1. Introduction
In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’,
G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue,
all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous"
(1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular,
have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against
qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.[1] But even its friends concede that it is none
too clear what the argument from diaphanousness—as I will call it—is
(Tye 2000; p.45).[2] The purpose of this paper is to formulate
the argument, and to assess its merits. My conclusion will be that qualia
realists have little to fear from the argument—provided both qualia and
diaphanousness are properly understood.
2. Preliminaries
I begin by making a number of preliminary
points about the contemporary background of the argument, its different
versions, and the proper understanding of its target.
2.1.
The Background Debate.
Suppose I am looking at the gray filing
cabinet in the corner of my office.
This is an experience I am having—the experience of looking at a gray
filing cabinet. And we can all agree
that there is something it is like for me to have this experience—some phenomenal character of the experience,
as it is usually put. Now, what makes
it the case that my experience has this character? According to one group of philosophers, qualia realists, to
explain phenomenal character one must postulate or assume particular qualities
of the experience, qualia. These
qualities are taken to be intrinsic to the experience, directly accessible to
introspection, and, in some versions of the view, non-functional, non-intentional,
and maybe even ineffable, primitive, and non-physical as well. On the other hand, according to another
group of philosophers, intentionalists, what explains the phenomenal character
of experience is simply the intentionality of experience, or perhaps the
intentionality of experience combined with its distinctive functional role.[3]
What
I have just said is one way of characterizing the contemporary debate about
qualia—at any rate one contemporary
debate about qualia[4]—a debate
which has attracted a lot of attention in recent philosophy of mind. It is this debate that forms the background
of the recent discussion of the argument from diaphanousness. As usually
presented, the argument is supposed to tell against qualia realism, and in
favor of intentionalism.
2.2.
Remarks on Qualia.
While it is simple enough on the surface,
the contemporary debate about qualia is in fact rather complex. One sort of complexity derives from the
evident obscurity in the notion of qualia.
As we have seen, all parties to the discussion agree that experiences
have phenomenal character, and that we can sensibly talk about these characters
without prejudicing their nature. So
one might suggest that qualia simply are
these phenomenal characters. But of
course, in this neutral sense there is little doubt that there are such
properties, and hence there is no hope that the argument from diaphanousness
could tell us otherwise. In effect,
then, the argument presupposes that we can articulate a more loaded sense of
the notion. In this paper, therefore,
we will use ‘qualia’ for this loaded notion, and use ‘phenomenal character’ for
the less loaded or neutral notion.
The
problem is that it is not easy to see how to expound this loaded notion in a
way which would command widespread assent.
Certainly different traditions tend to use the word ‘qualia’
differently. In Australia, for example, it is common to hear that ‘qualia’ are
by definition non-physical. In America,
it is common to deny this, and emphasize only that qualia are non-functional or
non-intentional properties of experience.
In addition, according to some views, qualia are thought of as
theoretical features which are postulated to explain an agreed-on fact, the
fact of phenomenal character. According
to other views, qualia are thought of simply as phenomenal characters of a certain special sort.
In order to impose some order
on this rather confusing situation, I will proceed here by stipulation. As I will use the term, qualia are mental or
psychological properties of experiences which satisfy at least the following
two conditions:
intrinsicness—roughly, the condition that a property
satisfies when it is intrinsic to experiences; and
direct
awareness—roughly, the
condition that a property satisfies when it is such that if one’s experience
has it, one in a position to apprehend this directly by introspection.
In accordance with this stipulation,
qualia realists are committed at least to the view that experiences have mental
properties which satisfy both intrinsicness and direct awareness—qualia precisely
are such properties. The argument from
diaphanousness is then an argument which tells us that there are no such
properties.
One
might be concerned that this conception of qualia is too weak. As we just
noted, often the notion is thought to include rather more than simply
this. And in any case, might someone
not hold that there are mental properties of experiences which satisfy these
conditions and deny qualia? However,
while these concerns are perfectly legitimate, I think we can sidestep them. As
I have said, the argument from diaphanousness would tell us if successful that
there are no mental properties of experience which satisfy these two
conditions. Given our assumption that
these two conditions are necessary
for some range of properties to qualify as qualia, it trivially follows that
the argument if successful would establish that there are no qualia. But it is plain that, from this point of
view, it doesn’t matter if there are further
features involved in the notion of qualia. Nor will harm be done if the
argument tells us more generally that there are no mental properties of other sorts which satisfy these
conditions. That would only show that
the argument is wider in scope than one might initially imagine.
Alternatively, one might be
concerned that the conception of qualia with which I am operating is too
strong. For example, Sydney Shoemaker
(1996) presents a version of qualia realism that, as I understand it, denies
direct awareness. However, while
Shoemaker’s version of qualia realism is an important one which deserves
extensive discussion, there are three reasons why I want to set it aside
here. First, as Shoemaker himself
emphasizes, his account of qualia is unorthodox in that by far the dominant
conception in the literature is one which accepts direct awareness. Second, Shoemaker is explicitly responding
to the argument from diaphanousness.
According to him, the way in which a qualia realist should react to the
argument is by revising the conception of qualia in such a way that one rejects
direct awareness—but this provides further evidence that the conception of
qualia that is targeted by the argument from diaphanousness is the one I have
set out.[5]
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, however one uses the word ‘qualia’, it
remains a substantive issue whether there are properties of experience which
are intrinsic and of which we are directly aware. It is this substantive issue which I take to be mainly at issue
in the following discussion.
2.3. Two Versions of the Argument.
One sort of complexity in the debate
about qualia prompts a certain regimentation of the notion. Another sort prompts us to distinguish two
versions of the argument from diaphanousness (Martin 2001). In one version, the
argument is a negative argument whose
goal is to establish that qualia realism is mistaken. In another version, the argument is a positive argument whose goal is to establish that intentionalism is
true.
Now,
if the contrast between qualia realism and intentionalism were straightforward
this would of course be a distinction without a difference: any argument which
would establish the falsity of qualia realism would ipso facto establish the
truth of intentionalism. But
unfortunately the contrast is anything but straightforward. Qualia realism is in the first instance an
ontological thesis to the effect that there are
properties of experience which satisfy a certain job description. But intentionalism per se does not seem to
take a stand on this ontological issue.
All intentionalism says is that the intentionality of experience
explains its phenomenal character. So
there would appear to be room for versions of intentionalism that are
compatible with, or even entail, qualia realism.
To
illustrate the problem, consider projectivism about color. According to projectivism, when I look at
the gray filing cabinet, my experience represents the cabinet as having a
particular quale G, and this very
quale is also instantiated by my experience.
So, on this view, the quale enters the picture twice: it qualifies the experience, and the
experience represents it as
qualifying something else, viz., the filing cabinet. (According to
projectivism, this quale just is
grayness—but we can ignore that aspect of the position.) In addition, on at
least some versions of projectivism, what makes it the case that my experience
has the content it does is that it has the qualia it does. This version of
projectivism is clearly a version of qualia realism. But it is also a version of intentionalism. For it is true on this view that the
phenomenal character of my experience is explained by the intentionality of the
experience. It is simply that the
intentionality of the experience is explained by its qualia!
Perhaps
the core idea of intentionalism—that the intentionality of experience explains
its phenomenal character—can be developed or extended in such a way that the
contrast between it and qualia realism will be made more precise. But whether that can be done or not, from
the point of view of an examination of the argument from diaphanousness, it
seems best to adopt the assumption that there are at least two versions of the
argument. In consequence, I will concentrate here on the first version of the
argument—the one that attacks qualia realism—and postpone discussion of the
second version until §7.
2.4.
A Puzzle about Moore.
The suggestion that the argument from
diaphanousness can or should be construed as an argument against qualia,
however, raises a further puzzle which must be confronted before we proceed any
further.[6] The puzzle starts from the observation that
the Moore to whom the insight concerning diaphanousness is credited is the very
same Moore who famously defended the sense-datum theory. But—one might say—the sense-datum theory is
surely a version of qualia realism! So,
barring the unlikely hypothesis that Moore was very confused indeed, it is
difficult to see how the diaphanousness of experience is going to result in the
denial of qualia.
There are a number of
possible ways of responding to this puzzle.
One is to question whether it is in fact so clear that sense-data
theorists are qualia realists. In view
of the difficulty of interpreting the central notions, none might well think
that there is, or might be, a legitimate interpretative approach according to
which this assumption should or could be denied. Another possibility is to suggest that, despite what one might
initially think, a sense-data theorist such as Moore does face a problem of diaphanousness after all. Martin (2001) for
example, points out that, according to one way of spelling out the idea behind
the diaphanousness argument, experience presents us with a series of
mind-independent properties. He goes on
to say that a sense-data theorist must deny this aspect of experience and to
that extent presents a revisionist conception of experience.
It may be true that
suggestions of this sort can be developed.
However, rather than investigate further the notions of qualia,
sense-data and mind-independence, I want here to finesse the puzzle about Moore
rather than confront it directly. For
it is possible to distinguish two sorts of qualia realist—a sort typified by
Moore and the sense-datum theorist, and a sort typified by contemporary
philosophers. For our purposes, it is
reasonable to assume that only the second sort is being targeted by the
argument.
The distinction between the
two sort of qualia realists emerges when we consider what I will call the relational thesis. According to the
relational thesis, the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly
determined by the objects that one is related to in having the experience. A wide variety of otherwise different
approaches to experience might endorse the relational thesis. According to what is sometimes called the
naïve approach, for example, in having an experience such as the experience of
looking a filing cabinet, one is directly related to the filing cabinet itself.[7] Against the background of this naïve
approach, the relational thesis tells us that the phenomenal character of the
experience is determined by features of the filing cabinet. According to intentionalism, by contrast, to
have an experience is in effect to
stand in a relation to some intentional object—say a property or a
proposition. Against the background of
that approach, the relational thesis tells us that the phenomenal character of
the experience is determined by features of the proposition or property that is
the intentional object of the experience.
