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8. Science of Consciousness (Science of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

• Consciousness and Neuroscience [235]
• Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness [38]
• Neural Correlates of Consciousness [26]
• Cerebral Hemispheres and Consciousness [12]
• Neural Timing and Consciousness [16]
• Neural Synchrony and Binding [35]
• Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues [38]
• Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc [32]
• Disorders and Syndromes of Consciousness [137]
• Blindsight [32]
• Neglect and Extinction [16]
• Schizophrenia [13]
• Anosognosia [9]
• The Minimally Conscious State [11]
• Vegetative State and Coma [15]
• Synesthesia [26]
• Other Disorders and Syndromes [15]
• States of Consciousness [38]
• Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming [10]
• Hypnosis and Consciousness [9]
• Meditation and Consciousness [9]
• Drugs and Consciousness [3]
• Other Altered States of Consciousness [5]
• States of Consciousness, Misc [2]
• Consciousness and Physics [124]
• Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [19]
• Quantum Mechanisms of Consciousness [57]
• Consciousness and Physics, Misc [21]
• Consciousness and Biology [71]
• Evolution of Consciousness [35]
• Animal Consciousness [27]
• Animal Self-Consciousness [7]
• Consciousness and Biology, Misc [2]
• First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness [122]
• Introspection and Introspectionism [55]
• Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology [12]
• Phenomenology and Consciousness [29]
• Eastern Approaches to Consciousness [8]
• First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Misc [18]
• Science of Consciousness, Miscellaneous [72]
• Consciousness and Language [13]
• Parapsychology and Consciousness [19]
• Science of Consciousness, Foundations [18]
• Science of Consciousness, Misc [21]
• Science of Visual Consciousness [167]
• Neural Correlates of Visual Consciousness [36]
• Binocular Rivalry [22]
• Visual Pathways [8]
• Change/Inattentional Blindness [59]
• Visual Imagery and Imagination [16]
• Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc [26]
• Consciousness and Psychology [252]
• Cognitive Models of Consciousness [46]
• Attention and Consciousness in Psychology [38]
• Metacognition and Consciousness [13]
• Control and Consciousness [12]
• Action and Consciousness in Psychology [25]
• Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology [39]
• Time and Consciousness in Psychology [6]
• Self-Consciousness in Psychology [29]
• Development of Consciousness [14]
• The Stream of Consciousness [14]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues [2]
• Consciousness and Psychology, Misc [14]
• Unconscious and Conscious Processes [332]
• Unconscious Perception [43]
• Conscious and Unconscious Memory [153]
• Conscious and Unconscious Learning [39]
• Consciousness and Anesthesia [14]
• Psychoanalysis and Consciousness [53]
• Unconscious Processes, Misc [30]

• Eric Lormand (online). Steps toward a science of consciousness?   (More)
• Leslie Marsh, Review essay: Dennett's sweet dreams philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The question of how a physical system gives rise to the phenomenal or experiential (olfactory, visual, somatosensitive, gestatory and auditory), is considered the most intractable of scientific and philosophical puzzles. Though this question has dominated the philosophy of mind over the last quarter century, it articulates a version of the age-old mind–body problem. The most famous response, Cartesian dualism, is on Daniel Dennett’s view still a corrosively residual and redundant feature of popular (and academic) thinking on these matters. Fifteen years on from his anti-Cartesian theory of consciousness (Consciousness Explained, 1991), Dennett’s frustration with this tradition is still palpable. This frustration is primarily aimed at philosophers. The “Sweet Dreams” of Dennett’s title are the rationalist thought experiments of wishful thinking philosophers who, neglectful or unaware of empirical evidence, generate premature conclusions “of unexamined presuppositions and circularly defined elaborations”.
• Justin Sytsma (2009). Phenomenological obviousness and the new science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers hold not only that it is but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article. †To contact the author, please write to: 1414 Simona Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15201; e‐mail: jmsytsma@gmail.com
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004383/01/Phenomenological_Obviousness_and_the_New_Science.pdf
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/605821
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) ¹ claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people ( . . . ) which escape the physicalist story" (Jackson, 1986). In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness
• Max Velmans (ms). A reflexive science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this model the external phenomenal world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart-from it. Observed events are only "public" in the sense of "private experience shared." Scientific observations are only "objective" in the sense of "intersubjective." Observed phenomena are only "repeatable" in the sense that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for "tokens" of the same event "type." This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Indeed, events out-there in the world can often be regarded as either physical or psychological depending on the network of relationships under consideration

Consciousness and Neuroscience

• Andrew Brook (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZS0eo39XOs8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA397&ots=mEvk0HqwLv&sig=-cVT4mFAkI52dc3K2fIIGS_dGVc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA397&ots=JljQlxL2Wv&sig=i_Srpcus4H70uo65_ebF6OR3pjo
  
• Patricia Churchland (ms). A neurophilosophical slant on consciousness research.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Explaining the nature and mechanisms of conscious experience in neurobiological terms seems to be an attainable, if yet unattained, goal. Research at many levels is important, including research at the cellular level that explores the role of recurrent pathways between thalamic nuclei and the cortex, and research that explores consciousness from the perspective of action. Conceptually, a clearer understanding of the logic of expressions such as ‘‘causes’’ and ‘‘correlates’’, and about what to expect from a theory of consciousness are required. The logic of some terms, such as ‘‘qualia’’ and ‘‘reductionism’’, continues to generate misunderstandings about the scientific possibilities and limits. Experimentally, a deeper understanding of the role of the thalamus in coordinating activity across cortical levels, and a readiness to reconsider the orthodox approach to thalamocortical organization are also required
• Axel Cleeremans & Tiago V. Maia (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-
• Jeffrey W. Cooney & Michael S. Gazzaniga (2003). Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref58.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2005/curso_22.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12691764&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000004/art00058
  
• A. Dietrich (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis.   (More)
• Deborah Faulkner & Jonathan K. Foster (2002). The decoupling of "explicit" and "implicit" processing in neuropsychological disorders: Insights into the neural basis of consciousness?   (More)
• Joseph J. Fins & F. Plum (2004). Neurological diagnosis is more than a state of mind: Diagnostic clarity and impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/61/9/1354
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/extract/61/9/1354
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15364678&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=15364678&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• David Galin (2000). Comments on Epstein's neurocognitive interpretation of William James's model of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://wernicke.ccn.upenn.edu/epstein_web/Galin_reply_PUBLISHED.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11150225&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000004/art90492
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000004/art00492
  
• Rick Grush (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/dv1v0217776k1v36/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/DV1V0217776K1V36.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000153/00000003/00009100
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2006). Consciousness, neurobiology and quantum mechanics: The case for a connection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness involves phenomenal experience, self-awareness, feelings, choices, control of actions, a model of the world, etc. But what _is_ _it?_ Is consciousness something specific, or merely a byproduct of information processing? Whatever it is, consciousness is a multi-faceted puzzle. Despite enormous strides in behavioral and brain science, essential features of consciousness continue to elude explanation. Unresolved problems include: 1) Neural correlates of conscious perception apparently occur too late—150 to 500 milliseconds (msec) after impingement on our sense organs—to have causal efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions, often initiated or completed within 100 msec after sensory impingement. For example in the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/x2h1p444w0t4321v.pdf
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://bbsonline.cup.cam.ac.uk/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.pdf
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/44/bbs00000544-00/bbs.hobson.html
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://assets.cambridge.org/052181/0442/excerpt/0521810442_excerpt.pdf
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson & Edward F. Pace-Schott (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12209117&dopt=Citation
  
• Graham A. Jamieson, Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/perl/local/psyc/makedoc?id=35&type=html
  
• Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne & Richard J. Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Meditation_Neuroscience_2005_AL_JDD_RJD_2.pdf
  
• Peter Lynds (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001360/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3125
  http://cogprints.org/3125/1/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3125/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003125/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3125/1/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_%2D_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001360/01/Subjective_Perception_of_Time_and_a_Progressive_Present_Moment_-_The_Neurobiological_Key_to_Unlocking_Consciousness.pdf
  
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1996). The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/50979.html
  ftp://cs.utk.edu/pub/maclennan/JCS2/JCS2.html
  http://www.cs.utk.edu/~mclennan/anon-ftp/JCS2/JCS2.html
  
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.zainea.com/ICTPN.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/380/0/ICTPN.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/73616.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000380/
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/maclennan95investigation.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:380
  
• Tiago V. Maia & Axel Cleeremans (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/report/2005/neuro/11.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16005677&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305001889
  
• Christophe Menant (online). Evolution and mirror neurons. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4533/1/Charts.pdf
  
• Alain Morin (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16260154&dopt=Citation
  
• Jesse J. Prinz (2005). A neurofunctional theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/PrinzNeurofunctionaltoc.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZS0eo39XOs8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA381&ots=mEvk7FvzOu&sig=kvnhZl3W_B-TXCoZGddJLv17EZc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA381&ots=JljQsvQ5Zu&sig=-KTVW1DRE4FnOlbsl9Lk8mAgFMQ
  
• Arash Sahraie, Lawrence Weiskrantz, J. L. Barbur, Alison Simmons & M. Brammer (1997). Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing of visual signals.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/17/9406
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/17/9406?terms=consciousness
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9256495&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19970819)94:17<9406:PONAAW>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=23203
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/42617.pdf
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Multimodal neuroimaging approaches to disorders of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/abstract.00001199-200609000-00003.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16983224&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff & F. Plum (2000). The role of arousal and "gating" systems in the neurology of impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.clinicalneurophys.com/pt/re/jclnneurophys/abstract.00004691-200009000-00002.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11085547&dopt=Citation
  
• Anil K. Seth, Zoltan Dienes, Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard & Luiz Pessoa, Measuring consciousness: Relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications
• Steven Sevush (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/
  http://cogprints.org/4432/01/single_neuron_theory.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16083912&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16083912&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519305002766
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt%2D9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/4432/1/single_neuron_theory.htm
  
• Steven Sevush (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt%2D9html.htm
  
• Ramesh Srinivasan, D. P. Russell, Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (1999). Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/13/5435
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/13/5435
  http://www.gruppomente.it/doc/sincronizzazione/increased.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10377353&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10377353&dopt=Citation
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). The Quest for consciousness: A quantum neurobiological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _ Theoretical Physics Group_ _ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory_ _ University of California_ _ Berkeley, California 94720_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.doc
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.pdf
  
• Giulio Srinivasan Tononi, Russell R & Edelman D. P. (1998). Investigating neural correlates of conscious perception by frequency-tagged neuromagnetic responses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/6/3198
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/6/3198?ijkey=rnFwYj1zbTS0M
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9501240&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9501240&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19980317)95:6<3198:INCOCP>2.0.CO;2-J
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=19719
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/44822.pdf
  
• John D. Dunne, Antione Lutz & Richard Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: An introduction.   (More)
• Francisco Varela (1999). The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness.   (More)
• Max Velmans, The limits of neuropsychological models of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Necessary Ingredients of Consciousness: Integration of Psychophysical, Neurophysiological, and Consciousness Research for the Red-Green Channel.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A general definition of consciousness is: ‘consciousness is a mental aspect of a system or a process, which is a conscious experience, a conscious function, or both depending on the context’, where the term context refers to metaphysical views, constraints, specific aims, and so on. One of the aspects of visual consciousness is the visual subjective experience (SE) or the first person experience that occurs/emerges in the visual neural-network of thalamocortical system (which includes dorsal and ventral visual pathways and frontal cortex) during dynamic interactions among widely distributed neuronal groups. In this article, however, consciousness and SE are interchangeably used unless noted. Consciousness can be either access (reportable) or phenomenal consciousness. For access consciousness, the interactions are between feed forward stimulus dependent signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals. The necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness are (i) wakefulness, (ii) reentrant interactions among neural populations, (iii) fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness, (iv) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (v) stimulus at or above threshold level, and (vi) neural-network proto-experiences (PEs) that are superposed SEs embedded in a neural-network. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. The neural source for the arousal system is the ascending reticular activating system in the brain stem, which brings the thalamocortical neural networks to wakeful state as a baseline for consciousness to occur. Reentrant interactions among neural populations bind stimulus attributes (such as location and features) and entail consciousness. Attention could be the results of reentry and competitive interactions, and modulates the stimulus related feed forward signal and consciousness. The ‘sources’ of attention may be thalamic reticular nucleus for bottom-up or frontal cortex for top-down direction. The ‘target’ of visual attention is ‘V4/V8/VO’ for Red-Green (R-G) channel. The neural correlates of the psychophysical entity R-G channel appear to be ‘V4/V8/VO’-neural-network (retina → LGN ↔ V1 ↔ V2 ↔ ‘V4/V8/VO’, and areas for attention, memory, and wakefulness). The psychophysical Red-Green Channel, its neurophysiological correlates V4/V8/VO-neural-network, and related experience (such as redness) are integrated. The dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, J Integr Neurosci 7:49–73, 2008) was used to address the explanatory gap problem of materialism. Neural-network and related SEs are the results of the co-evolution and co-development of the material aspect (mass, charge, spin, force, quanta, and space-time) and the mental aspect of fundamental particles (strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons)). Their mental aspects are considered as the carriers of superposed multiple possible experiences (SEs/PEs) in unexpressed form. These possibilities are actualized when neural-networks are formed via neural Darwinism, and a specific SE is selected by a matching process when the necessary ingredients of consciousness/SE are satisfied. A simple experimental design is suggested to address the necessary and sufficient attributes of consciousness.
• Rodrick Wallace, Consciousness, cognition, and the hierarchy of context: Expanding the global neuronal workspace.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Adapting Dretske's approach on the necessary conditions for mental process, we apply a communication theory analysis of interacting cognitive biological and social modules to the global neuronal workspace, the emerging standard model for consciousness. Using an obvious canonical homology with statistical physics, the method, when iterated, generates a fluctuating dynamic threshold recognizably similar to phase transition in a physical system, but constrained to a manifold/atlas structure analogous to a tunable retina. The resulting 'General Cognitive Model' can be extended in a straightforward manner to include the effects of psychosocial stress, culture, or other cognitive modules which constitute a structured, embedding hierarchy of contextual constraints acting at a slower rate than neuronal function itself. This produces a 'biopsychosociocultural' treatment of consciousness that, while otherwise remarkably similar to the standard development, meets compelling philosophical and other objections to brain-only descriptions
• Semir Zeki, S. Aglioti, D. McKeefry & G. Berlucchi (1999). The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/96/24/14124
  http://www.psychology.siu.edu/reinke/psych512/steve_The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10570209&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19991123)96:24<14124:TNBOCC>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?pubmedid=10570209
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24201
  

Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness

• Bernard J. Baars, J. B. Newman & John G. Taylor (1998). Neuronal mechanisms of consciousness: A relational global workspace approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/946/00/Baars,_Newman_and_Taylor_Tucson_9x_html.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:946
  
• Bernard J. Baars (online). Why it must be consciousness - for real!   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other site in the brain that has this property, except the reticular formation in the brain stem. In contrast, huge chunks of cortex can be damaged without abolishing the STATE of consciousness. (Cortical damage does change the CONTENTS of consciousness, of course)
• Richard Brockman (2001). Toward a neurobiology of the unconscious.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadPDF?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/extenza/loadPDF?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/GPI/doi/abs/10.1521/jaap.29.4.601.21544
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadPDFInit?objectIDValue=21544
  http://www.extenza-eps.com/GPI/doi/ref/10.1521/jaap.29.4.601.21544
  http://www.atypon-link.com/extenza/loadHTML?objectIDValue=21544&type=abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=11901556&dopt=citation
  
• William Clancey (1993). The biology of consciousness: Comparative review of Rosenfield and Edelman.   (More)
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1998). Consciousness and neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9542889&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=9542889
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0003a
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/unconscious-homunculus.html
  
• Balaram Das (online). A framework for conscious information processing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0702033
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007q.bio.....2033D
  
• Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/24/14529
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/152
  http://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1436/2005/lasmaterial/f10/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.pasteur.fr/recherche/unites/neubiomol/ARTICLES/Dehaene1998.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_NeuronalWorkspaceSimulation_PNAS1998.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/24/14529?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits=20&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=consciousness&searchid=QID_NOT_SET&FIRSTINDEX=
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9826734&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19981124)95:24<14529:ANMOAG>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24407
  
• Stanislas Dehaene & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2004). Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dehaene03neural.html
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/DehaeneChangeuxChapterGazzaniga.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/Dehaene2.pdf
  
• Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~psyc203/dehaene01.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/csaba/downloads/dehaene.pdf
  http://www.kkprogram.cogpsyphy.hu/PDF_letoltes/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.jsmf.org/meetings/2003/nov/Dehaene_Cognition_2001.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/Dehaene1.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/DehaeneNaccache_WorkspaceModel_Cognition2001.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164022&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00123
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (ms). Review of Damasio, Descartes' error.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively recent usurper of control, whose functions cannot properly be understood until we see it not as the boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious servant, working to further the interests of the body that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities meaning. This historical or evolutionary perspective reminds me of the change that has come over Oxford in the thirty years since I was a student there. It used to be that the dons were in charge, while the bursars and other bureaucrats, right up to the Vice Chancellor, acted under their guidance and at their behest. Nowadays the dons, like their counterparts on American university faculties, are more clearly in the role of employees hired by a central Administration, but from where, finally, does the University get its meaning? In evolutionary history, a similar change has crept over the administration of our bodies. Where resides the "I" who is in charge of my body? In his wonderfully written book, Antonio Damasio seeks to restore our appreciation for the perspective of the body, and the shared balance of powers from which we emerge as conscious persons
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/282/00/damasio.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/damasio.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000282/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:282
  http://cogprints.org/282/0/damasio.htm
  
• Gerald M. Edelman (2001). Consciousness: The remembered present.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349421&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05711.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120754217/PDFSTART
  
• Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience.   (More)
• Bill Faw (2003). Pre-frontal executive committee for perception, working memory, attention, long-term memory, motor control, and thinking: A tutorial review.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbWS03/Faw.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbWS03/faw.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12617864&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12617864&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Fell (2004). Identifying neural correlates of consciousness: The state space approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fias.uni-frankfurt.de/~wwwphil/pub_2004_fell_identifying neural.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15522628&dopt=Citation
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingerlkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=394191&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XT61JDMLRRQG49RN.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000003/00394191
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/?p=04afeb0498504429b0ba99af526242a9&pi=0
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
• Hans Flohr (1990). Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and specific hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/2/245
  
• Hans Flohr (1992). Qualia and brain processes.   (More)
• Jeffrey A. Gray (1995). The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture.   (More)
• Stephen Grossberg (2004). The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/Gro2000TICS.pdf
  
• E. Roy John (2002). The neurophysics of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12086706&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12086706&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01650173/2002/00000039/00000001/art00142
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/COI.pdf
  
• David Christopher Lane (online). Is My I-Phone Conscious: Throwing a Sound Grenade at Believers and Skeptics.   (More)
• R. Llinas (2001). Consciousness and the brain: The thalamocortical dialogue in health and disease.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349424&dopt=Citation
  
• Pete Mandik (2005). Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/zif.pdf
  
• J. B. Newman & Bernard J. Baars (1993). A neural attentional model for access to consciousness: A global workspace perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed specialized processors". Anatomical and physiological evidence are reviewed which suggest that this parallel, modular architecture is superceded by a more diffuse, tangential intracortical network capable of integrating underlying modular activites into increasingly global cognitive representations. There follows an explication of the role of this "neural global workspace" in providing the essential basis for the central control of attention and the generation of unified, conscious percepts. Finally the role of thalamic and brainstem activation systems in these integrative processes is discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000073/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:73
  
• Pavel Ortinski & Kimford J. Meador (2004). Neuronal mechanisms of conscious awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/61/7/1017
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/extract/61/7/1017
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15262731&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Parvizi & Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Consciousness and the brainstem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164026&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00127
  
• Frederic Peters (2010). Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self-Location.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately (and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending self-regulation into behavioral interaction with the environment: an orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing interaction in terms of controllable spatiotemporal parameters, and processing architecture that relates behavior to homeostatic needs via feedback. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged the emergence of anticipative feedforward processing mechanisms, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive self-locational schema processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness-as-subjectivity.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://precedings.nature.com/documents/2444/version/2
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pcl.tuke.sk/md/veda/ramachandran three laws of qualia.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/F0020005/803
  
• Alexei V. Samsonovich & Lynn Nadel (2005). Fundamental principles and mechanisms of the conscious self.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16209330&dopt=Citation
  
• Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars (2005). Neural darwinism and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/ConCog2004bWeb.pdf
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/ConCog2004bWeb.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15766895&dopt=Citation
  
• Anil K. Seth, Gerald M. Edelman, Eugene I. Izhikevich & George N. Reeke (2006). Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of these interactions. Here, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the strengths and limitations of three quantitative measures of dynamical complexity in the neural systems underlying consciousness: neural complexity, information integration, and causal density. We find that no single measure fully captures the multidimensional complexity of these systems and all have practical limitations. Our analysis suggests guidelines for the specification of alternative measures which, in combination, may improve the quantitative characterization of conscious neural systems. Given that some aspects of consciousness are likely to resist quantification altogether, we conclude that a satisfactory theory is likely to be one that combines both qualitative and quantitative elements
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006PNAS..10310799S
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/28/10799
  http://www.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethEtalPNAS2006.pdf
  http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/seth/Papers/SethEtalPNAS2006.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16818879&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1487169
  
• Steven Sevush (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A theory is outlined that shifts the presumed locus of mind/brain interaction from the whole brain level to that of single neurons. Neuroanatomical and neurophysiological evidence is offered in support of the existence of single neurons that may individually receive dendritic input of sufficient complexity and diversity to account for the full content of conscious experience, and of an arrangement in which the output of multiple such neurons summate to achieve amplification of the individually emitted messages. An ultramicroscopic extension of the theory is suggested as a way of moving forward on the philosophically difficult aspects of the mind/brain problem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003891/01/snt-9html.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16083912&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519305002766
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt-9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3891/1/snt%2D9html.htm
  http://cogprints.org/4432/1/single_neuron_theory.htm
  
• John G. Taylor (2002). From matter to mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000004/1266
  
• Arnold Trehub (2007). Space, self, and the theater of consciousness.   (More)
• Carlo Umiltà (2000). "Conscious experience depends on multiple brain systems": Response.   (More)

Neural Correlates of Consciousness

• Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.
• Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2005). Beyond cartesian subjectivism: Neural correlates of shared intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000007/art00002
  
• F. Blankenburg, C. C. Ruff, R. Deichmann, G. Rees & J. Driver (2006). The cutaneous rabbit illusion affects human primary sensory cortex somatotopically.   (More)
• Richard Brown (2006). What is a brain state?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/T06P873L0724307V.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/759246431.pdf
  
