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8. Science of Consciousness (Science of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

• Consciousness and Neuroscience [210]
• Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness [36]
• Neural Correlates of Consciousness [20]
• Cerebral Hemispheres and Consciousness [12]
• Neural Timing and Consciousness [19]
• Neural Synchrony and Binding [33]
• Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues [35]
• Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc [23]
• First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness [96]
• Introspection and Introspectionism [40]
• Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology [7]
• Phenomenology and Consciousness [27]
• Eastern Approaches to Consciousness [9]
• First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Misc [13]
• Science of Consciousness, Miscellaneous [70]
• Consciousness and Language [12]
• Parapsychology and Consciousness [19]
• Science of Consciousness, Foundations [18]
• Science of Consciousness, Misc [21]
• Science of Visual Consciousness [150]
• Neural Correlates of Visual Consciousness [38]
• Binocular Rivalry [20]
• Visual Pathways [7]
• Change/Inattentional Blindness [55]
• Visual Imagery and Imagination [3]
• Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc [27]
• Consciousness and Psychology [243]
• Cognitive Models of Consciousness [47]
• Attention and Consciousness in Psychology [37]
• Metacognition and Consciousness [13]
• Control and Consciousness [12]
• Action and Consciousness in Psychology [25]
• Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology [32]
• Time and Consciousness in Psychology [5]
• Self-Consciousness in Psychology [29]
• Development of Consciousness [13]
• The Stream of Consciousness [13]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues [2]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Misc [15]
• Unconscious and Conscious Processes [232]
• Unconscious Perception [44]
• Conscious and Unconscious Memory [45]
• Conscious and Unconscious Learning [39]
• Consciousness and Anesthesia [12]
• Psychoanalysis and Consciousness [55]
• Unconscious Processes, Misc [31]
• Disorders and Syndromes of Consciousness [130]
• Blindsight [30]
• Neglect and Extinction [16]
• Schizophrenia [13]
• Anosognosia [9]
• The Minimally Conscious State [11]
• Vegetative State and Coma [11]
• Synesthesia [26]
• Other Disorders and Syndromes [14]
• States of Consciousness [34]
• Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming [10]
• Hypnosis and Consciousness [9]
• Meditation and Consciousness [7]
• Drugs and Consciousness [2]
• Other Altered States of Consciousness [4]
• States of Consciousness, Misc [2]
• Consciousness and Physics [95]
• Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [18]
• Quantum Mechanisms of Consciousness [54]
• Consciousness and Physics, Misc [17]
• Consciousness and Biology [67]
• Evolution of Consciousness [33]
• Animal Consciousness [23]
• Animal Self-Consciousness [8]
• Consciousness and Biology, Misc [3]

• Eric Lormand (online). Steps toward a science of consciousness?   (More)
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) ¹ claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people ( . . . ) which escape the physicalist story" (Jackson, 1986). In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness

Consciousness and Neuroscience

• Andrew Brook (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZS0eo39XOs8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA397&ots=mEvk0HqwLv&sig=-cVT4mFAkI52dc3K2fIIGS_dGVc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA397&ots=JljQlxL2Wv&sig=i_Srpcus4H70uo65_ebF6OR3pjo
  
• Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
• Axel Cleeremans & Tiago V. Maia (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/05-TICS.pdf
  
• Jeffrey W. Cooney & Michael S. Gazzaniga (2003). Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref58.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2005/curso_22.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12691764&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000004/art00058
  
• A. Dietrich (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis.   (More)
• Deborah Faulkner & Jonathan K. Foster (2002). The decoupling of "explicit" and "implicit" processing in neuropsychological disorders: Insights into the neural basis of consciousness?   (More)
• Joseph J. Fins & F. Plum (2004). Neurological diagnosis is more than a state of mind: Diagnostic clarity and impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/61/9/1354
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/extract/61/9/1354
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15364678&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=15364678&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• David Galin (2000). Comments on Epstein's neurocognitive interpretation of William James's model of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://wernicke.ccn.upenn.edu/epstein_web/Galin_reply_PUBLISHED.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11150225&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000004/art90492
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000004/art00492
  
• Rick Grush (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/dv1v0217776k1v36/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/DV1V0217776K1V36.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000153/00000003/00009100
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2006). Consciousness, neurobiology and quantum mechanics: The case for a connection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness involves phenomenal experience, self-awareness, feelings, choices, control of actions, a model of the world, etc. But what _is_ _it?_ Is consciousness something specific, or merely a byproduct of information processing? Whatever it is, consciousness is a multi-faceted puzzle. Despite enormous strides in behavioral and brain science, essential features of consciousness continue to elude explanation. Unresolved problems include: 1) Neural correlates of conscious perception apparently occur too late—150 to 500 milliseconds (msec) after impingement on our sense organs—to have causal efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions, often initiated or completed within 100 msec after sensory impingement. For example in the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/x2h1p444w0t4321v.pdf
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://bbsonline.cup.cam.ac.uk/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.pdf
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/44/bbs00000544-00/bbs.hobson.html
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://assets.cambridge.org/052181/0442/excerpt/0521810442_excerpt.pdf
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson & Edward F. Pace-Schott (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12209117&dopt=Citation
  
• Graham A. Jamieson, Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/perl/local/psyc/makedoc?id=35&type=html
  
• Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne & Richard J. Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Meditation_Neuroscience_2005_AL_JDD_RJD_2.pdf
  
• Peter Lynds (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001360/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3125
  http://cogprints.org/3125/1/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3125/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://nfist.ist.utl.pt/~mrobalo/artigos/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1996). The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/50979.html
  ftp://cs.utk.edu/pub/maclennan/JCS2/JCS2.html
  http://www.cs.utk.edu/~mclennan/anon-ftp/JCS2/JCS2.html
  
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.zainea.com/ICTPN.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/380/0/ICTPN.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/73616.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000380/
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/maclennan95investigation.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:380
  
• Tiago V. Maia & Axel Cleeremans (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/05-TICS.pdf
  http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/report/2005/neuro/11.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16005677&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305001889
  
• Christophe Menant (online). Evolution and mirror neurons. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4533/1/Charts.pdf
  
• Alain Morin (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16260154&dopt=Citation
  
• Jesse J. Prinz (2005). A neurofunctional theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/PrinzNeurofunctionaltoc.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZS0eo39XOs8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA381&ots=mEvk7FvzOu&sig=kvnhZl3W_B-TXCoZGddJLv17EZc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA381&ots=JljQsvQ5Zu&sig=-KTVW1DRE4FnOlbsl9Lk8mAgFMQ
  
• Arash Sahraie, Lawrence Weiskrantz, J. L. Barbur, Alison Simmons & M. Brammer (1997). Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing of visual signals.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/17/9406
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/17/9406?terms=consciousness
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9256495&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19970819)94:17<9406:PONAAW>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=23203
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/42617.pdf
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Multimodal neuroimaging approaches to disorders of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/abstract.00001199-200609000-00003.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16983224&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff & F. Plum (2000). The role of arousal and "gating" systems in the neurology of impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.clinicalneurophys.com/pt/re/jclnneurophys/abstract.00004691-200009000-00002.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11085547&dopt=Citation
  
• Steven Sevush (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/
  http://cogprints.org/4432/01/single_neuron_theory.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16083912&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16083912&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519305002766
  
• Ramesh Srinivasan, D. P. Russell, Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (1999). Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/13/5435
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/13/5435
  http://www.gruppomente.it/doc/sincronizzazione/increased.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10377353&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10377353&dopt=Citation
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). The Quest for consciousness: A quantum neurobiological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _ Theoretical Physics Group_ _ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory_ _ University of California_ _ Berkeley, California 94720_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.pdf
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.doc
  
• Giulio Srinivasan Tononi, Russell R & Edelman D. P. (1998). Investigating neural correlates of conscious perception by frequency-tagged neuromagnetic responses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/6/3198
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/6/3198?ijkey=rnFwYj1zbTS0M
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9501240&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9501240&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19980317)95:6<3198:INCOCP>2.0.CO;2-J
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=19719
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/44822.pdf
  
