Philosophy of Mind Bibliography, Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia

Compiled by David Chalmers, Philosophy, Australian National University. Technical support by David Bourget, University of Toronto. For more information see the main page.

Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia [1523]

1.1 Consciousness [109]

1.1a Consciousness -- General [54]
1.1b The Concept of Consciousness [55]

1.2 Explaining Consciousness? [142]

1.3 Materialism and Dualism [293]

1.3a The Knowledge Argument [75]
1.3b Zombies & Modal Arguments [61]
1.3c Essentialist Arguments [33]
1.3d Arguments from Disembodiment [19]
1.3e Consciousness and Physicalism, Misc [19]
1.3f Consciousness and Dualism [20]
1.3g Mind-Body Problem, General [66]

1.4 Specific Views on Consciousness [316]

1.4a Higher-Order Thought Approaches [72]
1.4b Self-Representational Approaches [35]
1.4c Dennett on Consciousness [67]
1.4d Functionalism [9]
1.4e Eliminativism [17]
1.4f Epiphenomenalism [37]
1.4g Interactionism [20]
1.4h Panpsychism [29]
1.4i Russellian Monism [30]

1.5 Consciousness and Content [278]

1.5a Consciousness and Intentionality [37]
1.5b Representationalism [71]
1.5c The Content of Perceptual Experience [72]
1.5d Nonconceptual Content [35]
1.5e Internalism and Externalism about Experience [19]
1.5f Phenomenal Concepts [24]
1.5g Miscellaneous [20]

1.6 Aspects of Consciousness [237]

1.7 Qualia [148]

1.7a General [32]
1.7b Qualia and Materialism [13]
1.7c Eliminativism about Qualia [12]
1.7d The Inverted Spectrum [38]
1.7e Absent Qualia [17]
1.7f Introspection and Absent Qualia [10]
1.7g Functionalism and Qualia, General [26]

Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia

1.1a Consciousness -- General

Armstrong, D. M. & Malcolm, N. 1984. Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 30 | Google)

Block, N. , Flanagan, O. , & Guzeldere, G. (eds) 1997. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press. (Cited by 46 | Google)

An anthology of central philosophical papers on consciousness.

Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 44 | Google)

Catalano, J. 2000. Thinking Matter: Consciousness from Aristotle to Putnam and Sartre. Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 909 | Google)

Argues against the reductive explanation of consciousness, and for a kind of naturalistic dualism. Moves toward a "fundamental theory" to bridge the gap, and draws out some consequences.

Chalmers, D. J. 2003. Consciousness and its place in nature. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S. 1997. Recent work on consciousness: Philosophical, theoretical, and empirical. Seminars in Neurology 17:179-86. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Davies, M. & Humphreys, G. 1993. Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell. (Google)

A collection of 5 psychological and 8 philosophical essays on consciousness.

Flanagan, O. J. 1991. Consciousness. In The Science of the Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

On the mysteries of consciousness. Argues with epiphenomenalism, "conscious inessentialism", and the "new mysterians" (Nagel, McGinn). Toward a naturalistic theory, drawing on ideas of Edelman, Calvin, Dennett.

Flanagan, O. J. 1992. Consciousness Reconsidered. MIT Press. (Cited by 164 | Google)

Argues that consciousness can be accounted for in a naturalistic framework. With arguments against eliminativism and epiphenomenalism, evidence from neuroscience and psychology, and discussions of the stream and the self.

Flanagan, O. J. & Guzeldere, G. 1997. Consciousness: A philosophical tour. In (M. Ito, Y. Miyashita, & E. T. Rolls, eds) Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Foss, J. 2000. Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1998. Sensations and grain processes. In (G. Mulhauser, ed) Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Google)

Gregory, R. L. 1988. Consciousness in science and philosophy: conscience and con-science. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Guzeldere, G. 1995. Consciousness: what it is, how to study it, what to learn from its history. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:30-51. (Google)

A history of the study of consciousness, especially in psychology.

Guzeldere, G. 1995. Problems of consciousness: A perspective on contemporary issues, current debates. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:112-43. (Google)

A summary of recent philosophical debates over consciousness, focusing on the "what/where/who/why/how" questions, the explanatory gap, and the stalemate between "essentialist" and "causal" intuitions.

Hannay, A. 1987. The claims of consciousness: A critical survey. Inquiry 30:395-434. (Google)

Hannay, A. 1990. Human Consciousness. Routledge. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Honderich, T. 2004. On Consciousness. Edinburgh University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hurley, S. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Jackendoff, R. 1987. Consciousness and the Computational Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 241 | Google)

Separates computational mind from phenomenological mind, and studies the former, a third-person approach. The residue is the "Mind-Mind" problem. Consciousness supervenes on an intermediate level of representation. Elegant.

Kirk, R. 1994. Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Physicalism can explain consciousness in all its glory. Argues against zombies and inverted-spectrum scenarios, and suggests that the explanatory gap can be bridged by an account of directly-active information-processing.

Kriegel, U. 2006. Philosophical theories of consciousness: Contemporary Western perspectives. In (M. Moscovitch, E. Thompson, & P. Zelazo, eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Levine, J. 1997. Recent work on consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:379-404. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Livingston, P. 2002. Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 9(3):15-33. (Google)

Livingston, P. 2004. Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Lloyd, D. 2004. Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1987. Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 116 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press. (Cited by 203 | Google)

McGinn, C. 2004. Consciousness and Its Objects. Oxford University Press University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Metzinger, T. (ed) 1995. Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 34 | Google)

An excellent collection of 20 philosophical papers on consciousness.

Murata, J. 1997. Consciousness and the mind-body problem. In (M. Ito, Y. Miyashita, & E. T. Rolls, eds) Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nelkin, N. 1996. Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)

O'Shaughnessy, B. 2000. Consciousness and the World. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Papineau, D. 2000. Introducing Consciousness. Totem Books. Papineau, D. 2002. Theories of consciousness. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 37 | Google)

Perry, J. 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 31 | Google)

Revonsuo, A. & Kamppinen, M. (eds) 1994. Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Robinson, W. S. 2004. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Rowlands, M. 2001. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Sayre, K. M. 1969. Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines. Random House. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Seager, W. E. 1999. Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Searle, J. R. 1989. Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 17:193-209. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Argues that the first-person view has been ignored too much in the philosophy of mind. Even unconscious states are only mental by virtue of their potential consciousness.

Searle, J. R. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 658 | Google)

On the centrality of consciousness to the mind. Consciousness is irreducible but biological. On the history of the field, the structure of consciousness, its role in constituting intentionality, and problems with computation.

Searle, J. R. 1993. The problem of consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. (Cited by 13 | Google)

On the notion of consciousness, its relation to the brain, and some features that need to be explained: its subjectivity, unity, intentionality, center and periphery, Gestalt structure, aspect of familiarity, and so on.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. 1998. Consciousness: A natural history. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:260-94. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Siewert, C. 1998. The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 52 | Google)

Smith, Q. & Jokic, A. (eds) 2002. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Sprigge, T. L. S. 1982. The importance of subjectivity: An inaugural lecture. Inquiry 25:143-63. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Value is only found within streams of consciousness. Three ways of studying it: phenomenology, anthropology, and by relation to the physical. With an analysis of the "self-transcending" nature of conscious intentionality.

Strawson, G. 1994. Mental Reality. MIT Press. (Cited by 63 | Google)

Sturgeon, S. 2000. Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature. Routledge. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 288 | Google)

Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 95 | Google)

Villaneuva, E. (ed) 1991. Consciousness: Philosophical Issues. Ridgeview. (Google)

A collection of philosophical articles on consciousness.

1.1b The Concept of Consciousness

Antony, M. V. 1999. Outline of a general methodology for consciousness research. Anthropology and Philosophy 3:43-56. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Antony, M. V. 2001. Is 'consciousness' ambiguous?. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8:19-44. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Antony, M. V. 2001. Conceiving simple experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22:263-86. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Antony, M. V. 2002. Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'. Philosophical Studies 109:1-16. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Armstrong, D. M. 1979. Three types of consciousness. In Brain and Mind (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69). Elsevier. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Armstrong, D. M. 1981. What is consciousness? In The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 48 | Google)

On minimal consciousness, perceptual consciousness, and introspective consciousness. Introspective consciousness seems so special because it gives inner awareness of self, and memory of other mental events.

Baruss, I. 1986. Meta-analysis of definitions of consciousness. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 6:321-29. (Google)

Bisiach, E. 1988. The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Distinguishes C1 (phenomenal experience) from C2 (access of parts of a system to other parts). C2 is can be scientifically studied, and has a graspable, if fragmented, causal role. C1 is mysterious and perhaps beyond science.

Burt, C. 1962. The concept of consciousness. British Journal of Psychology 53:229-42. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Cam, P. 1985. Phenomenology and speech dispositions. Philosophical Studies 47:357-68. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Reportability is not phenomenology, as blindsight has reportability but no phenomenology.

Chalmers, D. J. 1997. Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds) The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Argues that the cognitive correlate of consciousness is direct availability for global control.

Church, J. 1998. Two sorts of consciousness? Communication and Cognition 31:51-71. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Clark, A. 2001. Phenomenal consciousness so-called. In (W. Backhaus, ed) Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Faw, B. 2002. Phenomenal, access, and reflexive consciousness: The missing 'blocks' in Ned Block's typlogy. Consciousness and Emotion 3: 145-158. (Google)

Finkelstein, D. H. 1999. On the distinction between conscious and unconscious states of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 36:79-100. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Gennaro, R. J. 1995. Does mentality entail consciousness? Philosophia 24:331-58. (Google)

Girle, R. A. 1996. Shades of consciousness. Minds and Machines 6:143-57. (Google)

Honderich, T. 1998. Consciousness as existence. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Honderich, T. 2000. Consciousness as existence again. Theoria. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Honderich, T. 2003. Perceptual, reflective, and affective Consciousness as existence. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, R. 1992. Consciousness and concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplement 66:23-40. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Analyzes consciousness in terms of the "presence" of information to the main decision-making processes of a system. No great conceptual capacities required, no higher-order thoughts. With application to blindsight.

Lagerspetz, O. 2002. Experience and consciousness in the shadow of Descartes. Philosophical Psychology 15:5-18. (Google)

Lee, B. D. 2004. Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief. Dialogue 43. (Google)

Lormand, E. 1995. What qualitative consciousness is like. Manuscript. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Lormand, E. 1996. Nonphenomenal consciousness. Nous 30:242-61. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Manson, N. 2000. State consciousness and creature consciousness: A real distinction. Philosophical Psychology 13:405-410. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Matthews, G. 1977. Consciousness and life. Philosophy 52:13-26. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McBride, R. 1999. Consciousness and the state/transitive/creature distinction. Philosophical Psychology 12:181-196. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Moody, T. C. 1986. Distinguishing consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47:289-95. (Google)

Separates consciousness from the mental -- functionalist accounts work for the latter but not the former. With remarks on Zen "pure consciousness".

Natsoulas, T. 1978. Consciousness. American Psychologist 33:906-14. (Cited by 19 | Google)

On the role of consciousness in psychology, and distinguishing various notions of consciousness: mutual knowledge, internal knowledge, awareness, direct awareness, personal unity, wakefulness, and double consciousness.

Natsoulas, T. 1983. A selective review of conceptions of consciousness with special reference to behavioristic contributions. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:417-47. (Google)

Ideas about consciousness from Locke, Brentano, Hebb, Dennett, Skinner, Sellars, Aristotle, Gibson. Theories: inner eye vs. verbal vs. outer eye.

Natsoulas, T. 1983. Concepts of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:195-232.

Natsoulas, T. 1991. The concept of consciousness(1): The interpersonal meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 21:63-89. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1991. The concept of consciousness(2): The personal meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 21:339-67. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1992. The concept of consciousness(3): The awareness meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 2:199-25. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1993. Consciousness(4): Varieties of intrinsic theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:107-32. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1994. The concept of consciousness(4): The reflective meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 24:373-400. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1994. The concept of consciousness(5): The unitive meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 24:401-24. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1995. Consciousness(3) and Gibson's concept of awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 3:305-28. (Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1996-1998. The case for intrinsic theory (parts 1-3). Journal of Mind and Behavior 17:267-85, 17:369-89, 19:1.

Natsoulas, T. 1997. Consciousness and self-awareness: Consciousness(1,2,3,4,5,6). Journal of Mind and Behavior 18:53-94.

Natsoulas, T. 2001. On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: Attempted inroads from the first person perspective. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 22:219-248. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Nelkin, N. 1987. What is it like to be a person? Mind and Language 21:220-41. (Google)

Critiques three senses of consc: awareness, verbalization and phenomenology. Argues that none are sufficient for person-consciousness. Quite good.

Nelkin, N. 1993. What is consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60:419-34. (Cited by 9 | Google)

On three senses of consciousness: phenomenality, intentionality, and introspectibility. Argues from empirical evidence (especially blindsight cases) that these three are all dissociable.

Nguyen, A. 2001. A critique of Dretske's conception of state consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:187-206. (Google)

O'Shaughnessy, B. 1991. The anatomy of consciousness. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Consciousness. Ridgeview. (Cited by 2 | Google)

O'Shaughnessy, B. 1998. Experience. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Place, U. T. 1992. Two concepts of consciousness: The biological/private and the linguistic/social. Acta Analytica 7:53-72. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1990. The independence of consciousness and sensory quality. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Consciousness. Ridgeview. (Cited by 26 | Google)

Argues that consciousness and sensory quality are independent properties: there can be unconscious sensations. Consciousness is a relational property.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1994. State consciousness and transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2:355-63. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 2002. How many kinds of consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11:653-665 (Cited by 4 | Google)

Shanon, B. 1990. Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11:137-51. (Cited by 2 | Google)

On three kinds of consciousness -- sensed being, mental awareness, and reflection -- and their relationships.

Smith, D. W. 2001. Three facets of consciousness. Axiomathes 12:55-85. (Google)

Tye, M. 1996. The burning house. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Uses various puzzles cases to distinguish higher-order consciousness, discriminatory consciousness, responsive consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness.

Weintraub, R. 1987. Unconscious mental states. Philosophical Quarterly 37:423-32. (Google)

1.2 Explaining Consciousness?

1.2a Subjectivity and Objectivity (Nagel) [see also 1.3a]

Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83:435-50. Reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979). (Cited by 562 | Google)

Physicalist explanations leave out consciousness, i.e. what it is like to be an organism. Objective accounts omit points of view (could there be an objective phenomenology?). Physicalism may be true, but we can't see how.

Nagel, T. 1979. Subjective and objective. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Subjective and objective views clash e.g. on meaning of life, free will, personal identity, mind-body problem, ethics. How to reconcile: reduction, elimination, annexation? Maybe just let multiple viewpoints coexist.

Nagel, T. 1986. The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 465 | Google)

Seeing philosophy as a clash between the subjective and objective views of various phenomena (mental states, self, knowledge, freedom, value, ethics). Eliminating the subjective is impossible.

Akins, K. 1993. What is it like to be boring and myopic? In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Gives a detailed account of perceptual processing in bats, and suggests that we can know what bat-experience is like: it's like nerd experience. But then is there an unexplained residue?

Akins, K. 1993. A bat without qualities? In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 18 | Google)

On what science tells us about the experience of bats, birds, and others. Why a movie of bat-experience isn't good enough -- because of the inseparability of intentionality and experience. Science can do OK.

Alter, T. 2002. Nagel on imagination and physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58. (Google)

Baker, L. R. 1998. The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:327-348. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Biro, J. I. 1991. Consciousness and subjectivity. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Consciousness. Ridgeview. (Cited by 6 | Google)

No real problems are posed by subjectivity and points of view, no matter how they are construed (fixed, portable, tokens, types). It's either a confusion or a triviality about the logic of indexicality.

Biro, J. I. 1993. Consciousness and objectivity. In (M. Davies and G Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Google)

Chrisley, R. 2001. A view from anywhere: Prospects for an objective understanding of consciousness. In (P. Pylkkanen & T. Vaden, eds) Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. (Google)

Flanagan, O. J. 1985. Consciousness, naturalism and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:373-90. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Naturalism can do autophenomenology just fine.

Foss, J. E. 1989. On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:305-320. (Cited by 2 | Google)

A Super Neuroscientist will know how we describe and think about experience, so will know as much as a Super Sympathist. One doesn't have to imagine to know what it's like. With remarks on bat experience.

Foss, J. E. 1993. Subjectivity, objectivity, and Nagel on consciousness. Dialogue 32:725-36. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Nagel conflates metaphysical and epistemological versions of the subjective/ objective distinction. Consciousness is metaphysically subjective, and science is epistemically objective, so there is incompatibility.

Francescotti, R. M. 1993. Subjective experience and points of view. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36. (Google)

Being graspable from only one point of view does not define the class of facts about conscious experience. Various ways of cashing this out fail.

Hacker, P. M. S. 2002. Is there anything it is like to be a bat? Philosophy 77:157-174. (Google)

Haksar, V. 1981. Nagel on Subjective and objective. Inquiry 24:105-21.

The objective and subjective don't conflict, but complement each other.

Hanna, P. 1990. Must thinking bats be conscious? Philosophical Investigations 13:350-55. (Google)

Hiley, D. R. 1978. Materialism and the inner life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16:61-70. (Google)

Nagel conflates questions about sensory qualities with those about a unique point of view. The truth of physicalism is irrelevant to uniqueness.

Hill, C. S. 1977. Of bats, brains, and minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38:100-106. (Google)

Kekes, J. 1977. Physicalism and subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37:533-6. (Cited by 3 | Google)

The subjective/objective distinction is ill-drawn. Objective descriptions aren't species-independent, but in terms of the space-time causal network. Science can explain the experience this way, but not provide the experience.

Lewis, D. 1983. Postscript to "Mad pain and Martian pain". In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Knowing what it's like consists in an ability, not possession of information.

Lycan, W. G. 1987. "Subjectivity". In Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Various anti-Nagel points.

Lycan, W. G. 1990. What is the "subjectivity" of the mental? Philosophical Perspectives. (Cited by 20 | Google)

The subjectivity of the mental is no more special than usual propositional subjectivity. It can be handled by a self-scanner model of introspection.

Malatesti, L. 2004. Knowing what it is like and knowing how. In (A. Peruzzi, ed) Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. (Google)

Malcolm, N. 1988. Subjectivity. Philosophy 63:147-60. (Cited by 4 | Google)

A critique of Nagel's idea of a "point of view" that is occupied by a "subject". There aren't any peculiar facts about given viewpoints.

Maloney, J. C. 1986. About being a bat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:26-49. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Mandik, P. 2001. Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14:179-202. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Mellor, D. H. 1993. Nothing like experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:1-16. (Cited by 7 | Google)

There are no fact about what an experience is like. Knowing what it's like is an ability to imagine, recognize, and recall; this explains ineffability, etc. With remarks on the experience of imagining an experience.

McClamrock, R. 1992. Irreducibility and subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 67:177-92. (Google)

Phenomenological properties cannot be picked out in physical or computational terms; argues against Lycan's criticism of Nagel. But all this is compatible with materialism. With comments on the phenomenological tradition.

McCulloch, G. 1988. What it is like. Philosophical Quarterly 38:1-19. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Criticizes absent/inverted qualia arguments for a special "what it is like", but argues that the possibility of "what it is like" differences relative to semantic states shows that something's not conveyed by functional accounts.

McMullen, C. 1985. `Knowing what it's like' and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48:211-33. (Google)

The Nagel/Jackson argument is analogous to the Perry indexical argument, and can be treated the same way.

Mounce, H. O. 1992. On Nagel and consciousness. Philosophical Investigations 15:178-84. (Google)

Muscari, P. 1985. The subjective character of experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:577-97. (Google)

Muscari, P. 1987. The status of humans in Nagel's phenomenology. Philosophical Forum 19:23-33. (Google)

Nagel's dilemma: separating feeling from process. Moral consequences?

Nagasawa, Y. 2003. Thomas versus Thomas: A new approach to Nagel's bat argument. Inquiry 46:377-395. (Google)

Nelkin, N. 1987. What is it like to be a person? Mind and Language 2:220-41. (Google)

Nagel-consciousness exists, but isn't so important. It's essential for sensations, but not for thoughts. Beings without it could still be persons.

Nemirow, L. 1980. Review of Nagel's Mortal Questions. Philosophical Review 89:473-7. (Google)

Understanding does not consist only in facts; we can understand via sympathy.

Nemirow, L. 1990. Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 35 | Google)

Knowing what it's like is really knowing how to imagine. We should reduce Nagel's question to a question about possession of a certain ability.

Pugmire, D. 1989. Bat or batman. Philosophy 64:207-17. (Google)

Subjectivity is not something we have knowledge of, as we lack comparisons.

Rorty, R. 1993. Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 3 | Google)

On the Nagel/Dennett debate: Nagel holds out for unexplained intrinsic properties once the relational is all accounted for; Dennett can renounce the transcendental ambition. Remarks on realism, holism, and metaphilosophy.

Rudd, A. J. 1999. What it's like and what's really wrong with physicalism: A Wittgensteinian perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:454-63. (Google)

Russow, L. 1982. It's not like that to be a bat. Behaviorism 10:55-63. (Google)

Divides Nagel's problem: qualitative differences, special access, mineness.

Simoni-Wastila, H. 2000. Particularity and consciousness: Wittgenstein and Nagel on privacy, beetles and bats. Philosophy Today 44:415-425. (Google)

Taliaferro, C. 1988. Nagel's vista or taking subjectivity seriously. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:393-401. (Google)

Nagel's `View from Nowhere' doesn't take subjectivity seriously enough.