• Robert C. Coghill, John G. McHaffie & Ye-Fen Yen (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003PNAS..100.8538C
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/100/14/8538
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/100/14/8538?ck=nck
  http://info.med.yale.edu/neurobio/yeckel/principles_2005/Principles_05_articles/Green_3.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12824463&dopt=Citation
  
• Sander M. Daselaar, Mathias S. Fleck, Steven E. Prince & Roberto Cabeza (2006). The medial temporal lobe distinguishes old from new independently of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/26/21/5835
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16723542&dopt=Citation
  
• Antoine Del Cul, Sylvain Baillet & Stanislas Dehaene (2007). Brain dynamics underlying the nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness.   (More)
• Emrah Duzel, Andrew P. Yonelinas, G. R. Mangun, H. J. Heinze & Endel Tulving (1997). Event-related brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/11/5973
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9159185&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19970527)94:11<5973:EBPCOT>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/42187.pdf
  
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert “downward” causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from “explanation” to “description” of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingerlkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=394191&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XT61JDMLRRQG49RN.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000003/00394191
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/?p=04afeb0498504429b0ba99af526242a9&pi=0
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.
• Yasuki Hashimoto & Kuniyoshi L. Sakai (2003). Brain activations during conscious self-monitoring of speech production with delayed auditory feedback: An fMRI study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.keck.ucsf.edu/~houde/coleman/hashimoto.pdf
  http://www.psych.mcgill.ca/perpg/fac/palmer/sakai03.pdf
  http://mind.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Sakai_Lab_files/Papers/SakaiLab_HBM_2003.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12953303&dopt=Citation
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hbm.10119
  
• Nancy Kanwisher (2001). Neural events and perceptual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nbu.bg/cogs/events/2002/materials/Mozer/kanwisher2001.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164024&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00125
  
• G. Kreiman, I. Fried & Christof Koch (2002). Single-neuron correlates of subjective vision in the human medial temporal lobe.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2002PNAS...99.8378K
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/99/12/8378
  http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:KREpnas02
  http://authors.library.caltech.edu/966/01/KREpnas02.pdf
  http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=123075
  http://cbcl.mit.edu/projects/cbcl/publications/ps/pnas-2002-kreiman.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(20020611)99:12<8378:SCOSVI>2.0.CO;2-O
  
• Anthony Randal McIntosh, M. Natasha Rajah & Nancy J. Lobaugh (2003). Functional connectivity of the medial temporal lobe relates to learning and awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/23/16/6520
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12878693&dopt=Citation
  
• N. Meiran, Bernhard Hommel, U. Bibi & I. Lev (2002). Consciousness and control in task switching.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Participants were required to switch among randomly ordered tasks, and instructional cues were used to indicate which task to execute. In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants indicated their readiness for the task switch before they received the target stimulus; thus, each trial was associated with two primary dependent measures: (1) readiness time and (2) target reaction time. Slow readiness responses and instructions emphasizing high readiness were paradoxically accompanied by slow target reaction time. Moreover, the effect of task switching on readiness time was an order of magnitude smaller then the (objectively estimated) duration required for task preparation (Experiment 3). The results strongly suggest that participants have little conscious awareness of their preparedness and challenge commonly accepted assumptions concerning the role of consciousness in cognitive control
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11883986&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2002/00000011/00000001/art90521
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000001/art00521
  
• Massimiliano Oliveri, Paolo Maria Rossini, Maria M. Filippi, Raimondo Traversa, Paola Cicinelli & Carlo Caltagirone (2002). Specific forms of neural activity associated with tactile space awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12060795&dopt=Citation
  
• Satu Palva, Klaus Linkenkaer-Hansen, Risto Näätänen & J. Matias Palva (2005). Early neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/21/5248
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/21/5248
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15917465&dopt=Citation
  
• C. Portas, Geraint Rees, A. Howseman, O. Josephs, R. Turner & Christopher D. Frith (1998). A specific role for the thalamus in mediating the interaction of attention and arousal in humans.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/portas98specific.html
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/18/21/8979
  http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/21/8979
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/21/8979
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9787003&dopt=Citation
  
• M. E. Raichle (2000). The neural correlates of consciousness: An analysis of cognitive skill learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.msu.edu/DSS/2000-2001/Raichle/NeuralCorrelates.pdf
  http://www.utdallas.edu/~npenard/FBIWG/Downloads/The neural correlates of consciousness_an analysis of cognitive skill learning.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9854261&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8436(19981129)353:1377<1889:TNCOCA>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rsl/rtb/1998/00000353/00001377/art00010
  
• Jeffrey D. Schall (2000). Investigating neural correlates of consciousness with ambiguous stimuli.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0032a
  
• Juha Silvanto (2007). Abstract Making the blindsighted see.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A lesion of striate cortex, area V1, produces blindness in the retinotopically corresponding part of the visual field, although in some cases visual abilities in the blind field remain that are paradoxically devoid of conscious visual percepts ("blindsight"). Here we demonstrate that the blindsight subject GY can experience visual sensations of phosphenes in his blind field induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Such blind field percepts could only be induced when stimulation was applied bilaterally, i.e. over GY's area V5/MT in both hemispheres. Consistent with an earlier report [Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2000). Magnetically induced phosphenes in sighted, blind and blindsighted observers. Neuroreport, 11, 3269-3273], GY never experienced phosphenes when stimulation was restricted to his ipsilesional V5/MT. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time GY has experienced visual qualia in his blind hemifield. The present report characterizes the necessary conditions for such conscious experience in his hemianopic visual field and interprets them as demonstrating that only via a contribution from GY's intact hemisphere can activation in the damaged hemisphere reach visual awareness.
• Justin Sytsma, Searching for evidence of phenomenal consciousness in ncc research.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent scientific work aiming to give a neurobiological explanation of phenomenal consciousness has largely focused on finding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The hope is that by locating neural correlates of phenomenally conscious mental states, some light will be cast on how the brain is able to give rise to such states. In this paper I argue that NCC research is unable to produce evidence of such neural correlates. I do this by considering two alternative interpretations of NCC research—an eliminativist and a disjunctivist interpretation. I show that each of these interpretations is compatible with the scientific data and yet is more parsimonious than accounts involving the supposed phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness
• Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink (2003). Neural correlates of the first-person perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.repraesentation.uni-bremen.de/Texte/Vogeley & Fink TICS 2003.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/selfSS03/vogeley1.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/selfSS03/Vogeley1.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517357&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12517357&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000001/art00003
  
• Kai Vogeley, M. May, A. Ritzl, P. Falkai, K. Zilles & Gereon R. Fink (2004). Neural correlates of first-person perspective as one constituent of human self-consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892904970799
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15200709&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2004/00000016/00000005/art00010
  
• Nancy J. Woolf (1997). A possible role for cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain and pontomesencephalon in consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9479485&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1997/00000006/00000004/art00319
  

Cerebral Hemispheres and Consciousness

• M. L. Albert, R. Silverberg, A. Reches & M. Berman (1976). Cerebral dominance for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/33/6/453
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=938268&dopt=Citation
  
• B. Cucchiara, S. E. Kasner, D. A. Wolk, P. D. Lyden, V. A. Knappertz, T. Ashwood, T. Odergren & A. Nordlund (2003). Lack of hemispheric dominance for consciousness in acute ischaemic stroke.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jnnp.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/74/7/889
  http://jnnp.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/74/7/889
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12810773&dopt=Citation
  
• Jillian H. Fecteau, Alan Kingstone & James T. Enns (2004). Hemisphere differences in conscious and unconscious word reading.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15336247&dopt=Citation
  
• Guido Gainotti (2005). Emotions, unconscious processes, and the right hemisphere.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://karnacbooks.metapress.com/index/Q272JKU830360683.pdf
  
• Michael S. Gazzaniga, J. E. LeDoux & David H. Wilson (1977). Language, praxis, and the right hemisphere: Clues to some mechanisms of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=563013&dopt=Citation
  
• Alain Morin (2002). Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one specific review of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of a right hemispheric self-awareness. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3790/01/RHSA.pdf
  http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/RHSA.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003790/01/RHSA.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3790
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12435375&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000003/art00009
  
• Alain Morin (2005). Self-awareness and the left hemisphere: The dark side of selectively reviewing the literature.   (More)
• Alain Morin (2001). The split-brain debate revisited: On the importance of language and self-recognition for right hemispheric consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this commentary I use recent empirical evidence and theoretical analyses concerning the importance of language and the meaning of self-recognition to reevaluate the claim that the right mute hemisphere in commissurotomized patients possesses a full consciousness. Preliminary data indicate that inner speech is deeply linked to self-awareness; also, four hypotheses concerning the crucial role inner speech plays in self-focus are presented. The legitimacy of self-recognition as a strong operationalization of self-awareness in the right hemisphere is also questioned on the basis that it might rather tap a preexisting body awareness having little to do with an access to mental events. I conclude with the formulation of an alternative interpretation of commissurotomy according to self-awareness — a “complete” one in the left hemisphere and a “primitive” one in the right hemisphere
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2475/1/JMB.PDF
  http://cogprints.org/2475/01/JMB.PDF
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002475/
  http://ideas.repec.org/a/hom/homoec/v18y2002p523-534.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2475
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2475
  
• Stephen D. Smith & M. Barbara Bulman-Fleming (2004). A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15223188&dopt=Citation
  
• Roger W. Sperry (1964). Brain bisection and mechanisms of consciousness.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry, E. Zaidel & D. Zaidel (1979). Self recognition and social awareness in the deconnected minor hemisphere.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two patients with cerebral commissurotomy were tested with visual input lateralized to left or right half of the visual field by an opaque hemifield screen set in the focal plane of an optical system mounted on a scleral contact lens which allowed prolonged exposure and ocular scanning of complex visual arrays. Key personal and affect-laden stimuli along with items for assessing general social knowledgability were presented among neutral unknowns in visual arrays with 4-9 choices. Selective manual and associated emotional responses obtained from the minor hemisphere to pictures of subject's self, relatives, pets and belongings, and of public, historical and religious figures and personalities from the entertainment world revealed a characteristic social, political, personal and self-awareness comparable roughly to that of the major hemisphere of the same subject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1247/00/Self-Recognition.PDF
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001247/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001247/00/Self-Recognition.PDF
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1247
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=379688&dopt=Citation
  
• Lucina Q. Uddin, Jan Rayman & Eran Zaidel (2005). Split-brain reveals separate but equal self-recognition in the two cerebral hemispheres.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16091274&dopt=Citation
  

Neural Timing and Consciousness

• David J. Chalmers (online). Determining the moment of consciousness? Commentary on Valerie Hardcastle.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course this is a very large and significant role for it to play, but it may be over-optimistic to suppose that it can play some further explanatory role, taking us where information-processing theories cannot. If so, then neurophysiological accounts will be no more and no less successful at dealing with consciousness than information-processing accounts are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/notes/hardcastle-comments.html
  
• Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/264/00/time&obs.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/50/
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/05-06/cogs200/dennett&kinsbourne.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000264/00/time&obs.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:264
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtFxJw&sig=NuvhlOy-qlQ25CLlLkKyUD_M44g
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHuLs&sig=dbFnFSn9YGFEMzlbcQtuAzWJ5sE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAGoDq&sig=MXGCSpE5sFSRHfvNoYJ0FZFuVIg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzEqLp&sig=1SCWU7sPJ7Inbppt7ZjX-s7lH60
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIrEw&sig=TBZY4NtD0lCnuRZ_sw2jKioD3Eo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzKtGw&sig=AqzmZehz_4S-LIfYTM59NP5KPtc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBEoCs&sig=uWBwxCh6nyFrXoxBAz09qqdQLi8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICHsLu&sig=bAKJB3pL1Iu-DBySuzLwA6QQRdI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBDtDu&sig=ml4NBpCWPpH2VRPRW-FGFvYsl88
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtGpKr&sig=JRJWPEytuzEm2W1RPaKS7aCKcYo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHvLr&sig=A0luOVKgCrJ_OOAhsFs1fhq6NWQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJxFp&sig=qggtgf7icUkWU76tXcX4NMpKrGs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyDxJx&sig=pnrLrtb_r1INKPt-7It-kbhxwiU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZLLtGrDs&sig=Fbnh6iLWYxrOAkh5V-MgSjWDEpQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyDtKw&sig=Pfs53KXrMr3NiqacqU5To-PKsyk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIuEs&sig=blxw58dXbS4kkHcQkjTHyS1xWm4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAGrIp&sig=DcgRgV9vbWpOMJMtPBstQvAB8nY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICIoDv&sig=nsT726R8Bl4oyHzLeLVEYOrVVmw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzEvJq&sig=K0Md58kq9ahMAg6f-Ffqv3iaMA4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBDuEu&sig=ypOoszCSt0vDttfhgMAeS2R9qd8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICHwIp&sig=jBo126iYNYzsVZa2El8Yu8hThtI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzFoKv&sig=d8pysz9qpbLn5rYVSwTJVMZvpNs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJtJx&sig=Cqogc3jeaoPceo6D4jPVENN0GpI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHsKt&sig=YLmTMIPKbc9GzApVDCJyw8K3ncM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIpIx&sig=IFMORl44INzpeJKG0ysCkqD1xYg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAFwGw&sig=mqA1eKUcGXXeA6jcegHOaA_o1HE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzKqCx&sig=CmCkYl9aeVfa7rUbu66JLGbLV-o
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzJwGq&sig=3aXZKyTv4O4_VC5MEXa2OxTzviY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJrJp&sig=PydxIL0HYSYP7qvfNKrFBmCFLkE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyEsEx&sig=BRT0N9p--AGx9m6UoFvL1rLHc8o
  
• Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191945&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00566
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2006). Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: Discreteness versus continuity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16832687&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/056L567G0K3V95P1.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/056l567g0k3v95p1/
  
• I. M. Glynn (1990). Consciousness and time.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v348/n6301/abs/348477a0.html
  
• Patrick Haggard & Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Conscious intention and brain activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~duck/ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/haggard.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000011/1238
  
• Ted Honderich (ms). Is the mind ahead of the brain? Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet.   (More)
• Ted Honderich (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the mind ahead of the brain? Behind it?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as

  _neural_

  _adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_ .⁵ This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary or lawlike connection, and also certain identity theories of mind and brain, as well as determinist theories
• Ted Honderich (1984). The time of a conscious sensory experience and mind-brain theories.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6492822&dopt=Citation
  
• Markus Kiefer & Manfred Spitzer (2000). Time course of conscious and unconscious semantic brain activation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200008030-00013.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10943693&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=20397609&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=10943693&dopt=citation
  
• Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Klein-Commentary.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191943&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00557
  
• S. A. Klein (2002). Libet's temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Libet_temporal_anomalies-a_reassessment_of_the_data.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191937&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00573
  
• Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cornea.berkeley.edu/pubs/ccog_2002_0580-Klein-Commentary_on_the_commentaries.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00569
  
• David M. Rosenthal (2002). The timing of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191938&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00558
  
• Judy A. Trevena & Jeff G. Miller (2002). Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00548
  
• Fred Alan Wolf (1998). The timing of conscious experience: A causality-violating interpretation.   (More)

Neural Synchrony and Binding

• F. Tito Arecchi (2003). Chaotic neuron dynamics, synchronization, and feature binding: Quantum aspects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004PhyA..338..218A
  http://www.pv.infn.it/~frontier/2003/talks/Arecchi_testo.doc
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0378437104002407
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KBJ5JFCQW44UHRXA.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Antonio R. Damasio (1989). The brain binds entities and events by multiregional activation from convergence zones.   (More)
• Sam M. Doesburg, Keiichi Kitajo & Lawrence M. Ward (2005). Increased gamma-band synchrony precedes switching of conscious perceptual objects in binocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200508010-00001.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16012336&dopt=Citation
  
• Andreas K. Engel, P. Fries, P. Kreiter Konig, M. Brecht & Wolf Singer (1999). Does time help to understand consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl/dspace/handle/2066/17348
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17348
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90400
  
• Andreas K. Engel, P. Fries, P. Kreiter Konig, M. Brecht & Wolf Singer (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called ''binding problem'' may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl/dspace/handle/2066/17353
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17353
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17349
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10447995&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90389
  
• Fingelkurts, A. Andrew, A. Alexander, Kallio Sakari & Revonsuo Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of this view in future multidisciplinary brain research.
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingerlkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=394191&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XT61JDMLRRQG49RN.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000003/00394191
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/?p=04afeb0498504429b0ba99af526242a9&pi=0
  
• Pascal Fries, Pieter R. Roelfsema, Andreas K. Engel & Wolf Singer (1997). Synchronization of oscillatory responses in visual cortex correlates with perception in interocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1997PNAS...9412699F
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/23/12699
  http://dare.ubn.kun.nl:8080/dspace/handle/2066/17352
  http://www.cogsci.uos.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/Fries.PNAS.97.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/23/12699?ijkey=MKBrLfZrttINA
  http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~NBP/PDFs_Publications/Fries.PNAS.97.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19971111)94:23<12699:SOORIV>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=25091
  
• H. D. R. Golledge, C. C. Hilgetag & M. J. Tovee (1996). Information processing: A solution to the binding problem.   (More)
• P. Kreiter Konig & Andreas K. Engel (1995). Correlated firing in sensory-motor systems.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7488854&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09594388/1995/00000005/00000004/art80013
  
• P. Kreiter Konig, Andreas K. Engel & Wolf Singer (1995). Relation between oscillatory activity and long-range synchronization in cat visual cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/92/1/290
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7816836&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19950103)92:1<290:RBOAAL>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=42864
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2366546.pdf
  
• Antoine Lutz, Jacques Martinerie, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Francisco J. Varela (2002). Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first- person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• Kimford J. Meador, P. G. Ray, J. R. Echauz, D. W. Loring & G. J. Vachtsevanos (2002). Gamma coherence and conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/59/6/847?ck=nck
  http://academic.evergreen.edu/curricular/scc/ArticlesForFallProjects/GammaConsciousSensoryPerceptionData.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12297565&dopt=Citation
  
• J. I. Nelson (1995). Binding in the visual system.   (More)
• R. C. O'Reilly, R. Busby & R. Soto (2003). Three forms of binding and their neural substrates: Alternatives to temporal synchrony.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psych-www.colorado.edu/~oreilly/papers/OReillyBusbySoto01_binding.pdf
  
• W. Amiri Prinzmetal (1981). Principles of feature integration in visual perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7322810&dopt=Citation
  
• A. Revonsuo & J. B. Newman (1999). Binding and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10447994&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90393
  
• Antti Revonsuo (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionable search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a part of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empirical work that builds on such a theoretical foundation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1999/00000008/00000002/art90384
  
• Lynn C. Robertson (2003). Binding, spatial attention and perceptual awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12563280&dopt=Citation
  
• Adina L. Roskies (1999). The binding problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (von der Malsburg, 1981), “the binding problem” has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per- sue’s prominence in these fields, what “binding” means cepts. In addition, there are cognitive binding problems: is rarely made explicit. In this paper, I will briefly survey they include relating a concept to a percept, such as the many notions of binding and will introduce some linking the visual representation of an apple to all the issues that will be explored more fully in the reviews semantic knowledge stored about it (it is edible, how it that follow
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10677022&dopt=Citation
  
• Lokendra Shastri (2002). Episodic memory and cortico-hippocampal interactions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/shastri02episodic.html
  http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~shastri/psfiles/ShastriTicsEM02.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arb/Shastri2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11912039&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000004/art01868
  
• L. Shastri & V. Ajjanagadde (1993). From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony.   (More)
• A. M. Sillito, H. E. Jones, G. L. Gerstein & D. C. West (1994). Feature-linked synchronization of thalamic relay cell firing induced by feedback from the visual cortex.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1038/369479a0
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v369/n6480/abs/369479a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=94261180&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8202137&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8202137&dopt=Books
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=94261180&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8202137&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Wolf Singer (2001). Consciousness and the binding problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/Np/PUBS/ZARAGOZA.PDF
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/Np/Pubs/zaragoza.pdf
  http://www.psych.nmsu.edu/~jkroger/lab/courses/articles/Singer_concsiousness.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349422&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05712.x
  
• Wolf Singer (1993). Synchronization of cortical activity and its putative role in information processing and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://physiol.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.ph.55.030193.002025
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8466179&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8466179&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Wolf Singer & Charles M. Gray (1995). Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neuro.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.003011
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7605074&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7605074&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=7605074&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Ramesh Srinivasan (2004). Internal and external neural synchronization during conscious perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.worldscinet.com/ijbc/14/1402/S0218127404009399.html
  
• Mircea Steriade, D. A. McCormick & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). Thalamocortical oscillations in the sleeping and aroused brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/262/5134/679
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;262/5134/679
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8235588&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=8235588&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• M. Stryker (1989). Is grandmother an oscillation?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v338/n6213/abs/338297a0.html
  
• Christopher Summerfield, Anthony Ian Jack & Adrian Philip Burgess (2002). Induced gamma activity is associated with conscious awareness of pattern masked nouns.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11909644&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S016787600200003X
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01678760/2002/00000044/00000002/art00003
  
• Anne Treisman (1980). A feature integration theory of attention.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1980-04685-001
  http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/class/Psy355/Gilden/treisman.pdf
  http://art-mind.org/review/IMG/pdf/Treisman-Gelade_1980_Feature-Integration-Theory__SD__CogPsy_.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?Db=pubmed&Cmd=ShowDetailView&TermToSearch=7351125&ordinalpos=6&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7351125&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=7351125&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Anne Treisman (1996). The binding problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8725958&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09594388/1996/00000006/00000002/art80070
  
• Christoph von der Malsburg (1995). Binding in models of perception and brain function.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The development of the issue of binding as fundamental to neural dynamics has made possible recent advances in the modeling of difficult problems of perception and brain function. Among them is perceptual segmentation, invariant pattern recognition and one-shot learning. Also, longer-term conceptual developments that have led to this success are reviewed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1486/00/Mal1995a.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001486/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1486
  http://firstsearch.oclc.org/fsip?sici=0959-4388(19950801)5:4<520:BIMOPA>2.0.TX;2-D&format=HTML&gsid=03aef2acc24645555b960c6667c5aa36c989677b9c7266beb1f26f54ccea2341b25ad62413ec651f242b6e1a86f111ac3d27e0cf1f9e24a1a19afeb4da09e526
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7488855&dopt=Citation
  
• Leo R. Ward (2003). Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://euryale.sbs.umass.edu/psych/modeling_course/Ward_TICS_2003.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/Ref71.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref71.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14643372&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14643372&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000012/art00289
  

Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues

• Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz & D. Cosmelli (online). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers in cognition and the brain : The philosophy and neuroscience movement.   (More)
• Jay David Atlas, Qualia, consciousness, and memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David Rosenthal's "higher-order thought" theory of consciousness also faces in accounting for qualia. I then contrast Dennett's newest account of consciousness with interestingly different conceptions by contemporary neuro-scientists, and I suggest that philosophers should take the recent suggestions by neuro-scientists more seriously as a subject for philosophical investigation
• Dieter Birnbacher (2006). Causal interpretations of correlations between neural and conscious events.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a causal interpretation on epiphenomenalist lines, both for reasons of metaphysical parsimony and for reasons of coherence with established physical principles such as the conservation of energy. In the concluding chapter, some of the philosophical and the empirical challenges following from this model are outlined, the most important being closer scrutiny of the neurophysiological processes accompanying conscious volition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/F0020001/art00006
  
• Ned Block (web). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/puzzle.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Block-09282006.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Block_BBS.pdf
  
• Ned Block (2001). How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000228/00/199712001.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/NeuralCorrelate.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:228
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8931266&dopt=Citation
  
• Ned Block (1998). How to find the neural correlate of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000228/00/199712001.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/NeuralCorrelate.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:228
  
• David J. Chalmers (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Chalmers, 1996). ]]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/ncc.html
  http://cogprints.org/227/
  http://cogprints.org/227/0/199711001.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000227/
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/27/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:227
  
• David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/ncc2.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/ncc2.html
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Chalmers2000.pdf
  
• Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA309&ots=JljTspK-Zz&sig=bPi-xVEVBkAvYyvHEx5l3S0Zl54
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727182509~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L803131023766655.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727182509.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000005/art00001
  
• Philip Clapson (2001). Consciousness: The organismic approach.   (More)
• Austen Clark (forthcoming). Vicissitudes of consciousness, varieties of correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ajp.press.uiuc.edu/116/1/clark.html
  
• Axel Cleeremans & John Haynes (1999). Correlating consciousness: A vew from empirical science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program — the search for the “Neural Correlates of Consciousness” — holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechner´s (1860) so-called “inner psychophysics”. Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. In this paper, we explore some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties of this approach. In both neurobiology and psychology, there are serious measurement problems that stand in the way of correlation research, even after the “hard problem” has been set aside. Thus, even if one had identified certain internal functional states as indicators of phenomenal states, the empirical psychologist would still be confronted with fundamental problems, such as determining the absence or presence of these functional states. In this respect, philosophy of science may help and provide a metatheoretical framework for the current interdisciplinary project
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-NCC.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cleeremans99correlating.html
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2003). A framework for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.hnl.bcm.tmc.edu/jli/reference/29.pdf
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/crick-koch-03.pdf
  http://ftp.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/dana/KochCrick.pdf
  https://www.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/dana/KochCrick.pdf
  http://cbcl.mit.edu/projects/cbcl/publications/ps/crick-koch-03.pdf
  http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/concourse/900/articles/CrickKochNN03.pdf
  http://www.paed.uni-muenchen.de/~allg1/lehrveranstaltungen/akt_arbSS03/Crick.pdf
  
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0003a
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/unconscious-homunculus.html
  
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East for Sublimation Process.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Previously (Vimal, 2009b) in Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE) framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizing them and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives. In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2009e), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) In, we developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) In, we found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect of consciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) In, we proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) In, we investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) In, we discussed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) In, we linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) In, we introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems.
• Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a neural correlate can function as an explanation of consciousness: Evidence from the history of science regarding the likely explanatory value of the NCC approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on work in the history and philosophy of science, I argue that this assumption - along with the related claim that even a correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness - is grounded in an inadequate conception of the way in which scientific explanations develop. Examination of parallel developments in 20th century biology reveals that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude correspondences can play an essential role in scientific discovery and can sometimes become central to our everyday understanding of the phenomena in question. A proper understanding of this process clarifies the value of NCC theories and sheds light on the standards by which they should be evaluated. In closing, I describe two specific criteria for evaluating NCC proposals: intertheoretic bridge potential and detailed mapping
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
• Walter J. Freeman (1997). Three centuries of category errors in studies of the neural basis of consciousness and intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/freeman97three.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=310098CI
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12662509&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12662509&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08936080/1997/00000010/00000007/art00054
  
• Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness.   (More)
• Rudolf Hernegger (ms). Changes of paradigm in consciousness research.   (More)
• Jakob Hohwy (2007). The search for neural correlates of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view the correlation as evidence for identity between conscious states and brain states. The common ground therefore seems to be that the scientific search for the NCC is largely independent of the metaphysics of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00086.x
  
• Susan L. Hurley & No (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/HurleyNoe.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-on-block.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-neural-plasticity.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h40w1228242762k4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5109518&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H40W1228242762K4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2003/00000018/00000001/05109518
  
• Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noe (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to Block.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley¹¹¹¹ andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë²²²²
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/HurleyNoe.pdf
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/npc.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-on-block.pdf
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/hurley-noe-neural-plasticity.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/noehurleyreply.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12907228&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=12907228&dopt=Citation
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5109518&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H40W1228242762K4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2003/00000018/00000001/05109518
  
• Ray S. Jackendoff (2000). Unconscious, yes; homunculus,???   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0017a
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=jnp.002.0017a
  
• Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Conscious and unconscious mental activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=np.002.0021a
  
• Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered: particularly the structures of temporality. In a second Hazeltine et al., Neural activation during response competi- interpretive approach, artificial neural networks were used tion; Ishai et al., The representation of objects in the human to detect a more explicit prediction from phenomenology, occipital and temporal cortex; Mechelli et al., The effects of namely, that present experience contains and is inflected by presentation rate during word and pseudoword reading; and past states of awareness and anticipated events. In all of 21 Postle et al., Activity in human frontal cortex associated with subjects in this analysis, nets were successfully trained to spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. The study of extract aspects of relative past and future brain states, in consciousness also draws from multiple disciplines. In this comparison with statistically similar controls. This exploratory article, the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology study thus concludes that the proposed methods for provides initial characterization of phenomenal structures ‘‘neurophenomenology’’ warrant further application, includ- conceptually necessary for an analysis of consciousness. These ing the exploration of individual differences, multivariate structures include phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal differences between cognitive task conditions, and explora- superposition, and experienced temporality..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.trincoll.edu/~dlloyd/fmri&consciousness.pdf.pdf
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892902760191027
  http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Lloyd_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/theo-20/www/10-731/Lloyd_consciousness_JOCN2002.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191448&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00002
  
• Pete Mandik (2007). The neurophilosophy of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the core philosophical issues of phenomenal conscious construe consciousness largely in terms of representations in neural networks associated with certain processes of attention and memory
• Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.ucsc.edu/~anoe/NCC.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/NCC.pdf
  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~noe/NCC.pdf
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/NCC.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/cogsci/papers/NCC.pdf
  
• Jaak Panksepp (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2000/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Geraint Rees (2001). Seeing is not perceiving.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11426216&dopt=Citation
  
• D. Smith (2000). Freudian science of consciousness: Then and now.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1975). In search of psyche.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1952). Neurology and the mind-brain problem.   (More)
• Roger W. Sperry (1968). Psychobiology and vice versa.   (More)
• Arnold S. Tannenbaum (2006). Consciousness and the self-sensing brain: Implications for feeling and meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16841778&dopt=Citation
  
• Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11707380&dopt=Citation
  
• Ruediger Vaas (1999). Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/t0000009.htm
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/t0000009.htm
  http://cogprints.org/5810/1/Vaas%2DNCC.pdf
  
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Dependent Co-origination and Inherent Existence: Dual-Aspect Framework.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent origination, and that is also why he rejects causality. Causality is a major issue in metaphysical views; for example, one could argue that consciousness causes/affects our brain/behavior/function/matter or vice-versa. My goals are as follows: (i) which entities lack ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ and which ones inherently exist? (ii) Do the entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise and hence can we reject causality as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy? (iii) Do the entities that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence? (iv) Do structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other? And (v) we critically analyze, extend, and examine Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)with respect to the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c). Our analysis suggests that: (i)All conventional entities lack inherently existence, except subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-experiences (PEs) that are fundamental and irreducible and hence inherently exist. (ii) The entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise, and hence causality for them can be rejected but instead conditions (such as efficient, percept-object, immediate, and dominant conditions) might be necessary, as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. (iii) It is not clear that SEs that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence, but one could argue that (a) superposed PEs/SEs in the mental aspect of stings or elementary particles might be the motivation for the evolution to form neural-nets to realize a specific SE, and (b) Nāgārjuna’s rejection of causality and ‘relational ontology’ (Caponigro & Prakash, 2009) need to be reconsidered for SEs. For example, the SE redness (redness-bhutatma (Vimal, 2009g)) inherently, independently, and eternally exists; and hence causality may not be rejected and the ‘relational ontology’ may not apply for any such SE. (iv) It is not clear that structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other, but they might be linked via conditions. (v) Furthermore, (a) an entity has double aspect: mental and material aspects, (b) string is a dual-aspect entity that dependently co-arises from string-vacuum or brane, and (c) the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework is consistent with these premises. For example, PEs/SEs inherently exist and are in superposed form in the mental aspect of (a) string-vacuum and/or brane before Big-Bang, (b) strings, elementary particles (bosons and fermions) and all evolved entities after Big-Bang, and (c) entities before and after Big-Freeze/Big-Crunch or entities in cyclic universe as in the big bounce/quantum-bounce (Loop Quantum Gravity) framework. However, the selection of a specific SE has dependent co-origination (and hence not inherently existent, consistent with Nāgārjuna), i.e., a specific SE occurs in brain when (i) relevant neural-net is formed via neural Darwinism, (ii) the specific SE is selected via matching and selection mechanisms, and (iii) the necessary ingredients ―such as wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory, stimulus at above threshold, and neural-net PEs― are satisfied. If this is true, then only experiences (PEs/SEs in superposed form) are inherently existent and other entities have dependent co-origination.

Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc

• Giorgio A. Ascoli (2000). The complex link between neuroanatomy and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/1099-0526(200009/10)6:1<20::AID-CPLX1003>3.3.CO;2-5
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/1099-0526(200009/10)6:1<20::AID-CPLX1003>3.0.CO;2-E
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/76509579/PDFSTART
  
• Bernard J. Baars (1998). The Neural Basis of Conscious Experience.   (More)
• Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.
• M. Bernhaut, E. Gellhorn & A. T. Rasmussen (1953). Experimental contributions to the problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=13035465&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=13035465&dopt=Citation
  
• Massimo Bondi & Manuele Bondi (1998). The role of synaptic junctions in the identification of human consciousness.   (More)
• Jonathan Cole, Natalie Depraz & Shaun Gallagher (online). Unity and disunity in bodily awareness: Phenomenology and neuroscience.   (More)
• Diego J. Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Evan Thompson (2007). Neurodynamics of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-
• Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1992). The problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciamdigital.com/gsp_qpdf.cfm?ISSUEID_CHAR=4E3B6963-3358-4EBE-9524-A7CFD3F328A&ARTICLEID_CHAR=52501561-76CF-4CEC-85E9-ECA62A3745A
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1502517&dopt=Citation
  
• Richard Cytowic (1995). Synesthesia: Phenomenology and neuropsychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-10-syn_phenomenology-1-cytowic.html
  
• Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/24/14529
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/152
  http://www.nada.kth.se/kurser/kth/2D1436/2005/lasmaterial/f10/Dehaene.pdf
  http://www.pasteur.fr/recherche/unites/neubiomol/ARTICLES/Dehaene1998.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_NeuronalWorkspaceSimulation_PNAS1998.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/95/24/14529?maxtoshow=&HITS=20&hits=20&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=consciousness&searchid=QID_NOT_SET&FIRSTINDEX=
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9826734&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19981124)95:24<14529:ANMOAG>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24407
  
• Matthew Donald (1995). The neurobiology of human consciousness: An evolutionary approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7501131&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/1995/00000033/00000009/art00050
  
• Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingerlkurts (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=394191&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XT61JDMLRRQG49RN.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2001/00000002/00000003/00394191
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt61jdmlrrqg49rn/?p=04afeb0498504429b0ba99af526242a9&pi=0
  
• Christopher D. Frith (1992). Consciousness, information processing, and the brain.   (More)
• Vittorio Gallese (2005). Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unipr.it/~gallese/P&CS2005.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m334wq727688472u/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M334WQ727688472U.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000001/00004737
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher.   (More)
• Michael S. Gazzaniga & Shaun Gallagher (1998). The neuronal platonist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
• Danko Georgiev, Interneuronal macroscopic quantum coherence in the brain cortex! The role of the intrasynaptic adhesive proteins beta-neurexin and neuroligin-.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There are many blank areas in understanding the brain dynamics and especially how it gives rise to consciousness. Quantum mechanics is believed to be capable of explaining the enigma of conscious experience, however till now there is not good enough model considering both the data from clinical neurology and having some explanatory power! In this paper is presented a novel model in defence of macroscopic quantum events within and between neural cells. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 link is claimed to be not just the core of the central neural synapse, instead it is a device mediating entanglement between the cytoskeletons of the cortical neurons. Thus a macroscopic quantum state can extend throughout large brain cortical areas and the subsequent collapse of the wavefunction could affect simultaneously the subneuronal events in millions of neurons. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 complex also controls the process of exocytosis and provides an interesting and simple mechanism for retrograde signalling during learning-dependent changes in synaptic connectivity
• Charles M. Gray & Gonzalo V. di Prisco (1997). Stimulus-dependent neuronal oscillations and local synchonization in striate cortex of the alert cat.   (More)
• Stuart R. Hameroff (ms). The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Figure 1. Dendrites and cell bodies of schematic neurons connected by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions form a laterally connected input_ _layer (“dendritic web”) within a neurocomputational architecture. Dendritic web dynamics are temporally coupled to gamma synchrony_ _EEG, and correspond with integration phases of “integrate and fire” cycles. Axonal firings provide input to, and output from, integration_ _phases (only one input, and three output axons are shown). Cell bodies/soma contain nuclei shown as black circles; microtubule networks_ _pervade the cytoplasm. According to the Orch OR theory, gamma EEG-synchronized integration phases include quantum computations in_ _microtubule networks which culminate with conscious moments. Insert closeup shows a gap junction through which microtubule quantum_ _states entangle among different neurons, enabling macroscopic quantum states in dendritic webs extending throughout cortex and other_ _brain regions._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/documents/CogScipub.pdf
  
• Edward M. Hubbard & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2005). Neurocognitive mechanisms of synesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Hubbard_NeuronReview05.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Hubbard_NeuronReview05.pdf
  http://www.neuron.org/content/article/abstract?uid=PIIS0896627305008354
  http://www.current-biology.com/content/article/abstract?uid=PIIS0896627305008354
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16269367&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0896627305008354
  
• Edward M. Hubbard (2007). Neurophysiology of synesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17521514&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K7078665H572G247.pdf
  
• Stephen Jones (online). Introduction to the physiology of ordinary consciousness.   (More)
• Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Ute Strehl, Herta Flor & Niels Birbaumer (2002). Can humans perceive their brain states?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although the brain enables us to perceive the external world and our body, it remains unknown whether brain processes themselves can be perceived. Brain tissue does not have receptors for its own activity. However, the ability of humans to acquire self-control of brain processes indicates that the perception of these processes may also be achieved by learning. In this study patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs). In particular ''probe'' sessions, the patients estimated the quality of the SCP shift they had produced in the preceding trial. The correspondence between the recorded SCP amplitudes and the subjective estimates increased with training. The ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring. These data provide evidence that humans can learn to perceive the neural activity of their brain. Alternative interpretations are discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11883990&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2002/00000011/00000001/art90535
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000001/art00535
  
• Sandra E. Leh, Heidi Johansen-Berg & Alain Ptito (2006). Unconscious vision: New insights into the neuronal correlate of blindsight using diffusion tractography.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16714319&dopt=Citation
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/129/7/1822
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/brainj/2006/00000129/00000007/art01822
  
• Arthur I. Miller (2007). Unconscious thought, intuition, and visual imagery: A critique of "working memory, cerebellum, and creativity".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1080/10400410701277456
  
• Greg Miller (2005). What is the biological basis of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summary/sci;309/5731/79
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15994525&dopt=Citation
  
• Ken Mogi (online). Creativity and the neural basis of qualia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In what computational aspect is the brain different from the computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be “creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of "externality" that adds new ingredients to the system and its output. We argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality". We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities (qualia) is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/creativity.pdf
  
• Ken Mogi (1997). Qualia and the brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/qualia-summary.pdf
  
• A. Salazar, Vance S. Grafman J. & Ludlow Dillon J. D. (1986). Consciousness and amnesia after penetrating head injury: Neurology and anatomy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=3945388&dopt=Citation
  
• Wolf Singer (2000). Phenomenal awareness and consciousness from a neurobiological perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mpih-frankfurt.mpg.de/global/Np/Pubs/METZINGER.PDF
  
• Henry P. Stapp & Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Appendix to Schwartz's paper in J. consc. Studies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The data emerging from the clinical and brain studies described above suggest that, in the case of OCD, there are two pertinent brain mechanisms that are distinguishable both in terms of neuro dynamics and in terms of the conscious experiences that accompany them. These mechanisms can be characterized, on anatomical and perhaps evolutionary grounds, as a lower level and a higher level mechanism. The clinical treatment has, when successful, an activating effect on the higher level mechanism, and a suppressive effect on the lower level one
• John G. Taylor (2002). Paying attention to consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14698766&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11983583&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14698766&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000005/art01890
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03010082/2003/00000071/00000004/art00179
  

Disorders and Syndromes of Consciousness

Blindsight

• Silke Anders, Niels Birbaumer, Bettina Sadowski, Michael Erb, Irina Mader, Wolfgang Grodd & Martin Lotze (2004). Parietal somatosensory association cortex mediates affective blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v7/n4/suppinfo/nn1213_S1.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15034586&dopt=Citation
  
• Paul Azzopardi & Alan Cowey (1997). Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/25/14190
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9391175&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19971209)94:25<14190:IBLNNV>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=28455
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/43882.pdf
  
• O. Braddick, J. Atkinson, B. Hood & W. Harkness (1992). Possible blindsight in infants lacking one cerebral hemisphere.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v360/n6403/abs/360461a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=1448169&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1448169&dopt=Citation
  
• Peter Carruthers (2001). Who is blind to blindsight?   (More)
• Alan Cowey (1995). Blindsight in monkeys.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1038/373247a0
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v373/n6511/abs/373247a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=95115798&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7816139&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=7816139&dopt=Citation
  
• Alan Cowey (1995). Blindsight in real sight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7566082&dopt=Citation
  
• Alan Cowey & Petra Stoerig (1997). Visual detection in monkeys with blindsight.   (More)
• James Danckert & Melvyn A. Goodale (2000). Blindsight: A conscious route to unconscious vision.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.current-biology.com/content/article/fulltext?uid=PIIS0960982200002840
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10662661&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982200002840
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09609822/2000/00000010/00000002/art00284
  
• Beatrice de Gelder, Gilles Pourtois, Monique van Raamsdonk, Jean Vroomen & Lawrence Weiskrantz (2001). Unseen stimuli modulate conscious visual experience: Evidence from interhemispheric summation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://spitswww.uvt.nl/~vroomen/papers/38.pdf
  http://labnic.unige.ch/papers/DG_GP_NR2001.pdf
  http://www.beatricedegelder.com/documents/84.PDF
  http://labnic.unige.ch/nic/papers/DG_GP_NR2001.pdf
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200102120-00040.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11209955&dopt=Citation
  
• Rainer Goebel, Lars Muckli, Friedhelm E. Zanella, Wolf Singer & Petra Stoerig (2001). Sustained extrastriate cortical activation without visual awareness revealed by fMRI studies in hemianopic patients.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11322986&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00426989/2001/00000041/00000010/art00069
  
• Alfons O. Hamm, Almut I. Weike, Harald T. Schupp, Thomas Treig, Alexander Dressel & Christof Kessler (2003). Affective blindsight: Intact fear conditioning to a visual cue in a cortically blind patient.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12538396&dopt=Citation
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/126/2/267
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/brainj/2003/00000126/00000002/art00267
  
• Justin A. Harris, Lisa Karlov & Colin W. G. Clifford (2006). Localization of tactile stimuli depends on conscious detection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/26/3/948
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16421314&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicholas Humphrey (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: A case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract. A rhesus monkey, Helen, from whom the striate cortex was almost totally removed, was studied intensively over a period of 8 years. During this time she regained an effective, though limited, degree of visually guided behaviour. The evidence suggests that while Helen suffered a permanent loss of `focal vision she retained (initially unexpressed) the capacity for `ambient vision
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1757/00/Helen74.pdf
  http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=p030241
  http://www.humphrey.org.uk/papers/1974Helen.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001757/
  http://www.perceptionweb.com/abstract.cgi?id=p030241
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1757
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1757
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=4459818&dopt=Citation
  
• Sean Dorrance Kelly, On the demonstration of blindsight in monkeys.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: : The work of Alan Cowey and Petra Stoerig is often taken to have shown that, following lesions analogous to those that cause blindsight in humans, there is blindsight in monkeys. The present paper reveals a problem in Cowey and Stoerig ’ s case for blindsight in monkeys. The problem is that Cowey and Stoerig ’ s results would only provide good evidence for blindsight if there is no difference between their two experimental paradigms with regard to the sorts of stimuli that are likely to come to consciousness. We show that the paradigms could differ in this respect, given the connections that have been shown to exist between working memory, perceptual load, attention, and consciousness
• Robert W. Kentridge, Charles A. Heywood & Lawrence Weiskrantz (1999). Attention without awareness in blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10518327&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8452(19990907)266:1430<1805:AWAIB>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rsl/rpb/1999/00000266/00001430/art00014
  
• F. C. Kolb & Jochen Braun (1995). Blindsight in normal observers.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v377/n6547/abs/377336a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=7566086&dopt=Citation
  
• Hakwan C. Lau & Richard E. Passingham (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/103/49/18763
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17124173&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1693736
  
• Sandra E. Leh, Heidi Johansen-Berg & Alain Ptito (2006). Unconscious vision: New insights into the neuronal correlate of blindsight using diffusion tractography.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16714319&dopt=Citation
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/129/7/1822
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/brainj/2006/00000129/00000007/art01822
  
• Morris J. Morgan, A. J. S. Mason & J. A. Solomon (1997). Blindsight in normal subjects?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/~morgan/blindsight.pdf
  http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/m.morgan/blindsight.pdf
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v385/n6615/abs/385401b0.html
  http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/~solomon/pubs/morganmasonsolomon97/blindsight.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9009187&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=9009187&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Jacques Paillard, F. Michel & C. E. Stelmach (1983). Localization without content: A tactile analogue of "blind sight".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/40/9/548
  http://espra.neuf.fr/PAILLARD 165-localization-without-content 1983.pdf
  http://jacquespaillard.apinc.org/pdf/165-localization-without-content-83.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6615285&dopt=Citation
  