• Francisco Varela (1999). The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness.   (More)
• Semir Zeki, S. Aglioti, D. McKeefry & G. Berlucchi (1999). The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/96/24/14124
  http://www.psychology.siu.edu/reinke/psych512/steve_The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10570209&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19991123)96:24<14124:TNBOCC>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?pubmedid=10570209
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24201
  

Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness

• Bernard J. Baars, J. B. Newman & John G. Taylor (1998). Neuronal mechanisms of consciousness: A relational global workspace approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/946/00/Baars,_Newman_and_Taylor_Tucson_9x_html.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:946
  
• Bernard J. Baars (online). Why it must be consciousness - for real!   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other site in the brain that has this property, except the reticular formation in the brain stem. In contrast, huge chunks of cortex can be damaged without abolishing the STATE of consciousness. (Cortical damage does change the CONTENTS of consciousness, of course)
• Ned Block (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuroscientists continue to search for 'the' neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal- detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/final_revised_proof.pdf
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Christine_NeualCorrelatesConsciousness_TICS.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15668096&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661304003183
  
• Richard Brockman (2001). Toward a neurobiology of the unconscious.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadPDF?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/extenza/loadPDF?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/GPI/doi/abs/10.1521/jaap.29.4.601.21544
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadPDFInit?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/GPI/doi/ref/10.1521/jaap.29.4.601.21544
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadHTML?objectIDValue=21544&type=abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=11901556&dopt=citation
  
• William Clancey (1993). The biology of consciousness: Comparative review of Rosenfield and Edelman.   (More)
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9542889&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=9542889
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0003a
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/unconscious-homunculus.html
  
• Balaram Das (online). A framework for conscious information processing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0702033
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007q.bio.....2033D
  
• Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/24/14529
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/152
  http://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1436/2005/lasmaterial/f10/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.pasteur.fr/recherche/unites/neubiomol/ARTICLES/Dehaene1998.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_NeuronalWorkspaceSimulation_PNAS1998.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/24/14529?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits=20&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=consciousness&searchid=QID_NOT_SET&FIRSTINDEX=
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9826734&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19981124)95:24<14529:ANMOAG>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24407
  
• Stanislas Dehaene & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2004). Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dehaene03neural.html
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/DehaeneChangeuxChapterGazzaniga.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/Dehaene2.pdf
  
• Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~psyc203/dehaene01.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/csaba/downloads/dehaene.pdf
  http://www.kkprogram.cogpsyphy.hu/PDF_letoltes/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.jsmf.org/meetings/2003/nov/Dehaene_Cognition_2001.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/Dehaene1.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/DehaeneNaccache_WorkspaceModel_Cognition2001.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164022&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00123
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Review of Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/282/00/damasio.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/damasio.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000282/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:282
  
• Gerald M. Edelman (2001). Consciousness: The remembered present.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349421&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05711.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120754217/PDFSTART
  
• Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience.   (More)
• Bill Faw (2003). Pre-frontal executive committee for perception, working memory, attention, long-term memory, motor control, and thinking: A tutorial review.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbWS03/Faw.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbWS03/faw.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12617864&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12617864&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Fell (2004). Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: The state space approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fias.uni-frankfurt.de/~wwwphil/pub_2004_fell_identifying neural.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15522628&dopt=Citation
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Towards solving the mind-brain problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationshipbetween brain and mind remains far from clear.It is well established that the brain'scapacity to integrate information from numeroussources forms the basis for cognitiveabilities. However, the core unresolvedquestion is how information about the``objective'' physical entities of the externalworld can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can beestablished in the internal entities ofdistributed neuronal systems. The present paperoffers a unified methodological and conceptualbasis for a possible mechanism of how thetransient synchronization of brain operationsmay construct the unified and relatively stableneural states, which underlie mental states.It was shown that the sequence of metastablespatial EEG mosaics does exist and probablyreflects the rapid stabilization periods of theinterrelation of large neuron systems. At theEEG level this is reflected in thestabilization of quasi-stationary segments oncorresponding channels. Within the introducedframework, physical brain processes andpsychological processes are considered as twobasic aspects of a single whole informationalbrain state.The relations between operational process ofthe brain, mental states and consciousness arediscussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/?p=04afeb0498504429b0ba99af526242a9&pi=0
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=394191&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XT61JDMLRRQG49RN.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000003/00394191
  
• Hans Flohr (1990). Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and specific hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sptap.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/1/2/245
  
• Hans Flohr (1992). Qualia and brain processes.   (More)
• Jeffrey A. Gray (1995). The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture.   (More)
• Stephen Grossberg (2004). The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/Gro2000TICS.pdf
  
• E. Roy John (2002). The neurophysics of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12086706&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12086706&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01650173/2002/00000039/00000001/art00142
  
• Uriah Kriegel (online). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/blog/2007/02/15/pms-wips-uriah-kriegel-a-cross-order-integration-hypothesis-for-the-neural-correlate-of-consciousness/
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17509895&dopt=Citation
  
• R. Llinas (2001). Consciousness and the brain: The thalamocortical dialogue in health and disease.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349424&dopt=Citation
  
• Pete Mandik (2005). Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/zif.pdf
  
• J. B. Newman & Bernard J. Baars (1993). A neural attentional model for access to consciousness: A global workspace perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed specialized processors". Anatomical and physiological evidence are reviewed which suggest that this parallel, modular architecture is superceded by a more diffuse, tangential intracortical network capable of integrating underlying modular activites into increasingly global cognitive representations. There follows an explication of the role of this "neural global workspace" in providing the essential basis for the central control of attention and the generation of unified, conscious percepts. Finally the role of thalamic and brainstem activation systems in these integrative processes is discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000073/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:73
  
• Pavel Ortinski & Kimford J. Meador (2004). Neuronal mechanisms of conscious awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/61/7/1017
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/extract/61/7/1017
  http://www.bme.ufl.edu/documents/meador_neuronal_research.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15262731&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Parvizi & Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Consciousness and the brainstem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164026&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00127
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pcl.tuke.sk/md/veda/ramachandran three laws of qualia.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/F0020005/803
  
• Alexei V. Samsonovich & Lynn Nadel (2005). Fundamental principles and mechanisms of the conscious self.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16209330&dopt=Citation
  
• Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars (2005). Neural darwinism and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethBaars.pdf
  http://www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/ConCog2004bWeb.pdf
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/163/01/ConCog2004bWeb.pdf
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/ConCog2004bWeb.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15766895&dopt=Citation
  
• Anil K. Seth, Gerald M. Edelman, Eugene I. Izhikevich & George N. Reeke (2006). Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of these interactions. Here, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the strengths and limitations of three quantitative measures of dynamical complexity in the neural systems underlying consciousness: neural complexity, information integration, and causal density. We find that no single measure fully captures the multidimensional complexity of these systems and all have practical limitations. Our analysis suggests guidelines for the specification of alternative measures which, in combination, may improve the quantitative characterization of conscious neural systems. Given that some aspects of consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether, we conclude that a satisfactory theory is likely to be one that combines both qualitative and quantitative elements
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006PNAS..10310799S
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/28/10799
  http://www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethEtalPNAS2006.pdf
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/162/01/SethEtal_PNAS2006.pdf
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethEtalPNAS2006.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16818879&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1487169
  
• Steven Sevush (2006). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A theory is outlined that shifts the presumed locus of mind/brain interaction from the whole brain level to that of single neurons. Neuroanatomical and neurophysiological evidence is offered in support of the existence of single neurons that may individually receive dendritic input of sufficient complexity and diversity to account for the full content of conscious experience, and of an arrangement in which the output of multiple such neurons summate to achieve amplification of the individually emitted messages. An ultramicroscopic extension of the theory is suggested as a way of moving forward on the philosophically difficult aspects of the mind/brain problem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16083912&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519305002766
  
• John G. Taylor (2002). From matter to mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000004/1266
  
• Arnold Trehub (2007). Space, self, and the theater of consciousness.   (More)
• Carlo Umiltà (2000). "Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems": Response.   (More)

