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Miscellaneous philosophy of mind :: Self-knowledge :: First-person authority and privileged access

• Quassim Cassam (2004). Introspection, perception, and epistemic privilege.   (More)
• Jordi Fernandez (2003). Privileged access naturalized.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000212/art00003
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00317/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00317
  
• Jordi Fernandez (2005). Privileged access revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose that you form a certain belief on the basis of perception. You believe, say, that your car is black. How can you be entitled to the belief that you believe that your car is black? I have proposed that the perceptual state that normally grounds your belief about your car also grounds your belief about your own perceptual belief. More generally, my suggestion was that, for any proposition p, if a subject believes that p on the basis of her own apparent perceptions or memories, or on the basis of inference or testimony, then she is entitled to believe that she believes that p if she forms that meta-belief on the basis of the state that lead her to believe that p.¹ It will be convenient to coin an expression that abbreviates that someone has formed a meta- belief thus. Let us baptize this procedure of meta-belief formation as ‘extrospection’
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x
  
• Jordi Fernandez (forthcoming). Desire and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We often form beliefs about our own mental states. I believe that I have political beliefs of a certain kind. Perhaps you believe that you want to eat fish for lunch. Most of us have believed, at some moment or other, that we were in love. Let us call beliefs of this kind ‘self-ascriptions’ of mental states. Self- ascriptions normally enjoy a special kind of epistemic justification when the self-ascribed mental state is of a certain type, such as a belief or a desire. Our justification for self-ascriptions of those mental stases seems to be, in some way, privileged or authoritative. In the philosophical literature, this idea is often expressed by saying that we have privileged access to our own mental states, or that our self-ascriptions constitute self-knowledge. The goal of this discussion will be to account for that fact. I will concentrate on privileged access to our own desires.[ii]
• Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive reasons: A problem for first-person authority.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, but one's self- ascriptions may lack authority. I present this new challenge from social psychology and use it to argue that first-person authority is agential authority: one's self-ascriptions are authoritative, in part anyway, because they are reliable expressions of those attitudes that govern further choices and behavior
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713629980~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2003/00000016/00000004/art00005
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/FEDR5WG7EB98H1X4.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713629980.pdf
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1994). First-person knowledge and authority.   (More)
• Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-knowledge failures and first person authority.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mmcculla/papers/skf.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00006.x
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(200203)64:2<365:SFAFPA>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3071044.pdf
  
• Colin McGinn (2004). Inverted first-person authority.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/870087/2004/00000001/00000001/art00010
  
• Chris Mortensen, Gerard O'Brien & Belinda Paterson (1993). Distinctions: Subpersonal and subconscious.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?4.62
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?article=4.62
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?split-brain.5
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Imagery011221.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel & Michael Gordon (2002). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001491/
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Echo.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000268/00/Echo000925.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001491/00/Echo000925.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~rosenblu/Mike_Gordon/EcholocationSchwitz&Gordon.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1491
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disk0/00/00/02/68/PITT-PHIL-SCI00000268-00/Echo000925.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). Why did we think we dreamed in Black and white?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the 1950s, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black and white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming assume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black and white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black and white was connected to this change in film technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can change with changes in technology, it seems to follow that our knowledge of the experience of dreaming is much less secure than we might at first have thought it to be
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1492/00/dreamb&w010430.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001492/
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/DreamB&W.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/DreamB&W020404.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000267/00/dreamb&w010430.pdf
  http://eprints1.library.pitt.edu/archive/00000267/00/dreamb&w010430.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1492
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disk0/00/00/02/67/PITT-PHIL-SCI00000267-00/dreamb&w010430.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/els/00393681/2002/00000033/00000004/art00033
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00393681/2002/00000033/00000004/art00033
  
• Ernest Sosa (2003). Privileged access.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002)

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