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/149079.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~mike/papers/Pylyshyn99.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs1999_reprint
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/index.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=30934&jid=BBS&volumeId=22&issueId=03&aid=30933
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=30934
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99552023
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99442025
  
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2000). Is vision continuous with cognition?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs98.PDF
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs1999_reprint
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=30934
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99552023
  
• Tony Ro & Robert Rafal (2006). Visual restoration in cortical blindness: Insights from natural and TMS-induced blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/W82UQR45K3678411.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/749262684.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/pnrh/2006/00000016/00000004/art00003
  
• Arash Sahraie, Lawrence Weiskrantz, J. L. Barbur, Alison Simmons & M. Brammer (1997). Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing of visual signals.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/94/17/9406
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/17/9406?terms=consciousness
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9256495&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19970819)94:17<9406:PONAAW>2.0.CO;2-S
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=23203
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/42617.pdf
  
• Petra Stoerig, Aspasia Zontanou & Alan Cowey (2002). Aware or unaware: Assessment of cortical blindness in four men and a monkey.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12003856&dopt=Citation
  http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/12/6/565
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/cercor/2002/00000012/00000006/art00565
  
• Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey (1997). Blindsight in man and monkey.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9126063&dopt=Citation
  http://www.brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/120/3/535
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/120/3/535
  
• Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey (1989). Wavelength sensitivity in blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v342/n6252/abs/342916a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=2594084&dopt=Citation
  
• Lawrence Weiskrantz (1996). Blindsight revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Weiskrantz1996.pdf
  http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/rwn/Teaching PDFs/blindsight revisited.pdf
  http://firstsearch.oclc.org/fsip?sici=0959-4388(19960401)6:2<215:BR>2.0.TX;2-T&format=HTML&gsid=03aef2acc24645555b960c6667c5aa36c989677b9c7266beb1f26f54ccea2341b25ad62413ec651f242b6e1a86f111ac7d08febf485a68cca19afeb4da09e526
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8725963&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09594388/1996/00000006/00000002/art80075
  
• Lawrence Weiskrantz (1998). Consciousness and commentaries.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/FU5H43LUX08UVJ2F.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/FU5H43LUX08UVJ2F.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/pijp/1998/00000033/00000003/art00005
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/pijp/1998/00000033/00000003/art00005
  
• Lawrence Weiskrantz (2002). Prime-sight and blindsight.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470623&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00015
  
• Semir Zeki, S. Aglioti, D. McKeefry & G. Berlucchi (1999). The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/96/24/14124
  http://www.psychology.siu.edu/reinke/psych512/steve_The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10570209&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19991123)96:24<14124:TNBOCC>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?pubmedid=10570209
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=24201
  

Neglect and Extinction

• Paolo Bartolomeo (2006). A parietofrontal network for spatial awareness in the right hemisphere of the human brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16966500&dopt=Citation
  
• William S. Boardman (online). Austin and the inferential account of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O SET THE STAGE for the discussion[1], I will rehearse and clarify a well-known dispute between A. J. Ayer and J. L. Austin concerning whether perceptual judgments are inferences. Both in his Sense and Sensibilia[2] and in his "Other Minds,"[3] Austin carefully distinguishes recognizing that p from inferring that p. For the purpose of comparing his position to Ayer's, we might put his basic claim in this way: given the way words such as "recognize" and "infer" are used outside philosophical discussions, one clearly distinguishes instances of recognizing from instances of inferring. Yet Ayer does not dispute that, but replies that while non-philosophers do make a sharp distinction between the two, it is arbitrary for philosophical purposes.[4] Claims based upon one's having recognized something are sufficiently like claims based upon one's having inferred, Ayer supposes, that it is useful to treat them as instances of a common category. So the issue is not whether the distinction is recognized outside philosophical circles, but whether it is a defensible and useful one to make. Clearly, Austin insists upon the distinction because he supposes that failing to make it will promote philosophical confusion; indeed, he argues that one traditional problem of skepticism is largely due to this confusion.[5] In his "Other Minds," Austin tries to suggest how recognizing differs from inferring by showing how the sorts of questions or challenges brought to bear differ between the two sorts of claim:[6] for inferences, one wants a rehearsal of the pieces of evidence and an account of their connections to the judgment; for perceptual claims of recognition, one explores whether the observer had the opportunity to see what he claimed to have seen, whether he had acquired the expertise to recognize the sort of thing he claimed to have seen, and whether the circumstances were free of evident distraction and defect. But his readers' appreciation of these things depends
• L. Deouell (2002). Pre-requisites for conscious awareness: Clues from electrophysiological and behavioral studies of unilateral neglect patients.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pissaro.soc.huji.ac.il/~leon/Lab/PDFs/prerequisites_for_awareness.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470622&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00024
  
• John Driver & Patrik Vuilleumier (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and extinction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://labnic.unige.ch/nic/papers/JD_PV_Cognition2001.pdf
  http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/rwn/Teaching PDFs/Driver and Vuilleumier.pdf
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/attention/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2001/Cognition 79 39 88.pdf
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/webspace/users/attentiongrp/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2001/Cognition 79 39 88.pdf
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/WebSpace/users/attentiongrp/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2001/Cognition 79 39 88.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164023&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00124
  
• Martin Eimer, Angelo Maravita, Jose Van Velzen, Masud Husain & Jon Driver (2002). The electrophysiology of tactile extinction: ERP correlates of unconscious somatosensory processing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/attention/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2002/Neuropsychologia 40 2438 2447.pdf
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/WebSpace/users/attentiongrp/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2002/Neuropsychologia 40 2438 2447.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12417471&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/2002/00000040/00000013/art00079
  
• Michael Esterman, Regina McGlinchey-Berroth, Mieke Verfaellie, Laura Grande, Patrick Kilduff & William Milberg (2002). Aware and unaware perception in hemispatial neglect: Evidence from a stem completion priming task.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12056691&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12056691&dopt=Abstract
  
• Melanie A. George, Veronika B. Dobler, Elaine Nicholls & Tom Manly (2005). Spatial awareness, alertness, and ADHD: The re-emergence of unilateral neglect with time-on-task.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15780461&dopt=Citation
  
• Hans-Otto Karnath, Susanne Ferber & Marc Himmelbach (2001). Spatial awareness is a function of the temporal not the posterior parietal lobe.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/steen/cogweb/Abstracts/Karnath_01.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11418859&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=11418859&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• C. Marzi, M. Girelli, Carlo Miniussi, N. Smania & Angelo Maravita (2000). Electrophysiological correlates of conscious vision: Evidence from unilateral extinction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/089892900562471
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/089892900562471
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11054928&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2000/00000012/00000005/art00015
  
• Geraint Rees, E. Wojciulik, Karen Clarke, Masud Husain & Christopher D. Frith (2002). Neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision in parietal extinction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/attention/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2002/Neurocase 8 387 393.pdf
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/WebSpace/users/attentiongrp/pubs/Jon Driver/Author/Original Research Papers/2002/Neurocase 8 387 393.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12499413&dopt=Citation
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/K44HGQYAQYAPA0NX.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/714017570.pdf
  
• Geraint Rees, E. Wojciulik, Karen Clarke, Masud Husain, Christopher D. Frith & Julia Driver (2000). Unconscious activation of visual cortex in the damaged right hemisphere of a parietal patient with extinction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/rees00unconscious.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10908192&dopt=Citation
  http://www.brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/123/8/1624
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/123/8/1624
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/brainj/2000/00000123/00000008/art01624
  
• L. C. Robertson (1999). What can spatial deficits teach us about feature binding and spatial maps?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/0FX3R1WWJDF925A2.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/psych/pvis/1999/00000006/00000003/art00009
  
• Nathalie Valenza, Mohamed L. Seghier, Sophie Schwartz, François Lazeyras & Patrik Vuilleumier (2004). Tactile awareness and limb position in neglect: Functional magnetic resonance imaging.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://labnic.unige.ch/nic/papers/NV_etal_AN2004.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14705125&dopt=Abstract
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ana.10854
  
• Patrik Vuilleumier & Sophie Schwartz (2001). Beware and be aware: Capture of spatial attention by fear-related stimuli iin neglect.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://labnic.unige.ch/nic/papers/PV_SS_NR2001a.pdf
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/fulltext.00001756-200105080-00014.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11338176&dopt=Citation
  
• P. Vuilleumier, N. Sagiv, E. Hazeltine, R. A. Poldrack, D. Swick, Rafal, R. D. & J. D. E. Gabrieli (2001). Neural fate of seen and unseen faces in visuospatial neglect: A combined event-related fMRI and ERP study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://labnic.unige.ch/papers/PV_PNAS2001.pdf
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001PNAS...98.3495V
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/98/6/3495
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/051436898v1
  http://cog.brown.edu/~jvettel/visionpapers/Vuilleumier_2001.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/gabrieli-lab/Publications/2001/Vuilleumier.PNAS.2001.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(20010313)98:6<3495:NFOSAU>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=30681
  
• Patrik Vuilleumier & Noam Sagiv (2001). Two eyes make a pair: Facial organization and perceptual learning reduce visual extinction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://labnic.unige.ch/nic/papers/PV_NPsia2001.pdf
  http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~prd/fragments/Effect of experience/Vuilleumier & Sagiv, Neuropsychologia2001, Eye, facial organizatin and perceptual learning.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11527551&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/2001/00000039/00000011/art00048
  

Schizophrenia

• R. Area, A. Garcia-Caballero, I. Gómez, M. J. Somoza, I. Garcia-Lado, M. J. Recimil & L. Vila (2003). Conscious compensations for thought insertion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.karger.com/doi/10.1159/000071257
  http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ProduktNr=224276&Ausgabe=229267&ArtikelNr=71257
  http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ArtikelNr=71257&Ausgabe=229267&ProduktNr=224276&filename=71257.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12845283&dopt=Citation
  
• Sean E. Baumann (2005). The schizophrenias as disorders of self consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=198&id=22971
  
• Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00179
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00179
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000005/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000005/art00179
  
• Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/Bortolotti___Broome_-_Thought_Insertion.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/145j2111842wpv7h/fulltext.pdf
  
• Max Coltheart (2005). Conscious experience and delusional belief.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_psychiatry_and_psychology/v012/12.2coltheart.html
  
• Christopher D. Frith (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=509004&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=509004&dopt=Citation
  
• Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore & D. Wolpert (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.keck.ucsf.edu/~houde/coleman/frith.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/frith00explaining.html
  http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/sblakemore/SJ_papers/FriBlaWol_BBR2000.pdf
  http://learning.eng.cam.ac.uk/wolpert/publications/papers/FriBlaWol99.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10719163&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01650173/2000/00000031/00000002/art00052
  
• Thomas Fuchs (2005). Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia.   (More)
• Donald C. Grant (2002). Becoming conscious and schizophrenia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=NP.004.0199A
  
• Patrick Haggard, Flavie Martin, Marisa Taylor-Clarke, Marc Jeannerod & Nicolas Franck (2003). Awareness of action in schizophrenia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12802207&dopt=Citation
  
• T. T. J. Kircher & D. Leube (2003). Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14656508&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2003/00000012/00000004/art00071
  
• Giulio Srinivasan Tononi & Gerald M. Edelman (2000). Schizophrenia and the mechanisms of conscious integration.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ntp.neuroscience.wisc.edu/faculty/fac-art/Tononi31.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10719167&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01650173/2000/00000031/00000002/art00056
  
• Jonathan Y. Tsou (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research on mental disorders supports the inference that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders) are real theoretical entities, and that the evidence supporting this inference is causal and abductive. In explicating the nature of such entities, I argue that real mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as they are natural classes of abnormal behavior whose members share the same causal structure. I present this position in terms of Richard Boyd’s homeostatic cluster property theory of natural kinds, and argue that this perspective reveals limitations of Hacking’s account on the looping effects of human kinds, which suggests that the objects classified by psychiatrists are unstable entities. I subsequently argue that a subset of mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and Down syndrome) are mental illnesses insofar as they are disorders caused by a dysfunctional biological process that leads to harmful consequences for individuals. I present this analysis against Thomas Szasz’s argument that mental illness is a myth. In addressing issues of psychiatric classification, my analysis focuses on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, and is currently in its fourth edition. After examining the history of DSM in the twentieth century, and in particular, DSM’s shift to an atheoretical and purely descriptive system in the 1980s, I consider the relative merits of descriptive versus causal systems of classification. Drawing on Carl Hempel’s analysis of taxonomic systems in psychiatry, I argue that a causal classification system would provide a superior approach to psychiatric classification than the descriptive system currently favored by DSM.

Anosognosia

• Linda Clare (2002). Developing awareness about awareness in early-stage dementia: The role of psychosocial factors.   (More)
• D. Ashley Cohen (online). Differences in awareness of neuropsychological deficits among three patient populations.   (More)
• Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies & Max Coltheart (2005). Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00283.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00283.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2005/00000020/00000002/art00004
  
• Tessa Hart, John Whyte, Junghoon Kim & Monica Vaccaro (2005). Executive function and self-awareness of "real-world" behavior and attention deficits following traumatic brain injury.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/fulltext.00001199-200507000-00005.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16030440&dopt=Citation
  
• Bradley J. Hufford (2000). Self-Awareness of Neuropsychological Deficits in Children and Adolescents with Epilepsy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI3018212/
  
• M. Jehkonen, J. Ahonen, P. Dastidar & J. Vilkki (2000). Unawareness of deficits after right hemisphere stroke: Double-dissociations of anosognosias.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pt.wkhealth.com/pt/re/obes/abstract.00000132-200012000-00008.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11125753&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1034/j.1600-0404.2000.102006378.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1034/j.1600-0404.2000.102006378.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119031347/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mksg/ane/2000/00000102/00000006/art00008
  
• Hans-Otto Karnath, Bernhard Baier & Thomas Nägele (2005). Awareness of the functioning of one's own Limbs mediated by the insular cortex?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroscience.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/31/7134
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16079395&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16079395&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• K. P. Rankin, E. Baldwin, C. Pace-Savitsky, J. H. Kramer & B. L. Miller (2005). Self awareness and personality change in dementia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jnnp.com/cgi/content/abstract/76/5/632
  http://jnnp.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/76/5/632
  http://jnnp.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/76/5/632
  http://intl-jnnp.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/76/5/632
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15834018&dopt=Citation
  
• Annalena Venneri & Michael F. Shanks (2004). Belief and awareness: Reflections on a case of persistent anosognosia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14644108&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00283932/2004/00000042/00000002/art00171
  

The Minimally Conscious State

• James L. Bernat (2002). Questions remaining about the minimally conscious state.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/full/58/3/337
  http://neurology.org/cgi/reprint/58/3/337?ck=nck
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/full/58/3/337?ck=nck
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11839827&dopt=Citation
  
• Joseph J. Fins, Nicholas D. Schiff & Kathleen M. Foley (2007). Late recovery from the minimally conscious state: Ethical and policy implications.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/68/4/304
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17242341&dopt=Citation
  
• Joseph J. Fins (2005). Rethinking disorders of consciousness: New research and its implications.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/503854?rss
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15957315&dopt=Citation
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hastings_center_report/v035/35.2fins.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/thc/hcr/2005/00000035/00000002/art00010
  
• Joseph T. Giacino & Charlotte T. Trott (2004). Rehabilitative management of patients with disorders of consciousness: Grand Rounds.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/abstract.00001199-200405000-00006.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15247847&dopt=Citation
  
• Joseph T. Giacino & Childs N. Ashwal S. (2002). The minimally conscious state: Definition and diagnostic criteria.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/58/3/349
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11839831&dopt=Citation
  
• Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte (2005). The vegetative and minimally conscious states: Current knowledge and remaining questions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/abstract.00001199-200501000-00005.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15668569&dopt=Citation
  
• Douglas Katz (online). Minimally conscious states.   (More)
• Steven Laureys, Fabien Perrin & Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville (2004). Cerebral processing in the minimally conscious state.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/63/5/916
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15365150&dopt=Citation
  
• Fabien Perrin, Caroline Schnakers, Manuel Schabus, Christian Degueldre, Serge Goldman, Serge Brédart, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville, Maurice Lamy, Gustave Moonen, André Luxen, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2006). Brain response to one's own name in vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/63/4/562
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16606770&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff, D. Rodriguez-Moreno & A. Kamal (2005). FMRI reveals large-scale network activation in minimally conscious patients.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/64/3/514
  http://neurology.org/cgi/content/abstract/64/3/514?ck=nck
  http://www.fmri.columbia.edu/pdfs/MCS_Neurology_2_8_05.pdf
  http://www.safar.pitt.edu/content/grant/jc/2005/0225 Fink.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15699384&dopt=Citation
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Modeling the minimally conscious state: Measurements of brain function and therapeutic possibilities.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16186043&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16186043&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  

Vegetative State and Coma

• Joseph J. Fins & F. Plum (2004). Neurological diagnosis is more than a state of mind: Diagnostic clarity and impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/61/9/1354
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/extract/61/9/1354
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15364678&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=15364678&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Daniel L. Greenberg (2007). Comment on "detecting awareness in the vegetative state".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/315/5816/1221b
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;315/5816/1221b
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17332395&dopt=Citation
  
• Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2009). Brain-Damaged Patients and the Moral Significance of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that the patients might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life and, indeed, that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.
• Steven Laureys, Adrian M. Owen & Nicholas D. Schiff (2004). Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S147444220400852X
  
• Steven Laureys (2005). The neural correlate of (un)awareness: Lessons from the vegetative state.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/papers/vs/2005_VS_TICS.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16271507&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16271507&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305002998
  
• Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys, Dietsje Jolles & John D. Pickard (2007). Response to comments on "detecting awareness in the vegetative state".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/315/5816/1221c
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;315/5816/1221c
  
• Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys & John D. Pickard (2007). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to detect Covert awareness in the vegetative state.   (More)
• Fabien Perrin, Caroline Schnakers, Manuel Schabus, Christian Degueldre, Serge Goldman, Serge Brédart, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville, Maurice Lamy, Gustave Moonen, André Luxen, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2006). Brain response to one's own name in vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://archneur.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/63/4/562
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16606770&dopt=Citation
  
• John Protevi (ms). The Terri schiavo case: Biopolitics and biopower: Agamben and Foucault.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While Agamben acknowledges the Arendtian and Foucaultian thesis of the modernity of biopower, he will claim that sovereignty and biopolitics are equally ancient and essentially intertwined in the originary gesture of all politics; sovereignty is the power to decide the state of exception whereby bare life or zoe is exposed "underneath" political life or bios. Agamben then finds in the concentration camp the modern biopolitical paradigm, in which the state of exception has become the rule and we have all become [potentially] bearers of exposed bare life in that we are all subject to what I will call a "de-politicizing predication": to use the current American jargon, being named an "enemy combatant."
• John Protevi, The Terri Schiavo case: Empathy, love, sacrifice, singularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the first part of this talk I show how some ideas in the new "4EA" branch of cognitive science (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, affective), which gets away from the computer metaphor to talk about affective cognition as the direction of action of an organism, can be illuminated by Deleuze's ontology. Now that may sound ridiculous, as Deleuze's terminology is notoriously baroque – how could it ever "illuminate" anything? So I'm going to be using plain English translations of his concepts; I think his concepts are too good, too useful, for his terminology to be such a barrier to entry. Then I'm going to use this mixture of Deleuze and 4EA ideas to examine a case study which has, besides its metaphysical and psychological implications, some ethical, political, and legal ones as well. So to deal with them we'll deal just a bit with Agamben and Foucault
• Nicholas D. Schiff (2006). Multimodal neuroimaging approaches to disorders of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/abstract.00001199-200609000-00003.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16983224&dopt=Citation
  
• P. Schotsmans (1993). The patient in a persistent vegetative state: An ethical re-appraisal.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?url=article.php&id=2015305&journal_code=BIJ
  
• Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne, The vegetative state and the science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state (VS) patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some VS patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some VS patients might indeed be conscious, although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some VS patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remarkable, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are conscious or not. We argue for a cluster-based ‘natural kind’ methodology that is adequate to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research into the presence or absence of consciousness in VS patients, and as a methodology for the science of consciousness more generally
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/12845/Vegetative_State.pdf
  
• J. R. Smythies (1999). The biochemical basis of coma.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Current research on the neural basis of consciousness is based mainly on neuroimaging, physiology and psychophysics. This target article reviews what is known about biochemical factors that may contribute to the development of consciousness, based on loss of consciousness (i.e., coma). There are two theories of the biochemical mode of action of general anaesthetics. One is that anaesthesia is a direct (i.e., not receptor-mediated) effect of the anaesthetic on cellular neurophysiological function; the other is that some alteration of receptor function occurs. General anaesthetics are mainly GABA agonists but some (such as ketamine) are glutamate antagonists. They also affect other systems, particularly cholinergic ones. There are various comas of metabolic origin. For example, a combination of small doses of the iron chelators desferrioxamine and prochlorperazine induce a profound and long lasting coma in humans. The mechanisms that might mediate this include redox mechanisms at the glutamate synapse, post-synaptic endocytosis of dopamine and iron, and intracellular iron-dopamine complexes, which are powerful dismuters of the superoxide anion. New findings in cell biology relating to endocytosis and recycling of receptors are discussed in a wider context. These biochemical events may induce coma by two mechanisms: (i) Consciousness may depend on widespread cortical (or cortico-thalamic) activation. (ii) Whereas these biochemical changes are widespread, only the changes in a subset of consciousness' neurons may count. An experimental program to distinguish between these two alternatives is proposed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.026
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000661/02/psyc.99.10.026.coma-biochemistry.1.smythies
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000661/01/psyc.99.10.026.coma-biochemistry.1.smythies.xml
  
• Graham Teasdale, R. Knill-Jones & J. van der Sande (1978). Observer variability in assessing impaired consciousness and coma.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jnnp.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/41/7/603
  http://jnnp.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/41/7/603
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=690637&dopt=Citation
  

Synesthesia

• Torin Alter (2006). Does synesthesia undermine representationalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Gregg Rosenberg (2004) argues that it does. On his view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. So, for example, he argues that sound/color synesthetic experiences show that visual experiences do not always represent spatial properties. I will argue that the representationalist can plausibly answer Rosenberg
• R. Cohen Kadosh, N. Sagiv, D. E. J. Linden, L. C. Robertson, G. Elinger & A. Henik (2005). When blue is larger than red: Colors influence numerical cognition in synesthesia.   (More)
• Richard Cytowic (1995). Synesthesia: Phenomenology and neuropsychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-10-cytowic.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-10-syn_phenomenology-1-cytowic.html
  