Teller, P. 1992. Subjectivity and knowing what it's like. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Google)

Rebutting various intuitions for the non-physical nature of experience. The Nagel/Jackson argument commits an intensional fallacy; experiences are physical states known from a different perspective.

Tilghman, B. R. 1991. What is it like to be an aardvark? Philosophy 66:325-38. (Cited by 1 | Google)

A Wittgensteinian critique of Nagel. Nagel's question is confused: "what it's like" is a matter of behavior, sociality, etc, not inner experience.

van Gulick, R. 1985. Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Topics 13:51-70. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Reducing doesn't imply understanding. Two different kinds of reduction.

Wider, K. 1989. Overtones of solipsism in Nagel's `What is it like to be a bat?' and `The view from nowhere'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:481-99. (Google)

Nagel is an epistemological solipsist, whether he likes it or not.

Wright, E. 1996. What it isn't like. American Philosophical Quarterly 33:23-42. (Google)

1.2b The Explanatory Gap (Levine)

Beckermann, A. 2000. The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness: C. D. Broad on the explanatory gap. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.

Bieri, P. 1995. Why is consciousness puzzling? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Reflections on the explanatory gap between physical processes and conscious experience. With remarks on different sorts of consciousness, and on why we need an intelligible necessary connection.

Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108:1-46. (Cited by 58 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2001. Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. Philosophy Supplement 49:61-85. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2004. Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34. (Google)

Chalmers, D. J. & Jackson, F. 2001. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. Philosophical Review 110:315-61. (Cited by 40 | Google)

Dempsey, L. 2004. Conscious experience, reduction and identity: Many gaps, one solution. Philosophical Psychology 17:225-246. (Google)

Ellis, R. D. & Newton, N. 1998. Three paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness: Bridging the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:419-42. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Gertler, B. 2002. Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind. Nous 36:22-49. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1987. Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:281-98. (Cited by 9 | Google)

On the physiological bases of phenomenal states, particularly color. Inverted spectrum isn't really coherent, as coolness/warmth would have to be inverted too. So the contingency of qualia is diminished.

Gertler, B. 2001. The explanatory gap is not an illusion: A reply to Michael Tye. Mind 110:689-694. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Gois, I. 2001. Understanding consciousness. Disputatio 10. (Google)

Hanfling, O. 2003. Wittgenstein and the problem of consciousness. Think 3. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1992. Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Google)

Argues in detail that psychophysics can provide a structural map to close the explanatory gap. If there is an explanatory residue, perhaps panpsychism can help.

Harnad, S. 1994. Why and how we are not zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164-67. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Kim, J. 1998. Reduction, reductive explanation, and "the explanatory gap". Manuscript. (Google)

Argues for a distinction between reduction and reductive explanation, and argues that reductive explanations generally involves conceptual connections via "functionalization". With comments on Block and Stalnaker.

Levin, J. 1991. Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies 61:211-38. (Google)

Contra Kripkean arguments, a good enough functional theory may help close the conceivability/explanatory gap between the physical and qualia. Contra Nagel/Jackson, such a theory could provide us with recognitional abilities.

Levine, J. 1983. Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61. (Cited by 150 | Google)

How do we explain the apparent contingency of the qualia-matter reduction? Even if it's not metaphysically contingent, it's conceptually contingent, so there's a gap in any physical explanation of qualia. Excellent.

Levine, J. 1993. On leaving out what it's like. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Google)

Physical accounts leave out qualia epistemologically but not metaphysically. So physicalism holds, but there is an explanatory gap. Discusses Kripke's and Jackson's arguments in detail; also explanation and content.

Levine, J. 2001. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Manson, N. 2002. Consciousness-dependence and the explanatory gap. Inquiry 45:521-540. Montero, B. 2002. The epistemic/ontic divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:404-418. (Google)

Musacchio, J. M. 2002. Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. Brain and Mind 3:331-365. (Google)

Papineau, D. 1998. Mind the gap. Philosophical Perspectives 12:373-89. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Price, M. C. 1996. Should we expect to feel as if we understand consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:303-12. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Argues that the explanatory gap between brain and consciousness is just the same as that found with causal relations everywhere; it's just that we usually overlook it in the latter case.

Scheele, M. 2002. Never mind the gap: The explanatory gap as an artifact of naive philosophical argument. Philosophical Psychology 15. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Sturgeon, S. 1994. The epistemic basis of subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy 91:221-35. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Qualia can't be explained in more basic terms, as that sort of explanation works by accounting for a property's canonical evidence, but the canonical evidence for qualia are qualia themselves. But they still may be physical.

Tye, M. 1999. Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion. Mind 108:705-25. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Tye, M. 2001. Oh yes it is. Mind 110:695-697. (Cited by 3 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 2002. Maps, gaps, and traps. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Webster, W. R. 2002. A case of mind/brain identity: One small bridge for the explanatory gap. Synthese 131:275-287. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Webster, W. R. 2003. Revelation and transparency in colour vision refuted: A case of mind/brain identity and another bridge over the explanatory gap. Synthese 133:419-39. (Google)

1.2c `Hard' and `Easy' Problems (Chalmers) [see also 3.1]

Block, N. 2002. The harder problem of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99:391-425. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:200-19. Also in (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 170 | Google)

Divides the problems of consciousness into easy and hard problems; the hard problem eludes reductive explanation as it isn't about explaining functions. Argues instead for a nonreductive theory with psychophysical laws.

Chalmers, D. J. 1995. The puzzle of conscious experience. Scientific American 273(6):80-86. (Cited by 52 | Google)

Like the JCS article, but shorter, more accessible, and with pretty pictures.

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. Can consciousness be reductively explained? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. (Google)

There is no a priori entailment from the physical to phenomenal facts (arguments from conceivability, epistemology, analysis), so reductive explanation fails. With a critique of existing empirical proposals.

Chalmers, D. J. 1997. Moving forward on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:3-46. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 27 | Google)

A reply to the 25 "hard problem" articles in JCS.

Chalmers, D. J. 1998. The problems of consciousness. In (H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci, & S. Rossignol, eds) Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Churchland, P. S. 1996. The hornswoggle problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:402-8. Reprinted in Shear 1997, (Cited by 13 | Google)

Argues that the "hard problem" in effect invokes an argument from ignorance, and that there's no deep difference between consciousness and other domains.

Clark, T. 1995. Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:241-54. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Argues contra Chalmers that experience is identical to certain functions, rather than emerging from them.

Crick, F. and Koch, C. 1995. Why neuroscience may be able to explain consciousness. Scientific American 273(6):84-85. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Divides the hard problem into three parts, and argues that neuroscience can make progress on at least one part (incommunicability); and maybe "meaning" holds the key to the rest.

Dennett, D. C. 1996. Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:4-6. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Argues contra Chalmers 1995 that functions are all we need to explain.

Eilan, N. 2000. Primitive consciousness and the 'hard problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:28-39. (Google)

Gray, J. 1998. Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Hodgson, D. 1996. The easy problems ain't so easy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:69-75. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Argues that consciousness plays a vital role in performing mental functions, so the easy problems won't be solved until the hard problem is solved.

Horst, S. 1999. Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:39-48. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Hohwy, J. 2004. Evidence, explanation, and experience: On the harder problem of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 101:242-254. (Google)

Ismael, J. 1999. Science and the phenomenal. Philosophy of Science 66:351-69. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Lewis, H. 1998. Consciousness: Inexplicable - and useless too? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:59-66. (Google)

Libet, B. 1996. Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:33-35. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Endorses the idea of consciousness as fundamental, but criticizes Chalmers' psychophysical laws. Advocates a theory with a "conscious mental field".

Lowe, E. J. 1995. There are no easy problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:266-71. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Argues that the "easy problems" -- reportability, attention, etc -- all involve concepts and therefore experience itself, for Kantian reasons, and therefore are not mechanisticcally explainable.

McLaughlin, B. P. 2003. A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem. Philosophical Issues 13:163-204. (Google)

Mills, E. O. 1996. Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:26-32. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Argues that the truly hard problem is that of giving a constitutive account of consciousness, and Chalmers doesn't solve that (laws aren't good enough); in fact it's unsolvable.

Mills, F. B. 1998. The easy and hard problems of consciousness: A Cartesian perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19:119-40. (Cited by 2 | Google)

O'Hara, K. & Scutt, T. 1996. There is no hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:290-302. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argue that we should work on the easy problems for now, as nobody has any good ideas about the hard problem; maybe it will gradually fade away.

Robinson, W. S. 1996. The hardness of the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:14-25. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Shear, J. 1996. The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:54-68. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 12 | Google)

On the epistemology of the hard problem. Argues that a scientific study of phenomenology is possible, drawing on work in developmental psychology and Eastern thought. "Pure consciousness" may be relevant to a resolution.

Shear, J. (ed) 1997. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

A collection of essays consisting of Chalmers' keynote paper, 26 replies from many perspectives, and Chalmers' response to the replies.

Smart, J. J. C. 2004. Consciousness and awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(2):41-50. (Google)

Varela, F. 1995. Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:330-49. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 94 | Google)

Advocates a careful phenomenological study of consciousness in its own right, systematucally linked with a neurophysiological investigation.

Velmans, M. 1995. The relation of consciousness to the material world. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:255-65. Reprinted in Shear 1997. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Agrees with Chalmers on nonreductionism, but disagrees on "awareness", organizational invariance, and thermostats. Advocates a kind of dual-aspect theory, where the physical world is present within consciousness,

1.2d Cognitive Closure (McGinn)

Brueckner, A. & Beroukhim, E. 2002. McGinn on consciousness and the mind-body problem. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Dauer, F. 2001. McGinn's materialism and epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61:136-139. (Google)

Davies, W. M. 1999. Sir William Mitchell and the "new mysterianism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:253-73. (Google)

Garvey, J. 1997. What does McGinn think we cannot know? Analysis 57:196-201. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Hanson, P. P. 1993. McGinn's cognitive closure. Dialogue 32:579-85. (Google)

Kirk, R. 1991. Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem? Analysis 51:17-23. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McGinn asks too much of a solution to the M-B problem. We might understand consciousness without understanding specific experiences; we could get at it by studying brain and consciousness not separately but simultaneously.

Krellenstein, M. F. 1995. Unsolvable problems, visual imagery, and explanatory satisfaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16:235-54. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2004. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica 18:177-191. (Google)

Kukla, A. 1995. Mystery, mind, and materialism. Philosophical Psychology 8:255-64. (Google)

McDonough, R. 1992. The last stand of mechanism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6:206-25. (Google)

McGinn, C. 1989. Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98:349-66. Reprinted in The Problem of Consciousness (Blackwell, 1991). (Cited by 84 | Google)

Argues that the mind-body problem might be solvable in principle, but beyond human capacities. Neither perception of the brain nor introspection of consciousness can uncover the property by which consciousness arises.

McGinn, C. 1991. The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution. Blackwell. (Cited by 108 | Google)

A collection of articles on the problem of consciousness, advocating a view on which the phenomenon is natural but permanently mysterious to us.

McGinn, C. 1991. Consciousness and the natural order. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

Argues that a naturalistic account of the intentionality of conscious states requires an account of their embodiment; and that embodiment may depend on the hidden structure of conscious states, not accessible to introspection.

McGinn, C. 1991. The hidden structure of consciousness. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Suggests that consciousness may have a hidden structure, analogous to the deep structure of language, that relates its surface properties to physical properties. We may not be able to understand this hidden structure, however.

McGinn, C. 1993. Problems in Philosophy. Blackwell. (Cited by 22 | Google)

McGinn, C. 1995. Consciousness and space. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 17 | Google)

McGinn, C. 1999. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. Basic Books. (Cited by 36 | Google)

McGinn, C. 2003. What constitutes the mind-body problem. Philosophical issues 13:148-62. (Google)

Sacks, M. 1994. Cognitive closure and the limits of understanding. Ratio 7:26-42 (Cited by 1 | Google)

Whitely, C. H. 1990. McGinn on the mind-body problem. Mind 99:289. (Google)

1.2e Miscellaneous

Churchland, P. M. 1996. The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Parodies arguments by Searle, Jackson, and Chalmers for the irreducibility of consciousness with analogous arguments for the irreducibility of "luminescence". The consciousness arguments are no better.

Churchland, P. S. 1998. What should we expect from a theory of consciousness? In (H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci, & S. Rossignol, eds) Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. 1993. The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:27-50. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Argues that consciousness can be handled within a scientific framework. We can translate first-person accounts into third-person accounts. Replies to skeptical objections using analogies from elsewhere in science.

Hardcastle, V. G. 1996. The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:7-13. (Cited by 9 | Google)

A "committed materialist" will not see any explanatory gap, or any "brute fact". The entrenched differences lie in one's choice of initial framework.

Hesslow, G. 1996. Will neuroscience explain consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:29-39. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Kirk, R. 1995. How is consciousness possible? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kurthen, M. 1995. On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Lockwood, M. 1998. The enigma of sentience. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Google)

Mills, F. B. 2001. A Spinozist approach to the conceptual gap in consciousness studies. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 22:91-101. (Google)

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1997. Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible? In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Google)

Taylor, J. G, 1998. Cortical activity and the explanatory gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7:109-48. (Cited by 8 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 1993. Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 31 | Google)

Qualia pose no insurmountable problems for materialism: knowledge argument can be answered, explanatory gap can be closed, and absent qualia arguments beg the question. With speculations on their functional role.

van Gulick, R. 1995. What would count as explaining consciousness? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Distinguishes six explananda, four explanatory restrictions, and four sorts of relations between them, making 96 possible problems. With a discussion of whether and how the central problems might be answered.

1.3 Materialism and Dualism

1.3a The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [see also 1.2a]

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 257 | Google)

Knowing a completed neuroscience does not imply knowing about qualia. Mary, the colorblind neuroscientist, gains color vision and learns about red. So physicalism is false, as there are facts over and above the physical facts.

Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary didn't know. Journal of Philosophy 83:291-5. (Cited by 116 | Google)

Reply to Churchland 1985: Mary learns, Churchland misstates the argument.

Jackson, F. 2003. Mind and illusion. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Alter, T. 1995. Mary's new perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73:585-84. (Google)

Contra Pereboom 1994: The way a color sensation appears is a fact about it.

Alter, T. 1998. A limited defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies 90:35-56. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Alter, T. 2001. Know-how, ability, and the ability hypothesis. Theoria 67:229-39. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Alter, T. 2006. Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Alter, T. & Walter, S. (eds) 2006. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Bachrach, J. E. 1990. Qualia and theory reduction: A criticism of Paul Churchland. Iyyun 281-94. (Google)

Argues that Churchland's neuroscientific descriptions must leave at least some qualia behind: they might account for what we know (e.g. brain states) in qualia-knowledge, but can't handle distinctions in how we know.

Berntsen, J. 2004. Why physicalists needn't bother with Perry's recent response to the knowledge argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42:135-148. (Google)

Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. 1990. Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Mary gains knowledge of old facts, in a new way: she gains a new mode of acquaintance with those facts. Analogies with indexical knowledge: her new knowledge eliminates no possible worlds.

Byrne, A. 2002. Something about Mary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:27-52. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Campbell, N. 2003. An inconsistency in the knowledge argument. Erkenntnis 58:261-266. (Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2004. Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Churchland, P. M. 1985. Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82:8-28. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 55 | Google)

Qualia can undergo a normal reduction to the neurophysiological. Jackson commits an intensional fallacy; in any case, perhaps Mary can understand red. When we apprehend qualia, we are directly introspecting our brain state.

Churchland, P. M. 1989. Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Rejoinder to Jackson 1986. The key lies in knowing-how vs. knowing-that.

Conee, E. 1985. Physicalism and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Quarterly 35:296-302. (Google)

Contra Lewis, Nemirow, and Horgan on the knowledge argument. But qualia may still be physical (though outside vocab of science) due to their causal role.

Conee, E. 1994. Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Mary knew all the facts about qualia beforehand, she just wasn't acquainted with them. Knowledge by acquaintance isn't factual knowledge.

Cummins, R. 1984. The mind of the matter: Comments on Paul Churchland. Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 2:791-8. (Google)

Speculation on how consciousness might be left out by a physical account.

Dennett, D. C. 1991. "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained, pp. 398-406. Little-Brown. (Google)

Argues that most people don't really imagine Mary's situation. In fact, Mary would be able to identify blue objects from the way they make her react.

Dennett, D. C. 2006. What RoboMary knows. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Furash, G. 1989. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against materialism. Dialogue 32:1-6. (Google)

Defends Jackson's argument against criticisms by Nemirow, Smith & Jones, Warner, Horgan, & Conee. The argument forces physicalism into a quandary: either deny qualia, or make the confused claim that qualia are physical.

Gertler, B. 1999. A defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies 93:317-336. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 2000. Mary Mary, quite contrary. Philosophical Studies 99:59-87. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 2005. Mary Mary au contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122:203-12. (Google)

Harman, G. 1993. Can science understand the mind? In (G. Harman, ed) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays on Honor of George A. Miller. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 2 | Google)

On Dilthey's "Verstehen", or "understanding from within". Mostly about meaning, but with application to the knowledge Mary gains.

Hellie, B. 2004. Inexpressible truths and the lure of the knowledge argument. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. (Google)

Hershfield, J. 1998. Lycan on the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Psychology 11:229-38. (Google)

Horgan, T. 1984. Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34:147-83. (Cited by 31 | Google)

Mary didn't know all the physical facts: she knew all the explicitly physical information, but not all the ontologically physical information.

Horowitz, A. & Jacobson-Horowitz, H. 2005. The knowledge argument and higher-order properties. Ratio 18:48-64. (Google)

Jackson, F. 2006. The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Jacquette, D. 1995. The blue banana trick: Dennett on Jackson's color scientist. Theoria 61:217-30. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Kelly, J. S. 1989. On neutralizing introspection: The data of sensuous awareness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:29-53. (Google)

Lahav, R. 1994. A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal indistinguishabilty. Philosophia 24:77-103. (Cited by 1 | Google)

A new version of the knowledge argument: given all the physical facts, one can't know when two experiences are indistinguishable. This avoids various objections to the standard version.

Law, S. 2004. Loar's defence of physicalism. Ratio 17:60-67. (Google)

Levin, J. 1986. Could love be like a heatwave?: Physicalism and the subjective character of experience. Philosophical Studies 49:245-61. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 6 | Google)

Contra Nagel/Jackson: Understand qualia through relational properties, and separate the mental concept from the recognitional capacity.

Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 59 | Google)

Against the hypothesis that phenomenology carries information. If it does, then qualia are epiphenomenal. Better to analyze the "new information" as acquiring an ability instead. In-depth and entertaining.

Loar, B. 1990. Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108. (Cited by 88 | Google)

Phenomenal and functional concepts are distinct, but the relevant properties may be identical. We directly refer to phenomenal properties by recognition. Remarks on other minds, transparency, incorrigibility & more. A meaty paper.

Ludlow, P. , Nagasawa, Y. , & Stoljar, D. (eds) 2004. There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1995. A limited defense of phenomenal information. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Gives nine arguments against the Lewis/Nemirow ability analysis, and proposes instead that the same fact is learned a new way, like water and H2O facts. This sort of phenomenal information is no danger to materialism.

Lycan, W. G. 1998. Phenomenal information again: It is both real and intrinsically perspectival. Philosophical Psychology 11:239-42. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 2002. Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McConnell, J. 1995. In defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Topics 22:157-187. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Defends against objections from Dennett, Churchland, etc. Horgan's objection (same fact different ways) has a certain force, but the argument can be reformulated to avoid them and imply property dualism. With remarks on Loar.

Meyer, U. 2001. The knowledge argument, abilities, and metalinguistic beliefs. Erkenntnis 55:325-347. (Google)

Moreland, J. 2003. The knowledge argument revisited. International Philosophical Quarterly 43:218-228. (Google)

Nagasawa, Y. 2002. The knowledge argument against dualism. Theoria 68. (Google)

Nemirow, L. 1995. Understanding rules. Journal of Philosophy 92:28-43. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Nemirow, L. 2006. So this is what it's like: A defense of the ability hypothesis. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Newton, N. 1986. Churchland on direct introspection of brain states. Analysis 46:97-102. (Google)

Contra Churchland 1985: we couldn't introspect sensations as brain states, although we could interpret them as such.

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1995. What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal states. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Google)

Reconstructing the Mary case as a Marianna case, and introducing a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal beliefs, to support the knowledge argument. A very nice and sophisticated paper.

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1998. On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:51-73. (Google)

Nida-Rumelin, M. 2002. Qualia: The knowledge argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Google)

Noordhof, P. 2003. Something like ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81:21-40. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nordby, K. 2006. What is this thing you call color? Some thoughts by a totally color-blind person. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Papineau, D. 1993. Physicalism, consciousness, and the antipathetic fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:169-83. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Mary goes from a third-person concept of experience to a first-person concept, but they co-refer; we can refer to an experience without having the experience. Physical and phenomenal properties are brutely identical.

Papineau, D. 1995. The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Pelczar, M. 2005. Enlightening the fully informed. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pereboom, D. 1994. Bats, brain scientists, and the limits of introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:315-29. (Google)

Mary learns an old fact under a new mode of presentation, and doesn't even learn a new fact about a mode of presentation. Her access to internal states is always mediated by representation, so we can always ascend to a new mode.

