David Chalmers

[This site is still under construction, with more readings, links, etc to be added. Please don't circulate the link beyond the seminar audience, as the book manuscripts aren't being publically circulated at this point.]

Seminar meetings: Monday 4-6pm, NYU Philosophy Department 2nd floor seminar room. Office hours: Tuesdays 3-5pm, Room 507

Overview

Overview: In Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, Carnap argued that all truths are definitionally entailed by a very limited class of truths. Most philosophers think that the project of the Aufbau is a failure and that nothing like it can succeed. We will investigate the prospects for an Aufbau-like project, centering around what I call the Scrutability Thesis: all truths are a priori entailed by a very limited class of truths. We will also investigate connections and applications to central questions in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. Topics that may be discussed along the way include: the analytic-synthetic distinction, the paradox of knowability, the a priori, reference magnets, metaontology, primitive concepts, verbal disputes, two-dimensional semantics, attitude ascriptions, the Fregean hierarchy, conceptual change, structuralism and Newman's problem, content internalism and externalism, Kripke's arguments against descriptivism, conditional probability, and epistemic possibility.

Readings

The main readings will be drawn from my book manuscripts Constructing the World and The Multiplicity of Meaning. Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World is recommended reading, but at last report it was out of stock at the publisher. I will make relevant excerpts available for week 2 when relevant.

Mailing list

I have set up an e-mail list, [email protected] for seminar discussion. I view this list as a continuation of the seminar itself. Everyone enrolled in the class is expected to make reasonably regular contributions to this list (details TBA), and everyone involved in the seminar is encouraged to contribute.

Assessment

Assessment will be based mainly on a final paper. Draft papers are encouraged. Their content will be play no constitutive role in assessment, but I will give feedback for revision for a final paper. I follow the departmental policy of only giving incompletes if a draft has been submitted. All incompletes must be completed by the start of spring semester.

Schedule

Here is a very approximate plan for the course, with associated readings.  This is very likely to be revised as things develop.  The first reading on each list is the main reading for that week. Others are associated optional readings that you may like to pursue.

Week 1 (Mon 9/14): Introduction (slides)

• Constructing the World, Introduction and Chapter 1
• Wikipedia, Laplacev's demon
• Wierzbicka and Goddard, The Natural Semantic Metalanguage
• Yablo, Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities

Week 2 (Mon 9/21): The Aufbau ((slides)

• Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, parts I-IV, especially sections 1-16, 38-44, 108-119, 153-156 (also 50-82, 125-126).
• Newman, Mr. Russell's "Causal Theory of Perception"
• Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, chapter V.
• Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, section 5
• Friedman, Reconsidering Carnap's Aufbau
• Pincock, An introduction to Carnap's Aufbau
• Leitgeb, New life for Carnap's Aufbau

Week 3 (Mon 9/28): Varieties of Scrutability (slides)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 2
• Brogaard and Salerno, The paradox of knowability
• Christensen, Does Murphy's law apply in epistemology?
• Hawthorne, Vagueness and the mind of god

Week 4 (Mon 10/5): The Cosmoscope Argument (slides)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 3
• Horgan, Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics

Week 5 (Mon 10/12): The Case for A Priori Scrutability (slides)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 4
• Block and Stalnaker, Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap
• Chalmers and Jackson, Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
• Schroeter, Against a priori reductions
• Byrne, Cosmic hermeneutics

Week 6: Hard Cases (Mon 10/19)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 5

Week 7: Minimizing the Base (Mon 10/26)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 6
• Lewis, Ramseyan humiity
• Thompson, The spatial content of experience
• Braddon-Mitchell and Nola, The Canberra plan
• Chalmers, The matrix as metaphysics

Week 8: Revisability and Conceptual Change (Mon 11/2)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 7
• Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism
• Carnap, Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Language

Week 9: Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress (Mon 11/9)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 8
• Hirsch, Dividing Reality, section XX.
• Jenkins, Merely verbal disputes

Week 10: The Roots of Scrutability (Mon 11/16)

• Constructing the World, Chapter 9
• Lewis, Putnam's paradox
• Schwarz, On reference magnets

Week 11: Epistemic Space (Mon 11/23)

• Chalmers, The Nature of Epistemic Space (esp. first half)
• Whittle, Epistemically possible worlds and propositions

Two-Dimensional Semantics (Mon 11/30)

• The Multiplicity of Meaning, chapters 2-4
• Byrne and Pryor, Bad intensions
• Pryor, Varieties of two-dimensionalism
• Stalnaker, On considering a possible world as actual
• Chalmers, Two-dimensional semantics

Two-Dimensional Content (Mon 12/7)

• The Multiplicity of Meaning, chapter 5 and/or chapter 6.
• Schiffer, Mental content and Epistemic two-dimensional semantics
• Brown, Narrow mental content

Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions (Mon 12/14)

• The Multiplicity of Meaning, chapter 7
• Soames, Ambitious two-dimensionalism
• Richard, Propositional Attitudes