• Sean Day (2005). Some demographic and socio-cultural aspects of synesthesia.   (More)
• M. Dixon, Daniel Smilek, C. Cudahy & Philip M. Merikle (2000). Five plus two equals yellow: Mental arithmetic in people with synaesthesia is not coloured by visual experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~src/papers/nature.pdf
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~src/papers/nature.pdf
  http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/Dixon.Nature.2000.pdf
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/Dixon.Nature.2000.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10935623&dopt=Citation
  
• John G. Gammack (2002). Synaesthesia and knowing.   (More)
• Jeffrey A. Gray & Nunn J. Chopping S. (2002). Implications of synaesthesia for functionalism: Theory and experiments.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000012/1320
  
• Edward M. Hubbard, Sanjay Manohar & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2006). Contrast affects the strength of synesthetic colors.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16683492&dopt=Citation
  
• Edward M. Hubbard, A. Cyrus Arman, Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Geoffrey M. Boynton (2005). Individual differences among grapheme-color synesthetes: Brain-behavior correlations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Hubbard_Neuron05.pdf
  http://www-scf.usc.edu/~aarman/Hubbard_Neuron_2005_Supp.pdf
  http://www.neuron.org/content/article/fulltext/?uid=PIIS0896627305001248
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15797557&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0896627305001248
  
• Edward M. Hubbard & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2005). Neurocognitive mechanisms of synesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Hubbard_NeuronReview05.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Hubbard_NeuronReview05.pdf
  http://www.neuron.org/content/article/abstract?uid=PIIS0896627305008354
  http://www.current-biology.com/content/article/abstract?uid=PIIS0896627305008354
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16269367&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0896627305008354
  
• Edward M. Hubbard (2007). Neurophysiology of synesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17521514&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K7078665H572G247.pdf
  
• Fiona Macpherson (2007). Synaesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_60642_en.doc
  
• Lawrence E. Marks & Eric C. Odgaard (2005). Developmental constraints on theories of synesthesia.   (More)
• D. Maurer & C. Mondloch (2005). Neonatal synesthesia: A re-evaluation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Psychology/Cognitive/?view=usa&ci=019516623X
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2003). Hearing colors, tasting shapes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jones and Coleman are among a handful of otherwise normal as a child and the number 5 was red and 6 was green. This the- people who have synesthesia. They experience the ordinary ory does not answer why only some people retain such vivid world in extraordinary ways and seem to inhabit a mysterious sensory memories, however. You might _think _of cold when you no-man’s-land between fantasy and reality. For them the sens- look at a picture of an ice cube, but you probably do not feel es—touch, taste, hearing, vision and smell—get mixed up in- cold, no matter how many encounters you may have had with stead of remaining separate. ice and snow during your youth. Modern scientists have known about synesthesia since Another prevalent idea is that synesthetes are merely being 1880, when Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, pub- metaphorical when they describe the note C flat as “red” or say lished a paper in _Nature _on the phenomenon. But most have that chicken tastes “pointy”—just as you and I might speak of brushed it aside as fakery, an artifact of drug use (LSD and a “loud” shirt or “sharp” cheddar cheese. Our ordinary lan- mescaline can produce similar effects) or a mere curiosity. guage is replete with such sense-related metaphors, and perhaps About four years ago, however, we and others began to un- synesthetes are just especially gifted in this regard. cover brain processes that could account for synesthesia. Along We began trying to find out whether synesthesia is a gen- the way, we also found new clues to some of the most mysteri- uine sensory experience in 1999. This deceptively simple ques- ous aspects of the human mind, such as the emergence of ab- tion had plagued researchers in this field for decades. One nat- stract thought, metaphor and perhaps even language. ural approach is to start by asking the subjects outright: “Is this A common explanation of synesthesia is that the affected just a memory, or do you actually see the color as if it were right people are simply experiencing childhood memories and asso- in front of you?” When we tried asking this question, we did ciations..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/SciAm_2003.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/SciAm.pdf
  http://www-psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/SciAm.pdf
  http://psychology.stanford.edu/~lera/273/Rama_sciam.pdf
  http://www.sciamdigital.com/index.cfm?fa=ExtServices.GspDownloadIssueView&ARTICLEID_CHAR=6F1E425A-0D8E-8F4E-27366BC3426968D7
  http://www.sciamdigital.com/gsp_qpdf.cfm?ISSUEID_CHAR=6EF68F9D-077C-A71D-5AC37CEEA2A8AFD9&ARTICLEID_CHAR=6F1E425A-0D8E-8F4E-27366BC3426968D7
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12701330&dopt=Citation
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2001). Psychophysical investigations into the neural basis of synaesthesia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We studied two otherwise normal, synaesthetic subjects who `saw' a speci¢c colour every time they saw a speci¢c number or letter. We conducted four experiments in order to show that this was a genuine perceptual experience rather than merely a memory association. (i)The synaesthetically induced colours could lead to perceptual grouping, even though the inducing numerals or letters did not. (ii)Synaesthetically induced colours were not experienced if the graphemes were presented peripherally. (iii)Roman numerals were ine¡ective: the actual number grapheme was required. (iv)If two graphemes were alternated the induced colours were also seen in alternation. However, colours were no longer experienced if the graphemes were alternated at more than 4 Hz. We propose that grapheme colour synaesthesia arises from `cross-wiring' between the `colour centre' (area V4 or V8)and the `number area', both of which lie in the fusiform gyrus. We also suggest a similar explanation for the representation of metaphors in the brain: hence, the higher incidence of synaesthesia among artists and poets
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Synaesth_P_Roy_Soc.pdf
  http://www-psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Reprint.PDF
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Ramachandran_PRSB01.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Synaesthesia - P Royal Soc.pdf
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/5MF8YDM183NV7FCN.pdf
  http://www.bluecatsandchartreusekittens.com/Proceedings_2001.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11370973&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8452(20010507)268:1470<979:PIITNB>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1088697
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/search/expand?pub=infobike://rsl/rpb/2001/00000268/00001470/art00014&unc=
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Synaesthesia%20-%20P%20Royal%20Soc.pdf
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2001). Synaesthesia: A window into perception, thought and language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) The induced colours led to perceptual grouping and pop-out, (2) a grapheme rendered invisible through ‘crowding’ or lateral masking induced synaesthetic colours — a form of blindsight — and (3) peripherally presented graphemes did not induce colours even when they were clearly visible. Taken collectively, these and other experiments prove conclusively that synaesthesia is a genuine percep- tual phenomenon, not an effect based on memory associations from childhood or on vague metaphorical speech. We identify different subtypes of number–colour synaesthesia and propose that they are caused by hyperconnectivity between col- our and number areas at different stages in processing; lower synaesthetes may have cross-wiring (or cross-activation) within the fusiform gyrus, whereas higher synaesthetes may have cross-activation in the angular gyrus. This hyperconnec- tivity might be caused by a genetic mutation that causes defective pruning of con- nections between brain maps. The mutation may further be expressed selectively (due to transcription factors) in the fusiform or angular gyri, and this may explain the existence of different forms of synaesthesia. If expressed very diffusely, there may be extensive cross-wiring between brain regions that represent abstract concepts, which would explain the link between creativity, metaphor and synaesthesia (and the higher incidence of synaesthesia among artists and poets). Also, hyperconnectivity between the sensory cortex and amygdala would explain the heightened aversion synaesthetes experience when seeing numbers printed in the ‘wrong’ colour. Lastly, kindling (induced hyperconnectivity in the temporal lobes of temporal lobe epilepsy [TLE] patients) may explain the purported higher incidence of synaesthesia in these patients. We conclude with a synaesthesia-based theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pepas.org/textos/ramachandran2.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Synaesth_JCS.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/JCS.pdf
  http://cbc.ucsd.edu/pdf/Synaesthesia - JCS.pdf
  http://www-psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/JCS.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Synaesthesia - JCS.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Ramachandran_JCS01.pdf
  http://www.bluecatsandchartreusekittens.com/Synaesthesia - JCS.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000012/1244
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran (1996). Synaesthesia in phantom Limbs induced with mirrors.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/X06LT4J121Q346WW.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8637922&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8452(19960422)263:1369<377:SIPLIW>2.0.CO;2-H
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2003). The phenomenology of synaesthesia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article supplements our earlier paper on synaesthesia published in JCS (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a). We discuss the phenomenology of synaesthesia in greater detail, raise several new questions that have emerged from recent studies, and suggest some tentative answers to these questions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cbc.ucsd.edu/pdf/Ramachandran_JCS2003.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/Ramachandran_JCS2003.pdf
  http://www.unicog.org/publications/Ramachandran_JCS2003.pdf
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Ramachandran_2003b.pdf
  http://www-psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Ramachandran_2003b.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/00000008/art00003
  
• Romke Rouw & H. Steven Scholte (2007). Increased structural connectivity in grapheme-color synesthesia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/~edhubbard/papers/Rouw_NatNeuro07.pdf
  http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v10/n6/abs/nn1906.html
  http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v10/n6/suppinfo/nn1906_S1.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17515901&dopt=Citation
  
• Noam Sagiv, Jeffrey Heer & Lynn Robertson (2006). Does binding of synesthetic color to the evoking grapheme require attention?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~hsstnns/reprints/Sagiv_et_al_Cortex2006.pdf
  http://vis.berkeley.edu/papers/synesthesia_binding/2005-Synesthesia-Cortex.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16683497&dopt=Citation
  
• Noam Sagiv (2005). Synesthesia in perspective.   (More)
• Noam Sagiv, Julia Simner, James Collins, Brian Butterworth & Jamie Ward (2006). What is the relationship between synaesthesia and visuo-spatial number forms?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mathematicalbrain.com/pdf/2006SAGIVETAL.PDF
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ739708
  http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~hsstnns/reprints/Sagiv_et_al_NF2006.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16288733&dopt=Citation
  
• J. Simner, C. Mulvenna, N. Sagiv, E. Tsakanikos, S. A. Witherby, C. Fraser, K. Scott & J. Ward (2006). Synaesthesia: The prevalence of atypical cross-modal experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=p5469
  http://www.perceptionweb.com/abstract.cgi?id=p5469
  http://www.perceptionweb.com/perc0806/p5469refs.html
  http://www.perceptionweb.com/perception/fulltext/p35/p5469.pdf
  http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~hsstnns/reprints/Simner_at_al_2006_Prevalence.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17076063&dopt=Citation
  
• Jamie Ward & Noam Sagiv (2007). Synaesthesia for finger counting and dice patterns: A case of higher synaesthesia?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?Db=pubmed&Cmd=ShowDetailView&TermToSearch=17566940&ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/779532915.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/778652037.pdf
  
• Jamie Ward, Ryan Li, Shireen Salih & Noam Sagiv (2006). Varieties of grapheme-colour synaesthesia: A new theory of phenomenological and behavioural differences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~hsstnns/reprints/CnC.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17126034&dopt=Citation
  

Other Disorders and Syndromes

• Clive Ballard (2002). Disturbances of conscious in dementia with Lewy bodies assocated with alterantion in nicotonic receoptor binding in the temporal cortex.   (More)
• Jeffrey W. Cooney & Michael S. Gazzaniga (2003). Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2004/Ref58.pdf
  http://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/posgraduacao/disciplinas/bmb5718/2005/curso_22.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12691764&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2003/00000007/00000004/art00058
  
• Martha J. Farah (1994). Perception and awareness after brain damage.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8038585&dopt=Citation
  
• Deborah Faulkner & Jonathan K. Foster (2002). The decoupling of "explicit" and "implicit" processing in neuropsychological disorders: Insights into the neural basis of consciousness?   (More)
• Todd E. Feinberg & Julian Paul Keenan (2005). Where in the brain is the self?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16325140&dopt=Citation
  
• Roger Gil, E. M. Arroyo-Anllo, P. Ingrand, M. Gil, J. P. Neau, C. Ornon & V. Bonnaud (2001). Self-consciousness and alzheimer's disease.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pt.wkhealth.com/pt/re/obes/abstract.00000132-200111000-00009.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11696024&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1034/j.1600-0404.2001.00280.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120696892/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mksg/ane/2001/00000104/00000005/art00280
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mksg/ane/2001/00000104/00000005/art00009
  
• Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. The present article shows that, if we are careful to consider the possibility that a demonstrative gesture can contribute content to a conscious experience, then neither source of evidence is compelling.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/118/472/995
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (1993). Behavioral and magnetoencephalographic correlates of plasticity in the adult human brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psy.ucsd.edu/chip/pdf/MEG_Correlates_PNAS.pdf
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/90/22/10413
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8248123&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19931115)90:22<10413:BAMCOP>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=47787
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Diane Rogers-Ramachandran & Marni Stewart (1992). Perceptual correlates of massive cortical reorganization.   (More)
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran (1996). Synaesthesia in phantom Limbs induced with mirrors.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/X06LT4J121Q346WW.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8637922&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8452(19960422)263:1369<377:SIPLIW>2.0.CO;2-H
  
• Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). The perception of phantom Limbs: The D. O. Hebb lecture.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9762952&dopt=Citation
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/121/9/1603
  
• Sophie Schwartz, Frédéric Assal, Nathalie Valenza, Mohamed L. Seghier & Patrik Vuilleumier (2005). Illusory persistence of touch after right parietal damage: Neural correlates of tactile awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15548555&dopt=Citation
  http://www.brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/awh347v1
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/128/2/277
  http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/awh347v1
  http://brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/128/2/277
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/brainj/2005/00000128/00000002/art00277
  
• Nicholas D. Schiff & F. Plum (2000). The role of arousal and "gating" systems in the neurology of impaired consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.clinicalneurophys.com/pt/re/jclnneurophys/abstract.00004691-200009000-00002.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11085547&dopt=Citation
  
• Benjamin Seltzer, Jennifer J. Vasterling, Charles W. Mathias & Angela Brennan (2001). Clinical and neuropsychological correlates of impaired awareness of deficits in alzheimer disease and Parkinson disease: A comparative study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuneubeneu.com/pt/re/cbneuro/fulltext.00010291-200104000-00009.htm?&fullimage=true
  http://www.neuneubeneu.com/pt/re/cbneuro/fulltext.00010291-200104000-00009.htm?&fullimage=false
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11417666&dopt=Citation
  
• Mark Sherer, Tessa Hart, John Whyte, Toad G. Nick & Stuart A. Yablon (2005). Neuroanatomic basis of impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain injury: Findings from early computed tomography.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.headtraumarehab.com/pt/re/jhtr/fulltext.00001199-200507000-00002.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16030437&dopt=Citation
  

States of Consciousness

Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming

• Susan J. Blackmore (1991). Lucid dreaming: Awake in your sleep?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What could it mean to be conscious in your dreams? For most of us, dreaming is something quite separate from normal life. When we wake up from being chased by a ferocious tiger, or seduced by a devastatingly good-looking Nobel Prize winner we realize with relief or disappointment that "it was only a dream."
• Bill Brewer (2001). Precis of perception and reason, and response to commentator (michael ayers).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential contribution to the subject’s understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. Part I of my book argues that this must be so; Part II explains in detail how it is so
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://bbsonline.cup.cam.ac.uk/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.pdf
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/44/bbs00000544-00/bbs.hobson.html
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://assets.cambridge.org/052181/0442/excerpt/0521810442_excerpt.pdf
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/SLEEP-SPECIAL/Hobson.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.hobson.html
  http://www.southalabama.edu/psychology/gordon/HobsonETAL(2000)Dreaming.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=84264&jid=BBS&volumeId=23&issueId=06&aid=84263
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11515143&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X00003976
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X00003976
  
• J. Allan Hobson & Edward F. Pace-Schott (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12209117&dopt=Citation
  
• S. LaBerge (1998). Dreaming and consciousness.   (More)
• S. LaBerge (1990). Lucid dreaming: Psychophysiological studies of consciousness during Rem sleep.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lucidity.com/SleepAndCognition.html
  
• S. LaBerge & D. DeGracia (2000). Varieties of lucid dreaming experience.   (More)
• S. Makeig, T. Jung & Terrence J. Sejnowski (2000). Awareness during drowsiness: Dynamics and electrophysiological correlates.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cnl.salk.edu/~scott/canexp00.html
  http://www.sccn.ucsd.edu/~scott/canexp00.html
  http://www.cnl.salk.edu/~scott/pdf/CanExp00.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/makeig00awareness.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11195717&dopt=Citation
  
• C. W. Simon & W. Emmons (1956). Consciousness, and sleep.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0604651
  

Hypnosis and Consciousness

• Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
• Ned Block (2002). Behaviorism revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/BehaviorismRevisited.htm
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=125123&jid=BBS&volumeId=24&issueId=05&aid=125122
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Erik Myin (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/325301.html
  http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~emyin/Hurley.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  
• Zoltán Dienes & Josef Perner (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis.   (More)
• Fingelkurts, A. Andrew, A. Alexander, Kallio Sakari & Revonsuo Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
• Shaun Gallagher (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
• Graham A. Jamieson, Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (More)
• Pierre Rainville, Rrrobert K. Hofbauer, M. Catherine Bushnell, Gary H. Duncan & Donald D. Price (2002). Hypnosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892902760191117
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/089892902760191117
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892902760191117?cookieSet=1&journalCode=jocn
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191456&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00011
  

Meditation and Consciousness

• L. I. Aftanas & S. A. Golosheikin (2003). Changes in cortical activity in altered states of consciousness: The study of meditation by high-resolution EEG.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=465639&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K3176514H2240M45.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/maik/hump/2003/00000029/00000002/00465639
  
• Daniel Goleman (1976). Meditation and consciousness: An asian approach to mental health.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1259055&dopt=Citation
  
• N. Humphrey (2000). One-self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1121/00/OneSelf.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001121/00/OneSelf.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1121
  
• Nicholas Humphrey (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I am looking at my baby son, as he thrashes around in his crib, two arms flailing, hands grasping randomly, legs kicking the air, head and eyes turning this way and that, a smile followed by a grimace crossing his face. . . And I’m wondering: what is it like to be him? What is he feeling now? What kind of experience is he having of himself?
• Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne & Richard J. Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Meditation_Neuroscience_2005_AL_JDD_RJD_2.pdf
  
• P. Novak (1996). Buddhist meditation and consciousness of time.   (More)
• Jonathan Shear & Ron Jevning (1999). Pure consciousness: Scientific exploration of meditation techniques.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020002/929
  
• N. Srinivasan & S. Baijal (2007). Concentrative meditation enhances pre-attentive processing: A MMN study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.neuroreport.com/pt/re/neuroreport/abstract.00001756-200710290-00015.htm;jsessionid=HS4JvQGwPlCbTBvBY9LCsvnQD2DMFFvGx6rJBt2SG1Mk4FzyhDrH!65375592!181195628!8091!-1
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=17921873&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• John D. Dunne, Antione Lutz & Richard Davidson (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: An introduction.   (More)

Drugs and Consciousness

• T. Bresnick & R. Levin (2006). Phenomenal qualities of ayahuasca ingestion and its relation to fringe consciousness and personality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ayahuasca, a hallucinogen with profound consciousness- altering properties, has been increasingly utilized in recent studies (e.g., Strassman, 2001; Shanon, 2002a,b). However, other than Shanon's recent work, there has been little attempt to examine the effects of ayahuasca on perceptual, affective and cognitive experience, its relation to fringe consciousness or to pertinent personality variables. Twenty-one volunteers attending a seminar on ayahuasca were administered personality measures and a semi-structured interview about phenomenal qualities of their experience. Ayahuasca ingestion was associated with profound alterations of temporal- spatial experiences including expansive space and slowed time. Ayahuasca use was also associated with positive emotional states, higher levels of fantasy proneness and psychological absorption and a greater openness to mystical experiences. Conversely, quickened time was associated with negative emotionality. The results are discussed within a multi-faceted model of fringe consciousness with a particular emphasis on Hunt's (1995) models of cross-modal translation as the basis for higher-order symbolic cognition and support James' (1890/1950) contention that fringe consciousness is essential to human cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/00000009/art00001
  
• Michael Lyvers (2003). The neurochemistry of psychedelic experiences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/10/
  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=hss_pubs
  
• Leonid Ivanovich Spivak (1991). Psychoactive Drug Research in the Soviet Scientific Tradition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: During the past 200 years, Soviet scientists have extensively investigated and evaluated the effects of psychoactive drugs in humans. An examination of the resultant literature provides insight into the four distinct periods that comprise this era of research.