Neural Correlates of Consciousness

• Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2005). Beyond cartesian subjectivism: Neural correlates of shared intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  
• F. Blankenburg, C. C. Ruff, R. Deichmann, G. Rees & J. Driver (2006). The cutaneous rabbit illusion affects human primary sensory cortex somatotopically.   (More)
• Robert C. Coghill, John G. McHaffie & Ye-Fen Yen (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003PNAS..100.8538C
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/100/14/8538
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/100/14/8538?ck=nck
  http://info.med.yale.edu/neurobio/yeckel/principles_2005/Principles_05_articles/Green_3.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12824463&dopt=Citation
  
• Sander M. Daselaar, Mathias S. Fleck, Steven E. Prince & Roberto Cabeza (2006). The medial temporal lobe distinguishes old from new independently of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/26/21/5835
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16723542&dopt=Citation
  
• Antoine Del Cul, Sylvain Baillet & Stanislas Dehaene (2007). Brain dynamics underlying the nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness.   (More)
• Emrah Duzel, Andrew P. Yonelinas, G. R. Mangun, H. J. Heinze & Endel Tulving (1997). Event-related brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/11/5973
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9159185&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19970527)94:11<5973:EBPCOT>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/42187.pdf
  
• Yasuki Hashimoto & Kuniyoshi L. Sakai (2003). Brain activations during conscious self-monitoring of speech production with delayed auditory feedback: An fMRI study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.keck.ucsf.edu/~houde/coleman/hashimoto.pdf
  http://www.psych.mcgill.ca/perpg/fac/palmer/sakai03.pdf
  http://mind.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Sakai_Lab_files/Papers/SakaiLab_HBM_2003.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12953303&dopt=Citation
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hbm.10119
  
• Nancy Kanwisher (2001). Neural events and perceptual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nbu.bg/cogs/events/2002/materials/Mozer/kanwisher2001.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164024&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00125
  
• Anthony Randal McIntosh, M. Natasha Rajah & Nancy J. Lobaugh (2003). Functional connectivity of the medial temporal lobe relates to learning and awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/23/16/6520
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12878693&dopt=Citation
  
• N. Meiran, Bernhard Hommel, U. Bibi & I. Lev (2002). Consciousness and control in task switching.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Participants were required to switch among randomly ordered tasks, and instructional cues were used to indicate which task to execute. In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants indicated their readiness for the task switch before they received the target stimulus; thus, each trial was associated with two primary dependent measures: (1) readiness time and (2) target reaction time. Slow readiness responses and instructions emphasizing high readiness were paradoxically accompanied by slow target reaction time. Moreover, the effect of task switching on readiness time was an order of magnitude smaller then the (objectively estimated) duration required for task preparation (Experiment 3). The results strongly suggest that participants have little conscious awareness of their preparedness and challenge commonly accepted assumptions concerning the role of consciousness in cognitive control
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11883986&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2002/00000011/00000001/art90521
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000001/art00521
  
• Massimiliano Oliveri, Paolo Maria Rossini, Maria M. Filippi, Raimondo Traversa, Paola Cicinelli & Carlo Caltagirone (2002). Specific forms of neural activity associated with tactile space awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12060795&dopt=Citation
  
• Satu Palva, Klaus Linkenkaer-Hansen, Risto Näätänen & J. Matias Palva (2005). Early neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/21/5248
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/21/5248
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15917465&dopt=Citation
  
• C. Portas, Geraint Rees, A. Howseman, O. Josephs, R. Turner & Christopher D. Frith (1998). A specific role for the thalamus in mediating the interaction of attention and arousal in humans.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/portas98specific.html
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/18/21/8979
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/21/8979
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/21/8979
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9787003&dopt=Citation
  
• M. E. Raichle (2000). The neural correlates of consciousness: An analysis of cognitive skill learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.msu.edu/DSS/2000-2001/Raichle/NeuralCorrelates.pdf
  http://www.utdallas.edu/~npenard/FBIWG/Downloads/The neural correlates of consciousness_an analysis of cognitive skill learning.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9854261&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8436(19981129)353:1377<1889:TNCOCA>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rsl/rtb/1998/00000353/00001377/art00010
  
• Jeffrey D. Schall (2000). Investigating neural correlates of consciousness with ambiguous stimuli.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0032a
  
• Juha Silvanto (2007). Abstract Making the blindsighted see.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A lesion of striate cortex, area V1, produces blindness in the retinotopically corresponding part of the visual field, although in some cases visual abilities in the blind field remain that are paradoxically devoid of conscious visual percepts ("blindsight"). Here we demonstrate that the blindsight subject GY can experience visual sensations of phosphenes in his blind field induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Such blind field percepts could only be induced when stimulation was applied bilaterally, i.e. over GY's area V5/MT in both hemispheres. Consistent with an earlier report [Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2000). Magnetically induced phosphenes in sighted, blind and blindsighted observers. Neuroreport, 11, 3269-3273], GY never experienced phosphenes when stimulation was restricted to his ipsilesional V5/MT. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time GY has experienced visual qualia in his blind hemifield. The present report characterizes the necessary conditions for such conscious experience in his hemianopic visual field and interprets them as demonstrating that only via a contribution from GY's intact hemisphere can activation in the damaged hemisphere reach visual awareness.
• Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink (2003). Neural correlates of the first-person perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.repraesentation.uni-bremen.de/Texte/Vogeley & Fink TICS 2003.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/selfSS03/vogeley1.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/selfSS03/Vogeley1.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517357&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517357&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000001/art00003
  
• Kai Vogeley, M. May, A. Ritzl, P. Falkai, K. Zilles & Gereon R. Fink (2004). Neural correlates of first-person perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892904970799
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15200709&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2004/00000016/00000005/art00010
  
• Nancy J. Woolf (1997). A possible role for cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain and pontomesencephalon in consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~nwoolf/Woolf1997.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9479485&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000004/art00319
  

Cerebral Hemispheres and Consciousness

• M. L. Albert, R. Silverberg, A. Reches & M. Berman (1976). Cerebral dominance for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/33/6/453
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=938268&dopt=Citation
  
• B. Cucchiara, S. E. Kasner, D. A. Wolk, P. D. Lyden, V. A. Knappertz, T. Ashwood, T. Odergren & A. Nordlund (2003). Lack of hemispheric dominance for consciousness in acute ischaemic stroke.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jnnp.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/74/7/889
  http://jnnp.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/74/7/889
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12810773&dopt=Citation
  
• Jillian H. Fecteau, Alan Kingstone & James T. Enns (2004). Hemisphere differences in conscious and unconscious word reading.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15336247&dopt=Citation
  
• Guido Gainotti (2005). Emotions, unconscious processes, and the right hemisphere.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://karnacbooks.metapress.com/index/Q272JKU830360683.pdf
  
• Michael S. Gazzaniga, J. E. LeDoux & David H. Wilson (1977). Language, praxis, and the right hemisphere: Clues to some mechanisms of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=563013&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin (2002). Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one specific review of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3790/01/RHSA.pdf
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/RHSA.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003790/01/RHSA.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3790
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12435375&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000003/art00009
  
• Alain Morin (2005). Self-awareness and the left hemisphere: The dark side of selectively reviewing the literature.   (More)
• Alain Morin (2001). The split-brain debate revisited: On the importance of language and self-recognition for right hemispheric consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this commentary I use recent empirical evidence and theoretical analyses concerning the importance of language and the meaning of self-recognition to reevaluate the claim that the right mute hemisphere in commissurotomized patients possesses a full consciousness. Preliminary data indicate that inner speech is deeply linked to self-awareness; also, four hypotheses concerning the crucial role inner speech plays in self-focus are presented. The legitimacy of self-recognition as a strong operationalization of self-awareness in the right hemisphere is also questioned on the basis that it might rather tap a preexisting body awareness having little to do with an access to mental events. I conclude with the formulation of an alternative interpretation of commissurotomy according to self-awareness — a “complete” one in the left hemisphere and a “primitive” one in the right hemisphere
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2475/1/JMB.PDF
  http://cogprints.org/2475/01/JMB.PDF
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002475/
  http://ideas.repec.org/a/hom/homoec/v18y2002p523-534.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2475
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2475
  