Pettit, P. 2004. Motion blindness and the knowledge argument. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Raffman, D. 2005. Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan. Philosophical Studies 122. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Raymont, P. 1995. Tye's criticism of the knowledge argument. Dialogue 34:713-26. (Google)

Raymont, P. 1999. The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:113-26. (Google)

Robinson, D. 1993. Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 69:1-34. (Cited by 8 | Google)

A thorough discussion of Lewis 1990. Phenomenal information implies epiphenomenalism, even at the intra-psychic level. Remarks on ineffability, and on whether properties should be individuated by nomic role or by essence.

Robinson, H. 1993. Dennett on the knowledge argument. Analysis 53:174-7. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Contra Dennett, Mary can't tell an object's color unless she already knows about experience. The knowledge argument bears on thought, not just qualia.

Robinson, H. 1993. The anti-materialist strategy and the "knowledge argument". In (H. Robinson, ed) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Robinson, W. 2003. Jackson's apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111:277-293. (Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1984. Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 2:799-809. (Google)

Introspection reveals functional properties, not physical, so qualia should be reduced to the functional, not to the physical.

Stemmer, N. 1989. Physicalism and the argument from knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:84-91. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Physicalism explains all the relevant evidence, hence all facts, and needn't admit mental entities; belief in mental entities is based on physical facts.

Thompson, E. 1992. Novel colors. Philosophical Studies 68:321-49. (Google)

Interesting remarks on what it would be for someone to see colors that we cannot, combining philosophical considerations with empirical findings about color space. Argues that science could tell us what such colors are like.

Tye, M. 2000. Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument. In Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 2004. So many ways of saying no to Mary. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Walter, S. 2002. Terry, Terry, quite contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:103-22. (Google)

Warner, R. 1986. A challenge to physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:249-65. (Cited by 4 | Google)

A Jackson-like argument that physical knowledge can't give you the knowledge of what pain feels like. With detailed consideration of objections and replies. Argues from limited incorrigibility to factualism about pains.

Watkins, M. 1989. The knowledge argument against the knowledge argument. Analysis, 49:158-60. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Epiphenomenalism -> qualia don't cause beliefs -> we don't know about qualia.

Zemach, E. 1990. Churchland, introspection, and dualism. Philosophia 20:3-13. (Google)

1.3b Zombies & Modal Arguments [see also 1.2c, 1.3a, 1.3c, 1.3d, 1.7e]

Aydede, M. & Guzeldere, G. 2001. Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate. Communication and Cognition 34:99-122. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Balog, K. 1999. Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 108:497-528. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Barnes, G. 2002. Conceivability, explanation, and defeat. Philosophical Studies 108:327-338. (Google)

Bealer, G. 2002. Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Bloomfield, P. 2005. Let's be realistic about serious metaphysics. Synthese 144:69-90. (Google)

Botterell, A. 2001. Conceiving what is not there. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:21-42. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Bringsjord, S. 1999. The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:41-69. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Brueckner, A. 2001. Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism. Analysis. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Byrne, A. 1999. Cosmic hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. Naturalistic dualism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Argues from the lack of logical supervenience to the falsity of physicalism. A two-dimensional analysis shows that objections from a posteriori necessity fail. Argues for a naturalistic variety of property dualism.

Chalmers, D. J. 1999. Materialism and the metaphysics of modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96. (Cited by 30 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2002. Does conceivability entail possibility? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2004. Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:182-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cottrell, A. 1999. Sniffing the camembert: On the conceivability of zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:4-12. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1995. The unimagined preposterousness of zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:322-26. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 2001. The zombic hunch: extinction of an intuition? In (A. O'Hear, ed) Philosophy at the New Millenium. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Dietrich, E. & Gillies, A. 2001. Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations. Synthese 126:361-381. (Google)

Gendler, T. & Hawthorne, J. (eds) 2002. Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Guzeldere, G. 1995. Varieties of zombiehood. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:326-33. (Google)

Hawthorne, J. 2002. Advice for physicalists. Philosophical Studies 109:17-52. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Hill, C. S. 1997. Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies 87:61-85. (Google)

Argues that the conceivability of zombies and the like can be explained away, in terms of the cognitive separability of perceptual imagination and sympathetic imagination of the same states.

Hill, C. S. 1998. Chalmers on the apriority of modal knowledge. Analysis 58:20-26. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Hill, C. S. & McLaughlin, B. P. 1998. There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers' philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Kirk, R. 1974. Sentience and behaviour. Mind 81:43-60. (Google)

Describing a situation where we would be justified in believing in zombies. Argues that zombies are logically possible, which seems incompatible with most or all varieties of materialism.

Kirk, R. 1974. Zombies vs materialists. Aristotelian Society Supplement 48:135-52. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Materialism requires that physical states logically entail all non-relational states; but zombies are logically possible, so materialism fails. With a description of a zombie, and replies to a verificationist. All very true.

Kirk, R. 1977. Reply to Don Locke on zombies and materialism. Mind 86:262-4. (Google)

Reply to Locke 1976: materialism needs zombies to be logically impossible.

Kirk, R. 1999. Why there couldn't be zombies. Aristotelian Society Supplement 73:1-16. (Google)

Kirk, R. 2006. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Kraemer, E. R. 1980. Imitation-man and the `new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10:479-487. (Google)

If Campbell's imitation man is possible, then the causal relation between the physical and phenomenal is unreliable.

Latham, N. 1998. Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Levin, J. 2002. Is conceptual analysis needed for the reduction of qualitative states? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64:571-591. Levine, J. 1998. Conceivability and the metaphysics of mind. Nous 32:449-480. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Loar, B. 2003. Qualia, properties, modality. Philosophical Issues 1:113-29. (Google)

Locke, D. 1976. Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely physical objects. Mind 83:97-99. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Contra Kirk: the logical possibility of zombies is compatible with empirical materialism. With some comments on Kirk's thought-experiment.

Lycan, W. G. 2003. Vs. a new a priorist argument for dualism. Philosophical Issues 13:130-47. (Google)

Marcus, E. 2004. Why zombies are inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:477-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Marton, P. 1998. Zombies vs. materialists: The battle over conceivability. Southwest Philosophy Review 14:131-38. (Google)

Melnyk, A. 2001. Physicalism unfalsified: Chalmers' inconclusive argument for dualism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Moody, T. 1994. Conversations with zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:196-200. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Argues that behavioral differences in zombies would show up, in their discourse about consciousness.

Nagel, T. 1998. Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem. Philosophy 73:337-52. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Perkins, M. 1970. Matter, sensation, and understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 8:1-12. (Google)

On the possibility of an Insentient Perceiver, who perceives the world without sensation. Sensation is inessential to perception and understanding, except understanding in the "whatlike" manner.

Perkins, M. 1971. Sentience. Journal of Philosophy 68:329-37. (Google)

Argues for the conceivability of insentient perception of colors (in "Insent", a kind of blindsighter or zombie), in order to argue for a realistic account of colors.

Perry, J. 2001. The zombie argument. In Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Perry, J. 2001. The modal argument. In Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Polger, T. 2000. Zombies explained. In (A. Brook, D. Ross, & D. Thompson, eds) Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. (Google)

Prudovsky, G. 1995. Arguments from conceivability. Ratio 8:63-69. (Google)

Robb, D. 1999. Conceivability and consciousness. Philosophical Topics. (Google)

Robinson, H. 1976. The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy. Zygon 11:346-360. (Cited by 1 | Google)

A discussion of materialism and its difficulties. The conceivability of zombies poses special problems. Criticism of Smart's & Armstrong's analyses.

Skokowski, P. 2002. I, zombie. Consciousness and Cognition 11:1-9. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Sommers, T. 2002. Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars. Psyche 8. (Google)

Squires, R. 1974. Zombies vs materialists II. Aristotelian Society Supplement 48:153-63. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Stalnaker, R. 2002. What is it like to be a zombie? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Stoljar, D. 2000. Physicalism and the necessary a posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 87:33-55. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Stoljar, D. 2001. The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15:393-413. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Thomas, N. J. T. 1998. Zombie killer. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 1999. Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & D. Chalmers, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press. (Google)

Vierkant, T. 2002. Zombie-Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'Knowledge Argument' with the argument from modality. Psyche 8. (Google)

Witmer, D. G. 2001. Conceptual analysis, circularity, and the commitments of physicalism. Acta Analytica 16:119-133. (Google)

Worley, S. 2003. Conceivability, possibility and physicalism. Analysis 63:15-23. (Google)

Yablo, S. 1998. Concepts and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Yablo, S. 1998. Textbook Kripkeanism and the open texture of language. Philosophical Quarterly. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Yablo, S. 2002. Coulda, woulda, shoulda. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)

1.3c Essentialist Arguments (Kripke) [see also 1.3b, 1.3d]

Kripke, S. A. 1971. Identity and necessity. In (M. Munitz, ed) Identity and Individuation. (Cited by 78 | Google)

An identity between mental and physical states can't be contingent, as it relates rigid designators. But nevertheless the co-occurrence of certain mental and physical states is contingent, so the identity theory is false.

Kripke, S. A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 1053 | Google)

Both "pain" and "C-fibres firing" are rigid designators, so if they are identical, this must be necessary. But their co-occurrence is contingent, and this can't be explained away epistemically, so the identity theory fails.

Barnette, R. 1977. Kripke's pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15. (Google)

Argues that pain and the associated epistemic situation are inequivalent. Beliefs about pain are simply produced by mechanisms, and could come about without any sensation.

Bayne, S. R. 1989. Kripke's Cartesian argument. Philosophia. (Google)

Trying to turn Kripke's argument against him: it's possible that pains and C-fibre stimulations are identical, so it's necessary that they're identical.

Bealer, G. 1994. Mental properties. Journal of Philosophy 91:185-208. (Cited by 15 | Google)

On four arguments against the identity theory: multiple-realizability, modal, knowledge, and certainty arguments. All face difficulties due to scientific essentialism, but the latter two can be reformulated to avoid them.

Blumenfeld, J. 1975. Kripke's refutation of materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53:151-6. (Google)

Kripke's argument doesn't refute token identity. Pains can have other essential properties besides painfulness, so psychophysical token identities can be necessary.

Boyd, R. 1980. Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol 1. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Materialism doesn't need rigid identities, due to the compositional plasticity of mental states. So the possibility of disembodiment is compatible with materialism. The possibility of zombies is illusory.

Carney, J. & von Bretzel, P. 1973. Modern materialism and essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51:78-81. (Google)

A materialist must deny essentialism to meet Kripke's argument.

Carney, J. 1975. Kripke and materialism. Philosophical Studies 27:279-282. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Comments on Feldman 1974: Feldman's view requires rejection of Kripke's views on necessity, or a problematic mixed view on rigid designators.

Della Rocca, M. 1993. Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69:101-112. (Google)

Kripke's premise that pains are essentially mental either begs the question (by assuming pains don't have physical properties) or weakens the premise that physical events aren't essentially mental.

Double, R. 1976. The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3:156-65. (Google)

Feldman, F. 1973. Kripke's argument against materialism. Philosophical Studies 24:416-19. (Google)

Painfulness need not be an essential feature of pains.

Feldman, F. 1974. Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71:665-76. (Google)

Kripke's arguments against person-body and mind-brain identity rely on the essentialness of aliveness to persons and painfulness to pains. There's no reason to grant this. If we do, rigidity is irrelevant to the argument.

Feldman, F. 1980. Identity, necessity, and events. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Defending a contingent event identity thesis against Kripke. Mental properties (which are distinct from physical properties) may not be essential properties of an event.

Gjelsvik, O. 1988. A Kripkean objection to Kripke's arguments against the identity-theories. Inquiry 30:435-50. (Google)

Uses Kripke's 1979 direct-reference theory against him. When rigid designators don't have associated reference-fixing descriptions, we can't expect the "explaining away" strategy to work.

Hill, C. S. 1981. Why Cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42:254-65. (Google)

The apparent contingency of identity is due to the fact that one can be aware of pain without being aware of C-fibers and vice versa, as well as to the fact that "C-fibers" may be picked out by a contingent description.

Holman, E. 1988. Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29. (Google)

Defending Kripkean arguments against various objections. Analysis in terms of manifest properties and their role in fixing reference to the subjective and objective.

Jackson, F. 1980. A note on physicalism and heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:26-34. (Cited by 3 | Google)

A Kripkean argument against non-analytic physicalism. Even if pain rigidly designates a brain state, the physicalist still has problems explaining the property of "pain-presents".

Jacquette, D. 1987. Kripke and the mind-body problem. Dialectica 41:293-300. (Google)

Kripke's argument doesn't refute contingent identity between minds and nonrigidly designated bodies, which is all materialism needs.

Leplin, J. 1979. Theoretical identification and the mind-body problem. Philosophia 8:673-88. (Google)

Some theoretical identification are analogous to mental-physical identifications -- entities are introduced by properties considered essential within a theory, but this doesn't preclude identification.

Levin, M. 1975. Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72:149-67. (Google)

The reference of "pain" is fixed not by essential features but by contingent topic-neutral descriptions; this is the real moral of Wittgenstein's private language argument. So Kripke's apparent contingency can be explained away?

Levin, M. 1995. Tortuous dualism. Journal of Philosophy 92:313-22. (Google)

Reply to Bealer 1994. Tries to clarify the dialactic, and argues that the materialist can explain "possibility" of straw thought as thought conjoined with mere appearance of straw.

Lycan, W. G. 1974. Kripke and the materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71:677-89. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kripke equivocates on "pain-sensation": pains aren't the same as impressions of pain. Argues that imaginability arguments aren't decisive, and that functionalism may be less vulnerable than the identity theory.

Lycan, W. G. 1987. Functionalism and essence. In Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Painfulness needn't be essential to pains: pains are events, not objects, and events don't have essences; and the reference of "pain" is fixed by topic-neutral descriptions. With remarks on pains vs. pain-sensations.

Maxwell, G. 1979. Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Cited by 14 | Google)

"Brain state" reference is fixed by topic-neutral description; picks out pain but mightn't have, explaining the illusion of contingency. "Nonphysicalist materialism" results, with mind the essence of matter. An important paper.

McGinn, C. 1977. Anomalous monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2:78-80. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Google)

Token identity theories aren't vulnerable to Kripke's argument: it may be essential to this pain that it is a C-fibre firing, although not to pain as a type.

McMullen, C. 1984. An argument against the identity theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87. (Google)

We can explain away the apparent contingency of identity in terms of possible differences in *evidence* for the physical state. With a discussion on identities between something perceived and something described.

Mucciolo, L. 1975. On Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Philosophia 5:499-506. (Google)

"Pain" need not be a rigid designator, but instead may pick out a state by its causal role. If it is a rigid designator, then the apparent contingency of identity comes from imagining something else filling the causal role.

Nida-Rumelin, M. 2004. Phenomenal essentialism: A problem for identity theorists. In (R. Schumacher, ed) Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. (Google)

Sher, G. 1977. Kripke, Cartesian intuitions, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:227-38. (Cited by 1 | Google)

The reference of "C-fibre stimulation" might be fixed contingently, allowing the intuitive contingency of identity to be explained away.

Taylor, P. 1983. McGinn, token physicalism, and a rejoinder of Woodfield. Analysis 43:80-83. (Google)

Woodfield, A. 1978. Identity theories and the argument from epistemic counterparts. Analysis 38:140-3. (Google)

Contra McGinn 1977, the counterpart strategy fails as any pain that occurred here now would have been this pain. A counterpart strategy on brain states may work. With a reply by McGinn and a later rejoinder by Woodfield.

Wright, C. 2002. The conceivability of naturalism. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.3d Arguments from Disembodiment [see also 1.3b, 1.3c]

Alston, W. P. & Smythe, T. W. 1994. Swinburne's argument for dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11:127-33. (Google)

Carrier, L. 1974. Definitions and disembodied minds. Personalist Forum 55:334-43. (Google)

Cole, D. J. & Foelber, F. 1984. Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:74-85. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Argues that materialism is only contingently true, as it's conceptually possible that we could become immaterial by gradual replacement.

Hart, W. D. 1988. The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Jones, J. 2004. Cartesian conceivings. Metaphysica 5(1):135-50. (Google)

Lewy, C. 1943. Is the notion of disembodied existence self-contradictory? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:59-78. (Google)

Long, D. 1977. Disembodied existence, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies. (Google)

Merricks, T. 1994. A new objection to a priori arguments for dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:81-85. (Google)

Physicalism is compatible with the possibility of disembodiment: one can hold that mind and body are identical, that the body is physical, but that it is not essentially physical.

Odegard, D. 1970. Disembodied existence and central state materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:256-60. (Google)

Pecnjak, D. 1995. Remarks on disembodied existence. Acta Analytica 10:209-13. (Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1983. On an argument for dualism. In (C. Ginet & S. Shoemaker, eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Swinburne, R. 1997. The modal argument for substance dualism. In The Evolution of the Soul (revised edition). Oxford University Press. (Google)

Taliaferro, C. 1986. A modal argument for dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:95-108. (Google)

Taliaferro, C. 1997. Possibilities in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57:127-37. (Google)

Tidman, P. 1994. Conceivability as a test for possibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:297-309. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Tye, M. 1983. On the possibility of disembodied existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:275-282. (Google)

There's no reason to believe that disembodied existence is possible: lack of logical contradiction doesn't imply possibility, conceivability is too weak a criterion, and it's not obvious that the situation is imaginable.

van Cleve, J. 1983. Conceivability and the Cartesian argument for dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Yablo, S. 1993. Is conceivability a guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:1-42. (Cited by 28 | Google)

Zimmerman, D. 1991. Two Cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul. American Philosophical Quarterly 28:127-37. (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.3e Consciousness and Physicalism, Misc [see also 1.2, 1.3, 1.7b, 3.5b]

Corcoran, K. 2001. The trouble with Searle's biological naturalism. Erkenntnis 55:307-324. (Google)

Fox, M. 1978. Beyond materialism. Dialogue 17:367-70. (Google)

Hill, C. S. 1991. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 41 | Google)

Defending type materialism, by way of criticism of dualism and functionalism. With treatments of introspection, sensory concepts, and other minds.

Jackson, F. 1994. Finding the mind in the natural world. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 23 | Google)

On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties in the natural world. Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be backed by a priori links. With remarks on supervenience. A nice paper.

Kirk, R. 1979. From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 29:229-37. (Cited by 2 | Google)

If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical facts. A nice argument.

Kirk, R. 1982. Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24:131-41. (Google)

Physicalism requires that all mental facts be strictly implied by the physical facts. Once this is recognized, questions about necessary or contingent identity are beside the point, and indeed identity is irrelevant.

Locke, D. 1971. Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 21:217-31. (Google)

Lund, D. 2000. Materialism and the subject of consciousness. Idealistic Studies 30:7-23. (Google)

Madell, G. 1988. Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness, and indexicality. Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position.

Madell, G. 2003. Materialism and the first person. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

McGinn, C. 2001. What is it not like to be a brain? In (P. Van Loocke, ed) The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Google)

Merricks, T. 2003. Maximality and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:150-158. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Robinson, H. 1982. Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Robinson, H. (ed) 1993. Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

A collection of arguments against physicalism, mostly based on worries about consciousness and qualia.

Robinson, W. S. 1982. Sellarsian materialism. Philosophy of Science 49:212-27. (Google)

Seager, W. E. 1992. Metaphysics of Consciousness. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Consciousness could be physical even if not explicable; but supervenience worries make it hard to see how it *could* be physical, though causal role suggests that it must be. We need a new conception. A stimulating book.

Sellars, W. 1981. Is consciousness physical? Monist 64:66-90. (Cited by 3 | Google)

On the place of "occurrent pink" and the "sensorium" in the physical world. It may turn out that the physics of the brain differs from other physics, in order to accommodate the causal role of sensations.

Smith, A. D. 1993. Non-reductive physicalism? In (H. Robinson, ed) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

A careful discussion of how to characterize physicalism, in terms of identity or supervenience, and argues that physicalism must reduce (bowdlerize) qualia to something they are not, as physicalism requires topic-neutral analyses.

Zemach, E. M. 1997. Can a scientist be a materialist? The Philosopher 85:12-16. (Google)

1.3f Consciousness and Dualism [see also 1.2c, 1.3, 3.4d]

Collins, C. 1997. Searle on consciousness and dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5:15-33. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Double, R. 1983. Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22. (Google)

Eccles, J. 1987. Brain and mind: Two or one? In (C. Blakemore & S. Greenfield, eds) Mindwaves. Blackwell. (Google)

Foster, J. 1989. A defense of dualism. In (J. Smythies & J. Beloff, eds) The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Argues that all forms of materialism fail, and that dualism is the only option. Defends dualism against objections, and argues for interactionism over epiphenomenalism. A very clear and interesting paper.

Honderich, T. 1981. Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24:277-303. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich.

Jacquette, D. 2002. Searle's antireductionism. Facta Philosophica 4:143-66. (Google)

Lahav, R. & Shanks, N. 1992. How to be a scientifically respectable `property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:211-32. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that the hypothesis of consciousness as an irreducible global property of the brain is compatible with what we know of both neuroscience and physics. With interesting remarks on quantum mechanics.

Latham, N. 2000. Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies 98:67-93.

McGinn, C. 1993. Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)

A dialogue with a "hyperdualist". On the pros and cons of materialist vs. dualist ontology and cosmology. Dualism avoids the "magic" of emergence at the cost of an inflated and bizarre ontology.