Now, one sort of qualia
realist, the sort typified by the sense datum theorist, holds the relational
thesis. According to the sense datum theorist, when I look at a gray filing
cabinet, what I look at or am acquainted with in the first instance is a mental
object which is both gray and filing-cabinet shaped. The properties of this object, according to sense-datum
theorists, determine the phenomenal character of my experience. Indeed, on at
least one well-established tradition, the qualities of this mental object are
the paradigm examples of what qualia are supposed to be. It is clear then that the sense-datum theory
endorses the relational thesis. But the
sense-datum theory is also a version of qualia realism.[8]
On the other hand, another
sort of qualia realist denies the relational thesis. One example of such a position emerges if we contrast the
sense-datum theory with its traditional rival, adverbialism. Adverbialism denies the relational thesis
since it denies that in having an experience one is related to an object of any
sort. According to adverbialism, the experience of looking at a gray object is
just the experience of sensing gray-ly, but to sense gray-ly is not to be
related to anything. On the other hand, an adverbialist is perfectly entitled
to combine this position with qualia realism—the experience of sensing gray-ly
might perfectly well have properties which satisfy intrinsicness and direct
awareness. So in adverbialism we have a position which might combine qualia
realism with the denial of the relational thesis.
Now adverbialism is not a
position that many contemporary philosophers are attracted to.[9] But there is a version of qualia realism
which agrees with the adverbialism in rejecting the relational thesis. I have in mind the position held at one time
by Sydney Shoemaker (1981), and most recently by Ned Block (1990), according to
which we sharply distinguish the intentionality of an experience from the
qualia it instantiates—the intentional from the phenomenal content of the
experience, as it is sometime put.[10] On this sort of view—which we might call the Shoemaker-Block view—experiences
generally have intentionality—that is what it means to say that experiences
have intentional content. And in addition experiences have qualia, properties
which satisfy intrinsicness and direct access and which explain or perhaps
partially explain the fact that the experience has the phenomenal character it
does. However—and this is the crucial fact for our purposes—these properties
are not themselves properties of the objects that one is related to in having the
experience. So here we have a second
position which denies the relational thesis, but still maintains that there are
qualia. Indeed, I think it is fair to
say that it is this sort of qualia realist, rather than the sort typified by
either Moore or by adverbialism, which is the dominant sort in contemporary
philosophy. So by ‘qualia realist’ I
will henceforth mean proponents of the Shoemaker-Block view, unless the context
suggests otherwise.[11]
How does the distinction I
have just drawn— between those qualia realists who endorse the relational
thesis and those that don’t—answer the puzzle about G.E.Moore? Well, as we will see presently, the argument
from diaphanousness involves precisely the idea that while we are directly
aware of objects that we are related to in having experiences we are not
directly aware of those experiences themselves, or of the intrinsic features of
such experiences. Such a position
certainly does threaten the Shoemaker-Block view, since according to that view
there are properties of experience of which we are directly aware. But an
argument of this sort does not threaten, or at least does not seem to threaten,
the sense-datum theorist, since, according to that view, it is not at all
obvious that there are properties of experience of which we are directly
aware. Instead of convicting Moore of
confusion, therefore, I will for the
most part limit the following discussion to the opposition between the argument
from diaphanousness and the Shoemaker-Block view.
2.5.
A Third Version of the Argument
Earlier we distinguished two versions of
the argument from diaphanousness, one against qualia realism and other in favor
of intentionalism. Having explicitly
noted the relational thesis, however, it is natural to go further and suggest a
third version of the argument. On this version, the argument is an argument
for the relational thesis, or equivalently, an argument against the denial of
that thesis.
The first thing to say is
that construing the argument this way would certainly widen the scope of our
discussion. For one thing, while it is
true that there are qualia realists (e.g. Block) who deny the relational
thesis, and qualia realists (e.g. Moore) who accept it, it is also true that
there are qualia non-realists who deny the relational thesis. A qualia non-realist who rejects the
relational thesis, for example, is Paul Churchland (1985). According to Churchland, or at least
according to the Churchland of that famous paper, one might envisage a future
direction of science in which neuroscientific knowledge becomes such an
everyday part of life that one might simply introspect directly the brain
states with which various sensory states are to be identified. One might of course question Churchland’s
vision of future science, and also the extent to which science so envisioned
would impact on our self-conception.
However, for our purposes the important point is simply that Churchland
is assuming that one might directly introspect intrinsic features of our mental
states, and is also not assuming that
those states have intentional objects of any sort. So, on at least this dimension, Churchland is to be grouped with
Block and not with Harman when it comes to the relational thesis. And yet Churchland is a qualia non-realist.
Similarly, while it is true
that there are both intentionalists and non-intentionalists who accept the
relational thesis (e.g. Harman and Moore) it is also true that there are
intentionalists who deny the relational thesis. An intentionalist who denies the relational thesis, for example,
is Lycan (1996). Lycan holds a view
which I will call soft intentionalism
and which is to be contrasted with the more straightforward development of the
position which I will call hard
intentionalism.[12]
The hard intentionalist holds the relational thesis since, according to that
view, in having an experience one bears an attitude to a proposition, and the
phenomenal character of the experience is wholly determined by the content of
the proposition. Soft intentionalism, by contrast, supposes that the phenomenal
character of an experience is determined, not solely by features of the
proposition one is related to in having the experience, but in addition by
features of the experience itself, including in particular functional features. The more a soft intentionalist emphasizes
the functional role of the experience in the determination of phenomenal
character, the less likely the position is to endorse the relational
thesis. And yet soft intentionalism is
recognizable as a version of intentionalism.[13]
So it seems that the
relational thesis raises an issue that in a certain sense stands apart from the
debate between intentionalism and qualia realism. Nevertheless, I think the suggestion that the argument from diaphanousness
can be construed as an argument for the relational thesis is a good one. And this introduces a further complexity
into our discussion. How should we deal with this complexity? As in the case of
our distinction between the first two versions of the argument, I think an
examination of the argument from diaphanousness has no choice but to consider
this third version. Once again, however, to keep things manageable, my
discussion here will remain focused on the question of whether the argument
defeats qualia realism in the sense intended.
I will return to this third version of the argument in §7.
3. The Argument
So far we have noted that
there are three versions of the argument, and set the version we want mainly to
discuss more sharply in focus. In this section I formulate the argument, and
discuss which premise in it should properly be called the thesis of
diaphanousness.
3.1 What it is
It is widely agreed that the
argument from diaphanousness starts from the considerations presented both in
the passage from Moore with which we began, and also in this famous passage
from Gilbert Harman:
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences. And that is true of you too…Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict that you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the tree… (1990, p.667).
Both passages are certainly
highly suggestive, but what is the argument they suggest exactly?
My proposal is
that the argument against qualia implicit in these passages and their
supporting texts might be presented as proceeding in three stages. At the first stage one makes a
phenomenological point the formulation of which we can simply take over from
Harman:
(1) Look at a tree and try
to turn your attention to intrinsic[14]
features of your visual experience. I
predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to
will be features of the presented tree.
Harman is here both giving
instructions (“look at a tree and try to turn your attention…”) and making a
prediction about what we will find ourselves doing if and when we obey his
instructions. Since both prediction and
instruction are supposed to be presented as a neutral and non-committal description
of the phenomena, we are so far only at the phenomenological stage of the
argument.
At the next stage, one makes a theoretical point about
introspection, which is intended to be grounded in the phenomenological point
just presented, and perhaps is plausible also on its own terms. There are a
number of ways to formulate this point, but I think a reasonable initial
formulation is this:[15]
(2) In
introspection, one is or becomes aware of the intrinsic features of one’s
experience by attending to the
objects and properties represented by that experience.[16]
Notice that (2) does not by
itself prejudice the issue of whether there are qualia or not in the sense we
have intended, that is, whether there are properties of experience which
satisfy the job-description of qualia.
It simply says that one apprehends the intrinsic features of one’s
experience by doing something else.
In the final stage of the argument, one draws the moral
from this theoretical point for the debate about qualia. Once again, there
might be different ways to state this moral, but a reasonable formulation is
this:
(3) In introspection, one is not directly aware of the intrinsic features
of one’s experience.
The force of (3) is of course
that qualia realism in the sense at issue is mistaken. If qualia realism is true, there must be
intrinsic features of experiences of which we are directly aware in
introspection. But, by (3), there are
no such features.
In summary, the argument from
diaphanousness takes us from (1) to (2) to (3), and (3) is something the qualia
realist is committed to denying.
3.2 What is 'The Diaphanousness of Experience'?
The formulation of the
argument from diaphanousness that I have just offered raises the question about
which claim here should be identified
with the thesis of the diaphanousness of
experience.
On the one hand, one might
think that this thesis should be identified with (1) or something like it. After all, the diaphanousness of experience
is often thought to be grounded in, or perhaps just to be, a piece of
phenomenology. On the other hand, one
might think that the thesis should be identified with the ‘by’-claim summarized
in (2), where (2) is, as we have noted, a theoretical claim about introspection
and about what is involved in being or becoming aware of the intrinsic features
of one’s experiences. Perhaps this
choice is in some respects terminological, but in any event, so far as I can
see the most natural interpretation is to treat (2) as the thesis of the
diaphanousness of experience and I will talk for the most part in those terms.
Even if one can afford to be somewhat sanguine about
which of (1) or (2) should be treated as the thesis of diaphanousness, it is
important to note that one should not be sanguine, or at least should not be so
sanguine, about whether (3) should be
treated as the thesis of diaphanousness.
For suppose that (3) were
thought of as the thesis of diaphanousness.
Then there would be no interesting question about how there could be an
argument from diaphanousness to the denial of qualia realism. For (3) obviously impacts on qualia
realism. On the other hand, as will
emerge in due course, the crucial question I want to focus on is precisely
whether there is a decent argument from
the thesis of diaphanousness—that is, (2)—to the denial of qualia realism. On
that assumption that (3) were the thesis of diaphanousness, therefore, the
central question of our inquiry could not be raised.
Of course one might say that this is all to the good from
the point of view of the argument. And perhaps there is some temptation in the
literature to identify (3) with the thesis of diaphanousness. But this manoever simply conceals the issue
rather than solving it. For the fact is
that in most presentations of the argument people begin by making remarks like
(1) or (2). The question which will
concern us is how it is that these remarks bear on the issue of qualia realism,
a question we have formulated in terms of an argument from the thesis of
diaphanousness. Dubbing (3) the thesis
of diaphanousness makes our question more difficult to express but it does not
make it disappear.