• Stephen D. Smith & M. Barbara Bulman-Fleming (2004). A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15223188&dopt=Citation
  
• Roger W. Sperry (1964). Brain bisection and mechanisms of consciousness.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry, E. Zaidel & D. Zaidel (1979). Self recognition and social awareness in the deconnected minor hemisphere.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two patients with cerebral commissurotomy were tested with visual input lateralized to left or right half of the visual field by an opaque hemifield screen set in the focal plane of an optical system mounted on a scleral contact lens which allowed prolonged exposure and ocular scanning of complex visual arrays. Key personal and affect-laden stimuli along with items for assessing general social knowledgability were presented among neutral unknowns in visual arrays with 4-9 choices. Selective manual and associated emotional responses obtained from the minor hemisphere to pictures of subject's self, relatives, pets and belongings, and of public, historical and religious figures and personalities from the entertainment world revealed a characteristic social, political, personal and self-awareness comparable roughly to that of the major hemisphere of the same subject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1247/00/Self-Recognition.PDF
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001247/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001247/00/Self-Recognition.PDF
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1247
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=379688&dopt=Citation
  
• Lucina Q. Uddin, Jan Rayman & Eran Zaidel (2005). Split-brain reveals separate but equal self-recognition in the two cerebral hemispheres.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16091274&dopt=Citation
  

Neural Timing and Consciousness

• David J. Chalmers (online). Determining the moment of consciousness? Commentary on Valerie Hardcastle.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course this is a very large and significant role for it to play, but it may be over-optimistic to suppose that it can play some further explanatory role, taking us where information-processing theories cannot. If so, then neurophysiological accounts will be no more and no less successful at dealing with consciousness than information-processing accounts are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/notes/hardcastle-comments.html
  
• Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/264/00/time&obs.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/50/
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/05-06/cogs200/dennett&kinsbourne.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000264/00/time&obs.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:264
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtFxJw&sig=NuvhlOy-qlQ25CLlLkKyUD_M44g
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzEqLp&sig=1SCWU7sPJ7Inbppt7ZjX-s7lH60
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICHsLu&sig=bAKJB3pL1Iu-DBySuzLwA6QQRdI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBDtDu&sig=ml4NBpCWPpH2VRPRW-FGFvYsl88
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyDtKw&sig=Pfs53KXrMr3NiqacqU5To-PKsyk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHsKt&sig=YLmTMIPKbc9GzApVDCJyw8K3ncM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAFwGw&sig=mqA1eKUcGXXeA6jcegHOaA_o1HE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIpIx&sig=IFMORl44INzpeJKG0ysCkqD1xYg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzJwGq&sig=3aXZKyTv4O4_VC5MEXa2OxTzviY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJrJp&sig=PydxIL0HYSYP7qvfNKrFBmCFLkE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAGoDq&sig=MXGCSpE5sFSRHfvNoYJ0FZFuVIg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHuLs&sig=dbFnFSn9YGFEMzlbcQtuAzWJ5sE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIrEw&sig=TBZY4NtD0lCnuRZ_sw2jKioD3Eo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtGpKr&sig=JRJWPEytuzEm2W1RPaKS7aCKcYo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyDxJx&sig=pnrLrtb_r1INKPt-7It-kbhxwiU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBDuEu&sig=ypOoszCSt0vDttfhgMAeS2R9qd8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzEvJq&sig=K0Md58kq9ahMAg6f-Ffqv3iaMA4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICHwIp&sig=jBo126iYNYzsVZa2El8Yu8hThtI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJtJx&sig=Cqogc3jeaoPceo6D4jPVENN0GpI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzKqCx&sig=CmCkYl9aeVfa7rUbu66JLGbLV-o
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzKtGw&sig=AqzmZehz_4S-LIfYTM59NP5KPtc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBEoCs&sig=uWBwxCh6nyFrXoxBAz09qqdQLi8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHvLr&sig=A0luOVKgCrJ_OOAhsFs1fhq6NWQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJxFp&sig=qggtgf7icUkWU76tXcX4NMpKrGs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtGrDs&sig=Fbnh6iLWYxrOAkh5V-MgSjWDEpQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIuEs&sig=blxw58dXbS4kkHcQkjTHyS1xWm4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAGrIp&sig=DcgRgV9vbWpOMJMtPBstQvAB8nY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICIoDv&sig=nsT726R8Bl4oyHzLeLVEYOrVVmw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzFoKv&sig=d8pysz9qpbLn5rYVSwTJVMZvpNs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyEsEx&sig=BRT0N9p--AGx9m6UoFvL1rLHc8o
  
• Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191945&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00566
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2006). Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: Discreteness versus continuity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16832687&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/056l567g0k3v95p1/
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/056L567G0K3V95P1.pdf
  
• I. M. Glynn (1990). Consciousness and time.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v348/n6301/abs/348477a0.html
  
• Gilberto Gomes (1999). Volition and the readiness potential.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them
• Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are mental events preceded by their physical causes?   (More)
• Patrick Haggard & Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Conscious intention and brain activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~duck/ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000011/1238
  
• Ted Honderich (ms). Is the mind ahead of the brain? Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet.   (More)
• Ted Honderich (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the mind ahead of the brain? Behind it?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as

  _neural_

  _adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_ .⁵ This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary or lawlike connection, and also certain identity theories of mind and brain, as well as determinist theories
• Ted Honderich (1984). The time of a conscious sensory experience and mind-brain theories.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6492822&dopt=Citation
  
• Markus Kiefer & Manfred Spitzer (2000). Time course of conscious and unconscious semantic brain activation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200008030-00013.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10943693&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=20397609&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=10943693&dopt=citation
  
• Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Klein-Commentary.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191943&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00557
  
• S. A. Klein (2002). Libet's temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Libet_temporal_anomalies-a_reassessment_of_the_data.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191937&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00573
  
• Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Klein-Commentary_on_the_commentaries.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00569
  
• Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (2002). The timing of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191938&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00558
  
• Judy A. Trevena & Jeff G. Miller (2002). Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00548
  
• Fred Alan Wolf (1998). The timing of conscious experience: A causality-violating interpretation.   (More)

Neural Synchrony and Binding

• F. Tito Arecchi (2003). Chaotic neuron dynamics, synchronization, and feature binding: Quantum aspects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004PhyA..338..218A
  http://www.pv.infn.it/~frontier/2003/talks/Arecchi_testo.doc
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0378437104002407
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KBJ5JFCQW44UHRXA.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Antonio R. Damasio (1989). The brain binds entities and events by multiregional activation from convergence zones.   (More)
• Sam M. Doesburg, Keiichi Kitajo & Lawrence M. Ward (2005). Increased gamma-band synchrony precedes switching of conscious perceptual objects in binocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200508010-00001.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16012336&dopt=Citation
  
• Andreas K. Engel, P. Fries, P. Kreiter Konig, M. Brecht & Wolf Singer (1999). Does time help to understand consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl/dspace/handle/2066/17348
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17348
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90400
  
• Andreas K. Engel, P. Fries, P. Kreiter Konig, M. Brecht & Wolf Singer (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called ''binding problem'' may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl/dspace/handle/2066/17353
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17353
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17349
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10447995&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90389
  
• Pascal Fries, Pieter R. Roelfsema, Andreas K. Engel & Wolf Singer (1997). Synchronization of oscillatory responses in visual cortex correlates with perception in interocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1997PNAS...9412699F
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/23/12699
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17352
  http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~peterk/OwnPapers/fries.pnas.97.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.uos.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/Fries.PNAS.97.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/23/12699?ijkey=MKBrLfZrttINA
  http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/Fries.PNAS.97.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19971111)94:23<12699:SOORIV>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=25091
  
• H. D. R. Golledge, C. C. Hilgetag & M. J. Tovee (1996). Information processing: A solution to the binding problem.   (More)
• P. Kreiter Konig & Andreas K. Engel (1995). Correlated firing in sensory-motor systems.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7488854&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09594388/1995/00000005/00000004/art80013
  
• P. Kreiter Konig, Andreas K. Engel & Wolf Singer (1995). Relation between oscillatory activity and long-range synchronization in cat visual cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/92/1/290
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7816836&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19950103)92:1<290:RBOAAL>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=42864
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2366546.pdf
  