Meixner, U. 2004. The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis. (Google)

O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. & McDonough, J. K. 1998. Numbers, minds, and bodies: A fresh look at mind-body dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:349-71. (Google)

Olafson, F. A. 1994. Brain dualism. Inquiry 37:253-65. (Google)

Rosenberg, J. F. 1988. On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism. Topoi 7:57-63. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Searle, J. 2002. Why I am not a property dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:57-64. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Smook, R. 1988. Egoicity and twins. Dialogue 27:277-86. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Smythies, J. R. & Beloff, J. (eds) 1989. The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Sprigge, T. L. S. 1994. Consciousness. Synthese 98:73-93. (Cited by 3 | Google)

On the non-physical nature of consciousness, and the threat of a merely contingent connection to behavior; suggests a denial of "Hume's principle". Perhaps consciousness is the noumenal essence of the physical. A nice paper.

Swinburne, R. 1986. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Taliaferro, C. 1996. Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

von Wright, G. H. 1994. On mind and matter. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:101-10. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.3g Mind-Body Problem, General

Beck, L. W. 1940. The psychophysical as a pseudo-problem. Journal of Philosophy 37:561-71. (Google)

Block, N. 2006. Max Black's objection to mind-body identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3. (Google)

Butler, C. W. 1972. The mind-body problem: A nonmaterialistic identity thesis. Idealistic Studies 2:229-48. (Google)

Campbell, K. K. 1970. Body and Mind. Doubleday. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Carrier, M. & Mittelstrass, J. 1991. Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. de Gruyter. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cheng, C. (ed) 1975. Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press. (Google)

Claxton, G. 2003. The mind-body problem--Who cares? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:35-37. (Google)

Cooper, W. E. 1977. Beyond materialism and back again. Dialogue 16:191-206. (Google)

Corcoran, K. 2001. The trouble with Searle's biological naturalism. Erkenntnis 55:307-324. (Google)

Crane, T. & Patterson, S. 2000. History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Diaz, J. 2000. Mind-body unity, dual aspect, and the emergence of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 13:393-403. (Google)

Feigl, H. 1934. Logical analysis of the psychophysical problem. Philosophy of Science 1:420-45. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Feinberg, T. E. 1997. The irreducible perspectives of consciousness. Seminars in Neurology 17:85-93. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Flanagan, O. 2003. The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. Basic Books. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1981. The mind-body problem. Scientific American 244:114-25. (Cited by 36 | Google)

An overview: behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, etc.

Foss, J. E. 1987. Is the mind-body problem empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:505-32. (Google)

Yes it is. Empirical evidence bears on materialism, property dualism, emergentism, functionalism, interactive dualism, idealism, etc.

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 2002. Sensations and grain processes. In (J. Fetzer, ed) Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.

Gunderson, K. 1970. Asymmetries and mind-body perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309. (Cited by 6 | Google)

The core of the mind-body problem is the first/third-person asymmetry. It's like a periscope trying to place itself between its crosshairs. But this doesn't imply any strong ontological consequences.

Honderich, T. 1989. Mind and Brain. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Honderich, T. 1995. Consciousness, neural functionalism, real subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 32:369-381. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Against "neural functionalism", and on how Searle's view reduces to either neural functionalism or property dualism.

Howard, D. J. 1986. The new mentalism. International Philosophical Quarterly 26:353-7. (Google)

Hutto, D. D. 1998. An ideal solution to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:328-43. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Kim, J. 1997. The mind-body problem: Taking stock after forty years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:185-207. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Kim, J. 2001. Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the physicalist. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Kirk, R. 2003. Mind and Body. Acumen. (Google)

Kneale, M. 1950. What is the mind-body problem? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:105-22. (Google)

Kohler, W. 1960. The mind-body problem. In (S. Hook, ed) Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Google)

Kuczynski, J. 2001. Materialism, causation, and the mind-body problem. Prima Philosophia 14:69-90. (Google)

Levin, M. 1979. Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Lockwood, M. 1989. Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 83 | Google)

On the mind-body problem and physical theory. Against reductive physicalism; instead, experience is the intrinsic nature of the physical. Discusses the interpretation of quantum mechanics and much else. A very enjoyable book.

Lowe, E. J. 1996. Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 28 | Google)

Ludwig, K. 2002. Mind/body problem I. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Lund, D. H. 1994. Perception, Mind, and Personal Identity: A Critique of Materialism. University Press of America. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Lycan, W. 2002. Mind/body problem II. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Margolis, J. 1974. Reductionism and ontological aspects of consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 4:3-16. (Google)

Matson, W. I. 1966. Why isn't the mind-body problem ancient? In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Matson, W. I. 1976. Sentience. University of California Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McGinn, C. 2001. How not to solve the mind-body problem. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McMullen, T. 1997. Sperry on consciousness as an emergent causal agent. Australian Journal of Psychology 49:152-155. (Google)

Michael, E. 2003. Renaissance theories of body, soul, and mind. In (J. Wright & P. Potter, eds) Psyche and Soma. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Nagel, T. 1993. What is the mind-body problem? In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. (Cited by 7 | Google)

On ways in which we might locate consciousness within the natural world via scientific study. Perhaps we need an wider conception of objective reality.

Nagel, T. 1994. Consciousness and objective reality. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Nagel, T. 2001. The psychophysical nexus. In (P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke, eds) New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

O'Shaughnessy, B. 1994. The mind-body problem. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Google)

Pratt, J. B. 1936. The present status of the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 65:144-56. (Google)

Reber, A. 1997. Caterpillars and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10:437-49. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Ripley, C. 1984. Sperry's concept of consciousness. Inquiry 27:399-423. (Google)

An in-depth analysis of Sperry's views on consciousness. Sperry is not a dualist; he simply believes in "structural causation" based on emergent properties. Thorough and interesting.

Robinson, W. S. 1988. Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal Conditions. Temple University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. (ed) 1971. Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Prentice-Hall. (Cited by 6 | Google)

A collection of essays from the 1960s on the identity theory, functionalism, eliminative materialism.

Rowlands, M. 2003. Consciousness: The transcendalist manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:205-21. (Google)

Senchuk, D. M. 1991. Consciousness naturalized: Supervenience without physical determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 28:37-47. (Google)

Sellars, W. 1953. A semantical solution of the mind-body problem. Methodos 5:45-84. Reprinted in Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds. Ridgview, 1980. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Sellars, W. 1971. The double knowledge approach to the mind-body problem. New Scholasticism 45:269-89. (Google)

Sperry, R. W. 1969. A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36. (Cited by 35 | Google)

Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs low-level flow of excitation. Midway between mentalism and materialism.

Sperry, R. W. 1980. Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism yes, dualism no. Neuroscience 5:195-206. (Cited by 24 | Google)

A summary of the position whereupon mental properties are emergent and have independent causal powers. With a contrast to Popper and Eccles' dualism.

Sperry, R. W. 1992. Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:259-80. (Cited by 6 | Google)

An account of the "new mentalist paradigm". Clarifies earlier work, comments on others' interpretations. The view is monist and functionalist, but consciousness is a distinct emergent quality with a "downward" causal role.

Strawson, G. 1994. The experiential and the non-experiential. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Stuart, S. 2003. A metaphysical approach to tht mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:223-37. (Google)

Thomas, A. 2003. An adverbial theory of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:161-85. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Velmans, M. 1990. Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology 3:77-99. (Cited by 20 | Google)

Wagner, S. J. 1994. Supervenience, recognition, and consciousness. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Google)

Warner, R. & Szubka, T. 1994. The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 14 | Google)

A collection of 27 (mostly original) papers on the mind-body problem.

Weintraub, R. 1999. The spatiality of the mental and the mind-body problem. Synthese 117:409-17. (Google)

Wilson, D. L. 1976. On the nature of consciousness and of physical reality. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 19:568-581. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wisdom, J. 1957. Some main mind-body problems. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:187-210. (Google)

Wright, J. & Potter, P. (eds) 2003. Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment. Oxford University Press University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.4 Specific Views on Consciousness [see also 1.2, 1.3, 1.5b]

1.4a Higher-Order Thought Approaches (Rosenthal, etc) [see also 6.2i]

Aquila, R. 1990. Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27:81-87. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Higher-order thought theories have two unacceptable consequences: one can notice one's hearing a sound without noticing one's consciousness of the sound; and one can unconsciously perceive one's surroundings as gloomy.

Byrne, A. 1997. Some like it HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2:103-29. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Byrne, A. 2004. What phenomenal consciousness is like. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 1989. Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 258-69. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Argues for a distinction between conscious and non-conscious experiences, depending on whether one is conscious of the experience. Animal experiences are of the second kind, and therefore are not morally significant.

Carruthers, P. 1992. Consciousness and concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplement 66:41-59. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Advocates the "reflexive thinking" account of consciousness over Kirk's "presence" account. Availability for reflexive thinking is naturally necessary and sufficient for qualia. Interesting paper.

Carruthers, P. 1996. Language, Thought, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 1997. Fragmentary versus reflexive consciousness. Mind and Language 12:181-95. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 1998. Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6:203-22. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 44 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2001. Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2004. HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2005. Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Dulany, D. 2004. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Dretske, F. 1993. Conscious experience. Mind 102:263-283. (Cited by 73 | Google)

Against higher-order thought accounts: one can have a conscious experience without being aware that one is having it. With remarks on thing-awareness vs. fact-awareness and on "inner-sense" accounts.

Dretske, F. 1995. Are experiences conscious? In Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. (Google)

We're not conscious of our experience in general, but conscious with it. Criticizes HOP theories (not conceptualized enough) and HOT theories (rules out animals; there's more in experience than thought).

Francescotti, R. M. 1995. Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical Psychology. (Google)

Argues that a higher-order thought is insufficient for consciousness, even with Rosenthal's constraint. A causal constraint is required, but the only strong enough such constraint doesn't work.

Gennaro, R. J. 1993. Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22:51-69. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Carruthers 1989 misanalyzes higher-order thought theory. There's no need for conscious HOTs, and not too much conceptual sophistication is required, so animals might have HOTs and therefore conscious pains.

Gennaro, R. J. 1996. Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 32 | Google)

Gennaro, R. J. 2000. Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 29:107-20. (Google)

Gennaro, R. J. 2002. Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:293-330. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Gennaro, R. 2003. Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81:581-586. Gennaro, R. (ed) 2004. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. Gennaro, R. 2004. Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Gennaro, R. 2004. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Gennaro, R. 2005. The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(2):3-21. (Google)

Guzeldere, G. 1996. Consciousness and the introspective link principle. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Guzeldere, G. 1995. Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's own mind? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Google)

A critique of higher-order-perception theories of consciousness. They're either committed to a "representational divide" fallacy or collapse into higher-order-thought or first-order theories.

Hardcastle, V. 2004. HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Jamieson, D. & Bekoff, M. 1992. Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis 52:23-28. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Various points against Carruthers 1989. His examples of nonconscious experience are likely conscious, and the higher-order account is circular.

Jacob, P. 1996. State consciousness revisited. Acta Analytica 11:29-54. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Levine, J. 1997. Are qualia just representations? (Critical notice of Tye.) Mind and Language 12:101-13. (Google)

Lurz, R. 2001. Begging the question: A reply to Lycan. Analysis 61:313-318. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Lurz, R. 2003. Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. Psyche 8. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Lurz, R. 2004. Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomy. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1995. Consciousness as internal monitoring, I. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.

Argues for a Lockean quasi-perceptual view of consciousness as internal monitoring via second-order states. Contra objections, e.g. Rey's point that it makes consciousness too prevalent -- consciousness isn't an on-off affair.

Lycan, W. G. 2001. A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. Analysis 61:3-4. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. & Ryder, Z. 2003. The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. Analysis 63:132-36. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 2004. The superiority of HOP to HOT. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Manson, N. 2001. The limitations and costs of Lycan's 'simple' argument. Analysis 61:319-323. (Google)

Manson, N. 2002. What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15. (Google)

Mellor, D. H. 1978. Conscious belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:87-101. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Conscious belief (or assent) is believing that one believes. Addresses various objections, from self-deception and from consciousness of assent. Communication needs conscious belief, not just belief.

Mellor, D. H. 1980. Consciousness and degrees of belief. In (D. H. Mellor, ed) Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1992. Appendage theory -- pro and con. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:371-96. (Cited by 4 | Google)

On various pros and cons of HOT theories, to do with reflexivity, objects of HOTs, introspection, and so on. With comparisons to "intrinsic" theories.

Natsoulas, T. 1992. Are all instances of phenomenal experience conscious in the sense of their being objects of inner (second-order) consciousness? American Journal of Psychology 105:605-12. (Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1993. What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 6:137-54. (Cited by 15 | Google)

On three theories of our direct awareness of conscious states: mental-eye theories, self-intimational theories, and appendage theory. Appendage theory (i.e. HOT theory) is promising, but how does an HOT determine its object?

Natsoulas, T. 1993. The importance of being conscious. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:317-40. (Google)

On the differences between first-order and second-order consciousness. Second-order consciousness is essential for communication and locomotion. With remarks on "nonconscious consciousness".

Nelkin, N. 1989. Unconscious sensations. Philosophical Psychology 2:129-41. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Separates CN (phenomenological) from C1 (info-processing) and C2 (higher order beliefs). CN is a subset of CS (image-representation state). We are always C2 of CN states, but not of other CS states: unconscious sensations!

Nelkin, N. 1995. The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Argues that we need not be apperceptively aware of phenomenal states. Introspection leaves the matter open, but some empirical results (e.g. hue blindsight) and theoretical arguments support dissociability.

Nguyen, A. M. 2000. On a Searlean objection to Rosenthal's theory of state-consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 25. (Google)

Ridge, M. 2001. Taking solipsism seriously: Nonhuman animals and meta-cognitive theories of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 103:315-340. (Google)

Robinson, W. 2004. A few thoughts too many? In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Rolls, E. 2004. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1986. Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49:329-59. (Cited by 130 | Google)

Consciousness should be construed neither as sensation nor intentionality, but as the existence of higher-order thoughts.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1990. Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious? Bielefeld Report. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Because verbally expressing and reporting are easily and immediately connected for 1st-order thoughts. But not for 2nd-order thoughts. Hmmm.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1993. Thinking that one thinks. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 77 | Google)

Conscious states are states that are the contents of higher-order thoughts. Express/report distinction: we report them, and express the HOT (which may be unconscious). Defense against dispositional and collapsing objections.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1993. Explaining consciousness. Manuscript. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Distinguishes the sense in which we are aware of conscious states; argues for the separation of consciousness and sensation; and outlines how higher-order thoughts might explain the what-it's-like of conscious states.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1993. Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6:155-66. (Cited by 8 | Google)

In response to Natsoulas, HOT theory needn't answer the general question of how intentional states determine their objects. With remarks on the other alternatives and the dangers of self-intimation.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1995. Moore's paradox and consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds) The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 106 | Google)

A conscious mental state is a state that is the subject of a higher-order thought. Consciousness is not essential to mentality, should be separated from sensory quality, and is not an intrinsic property of conscious states.

Rosenthal, D. M. 1997. Apperception, sensation, and dissociability. Mind and Language 2:206-23. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1998. Consciousness and metacognition. In (D. Sperber, ed) Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 2000. Consciousness, interpretation, and consciousness. Protosociology 14. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 2002. Explaining consciousness. In (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, D. 2004. Varieties of higher-order theory. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Rowlands, M. 2001. Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Mind and Language 16:290-310. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Seager, W. E. 1994. Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness. Analysis 54:270-76. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Seager, W. E. 1999. HOT Theory: The mentalistic reduction of consciousnes. In Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge. (Google)

Seager, W. 2004. A cold look at HOT theory. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)

Schroder, J. 2001. Higher-order thought and naturalist accounts of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8:27-46. (Google)

Stamenov, M. I. 1997. Grammar, meaning, and consciousness: What sentence structure can tell us about the structure of consciousness. In (M. Stamenov, ed) Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Stoerig, P. 1997. Phenomenal vision and apperception: Evidence from blindsight. Mind and Language 2:224-37. (Google)

Stone, J. 2001. What is it like to have an unconscious mental state? Philosophical Studies 104:179-202. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Van Gulick, R. 2004. Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In (R. Gennaro, ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Wright, W. 2005. Distracted drivers and unattended experience. Synthese 144:41-68. (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.4b Self-Representational Approaches [see also 1.6a]

Caston, V. 2002. Aristotle on consciousness. Mind 111:751-815. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Caston, V. 2004. More on Aristotle on consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113:523-533. (Google)

Drummond, J. 2006. The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Haldane, J. 2003. "(I am) thinking". Ratio 16:124-139. (Google)

Hill, C. S. 2006. Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Hofstadter, D. R. 2006. What is it like to be a strange loop? In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Horgan, T. , Tienson, J. & Graham, G. 2006. Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Hossack, K. 2002. Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102:168-181. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Hossack, K. 2003. Consciousness in act and action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:187-203. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kobes, B. W. 1995. Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2002. Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41:517-540. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian journal of Philosophy 33:103-132. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134:477-504. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2004. Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis 61:99-121. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2005. Naturalizing subjective character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2006. The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Kriegel, U. & Williford, K. 2006. Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Lehrer, K. 1996. Skepticism, lucid content, and the metamental loop. In (A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J. M. Larrazabal, eds.) Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Kluwer. (Google)

Lehrer, K. 1996. Consciousness. In (A. Schramm, ed.) Philosophie in Osterreich. Vienna: Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Google)

Lehrer, K. 1997. Evaluation and Consciousness. In (K. Lehrer) Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.

Lehrer, K. 2002. Self-presentation, representation, and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64:412-430. (Google)

Lehrer, K. 2004. Representation in painting and in Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 117:1-14.

Levine, J. 2006. Awareness and (self-)representation. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Lurz, R. 2006. Conscious beliefs and desires: A same-order approach. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Olivier, A. 2003. When pains are mental objects. Philosophical Studies 115:33-53. (Google)

Perrett, R. W. 2003. Intentionality and self-awareness. Ratio 16:222-235. (Google)

Sisko, J. 2004. Reflexive awareness does belong to the main function of perception: Reply to Victor Caston. Mind 113:513-521. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Smith, D. W. 1986. The structure of (self-)consciousness. Topoi 5:149-156. (Google)

Smith, D. W. 1989. The Circle of Acquaintaince. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Smith, D. W. 2004. Return to consciousness. In (D. W. Smith) Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Thomasson, A. 2000. After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 8:190-210. (Google)

van Gulick, R. 2006. Mirror, mirror -- Is that all? In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Williford, K. 2006. The self-representational structure of consciousness. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Zahavi, D. 2004. Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(10-11):66-87. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Zahavi, D. 2006. Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives. In (U. Kriegel & K. Williford, eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

1.4c Dennett on Consciousness [see also 1.7c]

Akins, K. 1996. Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts theory of consciousness. Mind and Language 11:1-43. (Google)

Akins, K, & Winger, S. 1996. Ships in the night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's theory of consciousness. In (K. Akins, ed) Perception. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Antony, M. 2002. Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory of consciousness. Philosophia 29:343-370. (Google)

Arbib, M. A. 1972. Consciousness: The secondary role of language. Journal of Philosophy 69. (Google)

Baker, L. R. 1995. Content meets consciousness. Philosophical Topics 22:1-22. (Google)

Block, N. 1995. What is Dennett's theory a theory of? Philosophical Topics 22:23-40. (Google)

Bricke, J. 1984. Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies 45:413-29. (Google)

Criticizing Dennett's accounts of pains, dreams, and images: in no case do his arguments earn their eliminative conclusions.

Bricke, J. 1985. Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies 48:249-56. (Google)

Reportability is no good for capturing consciousness: it completely leaves out the qualitative content of conscious states.

Brook, A. 2000. Judgments and drafts eight years later. In (A. Brook, D. Ross, & D. Thompson, eds) Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Christie, J. & Barresi, J. 2002. Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and misremembering (Orwellian) accounts of I am) Thinking.consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11:347-65. (Google)

Churchland, P. S. & Ramachandran, V. S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Argues that Dennett's account of the blindspot and scotomas are wrong. Neurophysiological data suggests that blind areas are represented explicitly; psychological data shows that it's not just "more of the same".

Clark, S. R. L. 1993. Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry 36:3-16. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1968. Content and Consciousness. Routledge. (Cited by 127 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1978. Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Brainstorms. MIT Press. (Google)

On various notions of awareness: contents of the speech center, contents directing behavior, and contents of attention. We have privileged access to one sort, but it is a different sort that plays the main role in control.

Dennett, D. C. 1978. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. Minnesota bStudies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 28 | Google)

Conscious contents are contents of a buffer memory to which a public report module has access. We only have conscious access to propositional judgments, not to underlying processes. With a cute functional diagram.

Dennett, D. C. 1979. On the absence of phenomenology. In (D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott, eds) Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer. (Cited by 8 | Google)

There is no real phenomenology. There are only judgments about phenomenology, and nothing more is going on. We don't have privileged access to anything, except perhaps certain propositional episodes.

Dennett, D. C. 1982. How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing comes to mind. Synthese 53:159-80. (Cited by 10 | Google)

We can study consciousness by the method of heterophenomenology: studying the things we say about conscious states, which we can interpret as we interpret texts. Autophenomenology gives nothing extra. With comments by Rorty.

Dennett, D. C. 1988. The evolution of consciousness. Manuscript. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Consciousness is a virtual machine which evolved.

Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Little-Brown. (Cited by 1297 | Google)

Argues against the "Cartesian Theatre", advocating a "multiple drafts" model of consciousness. Presents a detailed model of processes underlying verbal report, and argues that there is nothing else (e.g. qualia) to explain.

Dennett, D. C. & Kinsbourne, M. 1992. Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201. (Cited by 125 | Google)

Using temporal anomalies in consciousness to support a "Multiple Drafts" theory of consciousness rather than a "Cartesian Theater". Contents of consciousness are wholly determined by effects on action/memory.

Dennett, D. C. 1993. Precis of Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:889-931.