3.3. An Alternative Formulation.
The importance of not treating (3) as the
thesis of diaphanousness emerges in more detail when we contrast the
formulation of the argument that I have offered with an alternative
formulation. According to this alternative, the argument should be understood
as proceeding, not from (2) to (3), but rather from (2) to (3*):
(3*) In introspection, one is
only directly aware of the objects
and properties represented by one’s experience.
(3*) is logically distinct from (3). (3*)
presupposes, while (3) does not, that there are
objects and properties represented by experience and that we are directly aware
of them: it simply says that this is
all we are aware of. In addition, (3) presupposes,
while (3*) does not, that there are
intrinsic features of experience: it simply says that we are not aware of
them. So it seems that we do here have
a genuinely different formulation of the argument: one proceeds from (2) to (3), and the other proceeds from (2) to
(3*).
I think it should be agreed that this is
an alternative, but it is a formuation I want set aside in what follows. While
(3) and (3*) are certainly not logically equivalent, it is reasonable to assume
that, in the context of our discussion, they amount to largely the same thing,
or at least that one can relatively easily move back and forth between
them. On the one hand, it seems
reasonable to infer (3) from (3*) given the assumption that projectivism is
false: if it is true that one is only
directly aware of presented features, and presented features are not also
intrinsic features, then one is not directly aware of intrinsic features. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to infer (3*) from (3) given the assumption
that one is directly aware of something in having an experience: if one is not directly aware of intrinsic
features, and is directly aware of something, then presumably one is directly
aware of are presented features. But if
that is true, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the distance between
(3) and (3*) is not something over which we can make much hay. For this reason I will continue to focus on
(3).[17]
Even if (3*) is set aside
however, it is important to notice that, as in the case of (3), one must resist
the temptatation to identify (3*) with the thesis of diaphanousness. Our focus is on the question of how
observations such as Harman’s about Eloise and the tree support (3*). And we have articulated that question by
asking how the thesis of diaphanousness has an impact on qualia realism. On the assumption that (3*) were the thesis of diaphanousness, we
would be obliged to reformulate our question, even if, as we have already
noted, the question would certainly not disappear entirely.
4. Block’s Critique
In recent literature, the
philosopher who has done most to criticize the argument from diaphanousness is
Ned Block. In this section I set out
his criticisms and explain why I think they fail. I will start by pointing out two claims which a proponent of it
is not committed to. I will then
argue that Block’s criticisms largely rely on mistakenly attributing these
claims to a proponent of the argument.
4.1. Intrinsicness.
First, a proponent of the
argument is not committed to the
denial of intrinsicness, the idea that there a psychological properties of
experience which are intrinsic to the experience. The argument we just considered certainly involves the suggestion
that there are no intrinsic properties which meet direct awareness, but intrinsicness
itself is left untouched.
4.1.1. The suggestion that the argument does not involve denying
intrinsicness might seem initially strange. Proponents of the argument
certainly say things which on the surface suggest the opposite. Concerning Eloise, for example, Harman says
that she does not "experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her
experiences" (1990, p. 667, emphasis added). The idea here, I think, is that when we spell out the ways in
which Eloise takes the world to be in perception, one might say that she takes
the world to contain a tree, with a certain shape and color, which occupies a
position at such and such a distance from her and so on. But nowhere does one need to say that Eloise
takes the world to contain objects which instantiate intrinsic properties which
are also intrinsic properties of her
experiences. In short, Eloise takes the
world to be a certain way in perception but in spelling out that way one does
not need to mention intrinsic features of her experiences.
However, the difficulty here
is in moving from a claim of this form—which certainly has a good deal of
plausibility to it[18]—to
any claim which seems to threaten qualia. One might say that the qualia realist
is committed to the idea that qualia exist only
if we are directly aware of them in perception as intrinsic features of
objects. But put so baldly it is not at
all clear why anyone would make such a claim.
Similarly, one might say—Harman does
say—that qualia realists are guilty of confounding intrinsic properties of
objects represented by experience with intrinsic properties of experience. But
even if this charge of confusion is true, it would only be an explanation of
why people might falsely believe that qualia exist. It does not at all encourage the suggestion that belief in qualia
is false to begin with. Finally, one
might say that what these claims suggest is that one is directly aware only of
intrinsic features of objects and that one is aware of the intrinsic features
of one’s experiences by being aware of the intrinsic features of objects
represented in experiences. But to say
this is simply to embrace a version of the argument already presented.
4.1.2. There is also a second reason why it might seem initially strange
that the argument from diaphanousness does not target intrinsicness. Proponents of the argument usually write from a functionalist or
intentionalist perspective, and one might think that, from that perspective, it
is just obvious that there are no
intrinsic psychological features of experience.
The short answer to this is
that there is a difference between what a proponent of the argument is
committed to qua intentionalist or
functionalist and what a proponent of the argument is committed to qua proponent of the argument. My point is only that the argument does not
strictly speaking attack intrinsicness, not that people who propound the
argument do not attack it as a matter of fact.
The longer answer is that
there is in fact no reason at all why an intentionalist or functionalist must
deny intrinsicness. The plausibility of
the claim that there are psychological properties which are intrinsic to
experience depends largely on what one thinks an experience is. On the one hand, one might identify
an experience with what Shoemaker (1996) calls its ‘core realizer’. This is the
particular or local neural state which, as Shoemaker says, comes and goes as
the state comes and goes. Now, on this
view, the intrinsicness condition is quite an implausible claim, and, moreover,
it is so regardless of whether functionalism or intentionalism is true or
not. For, on this conception of
experience, to say that some psychological property of an experience is
intrinsic to the experience is to say that this property is wholly determined
by matters that are internal to its core realizer. But this is highly
implausible. At any rate, to assert boldly of any psychological property of an
experience that it is determined by
matters internal to its core realizer is a wild empirical speculation,
something that goes far beyond what anyone could reasonably claim at the
moment.
Now, one response to this is
to say that psychological properties are not intrinsic to experiences, i.e. to
deny the intrinsicness condition. But a better response is to deny that experiences
ought to be identified with their core realizers, and to look for an
alternative.[19] For there is an alternative available.
The alternative is to identify an experience with what Shoemaker calls
its ‘total realizer’.[20] This is the total state of the brain or
nervous system that one is in when one has a certain experience. On this view, to say that a property is
intrinsic to an experience is to say that this feature of the experience is
wholly determined by goings-on internal to the total realizer. But this claim is not at all implausible even if one is a functionalist or
intentionalist. For this claim amounts
to nothing more than the claim that someone who is in that same total or
overall brain state will also have the experience—if you like, on this view,
the idea that phenomenal character is intrinsic to experience is tantamount to
the claim that phenomenal character is intrinsic to the subjects of that
experience, rather than simply the experience.
This is a claim that has certainly been denied in contemporary
philosophy, but it is not one which off-hand is particularly implausible nor
one that is in conflict with intentionalism or functionalism.
The moral is that once
intrinsicness is to be understood in a way that makes it plausible—that is,
when the background conception of experience identifies experiences with total
realizers, rather than core realizers— it is not at all clear that
functionalists or intentionalists must deny it. But that means—to return to our main line of argument—that there
is no reason why a functionalist or intentionalist who endorses the argument
from diaphanousness must deny intrinsicness.[21]
4.2. Direct Awareness, not Awareness Tout Court.
Proponents of the argument
from diaphanousness are not only not committed to denying intrinsicness, they
are also not committed to denying that we are aware of the intrinsic features
of our experience. The conclusion of the argument is that one is not directly aware of those features. But, if ‘direct’ is doing any work at all here,
we cannot conclude from this that one is not aware of those features. To say that one is not directly aware of
something leaves open the possibility that one is aware of it, but to say that
one is not aware at all closes off
that possibility.
The point that a proponent of the argument is not
committed to the denial of awareness of intrinsic features is important when we
consider the overall credibility of the argument. After all, if the argument did
involve the suggestion that one is not aware in introspection of one’s
experience, then it would be fair to say that it should be treated as
presenting a paradox rather than as something to which one might look to decide
between competing positions in philosophy of mind. For surely it is a datum,
something on which everybody can agree, that one can be aware of one’s
experience in introspection!
One might respond that this underestimates the
radicalness of the proponent of the argument from diaphanousness. A proponent of that argument, one might
think, is certainly committed to the claim that one is directly aware of the
objects and properties presented in one’s experience. But this should not be interpreted in such a way that it is
consistent with the claim that one is also indirectly
aware of one’s experiences. Rather
it should be interpreted in such a way that it entails or suggests that one is
not aware of one’s experiences at all.
Moreover, one might suggest, the ‘datum’ that one is aware of one’s experiences
derives only from a confusion between the properties presented in one’s
experience and the experiences themselves.
However, someone
who adopts this radical course is in my view faced with rather serious
difficulties. For contrast visual
perception with visual imagination. If
I were sufficiently adept at visual imagination, I might be able to conjure up
in imagination a situation that is identical to the visual experience I am
having right now. In other words, it seems quite possible to contrast the
situation in which I am visually under the impression that p with a counterpart situation in which I only visually imagine
that p. If it were really true that in introspection I am not aware, or
could not become aware, of my experiences themselves, it would seem to follow
that introspection alone could not allow me to discern these two
situations. But surely I can tell the imagination case from the
impression case on the basis of introspection alone. In the impression case, I
am going to feel inclined to be believe that p. In the imagination case,
on the other hand, I am not going to
feel inclined to believe that p. The explanation for this, of course, is that
perception and imagination have very different functional roles in the mental
life of a person: to imagine something is an act of will in the way that to be
visually aware of something is not.
But, since the respective contents of perception and imagination are in
this instance presumed to be the same, it follows that I must be aware, not
simply of the intentional objects my experiences, but also of the experiences
itself.
We will return to the
contrast between imagination and perception at a later stage. For the moment the important point is simply
that it is a datum that we are or can
become aware of intrinsic aspects of our experience. And so the argument from diaphanousness could not possibly tell
us otherwise.
4.3. Block’s Objections.
We are now in a position to
demonstrate that Block’s three objections to the argument from diaphanousness
misfire.