• Peter Lipton (1998). Binding the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Several of the essays in this collection discuss the `binding problem', the problem of explaining in neurophysiological terms how it is that we see the various perceptual qualities of a physical object, such as its shape, colour, location and motion, as features of a single object. The perceived object seems to us a unitary thing, but its sensory properties are diverse and turn out to be processed in different areas of the brain. How then does the brain manage the integration? Readers of the essays in this collection may find themselves suffering from an analogous binding problem about the study of consciousness, though this problem is conceptual rather than perceptual, and here the difficulty is to achieve the integration rather than to understand how an effortless integration is achieved. Consciousness is the ideal topic for inter-disciplinary investigation. It is a central concern of such diverse disciplines as neurophysiology, evolutionary biology, psychology, cognitive science, philosophy and theology, among others, yet none of these disciplines has come close to providing full answers to the central questions that consciousness raises. Inter-disciplinary investigation seems an obvious way forward, but it generates the conceptual binding problem that this collection displays. The standard of the essays is very high, but it is extraordinarily difficult to integrate their content into anything like a single picture. We are all apparently talking about the same phenomenon, the conscious awareness of the world that each of us enjoys first-hand, but it is quite unclear how to see the very different things we say about this phenomenon as part of a single picture, or even as parts of different but compatible pictures. Having raised the binding problem for the inter-disciplinary study of consciousness, I hasten to say that I will not attempt even a partial substantive solution here: that is left as an exercise for the readers of this book.
• Antoine Lutz, Jacques Martinerie, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Francisco J. Varela (2002). Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first- person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• Kimford J. Meador, P. G. Ray, J. R. Echauz, D. W. Loring & G. J. Vachtsevanos (2002). Gamma coherence and conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/59/6/847?ck=nck
  http://www.bme.ufl.edu/documents/meador_gamma_research.pdf
  http://academic.evergreen.edu/curricular/scc/ArticlesForFallProjects/GammaConsciousSensoryPerceptionData.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12297565&dopt=Citation
  
• J. I. Nelson (1995). Binding in the visual system.   (More)
• R. C. O'Reilly, R. Busby & R. Soto (2003). Three forms of binding and their neural substrates: Alternatives to temporal synchrony.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psych-www.colorado.edu/~oreilly/papers/OReillyBusbySoto01_binding.pdf
  
• W. Amiri Prinzmetal (1981). Principles of feature integration in visual perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7322810&dopt=Citation
  
• A. Revonsuo & J. B. Newman (1999). Binding and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10447994&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90393
  
• Antti Revonsuo (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionable search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a part of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empirical work that builds on such a theoretical foundation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10448000&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90384
  
• Lynn C. Robertson (2003). Binding, spatial attention and perceptual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12563280&dopt=Citation
  
• Adina L. Roskies (1999). The binding problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (von der Malsburg, 1981), “the binding problem” has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per- sue’s prominence in these fields, what “binding” means cepts. In addition, there are cognitive binding problems: is rarely made explicit. In this paper, I will briefly survey they include relating a concept to a percept, such as the many notions of binding and will introduce some linking the visual representation of an apple to all the issues that will be explored more fully in the reviews semantic knowledge stored about it (it is edible, how it that follow
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~adinar/publications/binding.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10677022&dopt=Citation
  
• Lokendra Shastri (2002). Episodic memory and cortico-hippocampal interactions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/shastri02episodic.html
  http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~shastri/psfiles/ShastriTicsEM02.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arb/Shastri2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11912039&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000004/art01868
  
• L. Shastri & V. Ajjanagadde (1993). From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony.   (More)
• A. M. Sillito, H. E. Jones, G. L. Gerstein & D. C. West (1994). Feature-linked synchronization of thalamic relay cell firing induced by feedback from the visual cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1038/369479a0
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v369/n6480/abs/369479a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=94261180&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8202137&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8202137&dopt=Books
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=94261180&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8202137&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Wolf Singer (2001). Consciousness and the binding problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/Np/PUBS/ZARAGOZA.PDF
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/Np/Pubs/zaragoza.pdf
  http://www.psych.nmsu.edu/~jkroger/lab/courses/articles/Singer_concsiousness.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349422&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05712.x
  
• Wolf Singer (1993). Synchronization of cortical activity and its putative role in information processing and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://physiol.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8466179&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8466179&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Wolf Singer & Charles M. Gray (1995). Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neuro.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7605074&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7605074&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=7605074&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Ramesh Srinivasan (2004). Internal and external neural synchronization during conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.worldscinet.com/ijbc/14/1402/S0218127404009399.html
  
• Mircea Steriade, D. A. McCormick & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). Thalamocortical oscillations in the sleeping and aroused brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/262/5134/679
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;262/5134/679
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8235588&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8235588&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• M. Stryker (1989). Is grandmother an oscillation?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v338/n6213/abs/338297a0.html
  
• Christopher Summerfield, Anthony Ian Jack & Adrian Philip Burgess (2002). Induced gamma activity is associated with conscious awareness of pattern masked nouns.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11909644&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S016787600200003X
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01678760/2002/00000044/00000002/art00003
  
• Anne Treisman (1980). A feature integration theory of attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1980-04685-001
  http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/class/Psy355/Gilden/treisman.pdf
  http://art-mind.org/review/IMG/pdf/Treisman-Gelade_1980_Feature-Integration-Theory__SD__CogPsy_.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?Db=pubmed&Cmd=ShowDetailView&TermToSearch=7351125&ordinalpos=6&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7351125&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=7351125&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Anne Treisman (1996). The binding problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8725958&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09594388/1996/00000006/00000002/art80070
  
• Christoph von der Malsburg (1995). Binding in models of perception and brain function.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The development of the issue of binding as fundamental to neural dynamics has made possible recent advances in the modeling of difficult problems of perception and brain function. Among them is perceptual segmentation, invariant pattern recognition and one-shot learning. Also, longer-term conceptual developments that have led to this success are reviewed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1486/00/Mal1995a.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001486/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1486
  http://firstsearch.oclc.org/fsip?sici=0959-4388(19950801)5:4<520:BIMOPA>2.0.TX;2-D&format=HTML&gsid=03aef2acc24645555b960c6667c5aa36c989677b9c7266beb1f26f54ccea2341b25ad62413ec651f242b6e1a86f111ac3d27e0cf1f9e24a1a19afeb4da09e526
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7488855&dopt=Citation
  
• Leo R. Ward (2003). Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://euryale.sbs.umass.edu/psych/modeling_course/Ward_TICS_2003.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/Ref71.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref71.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14643372&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14643372&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000012/art00289
  

Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues

• Dieter Birnbacher (2006). Causal interpretations of correlations between neural and conscious events.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a causal interpretation on epiphenomenalist lines, both for reasons of metaphysical parsimony and for reasons of coherence with established physical principles such as the conservation of energy. In the concluding chapter, some of the philosophical and the empirical challenges following from this model are outlined, the most important being closer scrutiny of the neurophysiological processes accompanying conscious volition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/F0020001/art00006
  
• Ned Block (web). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/puzzle.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Block-09282006.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Block_BBS.pdf
  
• Ned Block (2001). How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000228/00/199712001.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/NeuralCorrelate.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:228
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8931266&dopt=Citation
  
• Ned Block (1998). How to find the neural correlate of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000228/00/199712001.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/NeuralCorrelate.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:228
  
• Ned Block (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuroscientists continue to search for 'the' neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal- detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/final_revised_proof.pdf
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Christine_NeualCorrelatesConsciousness_TICS.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15668096&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661304003183
  
• David J. Chalmers (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Chalmers, 1996). ]]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000227/
  http://consc.net/papers/ncc.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/227/0/199711001.html
  http://consc.net/papers/ncc.html
  http://cogprints.org/227/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:227
  
• David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/ncc2.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc2.html
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Chalmers2000.pdf
  
• Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA309&ots=JljTspK-Zz&sig=bPi-xVEVBkAvYyvHEx5l3S0Zl54
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727182509~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L803131023766655.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727182509.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000005/art00001
  
