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Metaphysics of mind :: Other psychophysical relations :: Realization

• Carl Craver & Robert Wilson (2006). Realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological
• Ronald Endicott (forthcoming). Realizability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts: “multiplicity” and “realizability.” “Multiplicity” designates a kind of variability in the mechanism and materials from which a particular type of thing can be made. “Realizability” designates a specific relation that exists when there is the stated variability
• Carl Gillett (2003). The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences.   (More)
• Jonathan Opie (1998). Connectionist modelling strategies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.30
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.30
  http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/16120
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?article=9.30
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/02/psyc.98.9.30.connectionist-explanation.27.opie
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/01/psyc.98.9.30.connectionist-explanation.27.opie.xml
  
• Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2006). How do connectionist networks compute?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the “conventional” account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks aren’t genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/How_do_Connectionist_Networks_Compute.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16628464&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Y7127222H3Q46182.pdf
  
• Thomas Polger (2004). Neural machinery and realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-PSA2002.pdf
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/425948
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS710531PDF
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/425948
  
• Thomas Polger (2007). Realization and the metaphysics of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the received view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are _realized_ by brain states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called _realization_ _physicalism_. Carl Gillett has recently defended a detailed formulation of the realization relation. However, Gillett’s formulation cannot be the relation that realization physicalists have in mind. I argue that Gillett’s “dimensioned” view of realization fails to apply to a textbook case of realization. I also argue Gillett counts as realization some cases that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I conclude that the relation described by Gillett cannot be realization
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-SSPP2004.pdf
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-Realization.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a779581591~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/779581591.pdf
  
• Agustín Vicente (2001). Realization, determination and mental causation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sc.ehu.es/ilwtheor/archivospdf/40-monvicente.pdf
  
• Robert Wilson & Carl Craver (2004). Realization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/realization.pdf
  
• Robert Wilson (2004). Realization: Metaphysics, mind, and science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/425947
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS710530PDF
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/425947
  

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