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Miscellaneous philosophy of mind :: Aspects of mind :: Imagination

• Radu Bogdan (2005). Pretending as imaginative rehearsal for cultural conformity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.brill.nl/jocc
  http://www.wmich.edu/cognition/current/index.html
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W4PV3467000P7V32.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/jocc/2005/00000005/F0020001/art00008
  
• John Dilworth (2008). Imaginative Versus Analytical Experiences of Wines.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The highly enjoyable experiences associated with drinking good wines have been widely misunderstood. It is common to regard wine appreciation as an analytical or quasi-scientific kind of activity, in which wine experts carefully distinguish the precise sensory qualities of each wine, and then pass on their accumulated factual knowledge to less experienced wine enthusiasts. However, this model of wine appreciation is seriously defective. One good way to show its defects is to provide a better and more fundamental scientific account of what is involved in wine appreciation. In order to do so, I outline a novel, evolutionarily based theory of perceptual consciousness that explains why there must be imaginative as well as analytical kinds of experiences of wines. In addition, imaginative wine experiences, unlike typical imaginative artistic experiences, may be shown to involve highly individualistic, improvisatory elements that help to give wine drinking a unique place among the recreational arts
• Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2007). Wanting things you don't want: The case for an imaginative analogue of desire.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0007.009
  
• Peter Goldie (2005). Imagination and the distorting power of emotion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _In real life, emotions can distort practical reasoning, typically in ways that it is_ _difficult to realise at the time, or to envisage and plan for in advance. This fea-_ _ture of real life emotional experience raises difficulties for imagining such expe-_ _riences through centrally imagining, or imagining ‘from the inside’. I argue_ _instead for the important psychological role played by another kind of imagin-_ _ing: imagining from an external perspective. This external perspective can draw_ _on the dramatic irony involved in imagining these typical cases, where one_ _knows outside the scope of the imagining what one does not know as part of the_ _content of what one imagines: namely, that the imagined emotion is distorting_ _one’s reasoning. Moreover, imagining from an external perspective allows one_ _to evaluate the imagined events in a way that imagining from the inside does not._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/F0030008/art00007
  
• Peter Goldie (2006). Wollheim on emotion and imagination.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/74XVK833R046X507.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/74xvk833r046x507/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2006/00000127/00000001/00001727
  
• Amy Kind (2001). Putting the image back in imagination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically dubious entities as mental images. Second, even those philosophers who accept mental images in their ontology have worried about what seem to be fairly obvious examples of imaginings that occur without imagery. In this paper, I aim to relieve both these points of philosophical pressure and, in the process, develop a new imagery-based account of the imagination: the imagery model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phil-rlst.academic.claremontmckenna.edu/akind/PIBII.doc
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=334
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(200101)62:1<85:PTIBII>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(200101)62:1<85:PTIBII>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00042.x
  http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/phil-rlst/akind/PIBII.doc
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653590.pdf
  
• Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1540-594X.2004.00146.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-594X.2004.00146.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/jaac/2004/00000062/00000002/art00007
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1559197.pdf
  
• Shaun Nichols (2002). Imagination and the puzzles of iteration.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Iteration presents opposing puzzles for a theory of the imagination. The first puzzle, noted by David Lewis, is that when a person pretends to pretend, the iteration is often preserved. Let’s call this the puzzle of ‘pre- served iteration’. At the other pole, Gregory Currie has noted that very often when we pretend to pretend, the iteration does collapse. We might call this the puzzle of ‘collapsed iteration’. Somehow a theory of the imagination must be able to address these two puzzles. I argue that an empirically inspired cognitive theory of the imagination (Nichols & Stich 2000) can accommodate both puzzles
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/journals/analysis/preprints/NICHOLS.pdf
  http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/iteration.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00417
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00417
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000279/art00003
  