• Philip Clapson (2001). Consciousness: The organismic approach.   (More)
• Austen Clark (forthcoming). Vicissitudes of consciousness, varieties of correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ajp.press.uiuc.edu/116/1/clark.html
  
• Axel Cleeremans & John Haynes (1999). Correlating consciousness: A vew from empirical science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program — the search for the “Neural Correlates of Consciousness” — holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechner´s (1860) so-called “inner psychophysics”. Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. In this paper, we explore some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties of this approach. In both neurobiology and psychology, there are serious measurement problems that stand in the way of correlation research, even after the “hard problem” has been set aside. Thus, even if one had identified certain internal functional states as indicators of phenomenal states, the empirical psychologist would still be confronted with fundamental problems, such as determining the absence or presence of these functional states. In this respect, philosophy of science may help and provide a metatheoretical framework for the current interdisciplinary project
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans99correlating.html
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2003). A framework for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.hnl.bcm.tmc.edu/jli/reference/29.pdf
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/crick-koch-03.pdf
  http://ftp.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/dana/KochCrick.pdf
  https://www.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/dana/KochCrick.pdf
  http://cbcl.mit.edu/projects/cbcl/publications/ps/crick-koch-03.pdf
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/concourse/900/articles/CrickKochNN03.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbSS03/Crick.pdf
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0003a
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/unconscious-homunculus.html
  
• Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a neural correlate can function as an explanation of consciousness: Evidence from the history of science regarding the likely explanatory value of the NCC approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on work in the history and philosophy of science, I argue that this assumption - along with the related claim that even a correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness - is grounded in an inadequate conception of the way in which scientific explanations develop. Examination of parallel developments in 20th century biology reveals that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude correspondences can play an essential role in scientific discovery and can sometimes become central to our everyday understanding of the phenomena in question. A proper understanding of this process clarifies the value of NCC theories and sheds light on the standards by which they should be evaluated. In closing, I describe two specific criteria for evaluating NCC proposals: intertheoretic bridge potential and detailed mapping
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/F0020004/art00005
  
• Walter J. Freeman (1997). Three centuries of category errors in studies of the neural basis of consciousness and intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/freeman97three.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310098CI
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662509&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12662509&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00054
  
• Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness.   (More)
• T. Hamanaka (1997). The concept of consciousness in the history of neuropsychiatry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hpy.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/31/361.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11619583&dopt=Citation
  
• Rudolf Hernegger (ms). Changes of paradigm in consciousness research.   (More)
• Jakob Hohwy (2007). The search for neural correlates of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view the correlation as evidence for identity between conscious states and brain states. The common ground therefore seems to be that the scientific search for the NCC is largely independent of the metaphysics of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00086.x
  
• Susan L. Hurley & No (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/HurleyNoe.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-on-block.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-neural-plasticity.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h40w1228242762k4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5109518&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H40W1228242762K4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2003/00000018/00000001/05109518
  
• Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noe (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to Block.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley¹¹¹¹ andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë²²²²
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/HurleyNoe.pdf
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/npc.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-on-block.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-neural-plasticity.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/noehurleyreply.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12907228&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12907228&dopt=Citation
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5109518&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H40W1228242762K4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2003/00000018/00000001/05109518
  
• Ray S. Jackendoff (2000). Unconscious, yes; homunculus,???   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0017a
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0017a
  
• Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Conscious and unconscious mental activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0021a
  
• Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered: particularly the structures of temporality. In a second Hazeltine et al., Neural activation during response competi- interpretive approach, artificial neural networks were used tion; Ishai et al., The representation of objects in the human to detect a more explicit prediction from phenomenology, occipital and temporal cortex; Mechelli et al., The effects of namely, that present experience contains and is inflected by presentation rate during word and pseudoword reading; and past states of awareness and anticipated events. In all of 21 Postle et al., Activity in human frontal cortex associated with subjects in this analysis, nets were successfully trained to spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. The study of extract aspects of relative past and future brain states, in consciousness also draws from multiple disciplines. In this comparison with statistically similar controls. This exploratory article, the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology study thus concludes that the proposed methods for provides initial characterization of phenomenal structures ‘‘neurophenomenology’’ warrant further application, includ- conceptually necessary for an analysis of consciousness. These ing the exploration of individual differences, multivariate structures include phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal differences between cognitive task conditions, and explora- superposition, and experienced temporality..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.trincoll.edu/~dlloyd/fmri&consciousness.pdf.pdf
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892902760191027
  http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Lloyd_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Lloyd_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191448&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00002
  
• Pete Mandik (2007). The neurophilosophy of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the core philosophical issues of phenomenal conscious construe consciousness largely in terms of representations in neural networks associated with certain processes of attention and memory
• Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/evant/NCC.pdf
  http://people.ucsc.edu/~anoe/NCC.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/NCC.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/NCC.pdf
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/NCC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/cogsci/papers/NCC.pdf
  
• Jaak Panksepp (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2000/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Geraint Rees (2001). Seeing is not perceiving.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11426216&dopt=Citation
  
• D. Smith (2000). Freudian science of consciousness: Then and now.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1975). In search of psyche.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1952). Neurology and the mind-brain problem.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1968). Psychobiology and vice versa.   (More)
• Arnold S. Tannenbaum (2006). Consciousness and the self-sensing brain: Implications for feeling and meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16841778&dopt=Citation
  
• Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://biologie.kappa.ro/Literature/Misc_cogsci/articole/conscience/varela01.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11707380&dopt=Citation
  
• Ruediger Vaas (1999). Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/t0000009.htm
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/t0000009.htm
  

Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc

• Giorgio A. Ascoli (2000). The complex link between neuroanatomy and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/1099-0526(200009/10)6:1<20::AID-CPLX1003>3.3.CO;2-5
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/1099-0526(200009/10)6:1<20::AID-CPLX1003>3.0.CO;2-E
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/76509579/PDFSTART
  
• Bernard J. Baars (1998). The Neural Basis of Conscious Experience.   (More)
• M. Bernhaut, E. Gellhorn & A. T. Rasmussen (1953). Experimental contributions to the problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=13035465&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=13035465&dopt=Citation
  
• Massimo Bondi & Manuele Bondi (1998). The role of synaptic junctions in the identification of human consciousness.   (More)
• Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher (online). Unity and disunity in bodily awareness: Phenomenology and neuroscience.   (More)
• Diego J. Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Evan Thompson (2007). Neurodynamics of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1992). The problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciamdigital.com/gsp_qpdf.cfm?ISSUEID_CHAR=4E3B6963-3358-4EBE-9524-A7CFD3F328A&ARTICLEID_CHAR=52501561-76CF-4CEC-85E9-ECA62A3745A
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1502517&dopt=Citation
  
• Richard Cytowic (1995). Synesthesia: Phenomenology and neuropsychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-10-syn_phenomenology-1-cytowic.html
  
• Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/24/14529
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/152
  http://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1436/2005/lasmaterial/f10/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.pasteur.fr/recherche/unites/neubiomol/ARTICLES/Dehaene1998.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_NeuronalWorkspaceSimulation_PNAS1998.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/24/14529?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits=20&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=consciousness&searchid=QID_NOT_SET&FIRSTINDEX=
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9826734&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19981124)95:24<14529:ANMOAG>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24407
  
• Matthew Donald (1995). The neurobiology of human consciousness: An evolutionary approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7501131&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/1995/00000033/00000009/art00050
  
• Christopher D. Frith (1992). Consciousness, information processing, and the brain.   (More)
• Vittorio Gallese (2005). Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unipr.it/~gallese/P&CS2005.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m334wq727688472u/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M334WQ727688472U.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000001/00004737
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher.   (More)
• Michael S. Gazzaniga & Shaun Gallagher (1998). The neuronal platonist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
• Stephen Jones (online). Introduction to the physiology of ordinary consciousness.   (More)
• Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Ute Strehl, Herta Flor & Niels Birbaumer (2002). Can humans perceive their brain states?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although the brain enables us to perceive the external world and our body, it remains unknown whether brain processes themselves can be perceived. Brain tissue does not have receptors for its own activity. However, the ability of humans to acquire self-control of brain processes indicates that the perception of these processes may also be achieved by learning. In this study patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs). In particular ''probe'' sessions, the patients estimated the quality of the SCP shift they had produced in the preceding trial. The correspondence between the recorded SCP amplitudes and the subjective estimates increased with training. The ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring. These data provide evidence that humans can learn to perceive the neural activity of their brain. Alternative interpretations are discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11883990&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2002/00000011/00000001/art90535
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000001/art00535
  