4.3.1. Block’s first objection is that the argument represents “an error
in philosophical method”. He goes
on: “Looking at a blue wall is an easy
thing to do, but it is not easy (perhaps not possible) to answer on the basis
of introspection alone the highly theoretical question of whether in so doing I
am aware of intrinsic properties of my experience “(1990, p. 689). As I understand this objection, Block is
suggesting that, whatever the argument from diaphanousness is exactly, its
premise is based on phenomenology or introspection, and its conclusion is that
one is not aware of intrinsic properties. His suggestion is that it is an error
to infer from premises to conclusions of this sort.
Block may or may not be right
that inferences like this are mistaken, but even so his objection does not
touch the argument from diaphanousness.
For, at least as I have set it out here, that argument does not conclude with the claim that one is
not aware of the intrinsic properties of experience. For consider: we have seen that it is consistent with advancing
the argument that one thinks that experiences have intrinsic properties. And we have also just seen that the argument
does not attack the idea that we are aware of those properties if they exist
and are instantiated. Putting these two
points together, we derive the result that the argument does not involve,
contrary to Block’s objection, the suggestion that one is not aware of
intrinsic properties.
One might respond that the distinction between direct
awareness and awareness tout court does not touch the basis of Block’s
objection, because that objection can simply be reformulated to accommodate
it. On this interpretation, Block’s
objection is that we cannot decide on the basis of introspection alone the question
of whether we are directly aware of
the intrinsic properties of our experiences.
However, the response to this version of the objection is that the
argument does not ask you to decide this question “on the basis of
introspection alone”. The only thing
that is to be decided on the basis of introspection alone is the
phenomenological point (1). But (1) is
supposed to provide evidence for (2),
which is not something that one can decide on the basis of introspection alone,
but is rather a theoretical claim about introspection. On the other hand, you need (2) to get you
to (3), the denial of direct awareness.
The argument that Block is attacking effectively cuts out the middle
man, that is, it is an argument that moves directly from (1) to (3). But that is evidently not the argument from
diaphanousness as we have been discussing it here.[22]
4.3.2 A similar criticism—that the position attacked is not the position
defended—is also appropriate when we turn to a second objection mounted by
Block against the argument:
Harman relies on the diaphanousness of perception (Moore, 1922), which may be defined
as the claim that the effect of concentrating on experience is simply to attend
to and be aware of what the experience
is of. As a point about attention in one familiar circumstance—e.g., looking at
a red tomato, this is certainly right. The more one concentrates on the
experience, the more one attends to the redness of the tomato itself. But
attention and awareness are distinct, and as a point about awareness, the
diaphanousness claim is both straightforwardly wrong and misleading. One can be
aware of what one is not attending to. For example, one might be involved in
intense conversation while a jackhammer outside causes one to raise one’s voice
without ever noticing or attending to the noise until someone comments on it—at
which time one realizes that one was aware of it all along. Or consider the
familiar experience of noticing that the refrigerator compressor has gone off
and that one was aware of it for some time, even though one didn’t attend to it
until it stopped (Block 2001 p. 7)
Block is certainly correct
that there is a distinction between attention and awareness—indeed, we will
come back to this distinction later on.
Nevertheless, the objection which I take him to be making in this passage
derives again from a mistake about what someone is committed to in advancing
the argument from diaphanousness. Block
is assuming, I think, that a proponent of the argument is committed to the
claim that one is not aware of the intrinsic features of my experience. The point about awareness and attention
certainly would defeat that
position: from the fact that one does
not attend (in the strict sense) to one’s experience, it does not follow that
one is not aware of it. But as we have
seen a proponent of the argument need not, or should not, adopt the position
that one is not aware of the intrinsic features of one’s experiences. What is at issue is direct awareness, not
awareness tout court.
4.3.3. Block’s third
objection is that the step from (1) to (2) is fallacious. (1) might be true and also conform to (2),
but there are plenty of examples of experiences which do not:
[c]lose
your eyes in daylight and you may find that it is easy to attend to aspects of
your experience. If all experiences that
have visual phenomenology were of the sort one gets with one’s eyes closed
while awake in daylight, I doubt that the thesis that one cannot attend to or
be aware of one’s experience would be so popular. (Block 2001, p. 8).
The crucial fact about an
example such as this—elsewhere Block also mentions orgasms and phosphenes—is
that here we seem to have an experience which lacks (or might lack)
intentionality. In these cases, Block
says, experience is not diaphanous, that is, it is not the case that one is or
becomes aware of the features of an experience by attending to the object and
properties represented by the experience—for in this case there are no such
objects and properties! It would thus
seem that the step from (1) to (2) is fallacious. Of course, some
experience are such that claims like (1) are true of them. Nevertheless, (2) is a massive
overgeneralization from these isolated examples.
One thing to say about this
objection is that it does not suffer from the sort of problem I identified with
the previous two. Unlike the previous
two objections, this objection really would
attack the argument as I have formulated it. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why I want to set it aside.
First, even if Block is right
about closing one’s eyes in daylight, orgasms and so on, Harman still seems to be right about
experiences which uncontroversially have intentionality, such as experiences of
color. But surely the qualia realist
does not want to be maneuvered into the position of saying that color experiences
lack qualia. It would be an odd sort of position indeed which postulates qualia
but then adds that qualia are only instantiated in cases in which you face the
sun with closed eyes, or else are in states of sexual climax!
Second, the question of
whether experiences of the kind mentioned by Block lack intentionality is a
controversial issue (cf. e.g. Tye 2000).
Part of the general issue raised by the debate about qualia with which
we began is precisely the question of whether there are sensations which have
phenomenal character but lack intentionality—whether there is a distinction
between sensation and perception as it is often put. Of course there is a tradition in which it is obvious that there
is such a distinction, and arguably ordinary thought recognizes a distinction
along these lines. But on the other
hand, there have been persistent efforts in philosophy to undermine this
distinction. There is first of all the
Galilean tradition in which one treats perception as a species of sensation, a
tradition partially revived and defended by the adverbialists of the twentieth
century. Then there is the sense datum
tradition which reduces both sensation and perception to something else – a
mental act in which one is acquainted with a sense-datum. Finally there are contemporary
intentionalists who try to show that both sensations and perceptions are
species of propositional attitude.
In Block’s third objection we
are in effect being asked to accept (a version of) the sensation/perception
distinction and so reject the argument from diaphanousness. However, whatever is the ultimate truth
about that distinction, this is unlikely to be a persuasive response to someone
who advances the argument from diaphanousness.
For such a person is very likely to rejected the sensation/perception
distinction in the first place. So I
think we need to leave Block’s third objection aside, and look elsewhere.
5. The Step from (2) to (3).
I have been concerned so far
only to set out the argument from diaphanousness, to point out what one is not
committed to in advancing it, and to defend it from some criticisms made by
Block. I now turn to my own suggestion about what is wrong with the argument.
My focus is the step from:
(2) In
introspection, one is or becomes aware of the intrinsic features of one’s
experience by attending to the
objects and properties represented by that experience
to:
(3) In introspection, one is not directly aware of the intrinsic features
of one’s experience.
I will argue that this step
is fallacious. Even if it is true that
I apprehend the features of my experience by attending to the objects presented
in that experience, it does not follow that I am not directly aware of those
features. In fact, there are two ways
of developing this objection. The first
proceeds via a closer examination of the direct awareness condition; the second via a closer examination of the
notion of attention.
5.1. The First way to
Develop the Objection.
In thinking about the direct
awareness condition, we need to focus on two questions. The directness
question asks: what does it mean to
say that one is directly aware of
intrinsic features of experience? In
other words, the directness question brackets the issue of what it is to be
aware of the intrinsic properties of experience and asks instead what it is to
be directly aware. The awareness question asks: what does it mean to say that one is
directly aware of the intrinsic
features of experience? In other words
the awareness question brackets the issue of directness, and asks instead what
it is to be aware of experience in
the first place.
Now, as regards the
directness question, I think it is plausible to operate with a rather schematic
account of what it is to be directly aware of something, an account which may
be extracted from classic discussions by William Alston on epistemic immediacy
and Frank Jackson on perceptual immediacy (cf. Alston 1971, Jackson 1977).[23] According to this account, one first defines
what it is to be indirectly aware of something, as follows: S
is indirectly aware of x just in case
one is aware of x by being aware of y, where y is distinct from x. One then defines what it is to be directly
aware of something as follows: S is directly aware of x just in case (a) S is aware of x; and (b) S is not (merely) indirectly aware of x.[24] So to say that one is directly aware of
experience is to say that one is aware of it but one is not aware of it by
being aware of anything else.
As regards the awareness
question, the crucial distinction to draw initially is one drawn by Fred
Dretske between f-awareness, o-awareness and p-awareness (Dretske, 1999). Dretske introduces the distinction with the
example of looking at a moving object.
In such a case, one might be aware of the object itself—this is object
or o-awareness. Or else one might be
aware of the movement of the object—this is property or p-awareness. And finally one might be aware that the object is moving—this is fact
or f-awareness. Similarly, in the case
of experiences and their intrinsic properties, one might be aware of the
experience itself—this is o-awareness.
Or else one might be aware of the intrinsic properties of the
experience—this is p-awareness. And
finally one might be aware that the experience has those intrinsic properties—this
is f-awareness. Dretske argues
persuasively that these notions are logically independent: one might, for example, be f-aware that
one’s experience e has property C, and be neither o-aware of e nor p-aware of C.
In the light of Dretske’s
distinction among species of awareness, as well as the schematic account of
directness, the bad news is that it now appears that there are no fewer than nine ways to interpret the direct
awareness condition:
(4a) S is o-aware of experience e
but not by being o-aware of anything else.
(4b) S is o-aware of experience e
but not by being p-aware of anything else.
(4c) S is o-aware of experience e
but not by being f-aware of anything else.
(4d) S is p-aware of the character C of experience e but not
by being o-aware of anything else.
(4e) S is p-aware of the character C of experience e but not
by being p-aware of anything else.
(4f) S is p-aware of the character C of experience e but not
by being f-aware of anything else.
(4g) S is f-aware that experience e
has character C but not by being
o-aware of anything else.
(4h) S is f-aware that experience e
has character C but not by being p-aware of anything else.
(4i) S is f-aware that experience e
has character C but not by being f-aware of anything else.
On the other hand, the good
news is that there is a decent case for supposing that it is interpretation
(4i) which is the correct one for our purposes. In the first place, as Dretske points out, the usual way of
explicating o-awareness or p-awareness is by assimilating them to certain
perceptual relations. One is o-aware of
the moving object just when one sees it, and one is p-aware of the movement of
the object just when one sees its movement.
