title was: "Is the definition of life important?"], and 2) Emmeche (1998): "Defining life as a semiotic phenomenon", Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5 (1): 3-17. The present web version below contains the complete argument of both articles. A further thoroughly rewritten version, accessible also for non-specialists, was made in collaboration with Charbel Niño El-Hani, and translated by him into Portuguese as a contribution to a book (this version can be found at www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/coPubl/99.DefVida.CE.EH.html)
• Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (1997). Explaining emergence: Toward an ontology of levels.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: University of Copenhagen University of Copenhagen University of Copenhagen Blegdamsvej 17 Njalsgade 80 Njalsgade 80 DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø DK 2300 Copenhagen S DK-2300 Copenhagen S Denmark
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jgps/1997/00000028/00000001/00101581
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/rl02g77094656g16/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=101581&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/RL02G77094656G16.pdf
  
• Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (2000). Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The idea of a higher level phenomenon having a downward causal influence on a lower level process or entity has taken a variety of forms. In order to discuss the relation between emergence and downward causation, the specific variety of the thesis of downward causation (DC) must be identified. Based on some ontological theses about inter-level relations, types of causation and the possibility of reduction, three versions of DC are distinguished. Of these, the `Strong' form of DC is held to be in conflict with contemporary science; the `Medium' version of DC may for instance describe thoughts constraining neurophysiological states, while the `Weak' form of DC is physically acceptable but may not in practice be a feasible description of the mind/brain or the cell/molecule relation. All forms have their specific problems, but the Medium and the Weak version seems to be most promising
• Claus Emmeche (1999). The biosemiotics of emergent properties in a pluralist ontology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Published in: Edwina Taborsky, ed. (1999): Semiosis. Evolution. Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign. Shaker Verlag, Aachen. (pp. 89-108). The book is based on the meeting "Semiosis. Evolution. Energy, Third International Conference on Semiotics", Victoria Collage, University of Toronto, Canada, October 17-19, 1997 (programme and list of papers, see the SEE web page:http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see)
• Carl Gillett (2002). The varieties of emergence: Their purposes, obligations and importance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a way one may fail to establish the possibility of Strong emergence. But I also show Weak emergence can help the full-blown reductionist and Ontological emergence helps those opposed to physicalism. Lastly, in Part 3, I argue that the Completeness of Physics (CoP) is incompatible with Strong emergence and that rejecting CoP provides hope for the possibility of Strong emergence in a physical world. The result is a notion of Strong emergence offering much to non-reductive physicalism. My final conclusion is that concepts of emergence, when properly understood, have important contributions to make to philosophical debate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2003/00000065/00000001/art00006
  
• D. Heard (2006). A new problem for ontological emergence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00428.x
  
• Michael Huemer (ms). The philosophical complaint against emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In _The Mind and its Place in Nature_ , C.D. Broad tries to show, as he says (p. 59), that "there is no doubt" that the Theory of Emergence is a logically possible view with a good deal in its favor. And in his history of British Emergentism, McLaughlin states that emergentism is perfectly internally coherent, although he doesn't think it has any empirical evidence in its favor at present. I am inclined to agree with the assessment that emergentism is a coherent theory, but I can't see that Broad or McLaughlin has shown this, at least if this is taken to mean that it represents a metaphysical possibility (and not merely is not self-contradictory). Moreover, I suspect many people find the concept of emergent properties somehow unscientific, mysterious, and possibly incoherent; and I doubt that Broad has adequately addressed this intuition. He has indeed admirably explicated the meaning of the theory, so that now we can all understand it; but just as even to explain the idea, for example, that there are alterations without causes in such a way that it becomes absolutely, crystal clear what one means by "an uncaused change" would not be to demonstrate
• Jaegwon Kim (2006). Being realistic about emergence.   (More)
• Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making sense of emergence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1999/00000095/00000001/00207163
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r86gq867212xt8v2/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R86GQ867212XT8V2.pdf
  