Other Altered States of Consciousness

• A. Dietrich (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis.   (More)
• Fingelkurts, A. Andrew, A. Alexander, Kallio Sakari & Revonsuo Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  
• Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
• Louis Tinnin (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation.   (More)
• Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss (2005). Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mp.uni-tuebingen.de/mp/fileadmin/user_upload/Kotchoubey/Vaitl-2005-ASC.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15631555&dopt=Citation
  

States of Consciousness, Misc

• Alain Morin (2007). Consciousness is more than wakefulness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Merker’s definition of consciousness excludes self-reflective thought, making his proposal for decorticate consciousness not particularly groundbreaking. He suggests that brainstem sites are neglected in current theories of consciousness. This is so because broader definitions of consciousness are used. Split-brain data show that the cortex is important for full-blown consciousness; also, behaviors exhibited by hydranencephaly patients and decorticated rats do not seem to require reflective consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=1007780&jid=BBS&volumeId=30&issueId=01&aid=1007776
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17475070&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X07001069
  
• Craig D. Murray & Michael S. Gordon (2001). Changes in bodily awareness induced by immersive virtual reality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/109493101300210268
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11710261&dopt=Citation
  

Consciousness and Physics

• Richard L. Amoroso (1997). The theoretical foundations for engineering a conscious quantum computer.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindspring.com/~noetic.advanced.studies/Amoroso19.pdf
  
• Michel Bitbol, Consciousness, situations, and the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There are two versions of the putative connection between consciousness and the measurement problem of quantum mechanics : consciousness as the cause of state vector reduction, and state vector reduction as the physical basis of consciousness. In this article, these controversial ideas are neither accepted uncritically, nor rejected from the outset in the name of some prejudice about objective knowledge. Instead, their origin is sought in our most cherished (but disputable) beliefs about the place of mind and consciousness in the world. It is first pointed out that these common beliefs about mind and consciousness arise from reification of situated first-person experience. Then, situatedness is shown to be a constitutive part of any exhaustive treatment of quantum measurements. It turns out that the alleged connection between consciousness and the measurement problem is a symptom of (i) the ineliminability of our being situated from the end-product of science, and (ii) our difficulty to express correctly this being situated
• Simon W. Blackburn (1991). Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar prevention.   (More)
• Jean E. Burns (2002). Quantum fluctuations and the action of the mind.   (More)
• Daniel C. Dennett (ms). "Quantum incoherence," review of A. G. Cairns-Smith, evolving the mind: On the nature of matter and the origin of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: After decades of persistent work by researchers in many fields, building foundations and patiently filling in details, the gigantic jigsaw puzzle of consciousness is beginning to come into focus. As large assemblies fall into place with a gratifying convergence of details drawn from different disciplines, the pace is quickening. Everybody wants to be in on the delicious task of describing what the Big Picture is going to look like, predicting the outlines before the mopping up operations confirm them. Well, not quite everybody. There are also those who dislike what they see happening: consciousness is turning out to be "just" a great big jigsaw puzzle. What? No cosmic revolutions in quantum (or meta-) physics? No Impenetrable Mysteries? Bummer!
• Matthew Donald, A review of the physics of consciousness by Evan Harris Walker.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At least three books struggle to emerge from this volume. One book, at the level of popular science, leads us through the development of physics, from Newton's laws to Bell's inequalities, in order to argue for the relevance of consciousness to the understanding of quantum theory. This is followed by a sketch of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Interwoven with both is a memoir of Walker's teenage girlfriend, who died of Hodgkin's disease nearly fifty years ago. The theme which holds the volume together is Walker's insistence on the importance of looking beyond materialism
• Mr Shan Gao, A quantum method to test the existence of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As we know, "Who can be said to be a conscious being?" is one of the hard problems in present science, and no method has been found to strictly differentiate the conscious being from the being without consciousness or usual matter. In this short paper, we present a strict physical method based on revised quantum dynamics to test the existence of consciousness, and the principle is to use the distinguishability of nonorthogonal single states. We demonstrate that although the dynamical collapse time can’t be measured by a physical measuring device, a conscious being can perceive it under the assumed QSC condition, thus can distinguish the nonorthogonal single states in the framework of revised quantum dynamics This in principle provides a quantum method to differentiate man and machine, or to test the existence of consciousness. We further discuss the rationality of the assumed QSC condition, and denote that some experimental evidences have indicated that our human being can satisfy the condition. This not only provides some confirmation of our method, but also indicates that the method is a practical proposal, which can be implemented in the near future experiments
• Attila Grandpierre, The physics of collective consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRACT: It is pointed out that the organisation of an organism necessarily involves fields which are the only means to make an approximately simultaneous tuning of the different subsystems of the organism-as-a-whole. Nature uses the olfactory fields, the acoustic fields, the electromagnetic fields and quantum-vacuum fields. Fields with their ability to comprehend the whole organism are the natural basis of a global interaction between organisms and of collective consciousness. Evidences are presented that electromagnetic potential fields mediate the collective field of consciousness. This result offers for the first time experimental access to the study of collective consciousness by measuring the field-related information-carrying potentials and their derivatives, the electric and magnetic fields between different individuals. The electrodynamic interaction of different brains/minds generates induction and in this way excitement, enhancement in the baseline of the interacting brains? activity. A list of empirical evidences is presented here proving the existence of this ?interactive excitement? effect in the known phenomenon of collective consciousness. The fundamental phenomenon of the collective consciousness is known as ?social facilitation? or ?group effect?. The character and completion of consciousness are outlined in the frame of this picture, and the role of the ?group effect? or ?social facilitation? as a primary factor in developing consciousness is described. A quantum-physical model of a multi-layered consciousness is presented, where the layering is expressed by the subsequent subtlety of the masses of the material carriers of information. I show that as the mental levels get deeper and more sensitive the couplings are on more and more global scales of their environment. I point out that direct, immediate action in distance actually exists in the electromagnetic field, which is the coupling, mediator field between waves and particles. I show how the environmental, natural and cosmic fields are determinative sources of our consciousness. The results presented point out that the Collective Field of Consciousness is a significant physical factor of the biosphere. I show that the morphogenetic field has an electromagnetic (EM) nature. EM fields are vacuum fields. Different basic forms of vacuum fields exist, and all kinds of fields, including the particle-mediated fields as well, when overlapping each other, seem to be in a direct resonant coupling, and form a complex, merged biofield. The vacuum model of consciousness presented here points to the inductive generation of consciousness, and to its self-initiating nature. Individual and collective methods, as well as the experimental possibilities of a global healing and improving the consciousness field of mankind are suggested. Keywords: olfactory, acoustic, electromagnetic, vacuum fields, generation of consciousness, evolution of collective consciousness, social evolution, completion of consciousness, healing
• Stuart Hameroff (ms). Anesthesia, consciousness and hydrophobic pockets a unitary quantum hypothesis of anesthetic action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Anesthetic gas molecules are recognized to act by van der Waals (London dispersion) forces in hydrophobic pockets of select brain proteins to ablate consciousness. Enigmatic features of consciousness have defied conventional neurophysiological exp lanations and prompted suggestions for supplemental occurrence of macroscopic quantum coherent states and quantum computation in the brain. Are these feasible? During conscious (non-anesthetic) conditions, endogenous Van der Waals London dispersion forces occur among non-polar amino acid groups in hydrophobic pockets of neural proteins and help regulate their conformation/function. London forces are weak instantaneous couplings between pairs of electron induced dipoles (e.g. between adjacent non-polar amino acid groups), and are quantum mechanical effects capable of supporting quantum superposition/computation and macroscopic quantum coherence. Quantum effects mediated by endogenous London forces in hydrophobic pockets of select neural proteins may be necessary for consciousness. The mechanism of anesthetics may be to inhibit (by exogenous London forces) the necessary quantum states
• Stuart Hameroff (ms). Consciousness, microtubules and the quantum world.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hameroff: I became interested in understanding consciousness as an undergraduate at the University of Pittsburgh in the late 60's. In my third year of medical school at Hahnemann in Philadelphia I did a research elective in professor Ben Kahn's hematology-oncology lab. They were studying various types of malignant blood cells, and I became interested in mitosis-looking under the microscope at normal and abnormal cell division. I became fascinated by centrioles and mitotic spindles pulling apart the chromosomes, doing this little dance, dividing the cytoplasm, establishing the daughter-cell architecture, and beginning differentiation. I remember wondering to myself how these centrioles and mitotic spindles "knew" where to go and what to do. What kind of intelligence was running the show at the cellular level?
• Stuart R. Hameroff (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
• Stuart Hameroff (ms). The quantum mind of.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Today we’re talking with Stuart Hameroff, Professor Emeritus at the Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology, and Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies, at the University of Arizona. Dr Hameroff is best-known for his research on 'quantum consciousness', an alternative model to the accepted view of how consciousness arises. With Sir Roger Penrose, Dr Hameroff has proposed that consciousness arises at the quantum level within structures inside neurons, known as microtubules
• Charles Hartshorne (1977). Physics and psychics: The place of mind in nature.   (More)
• Huping Hu (ms). Review of the book “quantum enigma - physics encounters consciousness”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By explicitly discussing the connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness and bravely using the book containing these discussions as course material for students, the authors show the readers and teach the students that such connections are real and tangible not just pseudoscience or New Age mumbo-jumbo. In doing so, Rosenblum and Kuttner lead by example. Hopefully, other physicists and scientists in the academics would follow suit by breaking away from the invisible “prison” of conformity and orthodoxy, opening widely physicists’ closet containing their skeleton and turning the same into golden opportunities for solving the mystery of consciousness. I highly recommend this book
• Huping Hu & Maoxin Wu (ms). Spin as primordial self-referential process driving quantum mechanics, spacetime dynamics and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have recently theorized that consciousness is intrinsically connected to quantum mechanical spin since said spin is embedded in the microscopic structure of spacetime and is more fundamental than spacetime itself, that is, spin is the “mind-pixel.” Applying these ideas to the particular structures and dynamics of the brain, we have developed a qualitative model of quantum consciousness. In this paper, we express our fundamental view that spin is a primordial self-referential process driving quantum mechanics, spacetime dynamics and consciousness. To justify such a view, we will draw support from existing literatures, discuss from a reductionist perspective the essential properties said spin should possess as mind-pixel and explore further the nature of spin to see whether said properties are present. Our conclusion is that these properties are indeed endowed to spin by Nature. One of the implications from our fundamental view is that the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics is due to the self-referential collapse of spin state that is contextual, non-local, non-computable and irreversible. Therefore, a complete theory of the self-referential spin process is necessarily semantic, that is, it should be based on internally meaningful information
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (2007). The quantum world, the mind, and the cookie Cutter paradigm.   (More)
• Bakytzhan Oralebkov (ms). Quantum mechanics and the consciousness.   (More)
• David Pearce, Mind, brain and the quantum.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Does introspection grant us privileged insight into the intrinsic nature of the stuff of the world? Michael Lockwood 's startling answer is yes. Quantum mechanics may indeed supply a complete formal description of the universe. Yet what "breathes fire into" the quantum-theoretic equations, it transpires, isn't physical in the traditional sense at all
• Thomas Filk & Albrecht von Müller (2009). Quantum Physics and Consciousness: The Quest for a Common Conceptual Foundation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Similar problems keep reappearing in both the discussion about the “hard” problem of consciousness and in fundamental issues in quantum theory. We argue that the similarities are due to common problems within the conceptual foundations of both fields. In quantum physics, the state reduction marks the “coming into being” of a new aspect of reality for which no causal explanation is available. Likewise, the self-referential nature of consciousness constitutes a “coming into being” of a new quality which goes beyond a fully causal account of reality. Both subjects require a categorical scheme which is significantly richer then the one used in addressing factual aspects of reality alone. While parts of this categorical scheme are realized in the formalism of quantum theory, they are seldom applied in the context of consciousness. We show what the structural limitations of a classical categorical framework are, how a richer framework can be developed, and how it can be applied to both quantum physics and consciousness
• Henry P. Stapp, A model of the quantum-classical and mind-brain connections, and of the role of the quantum Zeno effect in the physical implementation of conscious intent.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A simple exactly solvable model is given of the dynamical coupling between a person’s classically described perceptions and that person’s quantum mechanically described brain. The model is based jointly upon von Neumann’s theory of measurements and the empirical findings of close connections between conscious intentions and synchronous oscillations in well separated parts of the brain. A quantum-Zeno-effect-based mechanism is described that allows conscious intentions to influence brain activity in a functionally appropriate way. The robustness of this mechanism in the face of environmental decoherence effects is emphasized
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/QN.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp, Dear Walter , my article ``whiteheadian process and quantum theory of mind'' was the first `target article' on the E forum.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is already in quantum theory the huge *fact* of the apparent nonlocal (faster than light) connections: if one rejects the many worlds notion that all things happen [and I believe that that idea must be rejected for technical reasons --but that is a whole long argument itself] then there is an absolute need for some sort of FTL transfer of information. There simply must be a strong interconnectedness of the universe: FTL influence is unavoidable in quantum theory, if many worlds is rejected
• Henry P. Stapp, Philosophy of mind and the problem of free will in the light of quantum mechanics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Arguments pertaining to the mind-brain connection and to the physical effectiveness of our conscious choices have been presented in two recent books, one by John Searle, the other by Jaegwon Kim. These arguments are examined, and it is explained how the encountered difficulties arise from a defective understanding and application of a pertinent part of contemporary science, namely quantum mechanics. The principled quantum uncertainties entering at the microscopic levels of brain processing cannot be confined to the micro level, but percolate up to the macroscopic regime. To cope with the conflict between the resulting macroscopic indefiniteness and the definiteness of our conscious experiences, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces the idea of agent-generated probing actions, each of which specifies a definite set of alternative possible empirically/experientially distinguishable outcomes. Quantum theory then introduces the mathematical concept of randomness to describe the probabilities of the various alternative possible outcomes of the chosen probing action. But the agent-generated choice of which probing action to perform is not governed by any known law or rule, statistical or otherwise. This causal gap provides a logical opening, and indeed a logical need, for the entry into the dynamical structure of nature of a process that goes beyond the currently understood quantum mechanical statistical generalization of the deterministic laws of classical physics. The well-known quantum Zeno effect can then be exploited to provide a natural process that establishes a causal psychophysical link within the complex structure consisting of a stream of conscious experiences and certain macroscopic classical features of a quantum mechanically described brain. This naturally created causal link effectively allows consciously felt intentions to affect brain activity in a way that tends to produce the intended feedback. This quantum mechanism provides an eminently satisfactory alternative to the classical physics conclusion that the physical present is 1 completely determined by the physical past, and hence provides a physicsbased way out of the dilemma that Searle and Kim tried to resolve by philosophical analysis..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Philosophy.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp, Quantum mechanical coherence, resonance, and mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Norbert Wiener and J.B.S. Haldane suggested during the early thirties that the profound changes in our conception of matter entailed by quantum theory opens the way for our thoughts, and other experiential or mind-like qualities, to play a role in nature that is causally interactive and effective, rather than purely epiphenomenal, as required by classical mechanics. The mathematical basis of this suggestion is described here, and it is then shown how, by giving mind this efficacious role in natural process, the classical character of our perceptions of the quantum universe can be seen to be a consequence of evolutionary pressures for the survival of the species
• Henry P. Stapp, Quantum ontology and mind matter synthesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Solvay conference of marked the birth of quantum the ory This theory constitutes a radical break with prior tradition in physics because it avers if taken seriously that nature is built not out of matter but out of knowings However the founders of the theory stipulated cautiously that the theory was not to be taken seriously in this sense as a description of nature herself but was to be construed as merely a way of computing expectations about future knowings on the basis of information provided by past knowings There have been many e orts over the intervening seventy years to rid physics of this contamination of matter by mind But I use the reports at this Sym posium to support the claim that these decontamination e orts have failed and that because of recent developments pertaining to causal ity the time has come to take quantum theory seriously to take it as the basis for a conception of the universe built on knowings and other things of the same kind Quantum theory ensures that this con ception will yield all the empirical regularities that had formerly been thought to arise from the properties of matter together with all of those more recently discovered regularities that cannot be understood in that mechanical way Thus I propose to break away from the cau tious stance of the founders of quantum theory and build a theory of..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/40722.ps
  
• Henry P. Stapp, Quantum reality and mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two fundamental questions are addressed within the framework orthodox quantum mechanics. The first is the duality-nonduality conflict arising from the fact that our scientific description of nature has two disparate parts: an empirical component and a theoretical component. The second question is the possibility of meaningful free will in a quantum world concordant with the principle of sufficient reason, which asserts that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. The two issues are resolved by an examination of the conceptual and mathematical structure of orthodox quantum mechanics, without appealing to abstract philosophical analysis or intuitive sentiments
• Henry P. Stapp, Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to understand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for practical rules that describe connections between our observations. Many physicist have believed that this renunciation of the attempt describe nature herself was premature, and John von Neumann, in a major work, reformulated quantum theory as a theory of the evolving objective universe. In the course of his work he converted to a benefit what had appeared to be a severe deficiency of the Copenhagen interpretation, namely its introduction into physical theory of the human observers. He used this subjective element of quantum theory to achieve a significant advance on the main problem in philosophy, which is to understand the relationship between mind and matter. That problem had been tied closely to physical theory by the works of Newton and Descartes. The present work examines the major problems that have appeared to block the development of von Neumann’s theory into a fully satisfactory theory of Nature, and proposes solutions to these problems
• Dr Knud Thomsen (ms). Is quantum mechanics needed to explain consciousness ?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this short comment to a recent contribution by E. Manousakis [1] it is argued that the reported agreement between the measured time evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions derived from quantum mechanical formalisms does not require any direct effect of QM. The recursive consumption analysis process in the Ouroboros Model can yield the same behavior

Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

• David Bourget (2004). Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I discuss the quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and freewill offered by Stapp (1993, 1995, 2000, 2004). First I show that decoherence-based arguments do not work against this theory. Then discuss a number of problems with the theory: Stapp's separate accounts of consciousness and freewill are incompatible, the interpretations of QM they are tied to are questionable, the Zeno effect could not enable freewill as he suggests because weakness of will would then be ubiquitous, and the holism of measurement in QM is not a good explanation of the unity of consciousness for essentially the same reason that local interactions may seem incapable to account for it
• Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Quantum curiosities of psychophysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches are compatible with physicalism, they involve a very different conception of the physical, and of how the physical underpins the mental, from what most philosophers expect. And one approach exemplifies a a problem in the definition of physicalism which the metaphysical literature has discussed only in the abstract. A version of the paper has appeared in Consciousness and Human Identity, ed. John Cornwell, OUP 1998
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000193/00/QMCURIOFEB01.PDF
  http://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/butterfield/Papers/QmCuriositiesPsychophysicsFeb01.pdf
  
• Alex Byrne & N. Hall (1999). Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199909)66:3<370:COCAQM>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199909)66:3<370:COCAQM>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392693
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188592.pdf
  
• Matthew Donald (2002). Neural unpredictability, the interpretation of quantum theory, and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties in molecular motions, may overwhelm, by many orders of magnitude, many conventionally recognized sources of observed ``quantum'' uncertainty. Some possible ways of avoiding the problems are considered but found wanting. It is proposed that a complete understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates requires the introduction of mathematical definitions and indeed of new physical laws
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bss.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/nunquit.pdf
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2002quant.ph..8033D
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000716/
  http://www.bss.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/nunquit.html
  http://www.bss.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/nunquita.html
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000716/00/nunquit.pdf
  
• S. Klein (1991). The duality of psycho-physics.   (More)
• Jacques Mallah (ms). The many computations interpretation (MCI) of quantum mechanics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Computationalism provides a framework for understanding how a mathematically describable physical world could give rise to conscious observations without the need for dualism. A criterion is proposed for the implementation of computations by physical systems, which has been a problem for computationalism. Together with an independence criterion for implementations this would allow, in principle, prediction of probabilities for various observations based on counting implementations. Applied to quantum mechanics, this results in a Many Computations Interpretation (MCI), which is an explicit form of the Everett style Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI). Derivation of the Born Rule emerges as the central problem for most realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. If the Born Rule is derived based on computationalism and the wavefunction it would provide strong support for the MWI; but if the Born Rule is shown not to follow from these to an experimentally falsified extent, it would indicate the necessity for either new physics or (more radically) new philosophy of mind.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007arXiv0709.0544M
  
• Gregory R. Mulhauser (1995). On the end of a quantum-mechanical romance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-19-mulhauser.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-19-decoherence-1-mulhauser.html
  
• Diana N. Page (1995). Attaching theories of consciousness to Bohmian quantum mechanics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?papernum=9507006
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995quant.ph..7006P
  
• Don Page (2003). Mindless sensationalism: A quantum framework for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0108039
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?papernum=0108039
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001quant.ph..8039P
  
• Diana N. Page (1996). Sensible quantum mechanics: Are probabilities only in the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequency- type probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities gener- ally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to unconscious aspects of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arXiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9507024
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995gr.qc.....7024P
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1996IJMPD...5..583P
  
• David A. Harness (ms). Quantum continuum gravitoelectromagnetic mechanics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Static Maxwell-Einstein continuum mechanical gravitoelectromagnetic total stress energy momentum density tensor eigenvector matrix configuration space, provides flux for time dependent quantum mechanical eigenvalue matrix operator observables via Dirac-Noether conserved angular momentum probability current symmetry. Fundamental quantum continuum
  equation returns eigenvalues of photon gravitoelectromagnetic spectrum in units of Maxwell stress tensor pascals. Energization of off-diagonal stress tensor components results in electron-positron (moment of inertia x angular velocity) angular momentum origin of particle wave mass charge eigenvalues. In thought experiment test vs. general theory via pp-waves microlensing problem, where light-to-light gravitational attraction is four times matter-to-matter attraction, hypothesis predicts null result in area general theory known to break down on microscopic scale.
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum interactive dualism - an alternative to materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the_ _mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton_ _subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical_ _part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure_ _of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle._ _This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the_ _physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these_ _physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory_ _violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the_ _dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the_ _mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing_ _actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical_ _events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any_ _known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics_ _considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von_ _Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of_ _the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics_ _posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the_ _effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known_ _basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows_ _many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent_ _physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and_ _practically useful way..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.pdf
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.pdf
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.doc
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-59905
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=889633
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2006/00000041/00000003/art00009
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000011/art00003
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum interactive dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-podolsky-Rosen causal anomalies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance- free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.pdf
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.doc
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/42u403437l5208k5/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/42U403437L5208K5.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2006/00000065/00000001/00009017
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum interactive dualism: An alternative to materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and practically useful way..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.pdf
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-59905
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=889633
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2006/00000041/00000003/art00009
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2007). Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness are contrasted to classical ones. A key difference is that the quantum laws are fundamentally psychophysical and provide an explanation of the causal effect of conscious effort on neural processes, while the laws of classical physics, being purely physical, cannot. The quantum approach provides causal explanations, deduced from the laws of physics, of correlations found in psychology and in neuropsychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Blackwell.pdf
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=878524
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). The causal role of consciousness in the quantum brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Science is basically about correlations between conscious human experiences: that is what makes it both useful and testable in the realm of our expanding human knowledge. Explicit recognition of this understanding lies at the core of the formulation of quantum theory that was originally developed during the twenties by its founders
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/AbsLuc2007.doc
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1998). The evolution of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of a satisfactory science of consciousness The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no e ect on the behavior and hence on the survival prospects of the organisms in which it inheres Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high level form found in human beings In quantum theory on the other hand consciousness can be dynamically e cacious quantum the ory does allows consciousness to in uence behavior and thence to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection However this evo lutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/39241.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/stapp96evolution.html
  https://www.osti.gov/dublincore/gpo/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=442188
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=N9730037AH
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). "The observer" in physics and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuroscience is an important component of the scientific attack on the problem of consciousness. However, most neuroscientists, viewing our discussions, see only conflict and discord, and no reason why quantum theory has any great relevance the dynamics of the conscious brain. It is therefore worthwhile, in this first plenary talk of the 2003 Tucson conference on “Quantum Approaches to the Understanding of Consciousness,” to focus on the central issue, which is the crucial role of “The Observer,” and specifically, “The Mind of The Observer” in contemporary physical theory. I shall therefore review here this radical departure of present-day basic physics from the principles of classical physics, and then spell out some of its ramifications for neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Tucson2003.doc
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Tucson2003.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1995). Why classical mechanics cannot accommodate consciousness but quantum mechanics can.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/36574.ps
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995quant.ph..2012S
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-05-stapp.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-05-stapp.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-05-qm_stapp-1-stapp.html
  http://www.citebase.org/cgi-bin/fulltext?format=application/pdf&identifier=oai:arXiv.org:quant-ph/9502012
  