But that suggests that the idea that we are o-aware of experiences or
p-aware of properties of experience is simply the idea that a perceptual model
of introspection is true, and moreover is true in a rather extreme form. On the other hand, if one wants to avoid the
perceptual model, as most contemporary philosophers do, it would seem that the
only option is to operate with f-awareness and to adopt (4g-i). [25] In the second place, of these three
interpretations, it is really only (4i) that articulates a reasonable notion of
direct awareness. To see this, consider
the case in which I am aware of the fact that the filing cabinet is in my
office by seeing either it or its shape.
This is not the sort of case that is normally classified as a case of
indirect awareness. Indeed, in the
epistemological literature, cases such as this are the paradigmatic cases in
which one has direct awareness of something.
And yet both (4g) and (4h) represent cases in which I am or become aware
of some fact but not by being o- or p-aware of something else. So it seems natural to set (4g-h) aside and
operate only with (4i).
Now, however, it should be
perfectly clear that the step from (2) to (3) is illegitimate. On our preferred
interpretation, what (3) is telling us is that one is aware of the fact that
one’s experience has certain intrinsic features by being aware of some other fact. But (2) provides no grounds at all for that claim. What (2) tells us is that one is or becomes
f-aware of the intrinsic features of one’s experience by attending to properties
and objects represented in that experience.
But to say this is not to say that there is some other fact which is such that when one becomes f-aware of it, one
becomes f-aware of those features. On
the contrary, it is not to mention any other fact at all.
To illustrate, suppose I come
to know or be f-aware of the fact that the filing cabinet is in my office by
seeing or attending to the cabinet. As
we have just seen, intuitively this is not the sort of case that one would
describe as a case of indirect knowledge.
On the contrary, this is usually thought of as a paradigm case of direct perceptual knowledge. And indeed, the schematic account of
directness delivers this result. For in
this case it is not the case that I am aware of one fact—the fact that the
filing cabinet is in my office—by being aware of another. Nevertheless, this paradigm of direct
knowledge is certainly one in which I know something by seeing or attending to
something else—that is I know something about the cabinet by attending to it. So it seems that the idea that I am directly
f-aware of something is perfectly compatible with the idea that I am f-aware of
it by perceiving or attending to something else. By analogy, therefore, it is hard to see how the mere
fact—assuming it to be a fact—that I am or become f-aware of the intrinsic features
of my experience by attending to something else entails that here we are in the
presence here of anything other than direct f-awareness.
Admittedly, there are points
of disanalogy between the two cases. In
the cabinet case, I am aware of the fact of the form a is F by being seeing
or attending to o—in other words one
is aware of a fact by attending to something which is (in an intuitive sense) a
constituent of that very fact. I am aware that
the cabinet is in the office by being aware of
the cabinet. In the experience
case, however, I am not aware of a fact of the form a is F by attending to
something which is a constituent of that fact.
Rather I am aware that my experience has some intrinsic features by
being aware of something which is neither my experience nor a feature of that
experience.
However, at least given the
account of directness I have introduced so far, it is hard to see why this
disanalogy matters. For directness in
the sense at issue involves a negative
claim, and this negative claim is something that both cases share. What is important for directness is the
question of whether I come to know a certain fact by coming to know some other fact. If this is not the case, my awareness or knowledge counts as
direct. But in neither the experience
case nor the filing cabinet case has it been established that I come to know a
certain fact by knowing some other fact. Thus it has not been established that
(3) is true.
5.2. The Second Way to Develop the Objection.
The suggestion I have just
made—that because of considerations of awareness the step from (2) to (3) is
illegitimate—faces a number of different responses. Before considering them, however, I want to consider a different
reason for supposing that the crucial inference is illegitimate. This reason brings out a further source of
complexity in our discussion which I have so far been ignoring.
It is important to distinguish two meanings, or uses, of
‘attention’.[26] In one
sense ‘attention’ just means ‘to think about’—let us call this cognitive attention. This is the notion of attention that is at
issue when, for example, one says ‘Let us now attend to the second flaw of the
argument’ or ‘The program made us attend even more than we had before to the
effects of salination on the nation’s rivers’. In another sense, however, ‘attention’ means in the first
instance to focus on various items in one’s field of vision, and perhaps also
in other sensory fields—let us call this perceptual
attention. This is the notion at
issue when one says ‘John didn’t notice the pedestrian crossing because he was
attending to the spider on the windscreen’, or ‘The space-ship only appears
when you focus your attention through
the painting, rather than at the
painting’.
Now, so far in our
discussion, we have been assuming that the notion of attention in play is the
perceptual notion. However, it is
important also to notice that in the initial phenomenological premise of the
diaphanousness argument the word ‘attention’ appears twice. Here is the premise again with emphasis
added:
(1) Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your
visual experience. I predict you will
find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree.
Now, I think it is clear that Harman
intends the notion of attention to be univocal here. But that assumption creates a problem for the argument. Suppose that, in its first occurrence, ‘attention’
means perceptual attention. Then
Harman’s instructions could only be carried out if one could perceptually attend to the intrinsic features of one’s visual
experience. In turn, however, if one is
in a position to perceptually attend to the intrinsic features of one’s visual
experiences, it would seem that some version of the perceptual model of
introspection is true. For to perceptually attend to something is at least to
perceive it. This suggests that, unless
the perceptual model of introspection is going to be assumed from the start, in
its first occurrence, ‘attention’ ought to be interpreted as cognitive
attention.
What
then of the second occurrence of the word?
If we continue with the assumption of univocality, we have no choice but
to conclude that the second occurrence is likewise supposed to mean cognitive
attention. But this doesn’t seem to be
right. The most natural interpretation
is that when Harman is making predictions about what will happen when we try to
attend he is telling us that we will find ourselves perceptually attending to the tree. So Harman’s prediction is most naturally interpreted as involving
perceptual and not cognitive attention.
So far then, we have failed to find a
univocal interpretation of the initial premise of the argument. Should we then impose a non-univocal reading
on the premise? Of course there is the textual inconvenience that Harman seems
to want a univocal interpretation. But
perhaps we should ignore this and say that what Harman should have said is summarized in (1a)
(1a) Look at a tree and try to turn your cognitive attention to the intrinsic
features of your visual experience. I
predict you will find that the only features there to turn your perceptual attention to will be features
of the presented tree.
On this interpretation, Harman is
instructing us to think about or consider the intrinsic features of our visual
experience. And he is predicting that
when we try to do this we will find ourselves attending—that is, perceptually
attending—to features of the presented tree.
I think this is in fact the most
plausible interpretation of the initial premise of the argument. However there
is problem lurking here, and this is that once we allow this interpretation to
filter through to the rest of the argument, it is plain once again that the
inference from (2) to (3) is mistaken. For consider: if (1) is properly interpreted as (1a), likewise (2)
is properly interpreted as (2a):
(2a) In introspection, one cognitively attends
to (i.e. thinks about) the intrinsic features of one’s experience by (perceptually) attending to the objects
and properties represented by that experience
But it is quite clear that (2a) will not
result in (3):
(3) In introspection, one is not directly aware of the intrinsic features
of one’s experience.
After all, what (2a) says—that is, what
(2) says when you interpret it in the way indicated—is that in introspection
one thinks about the phenomenal character by perceptually attending to
something. But even if this is true,
the inference to (3) now looks to be a non sequitur.
The point may again be illustrated by my
experience of seeing the filing cabinet.
Suppose that I know that I am having this experience, and that I know
this directly. In other words, suppose I am directly aware that I am having an
experience of seeing the filing cabinet.
As we have noted, to be aware of something is not yet to attend to it,
and thus to suppose that I am aware of my experience is not yet to say that I
attend to it. But suppose now that I
begin to think about my experience—to cognitively attend to it. In doing so, I may well focus on the filing
cabinet, just as the thesis of diaphanousness predicts. My experience is thus diaphanous to introspection:
when I think about my experience of the cabinet, I find myself attending
to the cabinet. But none of this
provides one with any temptation at all to
take back the claim that my knowledge that I am having the experience is in
any sense not direct. More generally, (2a) gives us no grounds at all for
(3). (2a) tells me something about how
I think about what I know. But (3)
tells me something about how I know what I know in the first place.
Earlier we saw that Block’s appeal to the
distinction between attention and awareness misfired because he was attacking
the argument from diaphanousness in the wrong form. What we have just seen however is that there is something
importantly right in the suggestion that the argument trades on a conflation
between attention and awareness, and thus Block is at least partially
vindicated. On our revised interpretation, Moore’s point about
diaphanousness—viz., (2)—should be interpreted as (2a). But (2a) is a thesis about attention: it tells us what happens when we try to
attend to the intrinsic features of our experience. On the other hand (3) is a thesis about awareness or knowledge: it tells us that we are or become aware of
the intrinsic features by being or becoming aware of something else. However, since attention is one thing and
awareness is another, the step from (2) to (3) is illegitimate.
6. Replies and
Rejoinders
How might a proponent of the
argument from diaphanousness reply to the objection that, when one articulates
the direct awareness condition in the right way, and when one distinguishes the
two notions of attention, it is clear that (2) does not entail (3)?
6.1. A Perceptual Model of Introspection?
The first reply I want to
consider rejects the assumption—which we took over from Dretske—that awareness
of experience is f-awareness. It is
important to notice that this assumption has been critical to the argument. On
the assumption that the notion of awareness in play is f-awareness, it becomes
rather difficult to establish that my awareness of the intrinsic features of my
experience is indirect. For the only
way to establish that would be to produce some other fact on the basis of which I become aware that my experience
has such and such an intrinsic feature.
In effect, what I have been suggesting so far is that considerations of
diaphanousness fail to make it plausible that there is some other fact, and
thus fail to refute qualia realism.
But what if the notion of
awareness in play is not f-awareness but p-awareness? On that assumption, it
seems easier to establish that my awareness of intrinsic features of
experiences is indirect. For, on that assumption, to show that my awareness of
intrinsic properties is indirect one needs to produce, not another fact, but
only another property, and then to make it plausible that I am p-aware of the
intrinsic features by being aware of this other property. But the considerations
of diaphanousness precisely do seem
to make this plausible! After all,
those considerations make it plausible that I am p-aware of features of my
experience by being p-aware of features of objects in my environment. So if it can be made out that I am p-aware
of the intrinsic features, it would seem that the argument can be resuscitated.
