Reviews of
Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem            

This list is very incomplete, since I gave up maintaining the page soon after the book came out.

• Review by Andy Clark, New Scientist, August 23, 1997.
  
  "Chalmers' distinction, and his bold assertion that a resolution of the hard problem may require a radical revision in our notions of the physical world, set the agenda for this fine volume of papers. Among the various views and responses presented in this clear and well-organized book, four main camps emerge." ... "Explaining Consciousness is a fine volume that quickly takes the reader to the heart of the issues. But we still need to unravel the conceptual, methodological, and psychological threads that the hard/easy distinction threatens to fuse together. And this may yet prove to be the hardest problem of all."
  
  [Clark's four camps are: deny the problem, ordinary science will solve the problem, we can never solve the problem, we need new fundamental prnciples. He seems most sympathetic to the second, suggesting that the feeling of an explanatory gap may fade over time.]
  
  
• Review by Oliver Lemon, Philosophy in Review, 1998.
  
  "The problem of explaining how qualia could arise in any physical system at all, is, according to David Chalmers in the penetrating keynote article of this compendium, the 'hard problem' of consciousness. The `easy problems' of consciousness are those of the structural and functional aspects of cognition, which are in principle amenable to conventional scientific theory. The hard problem is not a new one - Chalmers' role has been to highlight it - but it is now being approached seriously by physicists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and neuroscientists." ... "This is a challenging and comprehensive volume, offering new directions for philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science, and is heartily recommended. It is also an engaging read - an intellectual adventure at the heart of the issues."
  
  [A thoughtful overview of the book with comments on a number of the approaches. Lemon suggests following up ideas based in information theory by collaboration with researchers working on the semantic theory of information.]
  
  
• Review by Stevan Harnad, Trends in Cognitive Science, 1998.
  
  "Chalmers is right: the hard problem is indeed that of explaining why and how it feels like something to be conscious. I'll say that again, backwards: If we were unconscious zombies, but otherwise identical to the way we are now in deed, word, and (unconscious) thought, then the hard problem of consciousness would vanish, leaving only the "easy problems" of reverse-engineering our remarkable capacity for thought, word and deed (including, just to set your scale: chess playing, novel writing, and "worrying" -- unconsciously, but verbally -- about the hard and easy problems of consciousness). "
  
  [Harnad is generally sympathetic with my view, and takes issue with those of Dennett and Churchland. He doesn't mind fundamental laws connecting physics and consciousness, but is worried about panpsychism (which is particularly problematic for a vegetarian who doesn't like eating conscious beings!)]
  
  
  
  

Return to

• David Chalmers' home page
• Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem web page