Quantum Mechanisms of Consciousness

• F. Tito Arecchi (2003). Chaotic neuron dynamics, synchronization, and feature binding: Quantum aspects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central issue of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how a large collection of coupled neurons combines external signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external stimulus localized at some input spreads over a large assembly of coupled neurons, building up a collective state univocally corresponding to the stimulus. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. Based on recent investigations of homoclinic chaotic systems and their synchronization, a novel conjecture for the dynamics of single neurons and, consequently, for neuron assemblies is formulated. Homoclinic chaos is proposed as a suitable way to code information in time by trains of equal spikes occurring at apparently erratic times. In order to classify the set of different perceptions, the percept space can be given a metric structure by introducing a distance measure between distinct percepts. The distance in percept space is conjugate to the duration of the perception in the sense that an uncertainty relation in percept space is associated with time-limited perceptions. This coding of different percepts by synchronized spike trains entails fundamental quantum features which are not restricted to microscopic phenomena. It is conjectured that they are related to the details of the perceptual chain rather than depending on Planck's action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004PhyA..338..218A
  http://www.pv.infn.it/~frontier/2003/talks/Arecchi_testo.doc
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0378437104002407
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KBJ5JFCQW44UHRXA.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Harald Atmanspacher (2004). Quantum theory and consciousness: An overview with selected examples.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely accepted that consciousness or, in other words, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the brain or, in other words, material brain activity. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness. Several approaches answering this question a?rmatively, proposed in recent decades, will be surveyed. It will be pointed out that they make di?erent epistemological assumptions, refer to di?erent neurophysiological levels of description, and adopt quantum theory in di?erent ways. For each of the approaches discussed, these imply both..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.igpp.de/english/tda/pdf/prigoddns.pdf
  http://hindawi.com/GetPDF.aspx?doi=10.1155/S102602260440106X
  
• Friedrich Beck & John C. Eccles (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/89/23/11357
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1333607&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19921201)89:23<11357:QAOBAA>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=50549&tools=bot
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=50549
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2360706.pdf
  
• Erhard Bieberich, In search of a neuronal substrate of the human mind: New concepts from "topological neurochemistry".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neurochemistry is a powerful discipline of modern neuroscience based on a description of neuronal function in terms of molecular reaction and interaction. This study aims at a neurochemical approach to the "hard" philosophical mind-body problem: the search for the neuronal correlate of consciousness. The scattered pattern of remote areas in the human brain simultaneously busy with the computation of single perceptions has left us with the unanswered questions why, where, and how the neuronal activity gives rise to a unified conscious observation of the outer world in a space inside of the human brain. In this study, conscious perception of temporally and spatially distinct events by an inner observer, the self, is treated as a topological problem demanding for a correlation of the self with a particular orchestration of neuronal or neurochemical activity triggered by action potentials. According to a novel concept of "topological neurochemistry" it is assumed that three features of the human brain are necessary in order to generate consciousness: 1) A network of neurons with dendritic branching structure and re-entry signaling of action potentials. 2)A macromolecular lattice structure as part of the neuron which is excitable or modulated by action potentials. 3) A spatial superposition of action potentials which underlies conscious perception but reveals not necessarily the same topology as the space perceived in consciousness. Several molecular models for the generation of consciousness and the self will be discussed, and a new concept, the "fractal approach", will be introduced. Mathematical theory and experimental methods for investigation of human consciousness will be presented
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/80/0/TOPO2.htm
  http://cogprints.org/80/00/TOPO2.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/00/80/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:80
  
• David Bourget (2004). Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I discuss the quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and freewill offered by Stapp (1993, 1995, 2000, 2004). First I show that decoherence-based arguments do not work against this theory. Then discuss a number of problems with the theory: Stapp's separate accounts of consciousness and freewill are incompatible, the interpretations of QM they are tied to are questionable, the Zeno effect could not enable freewill as he suggests because weakness of will would then be ubiquitous, and the holism of measurement in QM is not a good explanation of the unity of consciousness for essentially the same reason that local interactions may seem incapable to account for it
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East for Sublimation Process.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Previously (Vimal, 2009b) in Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, we discussed (i) the dual-aspect-dual-mode proto-experience (PE)-subjective experience (SE) framework of consciousness based on neuroscience, (ii) its implication in war, suffering, peace, and happiness, (iii) the process of sublimation for optimizing them and converting the negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects from both western and eastern perspectives. In this article, we summarize the recent development since then as follows. (1) In (Vimal, 2009e), we rigorously investigated the classical and quantum matching and selection processes for precisely experiencing a specific SE in a specific neural-network. (2) In (Vimal, 2009i), we unpacked the quantum view of superposition related to the superposition-based hypothesis H1 of our framework in terms of subquantum dual-aspect primal entities (bhutatmas) and addressed the related explanatory gaps. (3) In, we developed alternative hypotheses of our framework, namely, the superposition-then-integration-emergence based H2, the integration-emergence based H3, the intelligent mechanism based H4, and the vacuum/Aether based H5. We concluded that our framework with H1 is the most optimal one because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2009j). (4) In, we found over 40 different but overlapping meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ and suggested that authors must specify which aspect of consciousness they refer to when using this term to minimize confusion (Vimal, 2009f). (5) In, we proposed definitions of consciousness, qualia, mind, and awareness (Vimal, 2009h). (6) In, we investigated the necessary ingredients for access (reportable) consciousness: wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory and so on (Vimal, 2009g). (7) In, we discussed Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination with respect to our PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2009a). (8) In, we linked dynamic systems theory and fractal catalytic theory with standard representation theory using our framework (Vimal, 2009d). (9) In, we introduce the PE-SE aspects of consciousness in theoretical classical and quantum physics including loop quantum gravity and string theory (Vimal, 2009k). (10) In (Vimal, 2009c), we proposed that the SE of subject or ‘self’ in self-related neural-network is tuned to the self-related SEs/PEs superposed in other innumerable entities during samadhi state via matching and selection processes. This leads to bliss, ecstasy, or exceptionally high degree of climax at samadhi state. We conclude that, so far, the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework with hypothesis H1 is the most optimal framework for explaining our conventional reality because it has the least number of problems.
• Frank De Silva (ms). Foundation of all Axioms the Axioms of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A description of consciousness leads to a contradiction with the postulation from special relativity that there can be no connections between simultaneous event. This contradiction points to consciousness involving quantum level mechanisms. The Quantum level description of the universe is re- evaluated in the light of what is observed in consciousness namely 4 Dimensional objects. A new improved interpretation of Quantum level observations is introduced. From this vantage point the following axioms of consciousness is presented. Consciousness consists of two distinct components, the observed U and the observer I. The observed U consist of all the events I is aware of. A vast majority of these occur simultaneously. Now if I were to be an entity within the space-time continuum, all of these events of U together with I would have to occur at one point in space-time. However, U is distributed over a definite region of space-time (region in brain). Thus, I is aware of a multitude of space-like separated events. It is seen that this awareness necessitates I to be an entity outside the space-time continuum. With I taken as such, a new concept called concept A is introduced. With the help of concept A a very important axiom of consciousness, namely Free Will is explained. Libet s Experiment which was originally seen to contradict Free will, in the light of Concept A is shown to support it. A variation to Libet s Experiment is suggested that will give conclusive proof for Concept A and Free Will.
• John C. Eccles (1986). Do mental events cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/08201205Q157243L.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=2873576&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4649(19860522)227:1249<411:DMECNE>2.0.CO;2-G
  
• Shan Gao (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3064/01/qpan.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000467/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3064
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000467/00/qbp-jcs.PDF
  
• Mr Shan Gao (ms). Quantum, consciousness and panpsychism: A solution to the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can’t. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This provides a quantum basis for panpsychism. Furthermore, we argue that the conscious process is one kind of quantum computation process based on the analysis of consciousness time and combination problem. It is shown that a unified theory of matter and consciousness should include two parts: one is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness, and the other is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state. Lastly, some experimental suggestions are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of the paper
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3489/1/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3489/01/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003489/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3489
  
• Danko Georgiev (ms). Falsifications of Hameroff-Penrose orch OR model of consciousness and novel avenues for development of quantum mind theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper we try to make a clear distinction between quantum mysticism and quantum mind theory. Quackery always accompanies science especially in controversial and still under development areas and since the quantum mind theory is a science youngster it must clearly demarcate itself from the great stuff of pseudo-science currently patronized by the term "quantum mind". Quantum theory has attracted a big deal of attention and opened new avenues for building up a physical theory of mind because its principles and experimental foundations are as strange as the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Yet, the unwarranted recourse to paranormal phenomena as supporting the quantum mind theory plus the extremely bad biological mismodeling of brain physiology lead to great scepticism about the viability of the approach. We give as an example the Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model with a list of twenty four problems not being repaired for a whole decade after the birth of the model in 1996. In the exposition we have tried not only to pesent critique of the spotted flaws, but to provide novel possibilities towards creation of neuroscientific quantum model of mind that incorporates all the available data from the basic disciplines (biochemistry, cell physiology, etc.) up to the clinical observations (neurology, neurosurgery, molecular psychiatry, etc.). Thus in a concise fashion we outline what can be done scientifically to improve the Q-mind theory and start a research programme (in Lakatos sense) that is independent on the particular flaws in some of the existing Q-mind models
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003049/01/OOR.pdf
  
• Danko Georgiev (2003). On the dynamic timescale of mind-brain interaction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In neurophysiology it is widely assumed that our mind operates in millisecond timescale. This view might be wrong, because if consciousness is quantum coherent phenomenon at the level of protein assemblies, then its dynamic timescale can be picosecond one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4463/
  http://cogprints.org/4463/01/tucson_2003.ppt
  http://cogprints.org/4463/02/tucson_2003.pdf
  
• Gordon G. Globus (1996). Quantum consciousness is cybernetic.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-96-2-21-cybernetic-1-globus.html
  
• Rick Grush & P. Churchland (1995). Gaps in Penrose's toiling.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Using the Gödel Incompleteness Result for leverage, Roger Penrose has argued that the mechanism for consciousness involves quantum gravitational phenomena, acting through microtubules in neurons. We show that this hypothesis is implausible. First, the Gödel Result does not imply that human thought is in fact non algorithmic. Second, whether or not non algorithmic quantum gravitational phenomena actually exist, and if they did how that could conceivably implicate microtubules, and if microtubules were involved, how that could conceivably implicate consciousness, is entirely speculative. Third, cytoplasmic ions such as calcium and sodium are almost certainly present in the microtubule pore, barring the quantum mechanical effects Penrose envisages. Finally, physiological evidence indicates that consciousness does not directly depend on microtubule properties in any case, rendering doubtful any theory according to which consciousness is generated in the microtubules
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/papers/penrose/penrose.rtf
  
• Stuart R. Hameroff & A. C. Scott (1998). A sonoran afternoon: A dialogue on quantum mechanics and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Sonoran Desert, Stuart Hameroff and Alwyn Scott awoke from their_ _siestas to take margaritas in the shade of a ramada. On a nearby_ _table, a tape recorder had accidentally been left on and the following_ _is an unedited transcript of their conversation._
• Stuart R. Hameroff & Roger Penrose (1996). Conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000001/679
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2006). Consciousness, neurobiology and quantum mechanics: The case for a connection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness involves phenomenal experience, self-awareness, feelings, choices, control of actions, a model of the world, etc. But what _is_ _it?_ Is consciousness something specific, or merely a byproduct of information processing? Whatever it is, consciousness is a multi-faceted puzzle. Despite enormous strides in behavioral and brain science, essential features of consciousness continue to elude explanation. Unresolved problems include: 1) Neural correlates of conscious perception apparently occur too late—150 to 500 milliseconds (msec) after impingement on our sense organs—to have causal efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions, often initiated or completed within 100 msec after sensory impingement. For example in the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/x2h1p444w0t4321v.pdf
  
• Stuart R. Hameroff (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and space-time geometry.   (More)
• Stuart R. Hameroff (online). Consciousness, Whitehead and quantum computation in the brain: Panprotopsychism meets the physics of fundamental spacetime geometry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _dualism_ (consciousness lies outside knowable science), _emergence_ (consciousness arises as a novel property from complex computational dynamics in the brain), and some form of _panpsychism_, _pan-protopsychism, or pan-experientialism_ (essential features or precursors of consciousness are fundamental components of reality which are accessed by brain processes). In addition to 1) the problem of subjective experience, other related enigmatic features of consciousness persist, defying technological and philosophical inroads. These include 2) the “binding problem”—how disparate brain activities give rise to a unified sense of “self” or unified conscious content. Temporal synchrony—brain-wide coherence of neural membrane electrical activities—is often assumed to accomplish binding, but _what_ is being synchronized? What is being coherently bound? Another enigmatic feature is 3) the transition from pre-conscious processes to consciousness itself. Most neuroscientists agree that consciousness is the “tip of an iceberg”, that the vast majority of brain activities is
• Stuart R. Hameroff (1998). "Funda-mentality": Is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the universe?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Age-old battle lines over the puzzling nature of mental experience are shaping a modern resurgence in the study of consciousness. On one side are the long-dominant "physicalists" who view consciousness as an emergent property of the brain's neural networks. On the alternative, rebellious side are those who see a necessary added ingredient: proto-conscious experience intrinsic to reality, perhaps understandable through modern physics (panpsychists, pan-experientialists, "funda-mentalists"). It is argued here that the physicalist premise alone is unable to solve completely the difficult issues of consciousness and that to do so will require supplemental panpsychist/pan-experiential philosophy expressed in modern physics. In one scheme proto-conscious experience is a basic property of physical reality accessible to a quantum process associated with brain activity. The proposed process is Roger Penrose's "objective reduction" (OR), a self-organizing "collapse" of the quantum wave function related to instability at the most basic level of space-time geometry. In the Penrose- Hameroff model of "orchestrated objective reduction" (Orch OR), OR quantum computation occurs in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons. The basic thesis is that consciousness involves brain activities coupled to a self-organizing ripples in fundamental reality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/369/00/tics.html
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/Fundamentality.html
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/fundamentality.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:369
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/1998/00000002/00000004/art01157
  
• Stuart R. Hameroff (1998). More neural than thou (reply to churchland).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In "Brainshy: Non-neural theories of conscious experience," (this volume) Patricia Churchland considers three "non-neural" approaches to the puzzle of consciousness: 1) Chalmers' fundamental information, 2) Searle's "intrinsic" property of brain, and 3) Penrose-Hameroff quantum phenomena in microtubules. In rejecting these ideas, Churchland flies the flag of "neuralism." She claims that conscious experience will be totally and completely explained by the dynamical complexity of properties at the level of neurons and neural networks. As far as consciousness goes, neural network firing patterns triggered by axon-to-dendrite synaptic chemical transmissions are the fundamental correlates of consciousness. There is no need to look elsewhere
• Stuart R. Hameroff & Roger Penrose (1996). Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A model for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=0229431CI
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03784754/1996/00000040/00000003/art80476
  
• Stuart R. Hameroff (2002). Quantum computation in brain microtubules.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Proposals for quantum computation rely on superposed states implementing multiple computations simultaneously, in parallel, according to quantum linear superposition (e.g., Benioff, 1982; Feynman, 1986; Deutsch, 1985, Deutsch and Josza, 1992). In principle, quantum computation is capable of specific applications beyond the reach of classical computing (e.g., Shor, 1994). A number of technological systems aimed at realizing these proposals have been suggested and are being evaluated as possible substrates for quantum computers (e.g. trapped ions, electron spins, quantum dots, nuclear spins, etc., see Table 1; Bennett, 1995; and Barenco, 1995). The main obstacle to realization of quantum computation is the problem of interfacing to the system (input, output) while also protecting the quantum state from environmental decoherence. If this problem can be overcome, then present day classical computers may evolve to quantum computers
• Stuart R. Hameroff (ms). The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Figure 1. Dendrites and cell bodies of schematic neurons connected by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions form a laterally connected input_ _layer (“dendritic web”) within a neurocomputational architecture. Dendritic web dynamics are temporally coupled to gamma synchrony_ _EEG, and correspond with integration phases of “integrate and fire” cycles. Axonal firings provide input to, and output from, integration_ _phases (only one input, and three output axons are shown). Cell bodies/soma contain nuclei shown as black circles; microtubule networks_ _pervade the cytoplasm. According to the Orch OR theory, gamma EEG-synchronized integration phases include quantum computations in_ _microtubule networks which culminate with conscious moments. Insert closeup shows a gap junction through which microtubule quantum_ _states entangle among different neurons, enabling macroscopic quantum states in dendritic webs extending throughout cortex and other_ _brain regions._
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/documents/CogScipub.pdf
  
• Patrick A. Heelan (2004). The phenomenological role of consciousness in measurement.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an iota ('inner horizon') and the 'facticity' of the local world ('outer horizon'). Replacing 'perceptual cognition' by 'measurement' and 'subject' by 'expert subject using a measuring device' the analogy of a formal quantum structure is extended to the conscious structure of all empirical cognition. This is laid out in three theses: about perception, about classical measurement, and about quantum measurement. The results point to the need for research into the quantum structure of the physical embodiment of human cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2004/00000002/00000001/art00004
  
• Basil J. Hiley & Paavo Pylkkanen (2005). Can mind affect matter via active information?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mainstream cognitive neuroscience typically ignores the role of quantum physical effects in the neural processes underlying cogni¬tion and consciousness. However, many unsolved problems remain, suggesting the need to consider new approaches. We propose that quantum theory, especially through an ontological interpretation due to Bohm and Hiley, provides a fruitful framework for addressing the neural correlates of cognition and consciousness. In particular, the ontological interpretation suggests that a novel type of 'active information', connected with a novel type of 'quantum potential energy', plays a key role in quantum physical processes. After introducing the ontological interpretation we illustrate its value for cognitive neuroscience by discussing it in the light of a proposal by Beck and Eccles about how quantum tunneling could play a role in controlling the frequency of synaptic exocytosis. In this proposal, quantum tunneling would enable the 'self' to control its brain without violating the energy conservation law. We argue that the ontological interpretation provides a sharper picture of what actually could be taking place in quantum tunneling in general and in synaptic exocytosis in particular. Based on the notions of active information and quantum potential energy, we propose a coherent way of understanding how mental processes (understood as involving non-classical physical processes) can act on traditional, classically describable neural processes without violating the energy conservation law
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/mm/2005/00000003/00000002/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2005/00000003/00000002/art00002
  
• Robert G. Jahn & Brenda J. Dunne (1986). On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=6936499
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/VTRR87TG356154R7.pdf
  
• Robert G. Jahn (1993). The Complementarity of Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1550830707000699
  
• Stanley Klein (1995). Is quantum mechanics relevant to understanding consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-03-klein.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-03-klein.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-03-shadows-2-klein.html
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1995). Why the difference between quantum and classical mechanics is irrelevant to the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that the logical difference between classical and quantum mechanics that Stapp (1995) claims shows quantum mechanics is more amenable to an account of consciousness than is classical mechanics is irrelevant to the problem
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (online). Psychology all the way down.   (More)
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (ms). Quantum mechanics and consciousness: Fact and fiction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001quant.ph..2047M
  
• Harald Atmanspacher (online). Quantum Approaches to Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness. Several approaches answering this question affirmatively, proposed in recent decades, will be surveyed. It will be pointed out that they make different epistemological assumptions, refer to different neurophysiological levels of description, and use quantum theory in different ways. For each of the approaches discussed, problematic and promising features will be equally highlighted
• Takeo Oku (2005). A study on consciousness and life energy based on quantum holographic cosmology.   (More)
• Roger Penrose (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry: An addendum: Some new developments on the orch OR model for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349419&dopt=Citation
  
• Roger Penrose & Stuart Hameroff (1996). Orchestrated objective reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: The "orch OR" model for consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Features of consciousness difficult to understand in terms of conventional neuroscience have evoked application of quantum theory, which describes the fundamental behavior of matter and energy. In this paper we propose that aspects of quantum theory (e.g. quantum coherence) and of a newly proposed physical phenomenon of quantum wave function "self-collapse"(objective reduction: OR -Penrose, 1994) are essential for consciousness, and occur in cytoskeletal microtubules and other structures within each of the brain's neurons. The particular characteristics of microtubules suitable for quantum effects include their crystal-like lattice structure, hollow inner core, organization of cell function and capacity for information processing. We envisage that conformational states of microtubule subunits (tubulins) are coupled to internal quantum events, and cooperatively interact (compute) with other tubulins. We further assume that macroscopic coherent superposition of quantum-coupled tubulin conformational states occurs throughout significant brain volumes and provides the global binding essential to consciousness. We equate the emergence of the microtubule quantum coherence with pre-conscious processing which grows (for up to 500 milliseconds) until the mass-energy difference among the separated states of tubulins reaches a threshold related to quantum gravity. According to the arguments for OR put forth in Penrose (1994), superpositioned states each have their own space-time geometries. When the degree of coherent mass-energy difference leads to sufficient separation of space-time geometry, the system must choose and decay (reduce, collapse) to a single universe state. In this way, a transient superposition of slightly differing space-time geometries persists until an abrupt quantum classical reduction occurs. Unlike the random, "subjective reduction"( SR, or R) of standard quantum theory caused by observation or environmental entanglement, the OR we propose in microtubules is a self-collapse and it results in particular patterns of microtubule-tubulin conformational states that regulate neuronal activities including synaptic functions.
• Roger Penrose & Stuart R. Hameroff (1995). What 'gaps'? Reply to Grush and Churchland.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Grush and Churchland (1995) attempt to address aspects of the proposal that we have been making concerning a possible physical mechanism underlying the phenomenon of consciousness. Unfortunately, they employ arguments that are highly misleading and, in some important respects, factually incorrect. Their article ‘Gaps in Penrose’s Toilings’ is addressed specifically at the writings of one of us (Penrose), but since the particular model they attack is one put forward by both of us (Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996), it is appropriate that we both reply; but since our individual remarks refer to different aspects of their criticism we are commenting on their article separately. The logical arguments discussed by Grush and Churchland, and the related physics are answered in Part l by Penrose, largely by pointing out precisely where these arguments have already been treated in detail in Shadows of the Mind (Penrose, 1994). In Part 2, Hameroff replies to various points on the biological side, showing for example how they have seriously misunderstood what they refer to as ‘physiological evidence’ regarding to effects of the drug colchicine. The reply serves also to discuss aspects of our model ‘orchestrated objective reduction in brain microtubules – Orch OR’ which attempts to deal with the serious problems of consciousness more directly and completely than any previous theory
• Alfredo Pereira (2003). The quantum mind/classical brain problem.   (More)
• Eliano Pessa & Giuseppe Vitiello (2003). Quantum noise, entanglement and chaos in the quantum field theory of mind/brain states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review the dissipative quantum model of the brain and present recent developments related to the role of entanglement, quantum noise and chaos in the model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/pdf/q-bio/0309009
  http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.OT/0309009
  http://www.mindmatter.de/mmpdf/vitiello.pdf
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003q.bio.....9009P
  http://www.menem.com/~ilya/digital_library/q-comp/pessa-vitiello-03.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00005
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2003/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• A. C. Scott (1996). On quantum theories of the mind.   (More)
• A. C. Scott (2003). On quantum theories of the mind.   (More)
• Gao Shan (2004). Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a pre- ferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption that quantum collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J3J72U21K30R286T.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/fopl/2004/00000017/00000002/00486124
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1985). Consciousness and values in the quantum universe.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V0817677WR4H0K56.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). Chance, choice, and consciousness: A causal quantum theory of the mind/brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum mechanics unites epistemology and ontology: it brings human knowledge explicitly into physical theory, and ties this knowledge into brain dynamics in a causally efficacious way. This development in science provides the basis for a natural resolution of the dualist functionalist controversy, which arises within the classical approach to the mind brain system from the fact that the phenomenal aspects are not derivable from the principles of classical mechanics. A conceptually simple causal quantum mechanical theory of the mind/brain is described, and used to examine the necessity and function of consciousness in brain process
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37944new.txt
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1999). On quantum theories of the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Replies are given to arguments advanced in this journal that claim to show that it is to nonlinear classical mechanics rather than quantum mechanics that one must look for the physical underpinnings of conscious ness..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/173752.html
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/40369.ps
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?papernum=9711064
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1997quant.ph.11064S
  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/lbl/quantum_theory_mind.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp (ms). Physics in neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Classical physics is a theory of nature that originated with the work of Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century and was advanced by the contributions of James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein. Newton based his theory on the work of Johannes Kepler, who found that the planets appeared to move in accordance with a simple mathematical law, and in ways wholly determined by their spatial relationships to other objects. Those motions were apparently independent of our human observations of them
• Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum approaches to consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum approaches to consciousness are sometimes said to be motivated simply by the idea that quantum theory is a mystery and consciousness is a mystery, so perhaps the two are related. That opinion betrays a profound misunderstanding of the nature of quantum mechanics, which consists fundamentally of a pragmatic scientific solution to the problem of the connection between mind and matter
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Cambridge.pdf
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum interactive dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-podolsky-Rosen causal anomalies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance- free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.pdf
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.doc
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Libet.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/42u403437l5208k5/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/42U403437L5208K5.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2006/00000065/00000001/00009017
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2004). Quantum leaps in the philosophy of mind: Reply to Bourget's critique.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: David Bourget has raised some conceptual and technical objections to my development of von Neumann’s treatment of the Copenhagen idea that the purely physical process described by the Schrödinger equation must be supplemented by a psychophysical process called the choice of the experiment by Bohr and Process 1 by von Neumann. I answer here each of Bourget’s objections
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/repB.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-55887
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-55887/
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=860371
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/00000012/art00003
  
• Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model of mind €“brain interaction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. ‘feeling’, ‘knowing’ and ‘effort’) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-56291
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-56291/
  http://www.toriah.org/articles/schwartz-stapp-2004.pdf
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/FL8G2B86YKBXHT3M.pdf
  http://mapageweb.umontreal.ca/beauregm/Beauregard2005_PTRS.pdf
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=859710
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=878311
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Jelena_neuroscience_PTRS.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4041&context=lbnl
  http://m0134.fmg.uva.nl/publications_others/MacroscopicQuantum/Henry_Stapp.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16147524&dopt=Citation
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1997). Science of consciousness and the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum theory can be regarded as a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally e cacious and necessary role in brain dynamics It therefore provides a natural basis created by scientists for the science of consciousness As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms as compared to similar organisms that lack consciousness As a second illustration it is explained how within the quantum framework the consciously experi enced I directs the actions of a human being It is concluded that contemporary science already has an adequate framework for incorporat ing causally e cacious experiential events into the physical universe in a manner that puts the neural correlates of consciousness into the theory in a well de ned way explains in principle how the e ects of consciousness per se can enhance the survival prospects of organisms that possess it allows this survival e ect to feed into phylogenetic de velopment and explains how the consciously experienced I can direct human behaviour..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/38621.txt
  https://www.osti.gov/dublincore/gpo/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=269006
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=N9711596AH
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1995). The hard problem: A quantum approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/156538.html
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37163new.ps
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37163new.txt
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995quant.ph..5023S
  
• Henry P. Stapp (online). The Quest for consciousness: A quantum neurobiological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _ Theoretical Physics Group_ _ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory_ _ University of California_ _ Berkeley, California 94720_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.doc
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Quest.pdf
  
• Victor Stenger (1992). The myth of quantum consciousness.   (More)
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Towards a Theory of Everything: Unification of Consciousness with Fundamental Forces in Theories of Physics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Theory of everything must include consciousness. In this article, we focus on the subjective experiences component of consciousness. In Vimal (J Integrative Neuroscience, 2008: 7(1), 49-73), it was hypothesized that fundamental entities (strings or elementary particles: fermions and bosons) have two aspects: (i) material aspect such as mass, charge, spin, and space-time, and (ii) mental aspect, such as experiences. There are three competing hypotheses: superposition based H1, superposition-then-integration based H2, and integration based H3 where superposition is not required. In H1, the fundamental entities and inert matter are the carriers of superimposed fundamental subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-experiences (PEs). In H2, the fundamental entities and inert matter are the carriers of superimposed fundamental PEs (not SEs), which are integrated by neural-Darwinism (co-evolution, co-development, and sensorimotor co-tuning by the evolutionary process of adaptation and natural selection). There is a PE attached to every level of evolution (such as atomic-PE, molecular-PE, … genetic-PE, … bacterium-PE, … neural-PE, and neural-net-PE). In H3, a string has its own string-PE; a matter is not a carrier of PE(s) in superposed form as it is in H2, rather matter is a proto-experiential entity and has two aspects at every level; H3 is a dual-aspect panpsychism. These two aspects are rigorously integrated together by neural-Darwinism. One could argue for H3 that the PE keeps on transforming appropriately as matter evolves from elementary particles to atoms to molecules to eventually neural-networks. For example, when long wavelength light is presented to the V4/V8/VO neural-network, the neural-net PE takes the form of SE redness, in analogy to water takes the shape and color of the container. However, one has to unpack this mystery. In H1, a specific SE arises in a neural-net as follows: (i) there exist a virtual reservoir that stores all possible fundamental SEs/PEs, (ii) the interaction of stimulus-dependent feed-forward and feedback signals in the neural-net creates a specific neural-net state, (iii) this specific state is assigned to a specific SE from the virtual reservoir during neural Darwinism, (iv) this specific SE is embedded as a memory trace of neural-net-PE, and (v) when a specific stimulus is presented to the neural-net, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching and selection process and experienced by this net. In hypotheses H2 and H3, a specific SE emerges in a neural-net from the interaction of its constituent neural-PEs, such as in feed-forward stimulus-dependent neural signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals, in analogy to water emerges from the interaction of hydrogen and oxygen. In all hypotheses, SEs occur when essential ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above threshold level, and neural-net-PEs) are satisfied. We found that the followings in physics are invariant under the PE-SE transformation: Schrödinger equation, current, Dirac Lagrangian, electromagnetic strength tensor, electromagnetic stress-energy tensor, the Lagrangian for free gauge field, the Lagrangian for a charged self–interacting scalar field, electromagnetic theory (Maxwell's equations), Standard Model, Lagrangian for the electromagnetic interaction of a charged scalar field (Higgs Mechanism), Newtonian gravitational potential and field, special theory of Relativity and Lorentz transformation, geodesic equation, general theory of relativity and gravitational field, the metric gmn, Ricci curvature tensor Rmn, Ricci scalar curvature R, the cosmological constant L, the stress-energy tensor Tmn, the PE-SE transformation, Loop Quantum Gravity, and string theory. For H1 and H2, we quantitatively introduced the superposition of experiences (SEs/PEs) in the mental aspect of bosonic and fermionic strings using the Polyakov action. We conclude that experiences are independent of the time-like and space-like parameters (t,s). This is interpreted as a string is dual-aspect entity and all fundamental SEs/PEs superposed in the mental aspect of the string remains invariant with time and space. The introduction of mental aspect in this manner suggests that the mental aspect of string could be in all dimensions: both (3+1)D real dimensions and also in the hidden dimensions that are compactified (curled up). In addition, the Neumann and Dirichlet boundary conditions were also satisfied. These led us to conclude that the material aspect of the behavior of system in string theory remains invariant under the introduction of experiences in the mental aspect of strings as a function of experiences. For hypothesis H3, the equations of string theory remain the same; we simply need to acknowledge that a string has dual-aspect; its mental aspect is string-PE. We concluded that it is possible to unify consciousness with all four fundamental material forces by the introduction of (i) SEs/PEs (as in H1) or PEs (as in H2) in superposed form in bosonic and fermionic strings or (ii) the bosonic-string-PE and fermionic-string-PE based on integration principle (as in H3). This leads us towards the theory of everything.
• Ian J. Thompson (online). Quantum mechanics and consciousness: A causal correspondence theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Physics Department, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 5XH, U.K October, 1990. We may suspect that quantum mechanics and consciousness are related, but the details are not at all clear. In this paper, I suggest how the mind and brain might fit together intimately while still maintaining distinct identities. The connection is based on the correspondence of similar functions in both the mind and the quantum-mechanical brain. Accompanying material for a talk at The Second Mind and Brain Symposium held at the Institute of Psychiatry, Denmark Hill, London on 20th October, 1990
• P. Werbos (2002). What do neural nets and quantum theory tell us about mind and reality?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0311006
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003q.bio....11006W
  

Consciousness and Physics, Misc

• Carlos Acosta (2006). The frame(s) problem and the physical and emotional basis of human cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.atypon-link.com/INT/doi/ref/10.1386/tear.4.2.151_1
  http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/The%20Frame(s)%20Problem_0.pdf
  
• D. Aerts, J. Broekaert & Liane Gabora (2002). Intrinsic contextuality as the crux of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A stream of conscious experience is extremely contextual; it is impacted by sensory stimuli, drives and emotions, and the web of associations that link, directly or indirectly, the subject of experience to other elements of the individual's worldview. The contextuality of one's conscious experience both enhances and constrains the contextuality of one's behavior. Since we cannot know first-hand the conscious experience of another, it is by way of behavioral contextuality that we make judgements about whether or not, and to what extent, a system is conscious. Thus we believe that a deep understanding of contextuality is vital to the study of consciousness. Methods have been developed for handling contextuality in the microworld of quantum particles. Our goal has been to investigate the extent to which these methods can be used to analyze contextuality in conscious experience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/665954.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/aerts00intrinsic.html
  http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/PAPERS00/tokyo/tokyo99.htm
  http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/aerts/publications/2000CruxConsc.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000974/00/tokyo99.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:974
  http://cogprints.org/974/0/tokyo99.htm
  
• Bernard J. Baars (1995). Can physics provide a theory of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://calculemus.org/MathUniversalis/NS/10/02baars.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-08-shadows-6-baars.html
  
• Erhard Bieberich (ms). Structure in human consciousness: A fractal approach to the topology of the self perceiving an outer world in an inner space.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In human consciousness a world of separated objects is perceived by an inner observer who is experienced as an undivided feeling of one-self. A topological correlation of the self to the world, however, entails a paradoxical situation by either merging all separated objects into one or splitting the self into as many subselves as there are objects perceived. This study introduces a model suggesting that the self is generated in a neural network by algorithmic compression of spatial and temporal information into a fractal structure. A correlation of an inner observer to parts of a fractal structure inevitably entails a correlation to the whole, thereby preserving the undividedness of the self. Molecular mechanisms for the generation of a fractal structure in a neural network and the possibility of experimental investigation will be discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/79/0/struc2.htm
  http://cogprints.org/79/00/struc2.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000079/00/struc2.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/00/79/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:79
  
• David J. Bohm (1986). A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relationship of mind and matter is approached in a new way in this article. This approach is based on the causal interpretation of the quantum theory, in which an electron, for example, is regarded as an inseparable union of a particle and afield. This field has, however, some new properties that can be seen to be the main sources of the differences between the quantum theory and the classical (Newtonian) theory. These new properties suggest that the field may be regarded as containing objective and active information, and that the activity of this information is similar in certain key ways to the activity of information in our ordinary subjective experience. The analogy between mind and matter is thus fairly close. This analogy leads to the proposal of the general outlines of a new theory of mind, matter, and their relationship, in which the basic notion is participation rather than interaction. Although the theory can be developed mathematically in more detail, the main emphasis here is to show qualitatively how it provides a way of thinking that does not divide mind from matter, and thus leads to a more coherent understanding of such questions than is possible in the common dualistic and reductionistic approaches. These ideas may be relevant to connectionist theories and might perhaps suggest new directions for their development
• Frank De Silva (ms). Foundation of all Axioms the Axioms of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A description of consciousness leads to a contradiction with the postulation from special relativity that there can be no connections between simultaneous event. This contradiction points to consciousness involving quantum level mechanisms. The Quantum level description of the universe is re- evaluated in the light of what is observed in consciousness namely 4 Dimensional objects. A new improved interpretation of Quantum level observations is introduced. From this vantage point the following axioms of consciousness is presented. Consciousness consists of two distinct components, the observed U and the observer I. The observed U consist of all the events I is aware of. A vast majority of these occur simultaneously. Now if I were to be an entity within the space-time continuum, all of these events of U together with I would have to occur at one point in space-time. However, U is distributed over a definite region of space-time (region in brain). Thus, I is aware of a multitude of space-like separated events. It is seen that this awareness necessitates I to be an entity outside the space-time continuum. With I taken as such, a new concept called concept A is introduced. With the help of concept A a very important axiom of consciousness, namely Free Will is explained. Libet s Experiment which was originally seen to contradict Free will, in the light of Concept A is shown to support it. A variation to Libet s Experiment is suggested that will give conclusive proof for Concept A and Free Will.
• M. Dugic, Milan M. Cirkovic & D. Rakovic (2002). On a possible physical metatheory of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2002quant.ph.12128D
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/opsy/2002/00000009/00000002/05091541
  
• Michael Esfeld (1999). Quantum holism and the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper attempts to build a bridge between the interpretation of quantum theory and the philosophy of mind. In contrast to other such attempts, the bridge which this paper suggests does not consist in extending features of quantum theory to the philosophy of mind. The argument of this paper is that the discussion about a revision of the Cartesian tradition in current philosophy of mind is relevant to the interpretation of quantum theory: taking this discussion into account sharpens up the task for the interpretation of quantum physics as far as the scope of what is known as quantum holism is concerned. In particular, considering this discussion makes out a strong case against the interpretation that considers quantum holism to be universal in the physical realm
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Philo/Philosophie/Mitarbeiter_ALT/Esfeld/cons.pdf
  http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/philo/shared/DocsPerso/EsfeldMichael/1999/JCS99.pdf
  
• Amit Goswami (ms). The hard questions: View from a science of consciousness.   (More)
• Robert E. Haraldsen (online). Mind, Matter and Extreme Relativistic Aberration -ERA.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: On consciousness and the flow of spacetime with emphasis on Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and extra dimensions from the perspective of extreme relativistic aberration - ERA From the deepest levels of eternal consciousness we are shaped into an illusive subjective world of inherited collective projections built on phenomenological interactions, obeying solely the realm of purely abstract mathematics.
• Robert E. Haraldsen (ms). Spacetime Flow and Gravitation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Time's speed is a subjective illusion created by the accumulation of individual perception onto reflections within the mind . It is defined by the frequency of the interactions of thought process, where distance related to space is time's reciprocal. Consequently, "space" separated from "time" is a manifestation of structured consciousness, wherein experience exists as feedback of the mind projecting onto consciousness the illusion of separate entities. The direction and the speed of light is constant only when not influenced by different factors, such as gravity and material density. Light is also absorbed and emitted in atoms. This fact of differentiated speed and absorption/emission is of crucial importance to the following discussion relating to the mind's interpretational mechanisms.
• Robert E. Haraldsen (ms). The Flow of the Oscillating Universe.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A deeper understanding of the dynamics of consciousness, not only in the trivial sense of immaterial psychological relations, but as the prerequisite of the universe itself, may lead to an understanding of gravitation. The following argument acknowledges theories of higher dimensions, such as string-M-theory as important descriptive models along with the embedded theories of quantum mechanics and an expanded relativity theory. It is also presumed that the unexploited consequence of special relativity; extreme relativistic aberration , will turn out to be one of the most important keys to a better understanding of the overall unity.
• M. W. Ho (1997). Quantum coherence and conscious experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/MaeWanHo/brainde.pdf
  http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/viewContentItem.do?contentId=875723&contentType=Article
  http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/html/Output/Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Pdf/0670260302.pdf
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=20060953061384MT&recid=20060965088557CI&recid=20060944151968EA
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mcb/067/1997/00000026/00000003/art00002
  
• Copthorne Macdonald (1994). An energy/ awareness/ information interpretation of physical and mental reality.   (More)
• Gunter Mahler (2004). The partitioned quantum universe: Entanglement and the emergence of functionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Given that the world as we perceive it appears to be predominantly classical, how can we stabilize quantum effects? Given the fundamental description of our world is quantum mechanical, how do classical phenomena emerge? Answers can be found from the analysis of the scaling properties of modular quantum systems with respect to a given level of description. It is argued that, depending on design, such partitioned quantum systems may support various functions. Despite their local appearance these functions are emergent properties of the system as a whole. With respect to the separation of subject and object such functions of interest are control, simulation, and observation. They are interpreted in close analogy with more basic physical behavior
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2004/00000002/00000002/art00005
  
• J. McFadden (2002). The conscious electromagnetic information (cemi) field theory: The hard problem made easy?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000008/1298
  
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (online). Beyond the cookie Cutter paradigm.   (More)
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (2007). Particles, consciousness, volition: A vedantic vision.   (More)
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (online). Quantum mechanics and the cookie Cutter paradigm.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0009001
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2000quant.ph..9001M
  http://chaos.swarthmore.edu/courses/phys134/papers/0009001.pdf
  
• Hans Moravec (1995). Roger Penrose's gravitonic brains: A review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Summarizing a surrounding 200 pages, pages 179 to 190 of Shadows of the Mind contain a future dialog between a human identified as "Albert Imperator" and an advanced robot, the "Mathematically Justified Cybersystem", allegedly Albert's creation. The two have been discussing a Gödel sentence for an algorithm by which a robot society named SMIRC certifies mathematical proofs. The sentence, referred to in mathematical notation as Omega(Q*), is to be precisely constructed from on a definition of SMIRC's algorithm. It can be interpreted as stating "SMIRC's algorithm cannot certify this statement." The robot has asserted that SMIRC never makes mistakes. If so, SMIRC's algorithm cannot certify the Goedel sentence, for that would make the statement false. But, if they can't certify it, what is says is true! Humans can understand it is true, but mighty SMIRC cannot certify it. The dialog ends melodramatically as the robot, apparently unhinged by this revelation, claims to be a messenger of god, and the human shuts it down with a secret control
• Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal (2009). Towards a Theory of Everything: Unification of Consciousness with Fundamental Forces in Theories of Physics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Theory of everything must include consciousness. In this article, we focus on the subjective experiences component of consciousness. In Vimal (J Integrative Neuroscience, 2008: 7(1), 49-73), it was hypothesized that fundamental entities (strings or elementary particles: fermions and bosons) have two aspects: (i) material aspect such as mass, charge, spin, and space-time, and (ii) mental aspect, such as experiences. There are three competing hypotheses: superposition based H1, superposition-then-integration based H2, and integration based H3 where superposition is not required. In H1, the fundamental entities and inert matter are the carriers of superimposed fundamental subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-experiences (PEs). In H2, the fundamental entities and inert matter are the carriers of superimposed fundamental PEs (not SEs), which are integrated by neural-Darwinism (co-evolution, co-development, and sensorimotor co-tuning by the evolutionary process of adaptation and natural selection). There is a PE attached to every level of evolution (such as atomic-PE, molecular-PE, … genetic-PE, … bacterium-PE, … neural-PE, and neural-net-PE). In H3, a string has its own string-PE; a matter is not a carrier of PE(s) in superposed form as it is in H2, rather matter is a proto-experiential entity and has two aspects at every level; H3 is a dual-aspect panpsychism. These two aspects are rigorously integrated together by neural-Darwinism. One could argue for H3 that the PE keeps on transforming appropriately as matter evolves from elementary particles to atoms to molecules to eventually neural-networks. For example, when long wavelength light is presented to the V4/V8/VO neural-network, the neural-net PE takes the form of SE redness, in analogy to water takes the shape and color of the container. However, one has to unpack this mystery. In H1, a specific SE arises in a neural-net as follows: (i) there exist a virtual reservoir that stores all possible fundamental SEs/PEs, (ii) the interaction of stimulus-dependent feed-forward and feedback signals in the neural-net creates a specific neural-net state, (iii) this specific state is assigned to a specific SE from the virtual reservoir during neural Darwinism, (iv) this specific SE is embedded as a memory trace of neural-net-PE, and (v) when a specific stimulus is presented to the neural-net, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching and selection process and experienced by this net. In hypotheses H2 and H3, a specific SE emerges in a neural-net from the interaction of its constituent neural-PEs, such as in feed-forward stimulus-dependent neural signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals, in analogy to water emerges from the interaction of hydrogen and oxygen. In all hypotheses, SEs occur when essential ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above threshold level, and neural-net-PEs) are satisfied. We found that the followings in physics are invariant under the PE-SE transformation: Schrödinger equation, current, Dirac Lagrangian, electromagnetic strength tensor, electromagnetic stress-energy tensor, the Lagrangian for free gauge field, the Lagrangian for a charged self–interacting scalar field, electromagnetic theory (Maxwell's equations), Standard Model, Lagrangian for the electromagnetic interaction of a charged scalar field (Higgs Mechanism), Newtonian gravitational potential and field, special theory of Relativity and Lorentz transformation, geodesic equation, general theory of relativity and gravitational field, the metric gmn, Ricci curvature tensor Rmn, Ricci scalar curvature R, the cosmological constant L, the stress-energy tensor Tmn, the PE-SE transformation, Loop Quantum Gravity, and string theory. For H1 and H2, we quantitatively introduced the superposition of experiences (SEs/PEs) in the mental aspect of bosonic and fermionic strings using the Polyakov action. We conclude that experiences are independent of the time-like and space-like parameters (t,s). This is interpreted as a string is dual-aspect entity and all fundamental SEs/PEs superposed in the mental aspect of the string remains invariant with time and space. The introduction of mental aspect in this manner suggests that the mental aspect of string could be in all dimensions: both (3+1)D real dimensions and also in the hidden dimensions that are compactified (curled up). In addition, the Neumann and Dirichlet boundary conditions were also satisfied. These led us to conclude that the material aspect of the behavior of system in string theory remains invariant under the introduction of experiences in the mental aspect of strings as a function of experiences. For hypothesis H3, the equations of string theory remain the same; we simply need to acknowledge that a string has dual-aspect; its mental aspect is string-PE. We concluded that it is possible to unify consciousness with all four fundamental material forces by the introduction of (i) SEs/PEs (as in H1) or PEs (as in H2) in superposed form in bosonic and fermionic strings or (ii) the bosonic-string-PE and fermionic-string-PE based on integration principle (as in H3). This leads us towards the theory of everything.