Now, earlier, our reason for
operating with f-awareness rather than p-awareness was that to operate with
p-awareness was to commit oneself to the perceptual model of introspection, and
that there is ample reason to want to avoid that model. However, in light of
what has just been said about p-awareness, one might respond that it is really
not clear that the perceptual model is as a bad as its reputation. At any rate, one might respond that I have
certainly not shown that it is.
Now is not the time for a full-scale discussion of the
perceptual model, but perhaps it will suffice to note that, whether or not the
perceptual model is true, a proponent of the argument from diaphanousness is in
a particularly weak position to say that it is. For consider again the passage from Moore with which we
began. One implication of what Moore is
saying here is that my relation to my sensation, whatever that is, is not at
all the relation I bear to the blue.
However, since I see the blue,
we may conclude that I do not literally see the sensation. And, on the assumption that I am aware of my sensation, that is just
to say that the perceptual model is false.
So it will clearly do no good to appeal to the perceptual model as a
potential method of patching up the argument from diaphanousness.
One might reply that the thesis of diaphanousness and the
perceptual model of introspection are only in tension if one assumes that one
is aware of one's sensation. But
couldn't one deny this? As we have
noted, proponents of the argument are sometimes interpreted as holding that one
is not aware of experiences. And
perhaps one might read that into the passage from Moore.[27] After all, the word ‘diaphanous’ at least
suggests that experience is not perceived at all. And if introspection just is perception, it follows from this
interpretation of the diaphanousness point that I am not introspectively aware
of my own experience.
But at this point we are in
the position of using a Moorean fact against Moore himself, or at any rate
against Moore as we are currently interpreting him. As we in effect noted previously, surely it is a Moorean fact
that we are aware of our sensations.
Surely we are more sure that we are aware of our sensations than we are
of the perceptual model of introspection.
To put the point differently, the package of views that Moore on this
interpretation is committed to—the perceptual model of introspection plus the diaphanousness of
experience—has the result that one is not aware of one's own sensations. But since we evidently are aware of our own sensations, one or both members of this
package has to give. Hence a proponent
of the argument is in no position to dispense with diaphanousness, it is
obvious that what should be dispensed with is the perceptual model.[28]
Alternatively, and more
generally, one might suggest that this point misconstrues the role of the
perceptual model in the debate about diaphanousness and qualia. Perhaps the point is not that the perceptual
model is true, but rather that a qualia realist is committed to the perceptual
model, i.e., that the very notion of direct access is somehow bound up with the
perceptual approach to introspection.
If so the argument from diaphanousness would indeed seem to be on a
collision course with qualia realism.
But of course, the problem with this suggestion is that
it is completely unobvious that any qualia realist need or should endorse the
perceptual model. As we have seen already, the idea of direct awareness can
certainly be spelled out in terms of the idea that one is aware of the fact
that one’s experience has its phenomenal character not in virtue of being aware
of anything else. But that does not
involve commitment to the perceptual model.
It is true of course that there is a tradition according to which
commitment to qualia and commitment to the perceptual model go hand in hand,
viz., the sense-data tradition. But as
we have noted, the version of qualia realism that we are concerned with is not
a version of the sense-datum theory.
6.2. A Non-perceptual Model?
Our discussion of the
perceptual model was motivated by the thought that perhaps one could drop the
assumption that awareness of experience was f-awareness and operate with
p-awareness. And the problem we have run into is that the perceptual model is
implausible, or else it is not something which a proponent of the argument can
appeal to.
However, one might point out
that two things have been run together here:
the idea of p-awareness and the idea of the perceptual model. Surely not all p-awareness or o-awareness is
perceptual. After all, it seems quite
possible that one can be aware of (e.g.) the virtues of Ghandi, without
supposing that one sees the virtues
of Ghandi. But if that is so, might one
not introduce an account of introspection according to which one is p-aware of
phenomenal character? In that case, we
seem to have the indirectness claim back again. Moreover, we seem to have it back in a form that does not involve
us in a discussion of the perceptual model of introspection.
The suggestion that one might be p-aware of something and
yet not be perceptually aware of it raises the general topic of
non-propositional intentional states.
This is an enormous and interesting topic in its own right. Still, I think we can see what is wrong with
this method of defending the argument from diaphanousness without discussing
that issue in depth. Suppose it is true
that there is a notion of introspective awareness which is distinct from
perceptual awareness. And suppose also
that the awareness at issue is p-awareness rather than f-awareness. Would that help the proponent of the
argument respond to our objection? The
answer to this question is no. For the
fact is that once one draws a distinction between perceptual and introspective
awareness, we need to confront a further dimension of difference in the
argument from diaphanousness that we have so far been suppressing.
On the schematic account of
directness that we adopted from Alston and Jackson, one is indirectly aware of
something just in case one is aware of it, but not by being aware of anything
else. Now, the suggestion that there
are different ways of spelling out the notion of awareness forces us to
consider whether, in any putative case of indirect awareness, the awareness in
both cases is the same. One dimension
of difference that is relevant here concerns whether the notion of awareness
that is in play is o-awareness, p-awareness or f-awareness—this is the
dimension that we have so far been discussing.
However, a quite different dimension comes into focus when one
distinguishes between perceptual and introspective awareness. When we focus on that dimension of
difference, it seems reasonable to think that the only case in which a case of
awareness will count as indirect is when the awareness in both cases is of the
same sort. So a case of introspective
awareness will count as indirect if it is based on another case of introspective awareness. Similarly, a case of perceptual awareness will count as indirect only if its based on
another case of perceptual awareness.
On the other hand, in thinking about this sort of issue, we arrive at
yet further reason for supposing that (2) does not yield (3).
The issue might be presented
compactly if we look back once again at (2):
(2)
In
introspection, one is or becomes aware of the intrinsic features of one’s
experience, by attending to the
objects and properties represented by that experience.
Setting aside for the moment the
distinctions between attention and awareness, and between f- and p-awareness,
one might think that (2) admits of a simple permutation, as follows:
(2b) In introspection, one is or becomes aware
of the intrinsic features of one’s experience, by being or becoming aware of
the objects and properties represented by that experience.
But (2b) can be interpreted
in two quite different ways. On the one
hand, we might take the phrase ‘in introspection’ to govern the entire
construction. In that case (2b) means
something like:
(2ba) In
introspection, one is or becomes aware of the intrinsic features of one’s
experience, by being or becoming introspectively
aware of the objects and properties represented by that experience.
On the other hand, we might take ‘in
introspection’ to govern only the sentence that comes before ‘by’. In that case (2b) means something like:
(2bb) In introspection, one is or becomes aware of
the intrinsic features of one’s experience, by being or becoming perceptually aware of the objects and
properties represented by that experience.
But now the problem is transparent. On the interpretation of direct awareness
with which we are working, to derive (3) the proponent of the argument from
diaphanousness needs to establish (2ba).
For only then will it be true that one introspects the phenomenal
character of one’s experience by introspecting something else. One other hand, all (1) seems to support is
(2bb), and (2bb) does not yield (3).
Indeed,
it is worth pointing out that, on the interpretation we have introduced, the
argument is flawed in two quite separate ways.
One way is that (2ba) seems not to be supported by (1). But another is that (2ba) looks to be
nonsense. Surely it is not merely false, but nonsensical, to
say that I can introspect objects in the external world. That would be like saying that one can
remember future events. The point is
important because proponents of the argument from diaphanousness sometimes talk
as if one could ‘introspect’ properties of external objects—something which in
my view should raise alarm bells about the cogency of the argument.[29]
6.3. A Different Notion of Directness?
The two replies we have
considered so far both respond to our assumption that awareness of phenomenal
character is f-awareness. However, the
final reply I want to consider criticizes the objections I have made at
altogether a different juncture.
My assumption so far has been that direct awareness it to
be explicated on the model offered by Alston and Jackson. But—one might point out—there are at least
two other accounts of direct awareness available, and these must be disposed of
before our objection to the argument from diaphanousness can be assumed to be successful.
The first of these articulates direct awareness in terms
of the notion of inference. On this interpretation, the idea behind denying
direct awareness might be brought out as follows. I know what my experience is like because I first know what the
objects and properties represented in my experience is like, and I infer what
my experience is like on the basis of this.
On this account, my access to phenomenal character will be direct just
in case I know what it is like, but do not know what it is like on the basis of
an inference from any other knowledge.
However, there are three responses to this idea. The first is the (ad hominem) point that proponents of the argument from
diaphanousness tell us that what is involved here is not an inference (Tye
2000, p.47). The second is that it is
in any case implausible to say that I infer facts about my experience from
facts about my environment. It is plausible to say, for example, that
one might infer the phenomenal character of the experience of others on the
basis of their behavior, but given that my own access to the phenomenal
character of my mental states is supposed to be very different, inference does
not seem to be the appropriate notion here.
The third is that, in any case (2) does not entail (3) even on this
account of direct awareness. What (2)
tells us is that I apprehend in introspection the phenomenal character of my
experience by attending in perception to something. But it does not say that I apprehend the phenomenal character by
knowing anything.
The second way of interpreting the notion of directness
takes up and develops a suggestion of Dretske’s. At one point, Dretske (1999,
p. 164) says that one is directly f-aware of some fact F just in case F is
constituted by o and P and one is directly o-aware of o and directly p-aware of P.
On this understanding, if one is f-aware of the fact that one’s
experience e has phenomenal character
C, one can only be directly aware of
this if one is o-aware of e and
p-aware of C. It follows from this
that the diaphanousness of experience will easily establish that one is only
indirectly aware that one’s experience has any phenomenal character because
diaphanousness does suggest that one is not o-aware of e or p-aware of C.
Now, there is no point
doubting that, on this account of directness, my awareness of the intrinsic
features of my experience is indirect.
However, it does not follow from this that we have a version of the
argument that is successful. For it
should not be at all surprising that one might be able articulate notions of
directness according to which my awareness will count as indirect. The point is whether the qualia realist can
appeal to a workable notion of directness according to which they are direct. As we have seen, schematic
account of awareness that we have introduced does seem to capture such a workable notion. To put the point differently, one can agree
that there are senses of directness according to which any particular case of
awareness is indirect. But the crucial
point is whether the argument from diaphanousness can disprove the idea of
direct awareness as that idea is developed by the qualia realist.