• Paul Meehl & Wilfrid Sellars (1956). The concept of emergence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.tc.umn.edu/~pemeehl/040Emergence.pdf
  
• Nancey Murphy (2006). Emergence and mental causation.   (More)
• David Newman (2001). Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2001/00000079/00000002/art00003
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2001/00000079/00000002/art00180
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713931202~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/HBH80HEMXDXT258W.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713931202.pdf
  
• Timothy O'Connor & Jonathan Jacobs (2003). Emergent individuals.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://php.indiana.edu/~toconnor/Emergent_Individuals.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00330
  
• Timothy O'Connor (1994). Emergent properties.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1983onqp.book..719O
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/
  
• Timothy O'Connor (2003). Groundwork for an emergentist account of the mental.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=120215
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-24-t-000008.html
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-10-t-000067.html
  http://www.iscid.org/papers/OConnor_OntologicalEmergence_103103.pdf
  
• Timothy O'Connor (2005). The metaphysics of emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The objective probability of every physical event is fixed by prior physical events and laws alone. (This thesis is sometimes expressed in terms of explanation: In tracing the causal history of any physical event, one need not advert to any non-physical events or laws. To the extent that there is any explanation available for a physical event, there is a complete explanation available couched entirely in physical vocabulary. We prefer the probability formulation, as it should be acceptable to any physicalist, though some reject the explanation formulation.) (3) Causal Exclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://php.indiana.edu/~toconnor/MetaphEm.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00543.x
  
• Michael Polanyi (1965). The structure of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.compilerpress.atfreeweb.com/Anno Polanyi Structure of Consciousness Brain 1965.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=5856080&dopt=citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=5856080&dopt=Citation
  http://www.oxfordjournals.org/jnls/supplements/braini/hdb/Volume_88/Issue_04/880799.sgm.abs.html
  
• Charles Ripley (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness.   (More)
• Lynn Rothschild (2006). The role of emergence in biology.   (More)
• Jurgen Schroder (1998). Emergence: Non-deducibility or downwards causation?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/1998/00000048/00000193/art00001
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199810)48:193<433:ENODC>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199810)48:193<433:ENODC>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00113
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660236.pdf
  
• William Seager (2005). Emergence and efficacy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Imagine the day when physics is complete. A theory is in place which unifies all the forces of nature in one self-consistent and empirically verified set of absolutely basic principles. There are some who see this day as perhaps not too distant (e.g. Hawking 1988, Weinberg 1992, Horgan 1996). Of course, the mere possession of this theory of everything will not give us the ability to provide a complete explanation of everything: every event, process, occurrence and structure. Most things will be too remote from the basic theory to admit of explanation in its terms; even relatively small and simple systems will be far too complex to be intelligibly described in the final theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/Emergence and Efficacy.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m5pxXK-lTtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA176&dq=Emergence+and+efficacy+Seager&ots=d50uK5oUDl&sig=UJSOK--DUT8SplQd-Fh0DT89df4
  
• William Seager (2004). Emergence and efficacy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Imagine the day when physics is complete. A theory is in place which unifies all the forces of nature in one self-consistent and empirically verified set of absolutely basic principles. There are some who see this day as perhaps not too distant (e.g. Hawking 1988, Weinberg 1992, Horgan 1996). Of course, the mere possession of this _theory_ of everything will not give us the ability to provide a complete _explanation_ of everything: every event, process, occurrence and structure. Most things will be too remote from the basic theory to admit of explanation in its terms; even relatively small and simple systems will be far too complex to be intelligibly described in the final theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m5pxXK-lTtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA176&dq=Emergence+and+efficacy.+Seager&ots=d50uK5oVIj&sig=y5zC8vtIRajQOA9QAARji_CsNAE
  