• Arthur I. Miller (2007). Unconscious thought, intuition, and visual imagery: A critique of "working memory, cerebellum, and creativity".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1080/10400410701277456
  
• Greg Miller (2005). What is the biological basis of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summary/sci;309/5731/79
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15994525&dopt=Citation
  
• Ken Mogi (online). Creativity and the neural basis of qualia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In what computational aspect is the brain different from the computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be “creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of "externality" that adds new ingredients to the system and its output. We argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality". We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities (qualia) is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/creativity.pdf
  
• Ken Mogi (1997). Qualia and the brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/qualia-summary.pdf
  
• A. Salazar, Vance S. Grafman J. & Ludlow Dillon J. D. (1986). Consciousness and amnesia after penetrating head injury: Neurology and anatomy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=3945388&dopt=Citation
  
• Wolf Singer (2000). Phenomenal awareness and consciousness from a neurobiological perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/np/Pubs/metzinger.pdf
  
• John G. Taylor (2002). Paying attention to consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14698766&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11983583&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14698766&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000005/art01890
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03010082/2003/00000071/00000004/art00179
  

First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness

Introspection and Introspectionism

• William Y. Adams (online). Introspectionism reconsidered.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (2003). Is introspection inferential?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] as red. How do I come to know, as I shall sometimes put it, that I am seeing red?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/aydede01is.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=R6ipHOjEhNIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&ots=GbLStNx8B-&sig=qqdVXA_74-wpGY5ey_Iai1mdv_s
  
• Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain in the tradition of direct realist perceptual theories (e.g., Dretske, Tye) leaves out something crucial about the phenomenology of pain experiences, namely, their affective character. I touch upon the role that introspection plays in such representationalist views, and indicate how it contributes to the source of their trouble vis-à-vis bodily sensations. The paper ends by briefly commenting on the relation between the affective/evaluative component of pain and the hedonic valence of emotions
• Peter Carruthers (ms). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won’t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn’t (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren’t introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called “dual systems theories” of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
• Quassim Cassam (2004). Introspection, perception, and epistemic privilege.   (More)
• Barry F. Dainton (2004). Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/dainton/gilmore-r.pdf
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/dainton/gilmore-r.html
  http://www.doaj.org/goto/psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/dainton/gilmore-r.html
  http://web.mac.com/barrydainton1/Research/Papers_files/Unity and Introspectibility.pdf
  
• John B. Dilworth (2006). Perception, introspection, and functional consonance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. On such a Cartesian view, our introspective certainly about our own thoughts extends also to our perceptual experiences as to how things seem to be to us, so that our resulting introspective beliefs about our phenomenal states also count as knowledge of them
• Brie Gertler (2003). How to draw ontological conclusions from introspective data.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method of knowing one’s own mental states, and not just self-directed attention. But the more restrictive use is standard, and provides the topic of the current entry.) As we will see, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists doubt that any such introspective process underlies self-knowledge
• Cody S. Gilmore (2003). The introspectibility thesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v9/psyche-9-05-gilmore.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/dainton/gilmore.html
  http://www.doaj.org/goto/psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/dainton/gilmore.html
  
• Gary Hatfield (2005). Introspective evidence in psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications, ed. by Peter Achinstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkine University Press, 2005), 259–86. Key words: introspection, psychology of perception, Wundt, Gestalt Psychology
• Frank Hofmann (online). The epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the ‘introspective mode of mind’. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one’s environment in the mode of ‘taking one’s appearances at face value’. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed
• Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2002). Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12140083&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000008/art01941
  
• Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tony.jack.googlepages.com/JackShallice2001.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ628446
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/
  http://cogprints.org/1252/0/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1252/00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1252
  http://www.nil.wustl.edu/labs/corbetta/personnel/ajack_files/Jack_and_Shallice2001.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001252/00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/cog00001252-00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164027&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00128
  
• Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/310/5745/116
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=2006071644990SO
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/310/5745/116?ijkey=37s7YmVD4RY.I&keytype=
  ref&siteid=sci
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/People/petter.johansson/Papers/Johansson et al [2005] Failure to detect mismatches
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16210542&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• William S. Larkin (ms). A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (More)
• William G. Lycan (2002). Dretske's ways of introspecting.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=R6ipHOjEhNIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA15&dq=+Dretske's+ways+of+introspecting+Lycan&ots=GbLSrIyavY&sig=-kzXPAXVEoA4p_Wucj6eT6j1hbw
  
• Edouard Machery (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001954/01/BJPS_Instrospection.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/04/46/ijn_00000446_00/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/56/3/469?ijkey=uDjjrRt1XJAIbaF&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469?ijkey=0W190KJ1t6SNyL6&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/3/469
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2005/00000056/00000003/art00469
  
• Pete Mandik (2006). The introspectibility of brain states as such.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
• James Moore & Patrick Haggard (2006). Commentary on How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17071108&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin & James Everett (1991). Self-awareness and introspective private speech in 6-year-old children.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002561/
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/Privatespeech.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002561/01/Privatespeech.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2561
  
• Eddy A. Nahmias (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness: Reconsidering introspectionist methodology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states
• Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman (2002). Measuring pain: An introspective look at introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://studentfiles.evergreen.edu/Programs/SCC/Methods/ArticlesForFallProjects/CausalModelingSubjectiveReports.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470624&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00019
  
• Shaun Nichols (2000). The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.² But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.³ In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.⁴ In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
• Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199406)54:2<315:BBSATL>2.0.CO;2-W
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2108491.pdf
  
• Derk Pereboom (web). Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy.   (More)
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9-10 (2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that when properly understood and handled, introspective reports are a legitimate source of public scientific data
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Data From Introspective Reports.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00011
  
• Gualtiero Piccinini (online). Mind gauging: Introspection as a public epistemic resource.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Introspection used to be excluded from science because it isn?t public--for any question about mental states, only the person whose states are in question can answer by introspecting. However, we often use introspective reports to gauge each other?s minds, and contemporary psychologists generate data from them. I argue that some uses of introspection are as public as any scientific method
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000497/00/Publicityofintrospection_phil-sci.doc
  
• Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020007/art00009
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2005). Difference tone training: A demonstration adapted from Titchener's experimental psychology.   (More)
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030221.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020007/art00005
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective training: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030221.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030124.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (ms). The unreliability of naive introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/Naive.htm
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Naive050617.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Naive021111.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002965/01/Schwitzgebel060921.doc
  
• William E. Seager (2000). Introspection and the elementary acts of mind.   (More)
• Peter Slezak (2002). Thinking about thinking: Language, thought and introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mcox.org/introspect/Slezak-Thinking_Language.pdf
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2002/Slezak_Thinking_2002.doc
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2002/Slezak_Thinking_2002.pdf
  http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps/hps_core_links/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/Slezak-Thinking_Language.pdf
  http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps/sts_core_links/sts_staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/Slezak-Thinking _ Language.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/02715309/2002/00000022/00000003/art00012
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1912). The schema of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9556(191210)23:4<485:TSOI>2.0.CO;2-U
  
• Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness.   (More)
• Margaret Washburn (1921). Introspection as an objective method.   (More)
• Timothy D. Wilson (2003). Knowing when to ask: Introspection and the adaptive unconscious.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00010
  

Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology

• Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained.   (More)
• R. Hurlburt & C. L. Heavey (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports about awareness.   (More)
• Eddy A. Nahmias (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness: Reconsidering introspectionist methodology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states
• Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ163657
  http://depts.washington.edu/methods/readings/Nisbett_1977.pdf
  