A discussion of Consciousness Explained, with comments by Tye, Jackson, Shoemaker, and Rosenthal, and a reply by Dennett.

Dennett, D. C. 1993. Living on the edge. Inquiry 36:135-59. (Cited by 3 | Google)

A reply to Clark, Fellows & O'Hear, Foster, Lockwood, Seager, Siewert, and Sprigge.

Dennett, D. C. 1993. Caveat emptor. Consciousness and Cognition 2:48-57. (Cited by 5 | Google)

A reply to Baars & McGovern, Mangan, Toribio.

Dennett, D. C. 1995. Is perception the "leading edge" of memory. In (A. Spafadora, ed) Memory and Oblivion. (Google)

There is no "leading edge" of consciousness, separating perception and memory. With an analysis of metacontrast cases, etc.

Dennett, D. C. 1995. Get real. Philosophical Topics 22:505 (Cited by 8 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1996. Seeing is believing -- or is it? In (K. Akins, ed) Perception. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 2001. Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79:221-37. (Cited by 41 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 2005. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Densmore, S. & Dennett, D. C. 1999. The virtues of virtual machines. Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 59:747-61. (Google)

Dretske, F. 1995. Differences that make no difference. Philosophical Topics 22:41-57. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Criticizes Dennett's first-person operationalism as Cartesian. There can be awareness without judgment -- e.g. non-epistemic perception. This comes from information or "micro-judgments", and is not conceptual.

Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. 1993. Consciousness avoided. Inquiry 36: 73-91. (Google)

Foster, J. 1993. Dennett's rejection of dualism. Inquiry 36:17-31. (Google)

Gunderson, K. 1972. Content and Consciousness and the mind-body problem. Journal of Philosophy 69. (Google)

Hutto, D. 1995. Consciousness demystified: A Wittgensteinian critique of Dennett. Monist 78:464-79. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1993. Appendix A (for philosophers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:897-901.

Presses Dennett on the "truth-maker" question for materialists: what sort of physical fact makes it true that people are conscious?

Jarrett, G. 1999. Conspiracy theories of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 96:45-58. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Johnsen, B. 1997. Dennett on qualia and consciousness: A critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27:47-82. (Google)

Kirk, R. 1993. "The best set of tools"? Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Quarterly 43:335-43. (Google)

Joycean machines and multiple drafts turn out to shed no light on the question of what features make a conscious system conscious.

Lockwood, M. 1993. Dennett's mind. Inquiry. (Google)

Argues for a suitably sophisticated Cartesian Theatre, and against the identification of phenomenology with judgments.

Mangan, B. 1993. Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition 2:1-17. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Marbach, E. 1988. How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 19:252-268. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Marbach, E. 1994. Troubles with heterophenomenology. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 3 | Google)

McCauley, R. N. 1993. Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Brings empirical evidence to bear against Dennett's "filling-in" account of the blindspot, and argues that blindsight and the blindspot aren't analogous.

McGinn, C. 1995. Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nikolinakos, D. 2000. Dennett on qualia: The case of pain, smell and taste. Philosophical Psychology 13:505-522. (Google)

Puccetti, R. 1993. Dennett on the split-brain. Psycoloquy 4(52). (Cited by 13 | Google)

Radner, D. 1994. Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees. Journal of Philosophy 91:389-403. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Rey, G. 1995. Dennett's unrealistic psychology. Philosophical Topics 22:259-89. (Google)

Robinson, W. S. 1972. Dennett's analysis of awareness. Philosophical Studies 23:147-52. (Google)

Robinson, W. S. 1994. Orwell, Stalin, and determinate qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75:151-64. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Dennett's Orwell/Stalin argument doesn't establish its conclusion, as "brain smear" is quite compatible with determinate qualia.

Rockwell, T. 1996. Awareness, mental phenomena, and consciousness: A synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:463-76. (Google)

Rorty, R. 1972. Dennett on awareness. Philosophical Studies 23:153-62. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1993. Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:911-18. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1994. First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy. Philosophical Topics 22:319-349. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Rosenthal, D. M. 1995. Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 2 | Google)

We can subtract first-person operationalism from Dennett's multiple-drafts account, giving a higher-order thought theory.

Rosenthal, D. 2000. Content, interpretation, and consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84. (Google)

Ruz, M. , Tudela, P. , & Acero, J. 2002. Consciousness explained by Dennett: A critical review from a cognitive neuroscience point of view. Theoria 17:81-112. (Google)

Seager, W. E. 1993. Verification, skepticism, and consciousness. Inquiry. (Google)

An elucidation of Dennett's fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology, resting on verificationist arguments. Like many sceptical arguments, it ends up too powerful to be convincing.

Seager, W. E. 1999. Dennett, part I and II. In Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge. (Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1993. Lovely and suspect ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:903-908. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Siewert, C. 1993. What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that zombies are conceivable, via partial zombiehood in blindsight patients who respond unprompted. Dennett's arguments rely on a question-begging third-person absolutism.

Sprigge, T. L. S. 1993. Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo? Inquiry 36:33-57. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Toribio, J. 1993. Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2:28-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Criticizes behavioral, localist, and "intransitive" approaches to consciousness, and recommends a "transitive" metacognitive approach. But criticizes Dennett for not explaining subjective experience.

Tye, M. 1993. Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:891-6. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that Dennett's verificationism begs the question, and that "seeming" cannot be identified with believing or judging.

Vaden, T. 2001. Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44:149-170. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Van Gulick, R. 1995. Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism. Philosophical Topics 22:443-55. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Wuketits, F. 1994. Consciousness explained -- or explained away? Acta Analytica 9:55-64. (Google)

1.4d Functionalism [see also 1.4a, 1.4c, 1.5b, 1.8, 3.4]

Antony, M. V. 1994. Against functionalist theories of consciousness. Mind and Language 9:105-23. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Levin, J. 1991. Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies 61:211-38. (Google)

Contra Kripkean arguments, a good enough functional theory may help close the conceivability/explanatory gap between the physical and qualia. Contra Nagel/Jackson, such a theory could provide us with recognitional abilities.

Mangan, B. 1998. Against functionalism: Consciousness as an information-bearing medium. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Marcel, A. 1988. Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Myin, E. 1998. Holism, functionalism and visual awareness. Communication and Cognition, 31:3-19. (Google)

Perlis, D. 1995. Consciousness and complexity: The cognitive quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1993. Functionalism and consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Argues that introspective access is essential to many sorts of mental state, due to constitutive rationality requirements. Against a perceptual model of introspection; introspecting and introspected states are closer than that.

Schweizer, P. 1996. Physicalism, functionalism, and conscious thought. Minds and Machines 6:61-87. (Cited by 1 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 1988. A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97:149-88. (Cited by 15 | Google)

How functionalism can handle consciousness: Self-consciousness is the possession of reflexive metapsychological information. This helps understand learning, representation, and belief. Phenomenal experience is still tricky.

1.4e Eliminativism [see also 1.7c, 2.1c, 3.5c]

Allport, A. 1988. What concept of consciousness? In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Braddock, G. 2002. Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15:37-54. (Google)

Churchland, P. S. 1983. Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:80-95. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Experimental evidence against consciousness/introspection/transparency.

Dennett, D. C. 1976. Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73:151-71. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 11 | Google)

Argues that dreams might not be experienced, but rather be stored directly into memory (the "cassette-tape" theory of dreaming).

Dennett, D. C. 1979. The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies 35, 315-18. (Google)

Emmett, K. 1978. Oneiric experiences. Philosophical Studies 34:445-50. (Google)

Nikolinakos, D. 1994. General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 2:88-104. (Google)

Consciousness is an indispensable concept in anesthesiology, and therefore (contra Churchland and Wilkes) is a scientifically legitimate kind. With empirical details and anesthesiological theory on levels of consciousness.

Rey, G. 1982. A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In (R. Davidson, S. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro, eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol 3. Plenum Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

One could make a machine, duplicating the usual abilities that go along with consciousness, but surely it wouldn't be conscious. So what are the conditions for consciousness? Maybe there are none.

Rey, G. 1986. A question about consciousness. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 14 | Google)

A rerun of Rey 1982: An unconscious machine could duplicate all the obvious criteria for consciousness, so maybe even we aren't conscious. With remarks on the relation between our belief in consciousness and consciousness itself.

Rey, G. 1995. Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Google)

We "project" consciousness into ourselves and others. There are no explanation-transcendent phenomena for which there is non-question-begging evidence. With remarks on self-attribution and Wittgenstein.

Smith, D. W. 1986. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.

Commentary on Rey 1986: we are directly aware of our consciousness. It's not a theoretical entity, but rather something to be explained.

Tienson, J. L. 1987. Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers 16:187-93. (Google)

A skeptical argument: single neurons are not conscious, and adding a neuron won't produce consciousness, so finite brains are not conscious.

Wilkes, K. V. 1984. Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:223-43. (Cited by 11 | Google)

No, and it's not very coherent either. It divides into awakeness, sensation, sensory experience, and propositional attitudes. Also a history of the term.

Wilkes, K. V. 1988. Yishi, Duh, Um and consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Wilkes, K. V. 1995. Losing consciousness. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Consciousness is not a tenable notion in either commonsense or scientific psychology; we should return instead to the "psuche".

Williams, D. C. 1934. Scientific method and the existence of consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79. (Google)

Williams, D. C. 1959. Mind as a matter of fact. Review of Metaphysics 13:205-25. (Google)

1.4f Epiphenomenalism [see also 1.3a, 1.3f, 1.6e, 3.6]

Bering, J. 2004. Consciousness was a 'trouble-maker': On the general maladaptiveness of unsupported mental representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25:33-56. (Google)

Bieri, P. 1992. Trying out epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36:283-309. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Birnbacher, D. 1988. Epiphenomenalism as a solution to the ontological mind-body problem. Ratio 1:17-32. (Google)

Campbell, N. 2001. What was Huxley's epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16:357-375. (Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The paradox of phenomenal judgment. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Considers major arguments against the causal or explanatory irrelevance of consciousness -- arguments from self-knowledge, memory, reference, etc -- and argues that none pose fatal flaws.

Creel, R. 1980. Radical epiphenomenalism: B. F. Skinner's account of private events. Behaviorism 8:31-53.

Dennett, D. C. 1991. "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained, pp. 398-406. Little-Brown. (Google)

Discusses two senses of "epiphenomenalism" -- "Huxley's" and "philosophical" varieties -- and argues that the philosophical sort is crazy. (N.B. Huxley actually subscribed to the "philosophical" variety.)

Double, R. 1979. Taylor's refutation of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8:23-28. (Google)

Flanagan, O. & Polger, G. 1998. Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism. In (J. Fetzer, ed) Consciousness Evolving. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hodges, M. 1979. Meaning and the impotence hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics 32:515-29. (Google)

Hodgson, D. 2002. Three tricks of consciousness: Qualia, chunking and selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:65-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Horowitz, A. 1999. Is there a problem in physicalist epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:421-34. (Google)

Huxley, T. 1874. On the hypothesis that animals are automata. Fortnightly Review 95:555-80. Reprinted in Collected Essays. London, 1893. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Hyslop, A. 1998. Methodological epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78:61-70. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 257 | Google)

Uses the Mary thought-experiment to argue that qualia are epiphenomenal, and argues that epiphenomenalism is a tenable doctrine.

Kraemer, E. R. 1980. Imitation-man and the `new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10:479-487. (Google)

If Campbell's imitation man is possible, then the causal relation between the physical and phenomenal is unreliable.

Lachs, J. 1963. Epiphenomenalism and the notion of cause. Journal of Philosophy 60:141-45. (Google)

Lachs, J. 1963. The impotent mind. Review of Metaphysics 17:187-99. (Google)

Lachs, J. 1967. Angel, animal, machine: Models for man. Southern Journal of Philosophy 5:221-27. (Google)

Libet, B. 2003. Can conscious experience affect brain activity? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:24-28. (Google)

Long, W. 1953. Comments on the alleged proof of epiphenomenalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3:355-58. (Google)

Lonky, M. 2003. Human consciousness: A systems approach to the mind/brain interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24:91-118. (Google)

Pauen, M. 2000. Painless pain: Property dualism and the causal role of phenomenal consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 37:51-64. (Google)

Pecnjak, D. 1989. Epiphenomenalism and machines: A discussion of van Rooijen's critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40:404-8. (Google)

Pockett, S. 2004. Does consciousness cause behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(2):23-40. (Google)

Popper, K. R. 1977. Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86. (Google)

Puccetti, R. 1974. Physicalism and the evolution of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 1:171-83. (Google)

Robinson, D. 1993. Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 69:1-34. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Argues that phenomenal information implies epiphenomenalism, even at the intra-psychic level. With remarks on ineffability and on whether properties should be individuated by nomic role or by essence.

Robinson, W. S. 1982. Causation, sensation, and knowledge. Mind 91:524-40. (Google)

Argues that we can have non-inferential knowledge of sensations even if they don't make a causal difference to our beliefs, so epiphenomenalism is OK. All theories have a similar problems.

Rudd, A. 2000. Phenomenal judgment and mental causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:53-69. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Silvers, S. 2003. Agent causation, functional explanation, and epiphenomenal engines: Can conscious mental events be causally efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24:197-228. (Google)

van Rooijen, J. 1987. Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38:87-92. (Google)

Wasserman, G. D. 1982. Materialism and mentality. Review of Metaphysics 35:715-30. (Google)

Wassermann, G. 1979. Reply to Popper's attack on epiphenomenalism. Mind 88:572-75. (Google)

Watkins, M. 1989. The knowledge argument against the knowledge argument. Analysis, 49:158-60. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Epiphenomenalism -> qualia don't cause beliefs -> we don't know about qualia.

Wisdom, J. O. 1954. Is epiphenomenalism refutable? Proceedings of the 2nd International Congress of the International Union for the Philosophy of Science 5:73-78. (Google)

Woodhouse, M. 1974. A new epiphenomenalism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:163-69. (Google)

1.4g Interactionism [see also 1.3f, 3.3d]

Beloff, J. 1994. Minds and machines: A radical dualist perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:32-37. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Buncombe, M. 1995. The Substance of Consciousness: An Argument for Interactionism. Avebury. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Elitzur, A. C. 1989. Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Argues from the fact that we talk about consciousness to the conclusion that consciousness plays an active role, so physical laws must be incomplete.

Elitzur, A. C. 1990. Neither idealism nor materialism: A reply to Snyder. Journal of Mind and Behavior. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Elitzur, A. C. 1995. Consciousness can no longer be ignored. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:353-58. (Google)

Foster, J. 1991. The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Hodgson, D. 1991. The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Holman, E. 1984. Continuity and the metaphysics of dualism. Philosophical Studies 45:197-204. (Google)

Jackson, F. 1980. Interactionism revived? Philosophy of Social Science 10:316-23. (Google)

LaRock, E. 2001. Dualistic interaction, neural dependence, and Aquinas's composite view. Philosophia Christi 3:459-472. (Google)

Libet, B. 1994. A testable theory of mind-brain interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:119-26. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Lindahl, B. I. B. & Arhem, P. 1996. Mind as a force field: Comments on a new interactionistic hypothesis. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:111-22. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Popper, K. & Eccles, J. 1977. The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Springer. (Cited by 234 | Google)

Popper, K. 1994. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Roelofs, H. D. 1955. A case for dualism and interactionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15:451-76. (Google)

Snyder, D. 1990. On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the physical world. Journal of Mind and Behavior. (Google)

Argues with Elitzur on quantum mechanics and consciousness. With response.

Swinburne, R. 2003. The soul. In (T. O'Connor & D. Robb, eds) Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. (Google)

Swinburne, R. 2003. Body and soul. Think 5. (Google)

Warner, R. 1996. Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:217-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wilson, D. L. 1999. Mind-brain interactionism and the violation of physical laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Google)

1.4h Panpsychism [see also 1.4i]

Bjelland, A. G. 1982. Popper's critique of panpsychism and process proto-mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59:233-43. (Google)

Butler, C. 1978. Panpsychism: A restatement of the genetic argument. Idealist Studies 8:33-39. (Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. Is experience ubiquitous? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. (Google)

There are no strong arguments against panpsychism, and good reason to take it seriously. Extrapolating the processing properties crucial for standard complex experience suggests that simple process may yield simple experience.

de Quincey, C. 1994. Consciousness all the way down? Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:217-29. (Google)

An analysis of a debate between Griffin and McGinn on panexperientialism, arguing for new forms of understanding.

Edwards, P. 1967. Panpsychism. In (P. Edwards, ed) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, volume 5. Macmillan. (Cited by 2 | Google)

An excellent review article on panpsychism; highly recommended.

Farleigh, P. 1998. Whitehead's even more dangerous idea. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Google)

Ford, M. P. 1981. William James: Panpsychist and metaphysical realist. Transactions of the Peirce Society 17:158-70. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Gabora, L. 2002. Amplifying phenomenal information: Toward a fundamental theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Griffin, D. R. 1997. Panexperiential physicalism and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:248-68. (Google)

An interesting paper arguing for an experiential aspect in all matter, explicating a Whiteheadian position.

Griffin, D. R. 1998. Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Griffin, D. R. 1998. Pantemporalism and panexperientialism. In (P. Harris, ed) The Textures of Time. University of Michigan Press. (Google)

Hartshorne, C. 1978. Panpsychism: Mind as sole reality. Ultim Real Mean 1:115-29. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hut, P. & Shepard, R. 1996. Turning the "hard problem" upside-down and sideways. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:313-29. (Google)

Argues for a new fundamental feature ("X") which stands to consciousness as time stands to motion, thus making consciousness possible and ubiquitous.

Nagel, T. 1979. Panpsychism. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Material composition, nonreductionism, realism, non-emergence -> panpsychism.

Popper, K. R. 1977. Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86. (Google)

Rensch, B. 1977. Argument for panpsychist identism. In (J. Cobb & D. Griffin, eds) Mind in Nature. University Press of America. (Google)

Robinson, E. A. 1949. Animism as a world hypothesis. Philosophical Review 58:53-63. (Google)

Rosenberg, G. H. 1996. Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:76-88. (Cited by 4 | Google)

On why consciousness extends beyond the cognitive. Argues that fundamental laws for consciousness must connect at a basic level, and argues that panpsychism is not as implausible as often thought.

Rosenberg, G. 2004. A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Seager, W. 1995. Consciousness, information, and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:272-88. Reprinted in (J. Shear, ed) Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (MIT Press, 1999). (Cited by 12 | Google)

Examines a position on which experience is fundamental to the world, and suggests that this ought to lead to panpsychism. With some connections to information and quantum mechanics.

Sellars, R. W. 1960. Panpsychism or evolutionary materialism. Philosophy of Science 27:329-49. (Google)

Shepherd, J. J. 1974. Panpsychism and parsimony. Process Studies 4:3-10. (Google)

Shields, G. 2001. Physicalist panexperientialism and the mind-body problem. American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 22:133-154. (Google)

Skrbina, D. 2003. Panpsychism as an underlying theme in western philosophy: A survey paper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:4-46. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Skrbina, D. 2005. Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press. (Google)

Sprigge, T. L. S. 1983. The vindication of panpsychism. In The Vindication of Absolute Idealism. Edinburgh University Press. (Google)

van Cleve, J. 1990. Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226. (Google)

On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than Panpsychism. A construal of emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience.

Wright, S. 1953. Gene and organism. American Naturalist. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wright, S. 1977. Panpsychism and science. In (J. Cobb & D. Griffin, eds) Mind in Nature. University Press of America. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.4i Russellian Monism (Russell, etc) [see also 1.4h]

Blackburn, S. 1992. Filling in space. Analysis 52:62-3. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Physics is dispositional, but if there are only bare dispositions, then the world has no nature of its own. And if there are categorical grounds, we have no idea what they could be, except maybe subjective qualia.

Bolender, J. 2001. An argument for idealism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:37-61. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The metaphysics of information. In The Conscious Mind, pp. 301-8 (see also pp. 153-55). Oxford University Press. (Google)

An "it from bit" view fits the Russellian metaphysics (described earlier): physics is info from the outside, (proto)experience is info from the inside. The problem is constituting macrophenomenal from microphenomenal; some ideas.

Demopolous, W. & Friedman, M. 1989. The concept of structure in Russell's The Analysis of Matter. In (C. Savage & C. Anderson, eds) Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology. University of Minnesota Press. (Google)

A nice account of Russell's (and Schlick's and Carnap's) structuralism and Newman's objection, with analysis. (N.B. no philosophy of mind.)

Feigl, H. 1958. The `mental' and the `physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497. Reprinted (with a postscript) as The `Mental' and the `Physical'. University of Minnesota Press, 1967. (Google)

A long and very interesting essay on the mind-body problem. Ultimately advocates a "structural" view of the physical and identifies experience with the underlying reality, at least for some neurophysiological states.

Feigl, H. 1960. The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem. In (S. Hook, ed) Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Google)

Feigl, H. 1971. Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese 22:295-312. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Feigl, H. 1975. Russell and Schlick: A remarkable agreement on a monistic solution of the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis 9:11-34. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that Russell's and Schlick's views on the structural nature of physics and the possible identification of the "content" with experience are quite close to each other. With interesting historical remarks.

Feser, E. 1998. Can phenomenal qualities exist unperceived? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:405-14. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Foster, J. 1982. The Case for Idealism. Routledge. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Foster, J. 1991. Lockwood's hypothesis. In The Immaterial Self. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Argues that the Russellian view is implausible, as the structure of the underlying physical processes does not correspond to the structure and quality of consciousness.