• William Seager (ms). Emergence and supervenience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The metaphysical relation of supervenience has seen most of its service in the fields of the philosophy of mind and ethics. Although not repaying all of the hopes some initially invested in it – the mind-body problem remains stubbornly unsolved, ethics not satisfactorily naturalized – the use of the notion of supervenience has certainly clarified the nature and the commitments of so- called non-reductive materialism, especially with regard to the questions of whether explanations of supervenience relations are required and whether such explanations must amount to a kind of reduction
• Warren Shrader (ms). John Stuart mill and the development of british emergentism.   (More)
• Warren Shrader (online). Shoemaker on emergence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent literature in both philosophy of mind and philosophy of science is replete with numerous accounts as to the nature of mental and/or higher-level scientific properties all falling under the rubric of “ontological emergence.” Nevertheless, I think a careful inspection of the literature reveals that there is general agreement on three necessary conditions for any account of ontological emergence. I shall call any account entailing these conditions Minimal Ontological Emergence, or MOE. MOE is the view that there is a set of properties SE, the emergent properties, such that every member E of SE satisfies all of the following
• Michael Silberstein (online). Explaining consciousness: Convergence on emergence.   (More)
• Michael Silberstein (2006). In defence of ontological emergence and mental causation.   (More)
• Michael Silberstein & J. McGeever (1999). The search for ontological emergence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.etown.edu/philosophy/PDF/PQarticle.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/1999/00000049/00000195/art00003
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199904)49:195<182:TSFOE>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199904)49:195<182:TSFOE>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00136
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00136
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660261.pdf
  
• Achim Stephan (1997). Armchair arguments against emergence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~acstepha/Armchair_Arguments_Erkenntnis_46_(1997).pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/1997/00000046/00000003/00138880
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k26u84276450041h/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K26U84276450041H.pdf
  
• Tim van Gelder & Lars Niclasson (1994). Classicalism and cognitive architecture.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: systematicity is. Until systematicity is adequately systematicity. Most contributors to these debates have clarified, we cannot know whether classical paid little or no attention to the alleged empirical
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/322759.html
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://www.blutner.de/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/~tgelder/papers/CCA.pdf
  http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/~tgelder/papers/CCA.pdf
  http://www.blutner.de/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/tgelder/papers/CCA.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/tgelder/papers/CCA.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/connect/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/NeuralNets/Texts/gelder_nikl.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/van Gelder and Niklasson - Classicism and Cognitive Architecture (1994).pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/van Gelder and Niklasson - Classicism and Cognitive Architecture (1994).pdf
  
• Robert Williams (online). Metaphysical indeterminacy, supervenience, and emergence.   (More)

Realization

See also: Computation and physical systems, Interlevel relations, Causal role functionalism, Machine functionalism, Reduction and multiple realizability, Realization, Token identity.

• Carl Craver & Robert Wilson (2006). Realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological
• Ronald Endicott (forthcoming). Realizability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts: “multiplicity” and “realizability.” “Multiplicity” designates a kind of variability in the mechanism and materials from which a particular type of thing can be made. “Realizability” designates a specific relation that exists when there is the stated variability
• Carl Gillett (2003). The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences.   (More)
• Jonathan Opie (1998). Connectionist modelling strategies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.30
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.30
  http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/16120
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?article=9.30
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/02/psyc.98.9.30.connectionist-explanation.27.opie
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/01/psyc.98.9.30.connectionist-explanation.27.opie.xml
  
• Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2006). How do connectionist networks compute?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the “conventional” account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks aren’t genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/How_do_Connectionist_Networks_Compute.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16628464&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Y7127222H3Q46182.pdf
  
• Thomas Polger (2004). Neural machinery and realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-PSA2002.pdf
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/425948
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS710531PDF
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/425948
  
• Thomas Polger (2007). Realization and the metaphysics of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the received view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are _realized_ by brain states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called _realization_ _physicalism_. Carl Gillett has recently defended a detailed formulation of the realization relation. However, Gillett’s formulation cannot be the relation that realization physicalists have in mind. I argue that Gillett’s “dimensioned” view