• Morten Overgaard (2001). The role of phenomenological reports in experiments on consciousness.   (More)
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9-10 (2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that when properly understood and handled, introspective reports are a legitimate source of public scientific data
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Data From Introspective Reports.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00011
  
• Max Velmans (2007). Heterophenomenology vs. critical phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4741/01/HP_versus_CP_for_web.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k5115485h2247861/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K5115485H2247861.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/F0020001/00009033
  

Phenomenology and Consciousness

• Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli (2005). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.   (More)
• John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, consciousness and intentional relations: From constitutive phenomenology to cognitive science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch's constitutive phenomenology
• Steven Ravett Brown (1999). Beyond the fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the conscious horizon.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: All our conscious experiences, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are bound up with and dependent on a background that is vague, unexpressed, and sometimes unconscious. The combination of William JamesÕs concept of "fringes" coupled with Aaron GurwitschÕs analysis of the field of consciousness provides a general structure in which to embed phenomenal descriptions, enabling fringe phenomena to be understood, in part, relative to other experiences. I will argue, drawing on examples from Drew LederÕs book, The Absent Body, that specific and detailed phenomena can and should be interrelated through JamesÕs and GurwitschÕs analyses. I am proposing first that phenomenological descriptions in general could benefit from explicit consideration of the context of the phenomena within the totality of the field of consciousness, and second, that establishing that context requires a general structural model of that field, similar to that provided by Gurwitsch
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1000/0/James&Fringes.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001000/
  http://www.ravett.com/articles/uploads/55/James&Fringes.doc
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/10/00/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1000
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1000
  
• Steven Ravett Brown (2004). Structural Phenomenology: An Empirically-Based Model of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions of experiences may be organized. The work of Husserl, Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologists, and many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists reveals several basic parameters underlying subjectivity. Chapter I argues that Husserlian methodology possesses problems both of praxis and of internal logic, and that its phenomenological descriptions cannot have the certainty he claimed. Consequently, an adequate phenomenology must incorporate empirical studies. This conclusion enables explicit transitions between empirical investigations and phenomenological insights. Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework underlying my model. I identify four parameters applicable to all experiences: 1) the degree of volitional emphasis with which something is experienced, i.e., the intensity of our focus on it, 2) the degree of non-volitional emphasis, i.e., the degree to which it is salient, 3) a variant of intentionality I term “directionality”, and 4) the property of recursion. Experiences are embedded within a complex set of relationships that unify and direct a layered phenomenal structure. I support these claims with evidence discovered over the past two centuries of research. Chapter III applies my model to the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, in which difficulty remembering is accompanied by a sense of active searching. I show that a phenomenological description of the TOT experience is dependent on cognitive data, and that a phenomenological analysis is necessary to properly interpret these data. By showing how structural phenomenology offers a perspective from which to elucidate the results of experimental studies, I hope to clarify and establish the explicit role of introspection in empiricism, and of empiricism in phenomenology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3061
  
• Taylor Carman (2005). On the inescapability of phenomenology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=1xVtpfQ-8dQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA67&ots=CoKcBPcd61&sig=HEga1bcEGYd_pahpnSgddCW-5Cw
  
• Joshua W. Clegg (2006). Phenomenology as foundational to the naturalized consciousness.   (More)
• Christian de Quincey (2000). Intersubjectivity: Exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective.   (More)
• Hubert L. Dreyfus (ms). A phenomenology of skill acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian nonrepresentational cognitive science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/MerleauPontySkillCogSci.pdf
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/MerleauPontySkillCogSci.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Dreyfus - NonRepresentationalist Cognitive Science.pdf
  
• Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). The primacy of phenomenology over logical analysis: A critique of Searle.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/pdf/Primacy_of_Phenomenology.pdf
  
• Shaun Gallagher (1997). Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/00000003/759
  
• Shaun Gallagher (online). Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who do not even want to consider the usefulness of phenomenology for enlightening the sciences of the mind. For them cognitive science is simply too computational or too reductionistic to be seriously considered as capable of explaining experience or consciousness. [1] This is surprising in light of the fact that a highly respected phenomenologist like Merleau-Ponty was integrating phenomenological analyses with considerations drawn from the empirical sciences of psychology and neurology long before cognitive science was constructed as a framework to include just those aspects of psychology and neurology that focus on cognitive experience. Merleau-Ponty aside, philosophers on both sides of this issue have only gradually come to acknowledge the possibility that phenomenology may be directly relevant for a scientific understanding of cognition. Sometimes the empirical scientists themselves have arrived at this conclusion even before, and in spite of the philosophers. Francisco Varela's work on neurophenomenology provides an important example (Varela, 1996). Even the hardest of hard scientists have made peace offerings to phenomenology. Recently, for example, the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux declares that his purpose "is not to go to war against phenomenology; to the contrary, [he wants] to see what constructive contribution it can make to our knowledge of the psyche, acting in concert with the neurosciences" (Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000, p. 85)
• Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher.   (More)
• Shaun Gallagher & F. Varela (2003). Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences.   (More)
• David Galin (1996). The structure of subjective experience: Sharpen the concepts and terminology.   (More)
• Edmund G. Husserl (1937). The way into phenomenological transcendental philosophy from psychology.   (More)
• Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper foocuses on_ _neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues_ _about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person_ _reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person_ _reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an ‘ex-_ _planatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-_ _logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/JCS-Lutz_Thompson.pdf
  
• Antoine Lutz (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/PCS_128_Lutz6_july_02.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t71j601386222163/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5094054&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T71J601386222163.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2002/00000001/00000002/05094054
  
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.zainea.com/ICTPN.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/380/0/ICTPN.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/73616.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000380/
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/maclennan95investigation.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:380
  
• Wayne M. Martin (2005). Bubbles and skulls: The phenomenological structure of self-consciousness in dutch still-life painting.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I investigate the representation of self-consciousness in the still life tradition in the Netherlands around the time of Descartes’ residence there. I treat the paintings of this tradition as both a phenomenological resource and as a phenomenological undertaking in their own right. I begin with an introductory overview of the still life tradition, with particular attention to semiotic structures characteristic of the vanitas still life. I then focus my analysis on the representation of self-consciousness in this tradition, identifying both a Cartesian mode of representation of self-consciousness but also a counter trend
• John R. Searle (2000). Limits of phenomenology.   (More)
• Joel Smith (2005). Merleau-ponty and the phenomenological reduction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signify a rejection of the epoché. A proper _ _understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology shows that, at _ _least in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are _ _largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau-Ponty accepted _ _Husserl’s demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727729475~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L844534G72R7M411.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727729475.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/sinq/2005/00000048/00000006/art00004
  
• Evan Thompson (2001). Empathy and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/Thompson.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/evant/ETJCSEmpathy.pdf
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/Empathy.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/F0030005/1215
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/f0030005
  
• Evan Thompson (2004). Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco Varela.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r12u3175417q1w77/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5384113&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R12U3175417Q1W77.pdf
  
• Evan Thompson (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as ‘cognitive science’, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical and embodied approaches - whose underlying conceptions of mentality and its relation to biology, on the one hand, and to culture, on the other, are often strikingly different (see Clark, 2001, for a useful overview)
• Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What is it like to imagine or visualize something, and how is this type of experience different from perception? How is bodily experience related to self-consciousness? Such issues have been addressed in detail in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and developed by numerous other philosophers throughout the 20^th century. This chapter provides an introduction to this tradition and its way of approaching issues about consciousness. We first discuss some features of phenomenological methodology and then present some of the most important, influential, and enduring phenomenological proposals about various aspects of consciousness. These aspects include intentionality, self-awareness and the first-person perspective, time-consciousness, embodiment, and intersubjectivity. We also highlight a few ways of linking phenomenology and cognitive
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/ThompsonZahavi.pdf
  
• Dan Zahavi (2007). Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/654wl23366126312/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/654WL23366126312.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/F0020001/00009038
  
• Dan Zahavi (2004). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g247844rq20v6415/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5384112&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G247844RQ20V6415.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2004/00000003/00000004/05384112
  

Eastern Approaches to Consciousness

• Henk Barendregt (online). Buddhist phenomenology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/han