Hohwy, J. 2005. Explanation and two conceptions of the physical. Erkenntnis 62:71-89. (Google)

Holman, E. L. 1986. Maxwell and materialism. Synthese 66:505-14. (Google)

Lockwood, M. 1981. What was Russell's neutral monism? Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6:143-58. (Google)

Lockwood, M. 1989. Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 83 | Google)

On the mind-body problem and physical theory. Against reductive physicalism; instead, experience is the intrinsic nature of the physical. Explores some potential links with quantum mechanics.

Lockwood, M. 1993. The grain problem. In (H. Robinson, ed) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

On the "grain problem" for the intrinsic-nature view: how do lots of microphysical qualities add up into a smooth experience? Appeals to quantum mechanics and a preferred set of observables.

Lockwood, M. 1998. Unsensed phenomenal qualities: A defence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:415-18. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Maxwell, G. 1971. Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Maxwell, G. 1978. Unity of consciousness and mind-brain identity. In (J. Eccles, ed) Mind and Brain. Paragon House. (Google)

Maxwell, G. 1979. Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Cited by 14 | Google)

"Brain state" reference is fixed by topic-neutral description; picks out pain but mightn't have, explaining the illusion of contingency. "Nonphysicalist materialism" results, with mind the essence of matter. An important paper.

Newman, M. H. A. 1928. Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind. (Google)

Argues against Russell's structuralism: any collection can be arranged to have a given structure, under some relation, so if physics tells us only about structure, it tells us at most the cardinality of the world.

Robinson, H. 1982. Matter: Turning the tables. In Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Rosenberg, G. H. 1997. A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Dissertation, Indiana University.

Russell, B. 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul. (Cited by 74 | Google)

Argues that physics characterizes the external world only structurally, and leaves intrinsic qualities unspecified. Only experience acquaints us with anything intrinsic. Perhaps the intrinsic nature of physics is experiential?

Schlick, M. 1925. General Theory of Knowledge. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Stoljar, D. 1997. Neutral monism. Manuscript. (Google)

Stoljar, D. 2001. Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:253-81. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Stubenberg, L. 1996. The place of qualia in the world of science. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Stubenberg, L. 1997. Austria vs. Australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In (K. Lehrer & J. Marek, eds) Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer. (Google)

Stubenberg, L. 1998. Consciousness and Qualia. John Benjamins. (Cited by 24 | Google)

1.5 Consciousness and Content

1.5a Consciousness and Intentionality (Searle, etc)

Anscombe, G. E. 1965. The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature. In (R. Butler, ed) Analytic Philosophy, second series. Cole, D. 1994. Thought and qualia. Minds and Machines 4:283-302. (Cited by 25 | Google)

Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Philosophy. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Davies, M. 1995. Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness. In (C. Macdonald, ed) Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Dunlop, C. E. M. 2000. Searle's unconscious mind. Philosophical Psychology 13:123-148. (Google)

Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. 1994. What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:837-45. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Searle's formulation of the connection principle is unclear, and there is no formulation is both plausible and interesting.

Georgalis, N. 1996. Awareness, understanding, and functionalism. Erkenntnis 44:225-56. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Gillett, E. 1996. Searle and the "deep unconscious". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3:191-200. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Gillett, G. & McMillan, J. 2001. Consciousness and Intentionality. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Gorman, M. 2002. Intentionality, normativity, and a problem for Searle. Dialogue 42:703-714. (Google)

Gunderson, K. 1990. Consciousness and intentionality: Robots with and without the right stuff. In (C. A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI. (Google)

Honderich, T. 2001. Consciousness as existence and the end of intentionality. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Philosophy at the New Millenium. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 2002. The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Horgan, T. , Tienson, J. & Graham, G. 2004. Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. In (R. Schantz, ed) The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2003. Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116:271-307. (Google)

Lethin, A. 2002. How do we embody intentionality? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:36-44. Loar, B. 2003. Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Marbach, E. 1993. Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Mascarenhas, V. 2002. Intentionality, causality, and self-consciousness: Implications for the naturalization of consciousness. Metaphysica 3(2):83-96. (Google)

McCulloch, G. 1999. Bipartism and the phenomenology of content. Philosophical Quarterly 49:18-32. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Meijers, A. 2000. Mental causation and Searle's impossible conception of unconscious intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8:155-170. (Google)

McLoughlin, J. 1999. Unwittingly recapitulating Freud: Searle's concept of a vocabulary of the unconscious. Ratio 12:34-53. (Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1992. Intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:281-308. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nelkin, N. 1989. Propositional attitudes and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:413-30. (Cited by 5 | Google)

About conscious beliefs. We are not "conscious of" beliefs, merely "conscious that" -- i.e. belief is not phenomenological.

Nelkin, N. 1993. The connection between intentionality and consciousness. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Against Searle: some intentional states aren't even potentially conscious (blindsight, etc) and intentional content doesn't require a particular phenomenal feel. So there's no essential link. With remarks on McGinn.

Pasquerella, L. 2002. Phenomenology and intentional acts of sensing in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40. (Google)

Potrc, M. 2002. Intentionality of phenomenology in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40. (Google)

Schweizer, P. 1994. Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity. Minds and Machines 4:259-82. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Seager, W. E. 1999. Conscious intentionality and the anti-Cartesian catastrophe. In Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge. (Google)

Searle, J. R. 1984. Intentionality and its place in nature. Synthese. (Cited by 7 | Google)

(Subjective) intentionality sure is real. It causes and is caused.

Searle, J. R. 1990. Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:585-642. (Cited by 63 | Google)

Advocates a "connection principle": intentional states must be potentially conscious. If not, they're brutely neurophysiological. So cog-sci talk of "intentional" cognitive mechanisms below the conscious level isn't justified.

Searle J. R. 1994. The connection principle and the ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:847-55. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Clarifying the connection principle -- it's necessary in order to see how certain nonconscious neural states qualify as unconscious mental states.

Siewert, C. 2002. Consciousness and intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 4 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 1988. Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machines. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

van Gulick, R. 1995. Why the connection argument doesn't work. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:201-7. (Google)

van Gulick, R. 1995. How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Wilson, R. A. 2003. Intentionality and phenomenology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:413-431. (Google)

Worley, S. 1997. Belief and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10:41-55. (Google)

Argues that belief requires consciousness, as we can't make sense of the personal/subpersonal content distinction without appealing to consciousness.

Zahavi, D. 2003. Intentionality and phenomenality: A phenomenological take on the hard problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 29. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.5b Representationalism

Bailey, A. 2005. What is it like to see a bat? Disputatio 18. (Google)

Beckermann, A. 1995. Visual information-processing and phenomenal consciousness. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Google)

Block, N. 1990. Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79. (Cited by 92 | Google)

Uses Inverted Earth case, colors and lenses inverted, to argue vs Harman that qualitative states aren't intentional states. Also, less convincingly, to argue that qualitative states aren't functional states.

Block, N. 1996. Mental paint and mental latex. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Cited by 42 | Google)

Block, N. 1999. Sexism, racism, ageism, and the nature of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26:39-70. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Block, N. 2003. Mental paint. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Burge, T. 2003. Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)

Byrne, A. 2001. Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110:199-240. (Cited by 36 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2004. The representational character of experience. In (B. Leiter, ed) The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

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Deutsch, M. 2005. Intentionalism and intransitivity. Synthese 144:1-22. Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. (Google)

Dretske, F. 2003. Experience as representation. Philosophical Issues 13:67-82. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Droege, P. 2003. Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Google)

Glock, H. J. 2003. Neural representationalism. Facta Philosophica 5. (Google)

Gray, R. 2001. Synesthesia and misrepresentation: A reply to Wager. Philosophical Psychology 14:339-46. (Google)

Gray, R. 2003. Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat? Philosophical Studies 115:245-256. (Google)

Harman, G. 1990. The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives. (Cited by 143 | Google)

There are no real qualia problems, just Intentional confusions.

Harman, G. 1996. Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions. In (E. Villaneuva, ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Haselager, P. , de Groot, A. & van Rappard, H. 2003. Representationalism vs. anti-representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance. Philosophical Psychology 16. (Google)

Holman, E. 2003. Sense experience, intentionality, and modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57. (Google)

Jackson, F. 2004. Representation and experience. In (H. Clapin, ed) Representation in Mind. Elsevier. (Google)

Kind, A. 2003. What's so transparent about transparency? Philosophical Studies 115:2225-244. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2002. PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15:55-64. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Lalor, B. J. 1999. Intentionality and qualia. Synthese 121:249-290. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Leeds, S. 2002. Perception, transparency, and the language of thought. Nous 36:104-129. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Levine, J. 1997. Are qualia just representations? (Critical notice of Tye) Mind and Language 12:101-13. (Google)

Levine, J. 2002. Experience and representation. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Lloyd, D. 1991. Leaping to conclusions: connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Suggests that conscious states are identical to representational states, and that unconscious representation is impossible; transition between conscious states is non-representational. Appeals to connectionist models in support.

Lloyd, D. 1997. Consciousness and its discontents. Communication and Cognition 30:273-284. (Google)

Argues that consciousness and representation are distinct, as e.g. the latter depends on context but the former does not.

Loar, B. 2002. Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1996. Layered perceptual representation. In (E. Villaneuva, ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press. (Cited by 203 | Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1998. In defense of the representational theory of qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 12:479-87. (Google)

McCulloch, G. 1993. The very idea of the phenomenological. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:39-57. (Cited by 3 | Google)

The phenomenological can be reduced to the intentional. Intentional states have a what-it-is-like, and there is no special phenomenal object of introspection.

Neander, K. 1998. The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 12:411-34. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Noordhof, P. 2001. In pain. Analysis 61:95-97. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Noordhof, P. 2002. More In pain. Analysis 62:153-154.

O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. 1997. Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid it. Philosophical Psychology 10:269-86. (Cited by 9 | Google)

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Robinson, W. S. 1998. Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique. Erkenntnis 47:285-309. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Schroer, R. 2002. Matching sensible qualities: A skeleton in the closet for representationalism. Philosophical Studies 107:259-73. (Google)

Seager, W. E. 1999. Representational theories of consciousness, parts I and II. In Theories of Consciousness. Routledge. (Google)

Seager, W. E. 2003. Tye on consciousness: Time to panic? Philosophical Studies 113:237-247. (Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1990. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:109-131. (Cited by 36 | Google)

Qualia can't be reduced to standard intentional properties (due to certain inversion cases). Projectivist and sense-reference accounts don't work either. Perhaps qualia are necessarily-illusory intentional properties.

Shoemaker, S. 1991. Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100:507-24. (Cited by 19 | Google)

On the relationship between phenomenal and intentional aspects of qualia, and in particular on the accessibility of qualia to conscious awareness. Phenomenal & intentional similarity are connected but must be distinguished.

Shoemaker, S. 2003. Content, character, and color. Philosophical Issues 13:253-78. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Siewert, C. 2004. Is experience transparent? Philosophical Studies 117:15-41. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Stalnaker, R. 1996. On a defense of the hegemony of representation. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Stoljar, D. 1996. What what it's like isn't like. Analysis 56:281-83. (Google)

Sullivan, P. R. 1995. Contentless consciousness and information-processing theories of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2:51-59. (Google)

Travis, C. 2004. The silence of the senses. Mind 113:57-94. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Tye, M. 1992. Visual qualia and visual content. In (T. Crane, ed) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Tye, M. 1994. Do pains have representational content? In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Google)

Tye, M. 1995. A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Argues that pain is representational, and that its phenomenal character is narrow nonconceptual content. They have a complex representational structure, with map-like arrays of sentential contents.

Tye, M. 1995. What "what it is like" is like. Analysis. (Google)

Argues that "what it is like to be X" is an intentional context, which solves some of the associated problems.

Tye, M. 1996. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.

Tye, M. 1996. Orgasms again. In (E. Villanueva. ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Google)

Tye, M. 1997. The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it's like to be a honeybee? Philosophical Studies 88:289-317. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Tye, M. 1998. Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:459-78. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Tye, M. 2002. Representationalism and the transparency of experience. Nous 36:137-51. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Tye, M. 2002. Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism? In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Tye, M. 2002. On the location of a pain. Analysis 62:150-153. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Tye, M. 2003. On the virtue of being poised: Reply to Seager. Philosophical Studies 113:275-280. Tye, M. 2003. Phenomenal character and color: Reply to Maund. Philosophical Studies 113:281-285. (Google)

Tye, M. 2003. The PANIC theory: Reply to Byrne. Philosophical Studies 113:287-290. (Google)

Tye, M. 2005. Another look at representationalism and pain. In (M. Aydede, ed) Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Vinueza, A. 2000. Sensations and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 13:373-392. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Wager, A. 1999. The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationism. Philosophical Psychology 12:263-281. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Wager, A. 2001. Synaesthesia misrepresented. Philosophical Psychology 14:347-351. (Google)

Warfield, T. 1999. Against representational theories of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:66-69. (Cited by 2 | Google)

White, S. 1994. Color and notional content. Philosophical Topics 22:471-503. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Wright, W. 2003. Projectivist representationalism and color. Philosophical Psychology 16:515-529. (Cited by 3 | Google)

1.5c The Content of Perceptual Experience

Baldwin, T. 1992. The projective theory of sensory content. In (T. Crane, ed) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Bermudez, J. L. 2000. Naturalized sense data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:353-374. (Google)

Berger, G. 1987. On the structure of visual sentience. Synthese 71:355-70. (Google)

Bilgrami, A. 1994. On McDowell on The content of perceptual experience. Philosophical Quarterly 44:206-13. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Brewer, B. 1999. Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 50 | Google)

Burge, T. 2003. Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:503-548. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Burge, T. 2003. Phenomenality and reference: Reply to Loar. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)

Butchvarov, P. 1980. Adverbial theories of consciousness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:261-80. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2006. Perception and the fall from Eden. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Church, J. 2000. 'Seeing as' and the double bind of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:99-112. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Clark, A. 1996. Three varieties of visual field. Philosophical Psychology 9:477-95. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Clark, A. 2004. Sensing, objects, and awareness: Reply to commentators. Philosophical Psychology 17:553-79. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Clark, A. 2002. Visual experience and action: Are the bonds too tight? Philosophical Review. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Clark, R. 1973. Sensuous judgments. Nous 7:45-56. (Google)

Clark, R. 1976. The sensuous content of perception. In (H. Castaneda, ed) Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Clark, R. 1981. Sensing, perceiving, thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:273-95. (Google)

Crane, T. (ed) 1992. The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Crane, T. 2002. The intentional structure of consciousness. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Dainton, B. 2002. The gaze of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Google)

Davies, W. M. 1996. Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory. Avebury. (Google)

DeBellis, M. 1991. The representational content of musical experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:303-24. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Contra Peacocke, we don't need sensational properties to understand the content of musical experience. Fine-grained representational properties can do the job, with the help of some Schenkerian analysis.

Dokic, J. 1998. The ontology of perception: Bipolarity and content. Erkenntnis 48:153-69. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Dokic, J. 2000. Perception as openness to the facts. Facta Philosophica 2:95-112. (Google)

Gunther, Y. H. 1995. Perceptual content and the subpersonal. Conference 6:31-45. (Google)

Gunther, Y. H. 2001. Content, illusion, partition. Philosophical Studies 102:185-202. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Honderich, T. 1994. Seeing things. Synthese 98:51-71. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Honderich, T. 1992. Seeing qualia and positing the world. In (A. Griffiths, ed) A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1976. The existence of mental objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13:33-40. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Jakab, Z. 2003. Phenomenal projection. Psyche 8. (Google)

Johnston, M. 2004. The obscure object of hallucination. Philosophical Studies 120:113-83. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Kelly, S. D. 1999. What do we see (when we do)? Philosophical Topics 27:107-28.

Kraut, R. 1982. Sensory states and sensory objects. Nous 16:277-93. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2002. Phenomenal content. Erkenntnis 57:175-198. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2003. Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24:169-196. (Google)

Kriegel, U. 2004. Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances. American Philosophical Quarterly 41:5-20. (Google)

Kulvicki, J. 2005. Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction. Philosophical Studies 122. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Langsam, H. 2000. Experiences, thoughts, and qualia. Philosophical Studies 99:269-295. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Lowe, E. J. 1992. Experience and its objects. In (T. Crane, ed) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Macpherson, F. 2003. Novel colours and the content of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:43-66. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Macpherson, F. 2005. Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70. (Google)

Martin, M. G. F. 2002. The transparency of experience. Mind and Language 4:376-425. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Martin, M. G. F. 2003. Particular thoughts and singular thought. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Matthen, M. 2005. Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McFarland, D. 1998. Crane on concepts and experiential content. Analysis 58:54-58. (Google)

McLaughlin, B. 2002. Color, consciousness, and color consciousness. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

McDowell, J. 1994. The content of perceptual experience. Philosopical Quarterly 44:190-205. (Cited by 31 | Google)

McLaughlin, B. 2002. Color, consciousness, and color consciousness. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Meehan, D. 2002. Qualitative character and sensory representations. Consciousness and Cognition 11:630-641. (Google)

Millar, A. 1991. Concepts, experience, and inference. Mind 100:495-505. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1983. What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology 96:435-67. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 1994. On the distinction between the object and the content of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15:239-64. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Natsoulas, T. 2002. The experiential presence of objects to perceptual consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, sense impressions, and perceptual takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23:293-316. (Google)

Noe, A. 1999. Thought and experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36:257-65. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Noe, A. 2002. On what we see. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83:57-80. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Noe, A. 2005. Action in Perception. MIT Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)

O'Regan, K. and Noe, A. 2001. What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience. Synthese 129:79-103. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Pacherie, E. 2000. Levels of perceptual content. Philsophical Studies 100:237-54. (Google)

Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 94 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 1984. Colour concepts and colour experience. Synthese 58:365-82. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 1989. Perceptual content. In (J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein, eds) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 1992. Scenarios, concepts, and perception. In (T. Crane, ed) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Pendlebury, M. 1987. Perceptual representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Pendlebury, M. 1990. Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the propositional account. Inquiry 33:215-30. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Lots of reasons why experiences have propositional content (i.e., their content is truth-evaluable, etc). A nice paper.

Rowlands, M. 2002. Two dogmas of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:158-80. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Schantz, R. 2001. The given regained: Reflections on the sensuous content of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:167-180. (Google)

Siegel, S. 2004. Indiscriminability and the phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120:91-112. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Siegel, S. 2006. Which properties are represented in perception? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Snowdon, P. 1990. The objects of perceptual experience. Aristotelian Society Supplement, 64:121-50. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Sturgeon, S. 1998. Visual experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72:179-200. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Tolhurst, W. 1998. Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:293-302. (Google)

Valberg, J. J. 1992. The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Yoon, B. 2000. Intentionality of perceptual experience. Erkenntnis 52:339-355. (Google)

1.5d Nonconceptual Content

Ablondi, F. 2002. Kelly and McDowell on perceptual content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7. (Google)

Bermudez, J. L. 1994. Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of nonconceptualrepresentational content. Mind and Language 9:402-18. (Google)

Bermudez, J. L. 1995. Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states. Mind and Language 10:333-69. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Bermudez, J. L. 2003. Nonconceptual mental content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Bermudez, J. L. 2003. Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of nonconceptual representational content. In (Y. Gunther, ed) Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. (Google)

Byrne, A. 2003. Consciousness and nonconceptual content. Philosophical Studies 113:261-274. (Google)

Clark, A. 2001. Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?. Philosophical Review 110:495-519. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Coliva, A. 2003. The argument from the finer-grained content of colour experiences: A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non-conceptual theorists. Dialectica 57:57-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Crane, T. 1992. The nonconceptual content of experience. In (T. Crane, ed) The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 48 | Google)

Crane, T. 1988. The waterfall illusion. Analysis 48:142-47. on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Crane, T. 1988. Concepts in perception. Analysis 48:150-53. (Google)

Cussins, A. 1993. Nonconceptual content and the elimination of misonceived composites. Mind and Language 8:234-52. (Google)

Cussins, A. 2003. Content, conceptual content, and nonconceptual content. In (Y. Gunther, ed) Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Dreyfus, H. 2002. Samuel Todes's account of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge and its relation to thought. Ratio 15:392-409. (Google)

Gunther, Y. (ed) 2003. Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Hamlyn, D. W. 1994. Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content. Philosophical Quarterly 44:139-53. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Heck, R. G. 2000. Nonconceptual content and the space of reasons. Philosophical Review 109:483-523. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Kelly, S. D. 1998. What makes perceptual content non-conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Kelly, S. D. 2001. Demonstrative concepts and experience. Philosophical Review. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Kelly, S. D. 2001. The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: Situation dependence and fineness of grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:601-608. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Kelly, S. 2002. What makes perceptual content non-conceptual? Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7.

Laurier, D. 2004. Reasons, contents, and experiences. Disputatio 17. (Google)

Luntley, M. 2003. Nonconceptual content and the sound of music. Mind and Language 18:402-426. (Google)

Martin, M. G. F. 1992. Perception, concepts, and memory. Philosophical Review 101:745-63. (Cited by 14 | Google)

McDowell, J. 1994. Lecture III: Non-conceptual content. In Mind and World. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Mellor, D. H. 1988. Crane's waterfall illusion. Analysis 48:147-50. (Google)

Peacocke, C. 1986. Analogue content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:1-17. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 1994. Nonconceptual content: Kinds, rationales, and relations. Mind and Language 4:419-29. (Google)

Peacocke, C. 1997. Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 20 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 2001. Does perception have a nonconceptual content? Journal of Philosophy 98:239-264. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 2001. Phenomenology and nonconceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:609-615. (Google)

Poellner, P. 2003. Non-conceptual content, experience and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:32-57. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Sedivy, S. 1996. Must conceptually informed perceptual experience involve nonconceptual content? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:413-31. (Google)

Stalnaker, R. 2003. What might nonconceptual content be? In (Y. Gunther, ed) Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Wright, W. 2003. McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content. Disputation 14. (Google)

1.5e Internalism and Externalism about Experience [see also 2.2]

Adams, F. & Dietrich, L. 2004. Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17:323-40. (Google)

Davies, M. 1992. Perceptual content and local supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Argues that perceptual content does not supervene on internal state, even though it is non-conceptual. Constructs an Twin scenario to that effect. With remarks on the relation between perceptual content and phenomenology.