7. Conclusion
The argument from
diaphanousness, as I have been considering it, aims to show that there are no
psychological properties of experience which satisfy both intrinsicness and
direct awareness, and in particular, that there are no psychological properties
which satisfy direct awareness. My
suggestion has been that the argument is unsound because there is no way to defend
the inference from the claim that I apprehend the intrinsic features of my
experience by apprehending objects and properties represented in experience to
the claim that I only indirectly apprehend those features. As we have seen, there are various ways of
understanding what direct awareness and attention might amount to, but on none
of these does the ‘by’-claim summarized in (2) support the denial of direct
awareness summarized in (3).
I want now to close the paper by returning to the two
versions of the argument noted but set aside in §2 and by summarizing the main
points.[30]
7.1. The argument construed as an argument for the relational
thesis.
In discussing the puzzle
about Moore in §2.3, we took note of the relational thesis, the thesis that the
phenomenal character of an experience is determined by the properties of the
objects that one is related to in having the experience. We saw that the
relational thesis crosscuts the debate between intentionalists and qualia
realists: hard intentionalists and
sense-data theorists endorse it, soft intentionalists and qualia realists such
as Block deny it. Nevertheless—as we
also noted— it is plausible to suppose that the relational thesis is in the
background of the contemporary debate about the argument from
diaphanousness. So in this section, I
want to ask whether there is a version of the argument that provides any
support for the thesis.
This issue is in fact a rather large one, and so I will
limit myself here to two points. The
first point is that if the thesis of the diaphanousness of experience is going
to be a premise in an argument for the relational thesis then it would need to
be adjusted slightly. The reason is
that the thesis as we have been considering it presupposes that there are
intrinsic properties of experience. But
the relational thesis would seem to deny this, or at any rate, would seem to
deny it as far as phenomenal character is concerned. For suppose that the phenomenal character of an experience is
determined by the objects that one is related to in having the experience. Then it is hard to see how the phenomenal
character of the experience might count as an intrinsic, or, at any rate, as a
non-relational, property of that experience.
However, it is not hard to see how one might adjust the thesis to
accommodate this complication. Instead
of (2) or the variants that we have introduced, the thesis should now be
rendered as (2c):
(2c) In introspection, one is or becomes aware
of the phenomenal character of one’s experience by attending to the objects that one is related to in having the
experience.
This thesis differs from our
original thesis in two respects. First, we are now talking about the phenomenal
character of experience, rather than specifying that the phenomenal character
is intrinsic. Second, the thesis now
explicitly includes the picture of experience with which the relational thesis
operates, viz., the picture according to which in having an experience one is
related to a range of objects. As we
noted in §2.3, there are a wide variety of otherwise quite different approaches
to experience which conform to the experience thesis, hence there are wide variety of otherwise different
approaches to experience which can agree with (2c).
The second, and more
straightforward, point is that there is in any case a good reason for supposing
that there is no (convincing) argument from (2c) to the relational thesis. For the fact is that, while (2c) might be
true—at any rate, nothing I have said militates against it—the relational
thesis is false. To illustrate this, reconsider
the contrast noted in §4.2 between the situation in which I am under the visual
impression that p and the situation
in which I visually imagine that p. The relational thesis implies that then the
phenomenal character of these two experiences are identical. For according to that thesis, the phenomenal
character of an experience is determined
by the features of the object that one is related to in having the
experience. But in this case there is surely a strong sense
in which the phenomenal characters here are not identical. As we noted, in the visual impression case,
I am going to feel inclined to be believe that p. In the imagination case,
on the other hand, I am not going to feel inclined to believe that p.
However, since these inclinations are surely part of the phenomenal
character of imagination and perception, it is natural to suppose that what
explains the phenomenal character of an experience cannot simply be properties
of the objects that one is related to in having the experience—the nature of
the experience itself must be included also.
But if that is right then the relational thesis is false, and thus there
can be no persuasive argument from diaphanousness to the relational thesis.
7.2. The argument construed as an argument for intentionalism.
The final issue I want to
consider—and this is the last one I will deal with in the paper—concerns the
point noted in §2.2 that, while the argument from diaphanousness is often
formulated as a negative argument whose conclusion is that there are no qualia,
it is often also formulated as a positive argument whose conclusion is that
intentionalism is true. And we also saw
that, because the contrast between qualia realism and intentionalism was not
straightforward, it was necessary to treat the two versions of the argument
separately. In this final section,
therefore, I will consider this version of the argument.
We can start with the observation that, given the
distinction between hard and soft intentionalism, the only issue that requires
discussion is whether the diaphanousness of experience supports soft
intentionalism. For the difference
between hard and soft intentionalism can be expressed in terms of the
relational thesis—hard intentionalism endorses the relational thesis, soft
intentionalism denies it. And we have
already seen that the relational thesis is false. In consequence, hard
intentionalism is false also. Hence
there can be no (convincing) argument from the diaphanousness of experience to
hard intentionalism. Hence the only issue
to be considered is whether the thesis of the diaphanousness of experience
provides any support for soft intentionalism. Put differently, the issue is whether the ‘by’-claim summarized
in (2) tells us that soft intentionalism is true.
The first thing to say is that this step is certainly not
one of entailment. To see this, consider the step from (4) to (5):
(4) One apprehends the feelings of others by
attending to their (actual and potential) behavior.
(5) The feelings of others are completely
explained by their actual and potential behavior.
It should be clear the step
from (4) to (5) is invalid. It is
perfectly true that one apprehends the feelings of others by attending to their
behavior. But behaviorism—for (5) is
nothing else but a formulation of behaviorism—is as false as any philosophical
doctrine could be. Since (4) is true,
and (5) is false, the inference from (4) to (5) is not valid. But—and here is our objection—the inference
from (2) to intentionalism is of the same form as that from (4) to (5).
One might of course agree
that the step from (2) to intentionalism is invalid, while at the same time
insisting that intentionalism nevertheless provides the best explanation of
(2). Here too, however, the analogy with
behaviorism is instructive. Suppose the
behaviorist says that (5) provides the best explanation of (4), and that is why
we should believe it. Our response, I
think, would be to grant that behaviorism provides a potential explanation of (4), but to point out that there are
others. The other account is roughly
that the feelings of others find causal expression in their behavior. Once we have another account of why (4) is
true, likewise we may look to another account of why (2) is true. (2) is true—one might say—because if we were
in a situation in which our experiences were veridical, the world that we would
then find ourselves in would cause us to have certain experiences. In other words, while it might very well be
true that (2) represents a striking fact which cries out for explanation, it
does not at all follow that intentionalism is the best or only way to explain
it.
Of course none of this shows that soft intentionalism is
false, nor does it show that soft intentionalism might not draw a certain
limited level of support from considerations of diaphanousness. As I have noted previously, the relation of
intentionalism to qualia realism, and therefore also the truth of
intentionalism, is in fact a highly complex issue. The important point for our purposes, however, is only that the
argument from diaphanousness does not provide the short, sharp argument for
intentionalism that it is sometimes presented as doing in the literature.
7.3. Summary
Let me summarize the main
points I have tried to make. I began by
noting that the argument from diaphanousness comes in three versions: (a) a
version which attacks the sort of qualia realism which is prevalent in modern
philosophy, typified by the Shoemaker-Block view; (b) a version which supports
the relational thesis; and (c) a
version which supports intentionalism, the idea that the phenomenal character
of an experience is explained by its intentionality. I then argued that there is no version of the argument which is
successful.
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W. 1971. ‘Varieties of Privileged Access’, American
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D. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge.
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D. 1980. ‘Immediate Perception’. In The
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Queensland, 1980
Block,
N. 1990. ‘Inverted Earth’, in
Tomberlin, J. (ed.) 1990 Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol. 4, Ridgeview, pp.52-79.
Reprinted in Block et alia, (eds.) 1997 The Nature of
Consciousness: Philosophical
Debates, MIT Press.
Block,
N. 2000: ‘Mental Paint’. In Hahn, M and Ramberg, B (eds.) Essays in Honor of Tyler Burge, MIT Press.
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Broad,
C.D. 1925. The Mind and Its Place in
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Byrne,
A. 2001: ‘Intentionalism Defended’. Philosophical
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, P. 1985. ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain
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Grice,
P. 1962. ‘Some Remarks About the Senses’.
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G. 1990: ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophy of Mind and Action
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G. 1996: ‘Explaining Objective Color in
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M.G.F., 1997, ‘Sense, Reference and Selective Attention: The Shallows of the Mind’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 71. Pp. 75-98.
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M.G.F., 1998 ‘Setting Things Before the Mind’.
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W. 1996 Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman’s Critique, Erkenntnis 47:285-309.
Ryle,
G. 1949. The Concept of Mind.
Routledge.
Tye,
M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye,
M 2000. Color, Content and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Segal,
G 2000. A Slim Book on Narrow Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shoemaker,
S. 1981. ‘The Inverted Spectrum’, Journal of Philosophy, 79,7, 357-381.
Shoemaker, S. 1994.
'Phenomenal Character', Nous, 28
(1994), pp.21-38
Shoemaker,
S. 1996: The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker,
S. 2001: ‘Introspection and Phenomenal
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Daniel Stoljar
Senior Fellow
Philosophy Program
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200
Australia
Acknowledgments: I presented previous versions of this
paper to audiences at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia,
the Language, Mind and World Conference, Tlaxcala, Mexico, the Australian
Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science
Conference, Melbourne, and at MIT. I am
very much indebted to all who took part on those occasions, and to the very
many others with whom I have discussed this material. Particular thanks to Frank Jackson who was my commentator at the
Melbourne conference, and to Philippe Chuard and Dan Lopez for extensive
comments.
[1] Harman does not mention Moore by name,
but, as many have noted, it is clear that he has Moore mainly in mind. Presentations and discussion of the argument
can be found in Harman (1990, 1996), Tye (1995, 2001), Martin (1998, 2001),
Lycan 1996, Jackson 2001. Criticisms of the argument can be found in Block
(1990, 2001), Lormand 1996, Robinson 1996, and Shoemaker (1994, 1996). The diaphanousness of experience is
well-known in the history of philosophy of mind, receiving attention from Broad
1925, Ryle 1949 and Grice 1962. It has
also been widely discussed in the sense datum literature, though I will not
take up that issue in detail here; cf.
