Philosophy by Democracy: NEH Institute Poll Results

Results from a poll taken at the end of the NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality. 28 polls were returned (25 participants, plus David Chalmers, Maja Spener, and Brad Thompson).

n 1. Is materialism true about consciousness?

n 7 Yes

n 1 Agnostic, leaning yes

n 5 Agnostic

n 7 Agnostic, leaning no

n 8 No

n 2. Is materialism true about intentionality?

n 8 Yes

n 3 Agnostic, leaning yes

n 4 Agnostic

n 5 Agnostic, leaning no

n 8 No

n 3. Is there a deep explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness?

n 1 No

n 4 Yes, but closeable in principle

n 10 Yes, but not a metaphysical gap

n 12 Yes

n 4. Is there a deep explanatory gap between physical processes and intentionality?

n 4 No

n 4 Yes, but closeable in principle

n 6 Yes, but not a metaphysical gap

n 11 Yes

n 5. Is you had to choose one position from the following, which one would you choose?

n 1 Type-A materialism

n 7 Type-B materialism

n 0.5 Type-C materialism

n 0.5 Type-D dualism

n 2 Type-E dualism

n 8 Type-F monism

n 6 I can't remember the letters

n 6. Is representationalism true? (I.e., are phenomenal properties representational properties?)

n 5 Yes

n 6.5 No

n 16.5 Yes, but only nonreductive representationalism

n 7. Does perceptual experience have nonconceptual content?

n 14 Yes

n 0 No

n 13 Maybe

n 8. Is experience transparent? (I.e., in general, are we directly aware only of represented features of external objects?)

n 14 Yes

n 10 No

n 4 Maybe

n 9. Is it possible to take an oblique (non-transparent) perspective on experience?

n 14 Yes

n 3 No

n 11 Maybe

n 10. How much perceptual phenomenology is there outside attention?

n 0 None

n 9 A little

n 15 A lot

n 11. Is there phenomenal intentionality in perception (intentional content in virtue of phenomenology)?

n 9 Yes

n 8 No, because external relations are needed

n 0 No, because cognitive interpretation is needed

n 3 No

n 11 Maybe

n 12. Is there cognitive phenomenology (something it is like to think)?

n 4 No

n 4.5 Yes, but only imagery

n 17.5 Yes

n 13. Is there distinct (non-imagistic) cognitive phenomenology for distinct thoughts?

n 5 Yes

n 12 No

n 11 Maybe

n 14. Is the content of perceptual experience primarily Fregean (intensional) or Millian (extensional)?

n 14 Fregean

n 3 Millian

n 2 Neither

n 5 Both

n 2 Not sure

n 15. Is the content of belief primarily Fregean or Millian?

n 14 Fregean

n 3 Millian

n 1 Neither

n 4 Both

n 6 Not sure

n 16. How much content is narrow?

n 6 None

n 10 Some

n 9 Lots

n 2 All

n 17. How much phenomenal character is narrow?

n 3 None

n 5 Some

n 8 Lots

n 12 All

n 18. Are you more internalist or externalist (gut reaction)?

n 13 Internalist

n 12 Externalist

n 3 Not sure

n 19. Which is primary: perceptual content or belief content?

n 15 Perceptual content

n 1 Belief content

n 6 Neither

n 4 Not sure

n 20. Are phenomenal concepts (partly or wholly) constituted by phenomenal properties?

n 3 Yes

n 4 No

n 18 Not sure

n 21. Is consciousness crucial in explaining intentionality?

n 14 Yes

n 9 No

n 5 Not sure

n 22. Is intentionality crucial in explaining consciousness?

n 18 Yes

n 7 No

n 3 Not sure

n 23. Which is more fundamental: consciousness, intentionality, or neither?

n 6 Consciousness

n 9 Intentionality

n 13 Neither

n 24. Which is more valuable: consciousness, intentionality, or neither?

n 7 Consciousness

n 4 Intentionality

n 13 Impossible choice

n 25. If you had to choose between working on consciousness and working on intentionality, for the rest of your life, which would you choose?

n 9 Consciousness

n 11 Intentionality

n 8 Impossible choice

Hall of Horrors

n 1. How much intentional content would a brain in a vat have, compared to a normal person?

n 3 None

n 10 Some

n 3 Lots

n 13 Just about all

n 2. How much phenomenal character would a brain in a vat have, compared to a normal person?

n 1 None

n 2 Some

n 4 Lots

n 19 Just about all

n 3. Are the beliefs of a brain in a vat mostly true or mostly false?

n 8 Mostly true

n 10 Mostly false

n 4 BIVs don't have beliefs

n 6 Not sure

n 4. Are zombies (non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious beings) conceivable and/or possible?

n 5 Neither conceivable nor metaphysically possible

n 8.5 Conceivable but not metaphysically possible

n 13.5 Metaphysically possible

n 5. Does Mary learn something new on seeing something red for the first time?

n 0 No

n 0 Yes, but only know-how

n 11.5 Yes, but an old fact in a new way

n 13.5 Yes, a new fact

n 6. How much intentional content would a zombie have, compared to a corresponding normal person?

n 8 None

n 8 Some

n 6 Lots

n 5 Just about all

n 7. Are a zombie's phenomenal beliefs or analogs thereof (e.g. the belief expressed by "I am phenomenally conscious") true, false, or neither?

n 5 True

n 11 False

n 5 Neither

n 5 Zombies don't have beliefs

n 8. Is a functional duplicate of a conscious being with inverted qualia conceivable and/or possible?

n 2 No

n 4 Conceivable but not metaphysically possible

n 20 Metaphysically possible

n 0 Nomologically possible

n 9. Could a global clairvoyant have beliefs?

n 13 Yes

n 3 No

n 12 Not sure

n 10. Could a creature lacking any social interaction throughout its lifetime have intentional states?

n 21.5 Yes

n 6 No

n 0.5 Not sure

n 11. Which non-human animals/entities are phenomenally conscious? (Listed by last checkmark.)