Davies, M. 1993. Aims and claims of externalist arguments. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Naturalism and Normativity. Ridgeview. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Distinguishes modal and constitutive externalism, characterizes perceptual content and its relation to sensational content, and argues for externalism about perceptual content by examples.

Davies, M. 1997. Externalism and experience. In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G, Guzeldere, eds) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)

de Vries, W. A. 1996. Experience and the swamp creature. Philosophical Studies 82:55-80. (Google)

Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds.

Dretske, F. 1996. Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia? In (E. Villanueva, ed) Perception. Ridgeview. (Google)

We only have access to qualia through our concepts, which are external; so internal qualia would be inaccessible. So if qualia are knowable, they're external; and if not, why posit them? With comments by Kim, Horwich, Biro.

Forbes, G. 1997. Externalism and scientific Cartesianism. Mind and Language 12:196-205. (Google)

Hawthorne, J. 2004. Why Humeans are out of their minds. Nous 38:351-58. (Google)

Kirk, R. 1994. The trouble with ultra-externalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:293-307. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kirk, R. 1996. Why ultra-externalism goes too far. Analysis 56:73-79. (Google)

Kirk, R. 1998. Consciousness, information, and external relations. Communication and Cognition 30:249-71. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 2001. The case for phenomenal externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35. (Cited by 8 | Google)

McCulloch, G. 1990. Externalism and experience. Analysis 50:244-50. (Google)

Argues against McGinn that one should embrace a form of "strong externalism" about experience. Experience can be laden with externally-grounded concepts.

McCulloch, G. 1994. Not much trouble for ultra-externalism. Analysis 54:265-9. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McCulloch, G. 2002. Phenomenological externalism. In (N. Smith, ed) Reading McDowell. Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McCulloch, G. 2003. The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism. Routledge. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Sartwell, C. 1995. Radical externalism concerning experience. Philosophical Studies 78:55-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)

There is no epistemically available aspect of experience that is determined internally; experiences are "fused" with the environment.

Tappenden, P. 1996. The roundsquare copula: A semantic internalist's rejoinder. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:395-400. (Google)

Tonneau, F. 2004. Consciousness outside the head. Behavior and Philosophy 32:97-123. (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.5f Phenomenal Concepts

Alward, P. 2004. Is phenomenal pain the primary intension of 'pain'? Metaphysica 5(1):15-28. (Google)

Alter, T. & Walter, S. (eds) 2006. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Aydede, M. & Guzeldere, G. 2005. Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. Nous 39:197-255. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Bermudez, J. 2004. Vagueness, phenomenal concepts and mind-brain identity. Analysis 64:131-139. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Buekens, F. 2001. Essential indexicality and the irreducibility of phenomenal concepts. Communication and Cognition 34:75-97. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 2003. Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2002. The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 2006. Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Hawthorne, J. 2006. Dancing qualia and direct reference. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 2001. Deconstructing new wave materialism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Levin, J. 2006. What is a phenomenal concept? In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Levine, J. 2006. Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Loar, B. 1990. Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108. (Cited by 88 | Google)

Phenomenal and functional concepts are distinct, but the relevant properties may be identical. We directly refer to phenomenal properties by recognition. Remarks on other minds, transparency, incorrigibility & more. A meaty paper.

Loar, B. 2003. Qualia, properties, modality. Philosophical Issues 1:113-29. (Google)

Macdonald, C. 2004. Mary meets Molyneux: The explanatory gap and the individuation of phenomenal concepts. Nous 38:503-24. (Google)

McLaughlin, B. P. 2001. In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Nida-Rumelin, M. 2006. Grasping phenomenal properties. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

O'Dea, J. 2002. The indexical nature of sensory concepts. Philosophical Papers 32. (Google)

Pagin, P. 2000. Sensation terms. Dialectica 54:177-99. (Google)

Papineau, D. 2006. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Raffman, D. 1995. On the persistence of phenomenology. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 37 | Google)

Argues that our inability to reidentify qualia is a problem for materialism. How are they represented? Empty demonstrative would be vacuous, predicate would be reidentified, so maybe a plain presentation? Very interesting.

Stoljar, D. 2005. Physicalism and phenomenal concepts. Mind and Language. (Google)

Tye, M. 2003. A theory of phenomenal concepts. In (A. O'Hear, eds) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

White, S. 2006. Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

1.5g Miscellaneous

Cam, P. 1984. Consciousness and content-formation. Inquiry 27:381-98. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Campbell, J. 2004. Reference as attention. Philosophical Studies 120:265-76. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 1998. Conscious thinking: Language or elimination? Mind and Language 13:457-476. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Chalmers, D. J. 1991. Consciousness and cognition. Manuscript. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Exploring the link between consciousness and judgments about consciousness. Coherence between these -> consciousness depends on the functional but isn't reducible. Toward a dual-aspect theory based on pattern and information.

Falk, B. 1993. Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:55-73. (Google)

On conceptual influences on experience, and aspectual seeing, focusing on bodily and dynamic elements. Self-awareness is not of phenomenal states but *in* them. With commentary by S. Mulhall.

Fetzer, J. 2002. Consciousness and cognition: Semiotic conceptions of bodies and minds. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Google)

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Jacquette, D. 1984. Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47:229-40. (Google)

Sensations don't have intentional objects, they are intentional objects.

Kelly, S. 2004. Reference and attention: A difficult connection. Philosophical Studies 120:277-86. (Google)

Loar, B. 2002. Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Maloney, J. C. 1986. Sensuous content. Philosophical Papers 15:131-54. (Google)

McGinn, C. 1988. Consciousness and content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74:219-39. Reprinted in The Problem of Consciousness (Blackwell, 1991). (Cited by 8 | Google)

Comparing the problems of consciousness and content, and reconciling optimism on content with pessimism on consciousness. The phenomenological nature of content may be mysterious, but the individuation of contents is not.

Nelkin, N. 1994. Phenomena and representation. Philosophy of Science 45:527-47. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Arguing against the view that phenomenal properties are "read off" in making perceptual judgments. Experiences do not literally have color or shape.

Nudds, M. 2001. Experiencing the production of sounds. European Journal of Philosophy 9:210-229. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Scott, M. 2001. Tactual perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:149-160. (Google)

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On a propositional conception of experience, and making sense of awareness of experience and various problems for sense-data monadicism.

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1.6 Aspects of Consciousness

1.6a Self-Consciousness [see also 1.4b, 3.7, 6.2q, 6.4d]

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. The first person. In (S. Guttenplan, ed) Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 37 | Google)

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James, W. 1890. The consciousness of self. In The Principles of Psychology. (Cited by 6 | Google)

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Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian journal of Philosophy 33:103-132. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:1-26. Laycock, S. W. 1998. Consciousness it/self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:141-152. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Martin, M. G. F. 1995. Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In (J. Bermudez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan, eds) The Body and the Self. MIT Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Martin, M. G. F. 2004. The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies 120:37-89. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Meijsing, M. 2000. Self-consciousness and the body. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7:34-50. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Metzinger, T. 2000. The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationist analysis of the first-person perspective. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Metzinger, T. 2003. Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press. (Cited by 42 | Google)

Mittal, K. K. 1979. Self-identity and self-consciousness. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7:159-63. (Google)

Moran, R. 1999. The authority of self-consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26:174-200. (Cited by 3 | Google)

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Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2002. How to read your own mind: A cognitive theory of self-consciousness. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

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O'Hear, A. 1989. Evolution, knowledge, and self-consciousness. Inquiry 32:127-150. (Google)

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Richards, W. 1984. Self-consciousness and agency. Synthese 61:149-71. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Self-consciousness is consciousness of agency. Castaneda/Nozick/Nagel.

Rinofner-Kreidl, S. 2004. Representationalism and beyond: A phenomenological critique of Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(10-11):88-108. (Google)

Robbins, P. 2003. The paradox of self-consciousness revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:424-443. (Google)

Roessler, J. 2002. Action, emotion, and the development of self-awareness. European Review of Philosophy 5:33-52. (Google)

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Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65:555-67. (Cited by 45 | Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1986. Introspection and the self. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. (Cited by 15 | Google)

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Sosa, E. 1983. Consciousness of self and of the present. In (J. Tomberlin, ed) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World. Hackett. (Google)

Stephens, G. L. & Graham, G. 1994. Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought-insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1:1-10. (Google)

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Strawson, G. 1997. `The self'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:405-28. (Cited by 39 | Google)

Strawson, G. 1999. Self, body, and experience. Aristotelian Society Supplement 73:307-32. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Strawson, G. 2000. The phenomenology and ontology of the self. In (D. Zahavi, ed) Exploring the Self. John Benjamins. (Google)

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van Gulick, R. 1988. A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97:149-88. (Cited by 15 | Google)

How functionalism can handle consciousness: Self-consciousness is the possession of reflexive metapsychological information. This helps understand learning, representation, and belief. Phenomenal experience is still tricky.

Varela, F. G. 1971. Self-consciousness: Adaptation or epiphenomenon? Stud Gen 24:426-39. (Cited by 3 | Google)

White, S. 1987. What is it like to be a homunculus? Pac Philosophical Quarterly 68:148-74. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Weird examples of homunculi that are conscious but not self-conscious. Self-consciousness, not consciousness, is what really counts.

Zahavi, D. 2000. Self and consciousness. In (D. Zahavi, ed) Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.6b The Unity of Consciousness [see also 3.7d, 6.1e, 6.1g]

Arvidson, P. 2000. Transformations in consciousness: Continuity, the self and marginal consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7:3-26. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Bayne, T. 2000. The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. Australasian Journal Of Philosophy 78:248-254. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Bayne, T. 2001. Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:79-92. (Google)

Bayne, T. & Chalmers, D. J. 2003. What is the unity of consciousness? In (A. Cleeremans, ed) The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

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Beahrs, J. O. 1982. Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Beahrs, J. O. 1983. Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13. (Cited by 4 | Google)

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Brooks, D. H. M. 1995. The Unity of the Mind. St. Martin's Press. (Google)

Cleeremans, A. (ed) 2003. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Cotterill, R. M. J. 1995. On the unity of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:290-311. (Cited by 26 | Google)

Cotterill, R. 2003. Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In (A. Cleeremans, ed) The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Dainton, B. 2000. Stream of Consciousness: Unity and continuity in conscious experience. Routledge. (Cited by 16 | Google)

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Feinberg, T. 2000. The nested hierarchy of consciousness: A neurobiological solution to the problem of mental unity. Neurocase 6:75-81. (Google)

Fox, I. 1985. The individualization of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 13:119-43. (Google)

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Natsoulas, T. 1979. The unity of Consciousness. Behaviorism 7:45-63.

Natsoulas, T. 1984. Concerning the unity of consciousness: I. Varieties of conscious unity. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 3:281-303.

Natsoulas, T. 1986. Concerning the unity of consciousness: II. William James on personal conscious unity. Imagination, Cognition abd Personality 5:21-30. (Google)

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1.6c Homogeneity of Consciousness (Sellars, etc)

Clark, A. 1989. The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink. Synthese 80:277-304. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Explains homogeneity in terms of nontransitive matching among pixelized parts of vision. Experience of continuity, not continuous experience. Experiences may have subphenomenal parts (e.g. invisible pixels).

Cornman, J. W. 1970. Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23:417-51. (Google)

Delaney, C. F. 1971. Sellars' grain argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:14-16. (Google)

Friedman, I. S. 1989. Ultimate homogeneity: A dialogue. Philosophy Research Archives 14:425-53. (Google)

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Lycan, W. G. 1987. Sellars' "grain" argument. In Consciousness. (Google)

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Sellars, W. S. 1963. Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. (Cited by 174 | Google)

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1.6d Knowledge of Consciousness [see also 1.3a, 1.8a, 3.9, 6.2i]

Armstrong, D. M. 1963. Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62:417-32. (Cited by 11 | Google)

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Mary knew all the facts about qualia beforehand, she just wasn't acquainted with them. Knowledge by acquaintance isn't factual knowledge.

Dennett, D. C. 2002. How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:13-16. (Google)

Dretske, F. 1999. The mind's awareness of itself. Philosophical Studies 95:103-24. (Google)

Dretske, F. 2003. How do you know you are not a zombie? In (B. Gertler, ed) Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. (Cited by 8 | Google)

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Qualitative beliefs can supervene on behavioral dispositions even if absent/ /inverted qualia are possible. We just individuate belief contents and behavior widely, with wide content fixed to the qualia.

Gertler, B. 2001. Introspecting phenomenal states. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:305-28. (Cited by 10 | Google)

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A discussion of in what sense we are aware of qualia, and how we can have beliefs about them, with reference to Sellars. Ends up reducing qualia to phenomenal beliefs in a language of thought. A rich and subtle paper.

Levin, J. 2001. The myth of Jones and the return of subjectivity. Mind and Language 16:173-192. (Google)

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Reconstructing the Mary case as a Marianna case, and introducing a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal beliefs, to support the knowledge argument. A very nice and sophisticated paper.

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1997. On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google)

Odegard, D. 1992. Inner states. Personalist Forum 8:265-73. (Google)

Pappas, G. 1974. Incorrigibility, knowledge, and justification. Philosophical Studies 25:219-25. (Google)

Pappas, G. 1976. Incorrigibility and central-state materialism. Philosophical Studies 29:445-56. (Google)

Parsons, K. P. 1970. Mistaking sensations. Philosophical Review. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 1998. Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In (C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Pollock, J. L. 1970. Perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Review 80:287-319. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Robinson, W. S. 1975. The legend of the given. In (H. Castaneda, ed) Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Robinson, W. S. 1982. Causation, sensation, and knowledge. Mind 91:524-40. (Google)

Argues that we can have non-inferential knowledge of sensations even if they don't make a causal difference to our beliefs, so epiphenomenalism is OK. All theories have a similar problems.

Rosenberg, J. 2000. Perception vs. inner sense: A problem about direct awareness. Philosophical Studies 101:143-160. (Google)

Schick, T. W. 1992. The epistemic role of qualitative content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:383-93. (Google)

Contra Sellars, Rorty, and Churchland: knowledge of qualitative content is an important aspect of our understanding of mental concepts, although it is not everything.

Schwitzgebel, E. 2000. How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28:235-46. (Google)

Schwitzgebel, E. 2002. How well do we kow our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:35-53. (Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1994. Self-knowledge and "inner sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314. (Cited by 43 | Google)

Siewert, C. 2001. Self-knowledge and phenomenal unity. Nous 35:542-68. (Google)

Sosa, E. 2003. Consciousness and self-knowledge. In (B. Gertler, ed) Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. (Google)

Sprigge, T. L. S. 1981. Knowledge of subjectivity. Theoria to Theory 14:313-25. (Google)

Tibbetts, P. 1972. Feigl on raw feels, the brain, and knowledge claims: Some problems regarding theoretical concepts. Dialectica 26:247-66. (Google)

Tomberlin, J. E. 1975. A problem with incorrigibility. Philosophia 5:507-12. (Google)

Verges, F. G. 1974. Jackson on incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:243-50. (Google)

von Eckardt, B. 1975. Some consequences of knowing everything (essential) there is to know about one's mental states. Review of Metaphysics 29:3-18. (Google)

Wallraff, C. F. 1953. On immediacy and the contemporary dogma of sense-certainty. Journal of Philosophy. (Google)

Warner, R. 1993. Incorrigibility. In (H. Robinson, ed) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Warner, R. 1994. In defense of a dualism. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Google)

Warner, R. 1996. Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:217-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)

1.6e The Function of Consciousness [see also 1.4f, 6.4a]

Baars, B. 1988. The functions of consciousness. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Argues for nine major functions of consciousness: in defining inputs, adaptation, debugging, recruiting & control, prioritizing, decision-making, analogy-forming, self-monitoring, and self-maintenance.

Banks, W. P. 1996. How much work can a quale do? Consciousness and Cognition 5:368-80. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R. C. 1983. Consciousness and complexity: evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:378-95. (Google)

Contra Popper, evolution doesn't provide an argument against physicalism or epiphenomenalism. Speculation on what the function of consciousness might be, and how it might be realized: e.g. selecting information.

Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behaviora and Brain Sciences 18:227-47. (Cited by 260 | Google)

Separates phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness, and argues that cases like blindsight only suggest a function for access consciousness, not phenomenal consciousness. The latter remains a mystery. With commentaries.

Bringsjord, S. & Noel, R. 1998. Why did evolution engineer consciousness? In (G. Mulhauser, ed) Evolving Consciousness. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Cole, D. 2002. The function of consciousness. In (J. Fetzer, ed) Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. (Google)

DeLancey, C. 1996. Emotion and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:492-99. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Dretske, F. 1997. What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27:1-15. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Flanagan, O. & Polger, T. 1995. Zombies and the function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:313-21.

Argues for the possibility of zombies (contra Moody), then notes that any function could be performed by an unconscious zombie, it seems, so there's no function of consciousness in sight.

Flanagan, O. & Polger, T. 1998. Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism. In (J. Fetzer, ed) Consciousness Evolving. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Gregory, R. L. 1996. What do qualia do? Perception 25:377-79. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Suggests that qualia serve to distinguish hypotheses about present from past.

Himma, K. E. 2004. Moral biocentrism and the adaptive value of consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42:25-44. (Google)

Kraemer, E. R. 1984. Consciousness and the exclusivity of function. Mind 93:271-5. (Google)

Contra Mott 1982: Function needn't be exclusive, and brain processes and consciousness may share a function, due to their close relationship.

Kriegel, U. 2004. The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3:171-93. (Google)

McGinn, C. 1981. A note on functionalism and function. Philosophical Topics 12:169-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Function always underdetermines intrinsic nature, so absent/inverted qualia cases aren't incompatible with consciousness having a function.

Mott, P. 1982. On the function of consciousness. Mind 91:423-9. (Google)

Consciousness doesn't have a function, as any function it might have is a function of brain processes.

Perlis, D. 1997. Consciousness as self-function. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:509-25. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Place, U. T. 2000. The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind 1:183-192. (Google)

Popper, K. R. 1978. Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32:339-55. (Cited by 31 | Google)

Ramachandran, V. S. & Hirstein, W. 1998. Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:429-57. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Shanon, B. 1998. What is the function of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:295-308. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Tye, M. 1996. The function of consciousness. Nous 30:287-305. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Argues that the function of consciousness is not obvious, but that once one accepts a representational view of consciousness, it becomes obvious.

van Gulick, R. 1989. What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics 17:211-30. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Trying to counter absent qualia arguments by finding a role for consciousness e.g. in metacognition, or as as a way to achieve semantic transparency. But consciousness doesn't seem necessary for these, so it's still a mystery.

van Gulick, R. 1994. Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness. In (G. Graham & G. L. Stephens, eds) Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Velmans, M. 1992. Is human information-processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:651-69. (Cited by 93 | Google)

Uses experimental evidence to argue that consciousness is functionally inessential: the tasks associated with consciousness can be performed without consciousness. Only focal-attentive processing is required.

Velmans, M. 2002. How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:3-29. Velmans, M. 2002. Making sense of causal interactions between consciousness and brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:1-2. (Cited by 14 | Google)

1.7 Qualia

1.7a General

Burgess, J. A. 1990. Phenomenal qualities and the nontransitivity of matching. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Google)

Clark, Andy. 2000. A case where access implies qualia? Analysis 60:30-37. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Clark, A. 1985. Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception. Synthese 65:377-405. (Google)

One can give an information-theoretic explanation of color perception, which leaves nothing out. Rebuts various qualia objections, e.g. from the possibility of inversion. Qualia are codes for external properties.

Clark, A. 1992. Sensory Qualities. Clarendon. (Cited by 81 | Google)

Argues that psychology is in the business of explaining sensory qualities, and does a perfectly good job using discriminability as a basis. With detailed argument and many interesting examples.

Clark, A. 2000. A Theory of Sentience. Oxford University Press (Cited by 44 | Google)

Cunningham, B. 2001. Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism. Philosophical Psychology 14:29-41. (Google)

Feser, E. 2001. Qualia: irreducibly subjective but not intrinsic. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:3-20. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Fox, I. 1989. On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- Part one. Philosophical Topics 17:81-103. (Google)

Searching for a theory of qualia: rejects epiphenomenalism, separation of the form and quality of experience, and immediate perception of phenomenal objects. Experience consists in represented (inexistent) objects of thought.

Gilbert, P. 1992. Immediate experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:233-250. (Google)

Against an account of phenomenal content as given by inner discrimination. Argues that the character of experience consists in its reason-giving role.

Gustafson, D. 1998. Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Psychology 11:371-387. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Hubbard, T. L. 1996. The importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition. Consciousness and Cognition 3:327-58. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Jakab, Z. 2000. Ineffability of qualia: A straightforward naturalistic explanation. Consciousness and Cognition 9:329-351. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kind, A. 2001. Qualia realism. Philosophical Studies 104:143-62. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Kitcher, P. S. 1979. Phenomenal qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 16:123-9. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Qualia problems stem from assuming direct awareness of perceptual states. Instead, we should acknowledge only an ability to detect and label these states. Also argues for the possibility of unconscious and illusory pains.