Martin 2001 for discussion. A similar
idea about the ‘diaphanousness of belief’ is to be found in Evans 1982, but I
will not discuss that issue here. For
some recent discussion of the notion as it appears in Evans, see Peacocke 1998. Van Gulick 1993 presents an interesting
discussion of diaphanousness, in which he traces the idea, or a similar idea,
back to Kant.
[2] Here is Tye: “I believe that experience
is transparent. I also believe that its
transparency is a very powerful motivation for the representationist view. I concede, however, that the appeal to
transparency has not been well understood” (Tye, 2000; p. 45).
[3] In speaking of the intentionality of
experience, I mean that in having an experience one represents the world as
being a certain way. There are a number
of important philosophical issues concerning the nature of the intentionality
of experience, but I will set these issues aside here. I mention of the functional role of the
experience simply to register the fact that many intentionalists (e.g. Lycan
1996) include this factor in the determination of phenomenal character. For some further discussion of this issue,
see the discussion of the relational thesis, and the contrast between soft and
hard intentionalism, in §2.5 and §7 below.
[4] Another debate is of course physicalism,
but I think the physicalist debate can be profitably separated from the debate
about qualia as we will discuss it here and so I will set it aside.
[5] This oversimplifies matters
slightly. Shoemaker is responding both
to the argument from diaphanousness and to issues having to do with the
inverted spectrum. As we will see below,
I think the argument from diaphanousness can be answered even if one
adopts the conception of qualia discussed in the text. So, if I am right, at least one motivation
for Shoemaker’s view evaporates. It
should be noted that Shoemaker’s current view differs from the position
presented in 1996. See Shoemaker 2001.
[6] A
puzzle mentioned by a number of different authors including Jackson
2001, Martin 2001 and Tye 2000.
[7] For some discussion of the Naïve
Approach, see Martin 2001.
[8] The sense-datum theory is sometimes
interpreted as a theory according to which the intentionality of the experience
explains its phenomenal character (cf. Byrne 2001 for an interpretation like this,
but see Jackson 2001 for a dissenting interpretation). So, from this point of view, we have here a
second example of a position which combines qualia realism with intentionalism. As in the discussion of projectivism, I
assume that intentionalism strictly so-called can be developed in such a way
that it is not consistent with these versions of qualia realism. But I will not discuss the issue further
here.
[9] One reason that adverbialism fell out of
favor is that it was often presented as an account of the logical syntax of
perceptual vocabulary. On that
interpretation, the thesis is subject to extremely serious objections; cf.
Jackson 1977. But it is tempting to
suppose also that another reason that adverbialism fell out of favor is that
adverbialists offer no account of the intentionality of experience. Indeed, for adverbialists experiences lack
intentionality altogether. For some
development of this theme, particularly as it relates to the sense-datum
theory, see Jackson 2001.
[10] The Shoemaker-Block view is also closely
allied to views such as that of Peacocke 1983. It is important to note, however, that Peacocke’s position is
often construed as version of a sense-datum theory, but the Shoemaker-Block view
is not.
[11] It is important to notice that the
difference between kinds of qualia realists that I have just made does not
emerge when we consider only the form of words that is used to state the
doctrines. Take the statement ‘qualia
are properties of experience that satisfy intrinsicness and direct
access’. Both Moore and Block might
well agree to this form of words. But
they would understand it very differently.
For Moore, the word ‘experience’ will or might be taken to mean the
object that one is related to in having the experience, a sense datum. For Block, on the other hand, and for all
qualia-realists who endorse the Shoemaker-Block view, the word ‘experience’ in
this form of words will be taken to mean the psychological state of
experiencing. Again, since I will operate with the Shoemaker-Block view here, I
will follow them in this usage.
[12] Lycan’s position is sometimes called
'quasi-representationism' or 'quasi-intentionalism'. However, since I want to emphasize the fact that Lycan’s position
is a version of intentionalism, I will adopt a different phraseology here. Thanks to Philip Pettit for suggesting the
phraseology.
[13] It is important to stress that the
difference between hard and soft intentionalism is mainly a matter of degree
rather than kind. Most intentionalists do emphasize the functional role of
experience to some extent The crucial
issue is to what extent they do so. Cf.
Block 2001 including in particular the discussion of whether Harman is a
‘quasi-representationist’ or not.
[14] One should perhaps emphasize psychological or mental intrinsic features here—but I will largely leave that
implicit in what follows.
[15] My formulation of (2) has been greatly
influenced by Martin 2001 and Tye 2000.
Tye (p. 51) says for example, that “When we introspect our experiences
and feelings, we become aware of what it is like for us to undergo them. But we are not directly aware of those
experiences and feelings; nor are we
directly aware of any of their qualities.
The qualities to which we have direct access are the external ones, the
qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities of external
things. By being aware of these qualities, we are aware of phenomenal
character.” It is important to note
that (2) embodies a certain conception of experience which is friendly to an
intentionalist, since it speaks of objects and properties represented by the
experience. As we will note in §7,
there are more general ways to state the thesis, but I will ignore this aspect
of the issue until then.
[16] One may speak not only of the objects
and properties represented by the experience but also of the object and
properties presented in the experience. I will sometimes adopt this expression
as a stylistic alternative.
[17] In his commentary on this paper at the
conference in Melbourne, Frank Jackson suggested that one might think about the
structure of the argument in a slightly different way. According to Jackson, from the premise that
one is only directly aware of the objects and properties presented in
experience one may conclude that there are no qualia—the reason being that the
properties that one are aware of are intentional rather than real, and thus
need not be instantiated in experiences.
Surely however, qualia are properties which are instantiated in
experiences. This interpretation of the
argument is interesting and is different from the version that I consider in
the text. Nevertheless, I think we can
set aside this suggestion here. Given
our distinction between (3) and (3*) what Jackson is doing is providing novel
grounds to move from (3*) to (3). As
noted in the text, however, my focus here is not on the move from (3*) to (3),
but rather on the move from (2) to (3), or—something I take to be largely
equivalent in the context—the move from (2) to (3*). So far as I can see, Jackson’s point does not affect what I have
so say about that transition.
[18] As Josh Parsons pointed out to me, there
is one sort of intrinsic property of an experience which one might say is both
a property of the tree and of Eloise’s experience: the property of being such that there is an experience. But it is not clear that one needs to appeal
to this property in spelling out how Eloise takes the world to be in visual
experience.
[19] To what extent is the idea that
experiences are to be identified with their core-realizers influencing those
who deny intrinsicness? This interpretative question is difficult to
resolve. However, it is important to
note that both Harman 1990 and Block 1990 are operating with a ‘language of
thought’ conception according to which an experience is to be identified with a
linguistic vehicle of some sort. I take
it that this conception of experience is at least close to version which
identifies an experience with its core realizer.
[20] Another alternative would be to deny the
identity between experiences and their core-realizers and go for a constitution
thesis. Thanks to Martin Davies for
pointing out this option to me.
[21] Two further points concerning
intrinsicness should be noted: (1) Philosophers who support internalism in the
philosophy of mind, or at least do so in certain specific cases, argue that
intentional properties are (or at least are in some cases) intrinsic in the
second sense. For a recent general
recent defense of internalism see Segal 2000, and for discussion of how the
externalism/internalism issue figures in the debate about qualia and
intentionalism, see Block 2001 and Jackson 2001. (2) The notion of
intrinsicness is in any case extremely puzzling. For a recent discussion see
Langton and Lewis (1998) and the references therein.
[22] There is a further point here that might
also be mentioned. Block is contrasting
a theoretical question and a question that might answered on the basis of
introspection alone. But is not clear
that there is any genuine contrast here.
Certainly if one lacks a certain concept, one cannot answer on the basis
of introspection alone the question of whether the concept applies—but the
issue of concept possession does not seem to be relevant to the case Block has
in mind. On the other hand, if one possesses
the relevant concept, one might
well be able to decide the question of whether it applies on the basis of
introspection alone. The issue turns on
whether the concept is the sort of concept for which introspection provides a proprietary
evidential basis. If so, there is no reason to suppose that introspection alone
should not furnish sufficient information for one to be able to decide that the
concept applies. The problem for Block
is that it is not at all clear that the concepts in question are not of this
sort.
[23] For further discussion of the notion of
immediacy, see Armstrong 1980.
[24] The ‘merely’ is required here to rule
out the case in which one is both directly and indirectly aware of something.
[25] The assertion that most modern
philosophers are not attracted to the perceptual model might seem strange in
light of the fact that that some, like Armstrong 1968 and Lycan 1986, express
their allegiance to it. But this
strangeness is avoided when we notice that for Armstrong and Lycan the
perceptual model at issue is what Shoemaker (1996) calls a ‘broad perceptual
model’, that is, on this model one’s awareness that one has an experience of a
certain sort is f-awareness. In short,
the perceptual model rejected by Dretske is not
the theory defended under that name by Armstrong.
[26] For some excellent discussion of this
see Martin 1997. See also Shoemaker
1996 and Martin 1998
[27] I think this would be a misreading,
since Moore is careful to say that the sensation is as if it were diaphanousness.
But the interpretative issues are difficult and I will not attempt to
address them here.
[28] One might
attempt to defend the package from this criticism by introducing a distinction
between direct and indirect introspection on the model of direct and indirect
perception. In Berkeley's famous
example, I directly hear the clip-clop of the horse’s hooves, but I only
indirectly hear the carriage. By
analogy, one might say that while I only directly see the blue in introspection
I indirectly see the sensation.
However, the problem with this suggestion is that the claim that I
indirectly see the sensation is only marginally less implausible than the claim
that I directly see it. To say that I
hear the carriage indirectly is to say that I hear it. It is not to say that it is inaudible. But to say that experience is diaphanousness
would seem to imply that I do not see it at all.
[29] At one point, for example, Tye says that
“Via introspection, you are directly aware of a range of qualities that you experience
as being qualities of surfaces at varying distances away and orientations…”
(2000; p. 47).
[30] Attentive readers will note that I have
switched the order of discussion here.