• Thomas Nigel (1998). Imagination, eliminativism, and the pre-history of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Classical and medieval writers had no term for consciousness in anything like the modern sense, and their philosophy seems not to have been troubled by the mind-body problem. Contemporary eliminativists find strong support in this fact for their claim that consciousness does not exist, or, at least, is not an appropriate scientific explanandum. They typically hold that contemporary conceptions of consciousness are artefacts of Descartes' (now outmoded) views about matter and his unrealistic craving for epistemological certainty. Essentially, they say, our belief in consciousness is a residue of once pressing, but now irrelevant, intellectual tensions between religion and the rising new science of the Early Modern period. With the attempts of Descartes and his successors to resolve these tensions, Western thought began down a track toward the conceptual cul-de-sac of the "hard problem". Plausibly, the problem will only be (dis)solved, and the onward march of science assured, when we are able to shake off the pervasive influence of the Cartesian tradition in a way that goes far beyond the mere rejection of dualism. But when we do so, eliminativists contend, the distinctively Cartesian notion of consciousness will simply drop out of our world-picture, like phlogiston or the vital entelechy
• Susanna Schellenberg (online). Comments on Tyler doggett and Andy Egan's "wanting things you don't want".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~susanna/Doggett_EganComments.pdf
  
• Leslie Stevenson (2003). Twelve conceptions of imagination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The ability to think of something not presently perceived, but spatio-temporally real. (2) The ability to think of whatever one acknowledges as possible in the spatio-temporal world. (3) The liability to think of something that the subject believes to be real, but which is not. (4) The ability to think of things that one conceives of as fictional. (5) The ability to entertain mental images. (6) The ability to think of anything at all. (7) The non-rational operations of the mind, that is, those explicable in terms of causes rather than reasons. (8) The ability to form perceptual beliefs about public objects in space and time. (9) The ability to sensuously appreciate works of art or objects of natural beauty without classifying them under concepts or thinking of them as useful. (10) The ability to create works of art that encourage such sensuous appreciation. (11) The ability to appreciate things that are expressive or revelatory of the meaning of human life. (12) The ability to create works of art that express something deep about the meaning of life
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/43/3/238
  http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/43/3/238
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/aesthj/2003/00000043/00000003/art00238
  
• Nigel Thomas (online). Imagination.   (More)
• Nigel Thomas (1997). Imagery and the coherence of imagination: A critique of white.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article defends tradition and common sense against a widespread and rarely questioned contemporary philosophical orthodoxy that underpins the entrenched and exorbitant "lingualism" of so much 20th century thought, and leads the way to extreme doctrines like cognitive relativism and eliminative materialism. It also plugs what might otherwise have seemed to be a significant hole in the argument of my Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? (which I regard as my main positive contribution so far to the understanding of the mind). For a relatively brief overview of the situation in cognitive theory and consciousness studies, as I see it, see A Stimulus to the Imagination. Click here to view the full article: Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination: a Critique of White. Earlier drafts of this article, one entitled "The White Images of Imagery and Imagination: A Critique and an Alternative", were formerly available on the net. Please make any citations to the published version. - N.J.T.T
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/nthomas/white.htm
  
• Nigel Thomas (1998). Imagination, eliminativism, and the pre-history of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Classical and medieval writers had no term for consciousness in anything like the modern sense, and their philosophy seems not to have been troubled by the mind-body problem. Contemporary eliminativists find strong support in this fact for their claim that consciousness does not exist, or, at least, is not an appropriate scientific explanandum. They typically hold that contemporary conceptions of consciousness are artefacts of Descartes' (now outmoded) views about matter and his unrealistic craving for epistemological certainty. Essentially, they say, our belief in consciousness is a residue of once pressing, but now irrelevant, intellectual tensions between religion and the rising new science of the Early Modern period. With the attempts of Descartes and his successors to resolve these tensions, Western thought began down a track toward the conceptual cul-de-sac of the "hard problem". Plausibly, the problem will only be (dis)solved, and the onward march of science assured, when we are able to shake off the pervasive influence of the Cartesian tradition in a way that goes far beyond the mere rejection of dualism. But when we do so, eliminativists contend, the distinctively Cartesian notion of consciousness will simply drop out of our world-picture, like phlogiston or the vital entelechy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.imagery-imagination.com/im-c-abs.htm
  http://htpprints.yorku.ca/archive/00000220/01/iepc2.htm
  http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/nthomas/im-c-abs.htm
  
• Nigel Thomas (2003). Imagining minds.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/Claremont.pdf
  
• Jonathan Weinberg & Aaron Meskin (2006). Puzzling over the imagination: Philosophical problems, architectural solutions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/1437736/2006/00000001/00000001/art00013
  

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