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Miscellaneous philosophy of mind :: Self-knowledge :: Observational accounts

• Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method of knowing one’s own mental states, and not just self-directed attention. But the more restrictive use is standard, and provides the topic of the current entry.) As we will see, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists doubt that any such introspective process underlies self-knowledge
• Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phil-rlst.academic.claremontmckenna.edu/akind/shoemaker.doc
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000210/art00003
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00294/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00294
  
• William Larkin (ms). A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments.   (More)
• Eric Lormand (ms). Inner sense until proven guilty.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is the key to explaining the most puzzling kind of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness—there being "something it is like" to have certain mental states. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against accusations— twenty-two in all!—rather than to argue positively for the view. However, I begin by indicating some of the motivation for the account I defend
• Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "inner sense".   (More)
• Cynthia MacDonald (1998). Self-knowledge and the "inner eye".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782352043.pdf
  
• Cynthia MacDonald (1999). Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sense.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199909)59:3<711:SOSAIS>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199909)59:3<711:SOSAIS>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653791.pdf
  

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