Leeds, S. 1993. Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Nous 27:303-330. (Cited by 6 | Google)

A discussion of in what sense we are aware of qualia, and how we can have beliefs about them, with reference to Sellars. Ends up reducing qualia to phenomenal beliefs in a language of thought. A rich and subtle paper.

Leon, M . 1988. Characterising the senses. Mind and Language 3:243-70. (Google)

Levine, J. 1995. Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Lormand, E. 1995. Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you.) Philosophical Topics 22:127-156. (Google)

Mandik, P. 1999. Qualia, space, and control. Philosophical Psychology 12:47-60. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Nelkin, N. 1987. How sensations get their names. Philosophical Studies 51:325-39. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Sensations are an inessential element of experiences. Experiences are typed by their cognitive component, and the naming of sensations is derivative on this. With examples and empirical evidence about pain, color, perception.

Nelkin, N. 1990. Categorizing the senses. Mind and Language. (Google)

Place, U. T. 2000. The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and source. Brain and Mind 1:183-92. (Google)

Putnam, H. 1981. Mind and body. In Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Considers qualia, inverted and absent, and various other stuff. Wishy-washy.

Rey, G. 1993. Sensational sentences. In (M. Davies & G. Humphreys, eds) Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Explicating sensory experience in terms of an appropriate computational relation to a sentence in the language of thought. Argues that this handles many features of qualia (privacy, ineffability, grainlessness, unity, etc).

Robinson, W. S. 1999. Qualia realism and neural activation patterns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:65-80. (Google)

Rosenthal, D. R. 1999. Sensory quality and the relocation story. Philosophical Perspectives 26:321-50. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Ross, P. 2001. Qualia and the senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51:495-511. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Shepard, R. N. 1993. On the physical basis, linguistic representation, and conscious experience of colors. In (G. Harman, ed) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Shoemaker, S. 1975. Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7:3-37. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 3 | Google)

Where does similarity come from? From belief therein? Similarity of experience = experience of similarity. Also relation to projectibility.

Shoemaker, S. 1994. Phenomenal character. Nous 28:21-38. (Cited by 39 | Google)

Phenomenal character is bestowed by representation of certain relational properties, defined by relation to experience. With a discussion of possible candidates, and argument against other views such as projectivism.

Sleutels, J. 1998. Phenomenal consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31:21-55. (Google)

Vaden, T. 2001. Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44:149-169. (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.7b Qualia and Materialism [see also 1.2, 1.3]

Aranyosi, I. 2003. Physical constituents of qualia. Philosophical Studies 116:103-131. (Google)

Clark, A. 1985. A physicalist theory of qualia. Monist 68:491-506. (Cited by 3 | Google)

A Goodman-like theory of qualia discrimination.

Cornman, J. W. 1971. Materialism and Sensations. Yale University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Double, R. 1985. Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:383-92. (Google)

A somewhat vague defense of materialism against objections from phenomenal properties. The only problems are epistemological.

Harding, G. 1991. Color and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 45:289-307. (Cited by 6 | Google)

On the unique nature of color expanses, which are laid bare to perception as they are in themselves. These are incompatible with functionalist accounts of mind, but might still be physical, on a broader conception thereof.

Holborow, L. C. 1973. Materialism and phenomenal qualities. Aristotelian Society Supplement 47:107-19. (Google)

Horgan, T. 1987. Supervenient qualia. Philosophical Review 96:491-520. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Arguing from the causal efficacy of qualia and the closedness of physical causation to the conclusion that qualia conceptually supervene on the physical. A very thorough paper.

Jolley, K. D. & Watkins, M. 1998. What is it like to be a phenomenologist? Philosophical Quarterly 48:204-9. (Cited by 3 | Google)

A reply to Raffman 1995. Maybe our experiences are no more fine-grained than our concepts. Even our experiences of unique hues may be coarse.

Lewis, D. 1995. Should a materialist believe in qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73:140-44. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Materialists can believe in qualia, qua occupier of the folk psychological role. But they cannot accept the Identification Thesis, that having qualia allows us to know exactly what they are.

Lycan, W. G. 1988. Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Argues that qualia, if viewed as simple properties of phenomenal individuals, are problematic for materialism. Considers the case for phenomenal individuals, and argues that they are intentional inexistents.

Marras, A. 1993. Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia. Dialogue 32:475-92. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Qualia aren't reducible to physical properties, but they are supervenient (and ontologically dependent) on microfunctional properties. With remarks on the knowledge argument, Kripke, absent qualia, epiphenomenalism, etc.

Mellor, D. H. 1973. Materialism and phenomenal qualities II. Aristotelian Society Supplement 47:107-19. (Google)

Tye, M. 1986. The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95:1-17. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Absent/inverted qualia aren't really imaginable. The Knowledge Argument fails, as discovering new experiences doesn't imply learning new facts, but only coming to know old facts in a new way.

1.7c Eliminativism about Qualia [see also 1.4e]

Dennett, D. C. 1978. Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese 38. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 22 | Google)

The concept of pain is incoherent, as it's asked to do too many things at once. With a discussion of drugs, flowcharts, reportability, etc.

Dennett, D. C. 1981. Wondering where the yellow went. Monist 64:102-8. (Cited by 3 | Google)

A response to Sellars. All there is to seeing occurrent yellow is the judgment that one is seeing occurrent yellow.

Dennett, D. C. 1988. Quining qualia. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 111 | Google)

Argues against the existence of ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly accessible properties. With lots of meaty-thought experiments, and arguments that there is no fact of the matter about inversion cases.

Dennett, D. C. 1991. Lovely and suspect qualities. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Consciousness. Ridgeview. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Everett, A. 1996. Qualia and vagueness. Synthese 106:205-226. (Cited by 4 | Google)

There are no qualia: qualia would have to be vague (for Sorites reasons), but there can be no vague properties in nature. The usual Sorites defenses don't work here, as there's no appearance/reality distinction for qualia.

Garcia-Carpintero, M. 2003. Qualia that it is right to Quine. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:357-377. (Google)

Jacoby, H. 1985. Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies 47:257-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Arguing against eliminativism for qualia. Even if nothing satisfies all the common-sense properties of qualia, reference of qualia terms is still fixed under a Putnam-style theory of meaning. Argues for scientific functionalism.

Levin, M. 1981. Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42:42-58. (Google)

There are no irreducible phenomenal properties. Materialism can handle our direct awareness of inner states by the right sort of causal connection. Gives a materialism account of discrimination and learning mental concepts.

Levine, J. 1994. Out of the closet: A qualophile confronts qualophobia. Philosophical Topics 22:107-126. (Cited by 2 | Google)

On bold vs. modest qualophilia, and against various qualophobic strategies. With remarks on scientific objectivity, qualia as an explanandum, and on how our knowledge of qualia is consistent with the conceivability of zombies.

Ross, D. 1993. Quining qualia Quine's way. Dialogue 32:439-59. (Google)

Seager, W. E. 1993. The elimination of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:345-65. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Dennett's 1988 argument against ineffability, etc., doesn't nearly make the case against qualia, and largely relies on verificationist assumptions.

Wright, E. W. 1989. Querying "Quining Qualia". Acta Analytica 4:9-32. (Google)

1.7d The Inverted Spectrum

Block, N. 1990. Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79. (Cited by 92 | Google)

Uses Inverted Earth case, colors and lenses inverted, to argue vs Harman that qualitative states aren't intentional states. Also, less convincingly, to argue that qualitative states aren't functional states.

Campbell, N. 2000. Physicalism, qualia inversion, and affective states. Synthese 124:239-256. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Campbell, N. 2004. Generalizing qualia inversion. Erkenntnis 60:27-34. (Google)

Casati, R. 1990. What is wrong in inverting spectra? Teoria 10:183-6. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S. 1981. Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 12 | Google)

Functional role counts more than qualitative content in determining what e.g. "redness" is.

Clark, A. 1985. Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:431-43. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that there could be inverted spectra even without a symmetrical color space. Qualia must be distinguished from their place in color space.

Cohen, J. 2001. Color, content, and Fred: On a proposed reductio of the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Philosophical Studies 103:121-144. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cole, D. J. 1990. Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82:207-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Acquired spectrum inversions do not refute functionalism, if qualia revert after behavioral adaptation (as they do with inverting lenses).

Dennett, D. C. 1994. Instead of qualia. In (A. Revonsuo & M. Kamppinen, eds) Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Describes some "inverted spectrum" scenario in computer registers, and argues that in the absence of a "central clearing house", the inversion of qualia is indeterminate. There's no reason to believe in non-dispositional qualia.

Gert, B. 1965. Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16:44-47. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Inverted spectra with constant behavior is a meaningful hypothesis even under verificationism. Switching nerve endings, tinting contact lenses, etc.

Ginet, C. 1999. Qualia and private language. Philosophical Topics 26:121-38. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1987. Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:281-98. (Cited by 9 | Google)

On the physiological bases of phenomenal states, particularly color. Inverted spectrum isn't really coherent, as coolness/warmth would have to be inverted too. So the contingency of qualia is diminished.

Hardin, C. L. 1988. Color for Philosophers. Hackett. (Cited by 74 | Google)

Distinguishes various functionally distinct inverted spectrum cases.

Hardin, C. L. 1991. Reply to Levine. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Reply to Levine 1991. "Green residue" and "red residue" may be identical. Physiology might put more constraints on qualia, eventually ruling out all other possibilities. But there may still be absent/alien qualia problems.

Hardin, C. L. 1997. Reinverting the spectrum. In (A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert, eds) Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Harrison, B. 1967. On describing colors. Inquiry 10:38-52. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Harrison, B. 1973. Form and Content. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google)

The inverted spectrum is impossible, due to asymmetries in color space.

Harvey, J. 1979. Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57:211-19. (Cited by 2 | Google)

The inverted spectrum can be detected, if a single person experiences both.

Hatfield, G. 1992. Color perception and neural encoding: Does metameric matching entail a loss of information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992, 1:492-504. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Johnsen, B. C. 1986. The inverted spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:471-6. (Google)

Against Shoemaker: physical realizations do not give empirical conditions for qualia inversion. Nice.

Johnsen, B. C. 1993. The intelligibility of spectrum inversion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23:631-6. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kirk, R. 1982. Goodbye to transposed qualia. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44. (Google)

The possibility of an inverted spectrum w.r.t. dispositions implies the falsity of physicalism. But this rests on an implausible "slide-viewer" model of seeing, and is incoherent otherwise.

Levine, J. 1988. Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Inverted qualia, with respect to a functional account, are no more plausible than absent qualia (by analysis of thought experiments). Both lead to first-person skepticism about qualia.

Levine, J. 1991. Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4:27-40. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Contra Hardin 1988: there's a "green residue" after coolness is subtracted, so inverted spectrum could still be possible. In any case, the impossibility of IS doesn't affect the explanatory gap for qualia, which is epistemic.

Lycan, W. G. 1973. Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15:315-9. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Inverted spectrum holding behavior constant is at least a coherent idea. Hook up brain in different ways, etc.

Lycan, W. G. 1993. Functionalism and recent spectrum inversions. Manuscript. (Google)

Argues that qualia are intentional properties, and that inverted spectra, though conceivable, are metaphysically impossible, due to considerations about society and normality. Argues against Block's "inverted earth".

Meyer, U. 2000. Do pseudonormal persons have inverted qualia? Scientific hypotheses and philosophical interpretations. Facta Philosophica 2:309-25. (Google)

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. (Google)

A fascinating note on the possibility of people with doubled colorblindness genes, thus inverting color processing; such people may actually exist.

Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Peirce, M. 2001. Inverted intuitions: occupants and roles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39:273-298. (Google)

Rey, G. 1992. Sensational sentences reversed. Philosophical Studies 68:289-319. (Google)

Argues for a computational/sentential theory under which qualia are fixed by functional organization. Argues against Block's 1990 inversion: qualia might slowly change back as associations fade. Memory isn't 100% reliable.

Shoemaker, S. 1975. Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7:3-37. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 3 | Google)

Maybe IS is ongoing, with memory changes. What is the logic of "appears"?

Shoemaker, S. 1982. The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79:357-381. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 52 | Google)

All about the coherence and otherwise thereof. Uses switch in state for IS IS wrt behavior. Also claims that IS wrt function is possible as qualia are fixed by realizing state, not functional state. Bad assumption.

Shoemaker, S. 1996. Intersubjective/intrasubjective. In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Stalnaker, R. 1999. Comparing qualia across persons. Philosophical Topics 26:385-406. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Takenaga, R. 2002. Inverting intentional content. Philosophical Studies 110:197-229. (Google)

Taylor, D. 1966. The incommunicability of content. Mind 75:527-41. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Inverted spectra thought-experiments show that experiential content is incommunicable. Accounts for the fact that attempts to describe such cases lead to contradiction (I'm seeing green & not seeing green).

Tye, M. 1993. Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Nous. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Argues that qualia are intentional properties, along the lines of "looks F to P". Handles inverted earth and related cases by taking the narrow intentional content. With remarks on the semantics of color terms.

1.7e Absent Qualia (Block, etc) [see also 1.3b]

Block, N. & Fodor, J. A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. (Cited by 54 | Google)

As a criticism of functionalism. raises the possibility that realizations of any given functional account of mental states may lack qualia.

Block, N. 1980. Troubles with functionalism. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 194 | Google)

All kinds of absent qualia cases: homunculi-headed robots, the population of China, and so on. There is a prima facie doubt that such cases lack qualia, so there is a prima facie case against functionalism.

Bogen, J. 1981. Agony in the schools. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:1-21. (Cited by 2 | Google)

It's OK for bizarre realizations to lack pain, as functionalism requires teleology as well as organization. With remarks on the relation between pain and "introspectible noxiousness".

Carleton, L. 1983. The population of China as one mind. Philosophy Research Archives 9:665-74. (Google)

Taking the personal stance, we should regard the Chinese nation as having qualia. A lack of qualia would make a functional difference.

Absent qualia are impossible. Also, qualia aren't essential to mental state, functional role is.

Cuda, T. 1985. Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48:111-27. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Replace neurons one by one with homunculi: what happens? Beliefs don't change, does consciousness fade? Very nice.

Dempsey, L. 2002. Chalmers's fading and dancing qualia: Consciousness and the "hard problem". Southwest Philosophy Review 18:65-80. (Google)

Elugardo, R. 1983. Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia. Dialogue 21:47-56. (Google)

If absent qualia are possible, then either qualia are inexplicable or species chauvinism is true. Homunculi-heads could make similar arguments about us.

Elugardo, R. 1983. Functionalism and the absent qualia argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13:161-80. (Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. 1996. Functionalism's response to the problem of absent qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:357-73. (Google)

Hershfield, J. 2002. A note on the possibility of silicon brains and fading qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:25-31. (Google)

Jacoby, H. 1990. Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2:271-82. (Google)

Conceivability arguments are only a problem for empirical functionalism insofar as they are a problem for materialism in general. Very true.

Juhl, C. F. 1998. Conscious experience and the nontrivality principle. Philosophical Studies 91:91-101. (Google)

Levin, J. 1985. Functionalism and the argument from conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:85-104. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Argues that metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from conceivability arguments, but that absent qualia cases have not been clearly and distinctly conceived. The functionalist is better off than the identity theorist here.

Levine, J. 1988. Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87. (Cited by 3 | Google)

IQ are no more plausible than AQ (by analysis of thought experiments and skepticism). So there's no reason to choose physicalist-functionalism over pure functionalism, as Shoemaker does. Nice.

Sayan, E. 1988. A closer look at the Chinese Nation argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36. (Google)

The Chinese Nation would require less people than Churchland & Churchland 1981 suggest, as we'd only need to handle a subset of all possible inputs.

Tye, M. 1993. Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In (C. Hookway, ed) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Gives a thorough neurophysiological analysis of blindsight and related pathologies, and argues that these cannot be used to support the possibility of absent qualia. With remarks on the mystery of consciousness.

1.7f Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [see also 1.6d]

Shoemaker, S. 1975. Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies 27:291-315. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 66 | Google)

Absent qualia possible => qualia make no causal difference => no knowledge of qualia, therefore absent qualia are impossible. If qualia are introspectively accessible, they must be functional. An important argument.

Shoemaker, S. 1981. Absent qualia are impossible -- A reply to Block. Philosophical Review 90:581-99. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 8 | Google)

Reply to Block 1980. Distinguishes two AQ theses, and argues that if AQ are possible, then the problem for functionalism isn't due solely to qualia.

Averill, E. W. 1990. Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:449-67. (Google)

Defending Shoemaker's argument against Conee: immediate awareness and qualitative beliefs are the same. But maybe people *can't* tell whether they're having genuine or ersatz pain. Eliminativism is the best option.

Block, N. 1980. Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review 89:257-74. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Reply to Shoemaker 1975. The possibility of absent qualia is compatible with a functional role for qualia, as qualia can make a causal difference that is independent of a given functional account.

Conee, E. 1985. The possibility of absent qualia. Philosophical Review 94:345-66. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Contra Shoemaker: qualia cause qualitative beliefs, which are affected by the absence of qualia, so we know about qualia even if AQ are possible.

Davis, L. 1982. Functionalism and absent qualia. Philosophical Studies 41:231-49. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Elucidating Shoemaker's argument: if absent qualia are possible, then the difference between real and ersatz pain makes no difference to belief, so qualia aren't introspectively accessible. A nice analysis.

Doore, G. 1981. Functionalism and absent qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59:387-402. (Google)

Qualia and qualitative beliefs are the same, so Shoemaker's argument fails. A numbness/pain inversion argument shows that pain isn't a functional state; it yields an introspectible difference without a functional difference.

Francescotti, R. M. 1994. Qualitative beliefs, wide content, and wide behavior. Nous 28:396-404. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Qualitative beliefs can supervene on behavioral dispositions even if absent/ /inverted qualia are possible. We just individuate belief contents and behavior widely, with wide content fixed to the qualia.

Hill, C. S. 1991. Introspection and the skeptic. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Argues that the possibility of absent qualia is compatible with introspective knowledge. The fact that we have evidence of qualia isn't altered by the fact that we'd still think we had that evidence if we didn't have qualia.

White, N. 1985. Professor Shoemaker and the so-called `qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies 47:369-383. (Google)

Shoemaker's account leaves out experienced relations, such as experienced similarity. Experienced similarity is not the same as similarity between experiences. Being experienced is not an experienced feature.

1.7g Functionalism and Qualia, General

Brown, M. 1983. Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung 10:218-28. (Google)

Various comments on functionalism's troubles with qualia, including absent and inverted qualia. Analogis with biology and information theory.

Chalmers, D. J. 1995. Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Argues that absent qualia and inverted qualia are empirically impossible (though logically possible), using neural-replacement thought-experiments. So functional organization fully determines conscious experience.

Cole, D. J. 1990. Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82:207-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Acquired spectrum inversion doesn't refute functionalism, if qualia revert after behavioral adaptation. With empirical evidence.

Dumpleton, S. 1988. Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:376-89. (Google)

Eshelman, L. J. 1977. Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:255-74. (Google)

Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1985. Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22:73-80. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Pain-qualia are in the body, not the mind, and so aren't part of psychology.

Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1987. Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible qualities. Nous 21:395-405. (Google)

Gray, R. 2004. What synaesthesia really tells us about functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9):64-69. (Google)

Greenberg, W. 1998. On Chalmers' "principle of organizational invariance" and his "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:53-58. Hill, C. S. 1991. The failings of functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Gives a number of arguments against both analytic functionalism and psychofunctionalism: arguments from absent qualia, absent functional role, epistemology, semantics, and heterogeneity of functional roles.

Horgan, T. 1984. Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44:453-69. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Argues that non-phenomenal mental events are functional, while qualia are low-level physiological.

Jarrett, G. 1996. Analyzing mental demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 84:49-62. (Google)

Levine, J. 1999. Philosophy as massage: Seeking relief from conscious tension. Philosophical Topics 26:159-78. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1981. Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50. (Cited by 20 | Google)

Accuses Block of a perspective error. Functionalism can handle a lot, if it's multi-levelled.

Lycan, W. G. 1987. Homunctionalism and qualia. In Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Various stuff, mostly against absent qualia arguments.

Moor, J. H. 1988. Testing robots for qualia. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Google)

Behavioral evidence for qualia is always indirect. And you can't check by replacing own neurons by chips, as you'll still believe you have qualia if you're functionally identical. Posit robot qualia as explanatory construct?

Nemirow, L. 1979. Functionalism and the subjective quality of experience. Dissertation, Stanford University. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Pettit, P. 2003. Looks as powers. Philosophical Issues 13:221-52. (Cited by 2 | Google)

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Computational functionalism about qualia is compatible with Wittgenstein's views. It makes sense of the points about "dividing through" my private objects, for example. With remarks on spectrum inversions.

Seager, W. E. 1983. Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind 92:174-88. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Functionalism can't explain the causal role of qualia by identifying them with functional states (circularity) or physical realizations (chauvinism). Which leaves property dualism, epiphenomenalism, or eliminativism for qualia.

Shoemaker, S. 1994. The first-person perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68:7-22. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Against drawing strong conclusions from first-person imaginings. Considers Searle's silicon-replacement scenario: we might infer that perception isn't veridical, that there's another mind about, or even another body.

van Gulick, R. 1988. Qualia, functional equivalence and computation. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Google)

Commentary on Moor 1988. Systems that differ in qualitative properties will likely differ in functional organization.

van Heuveln, B. , Dietrich, E. & Oshima, M. 1998. Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines. (Google)

White, S. 1986. Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68:333-68. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Criticism of "physicalist-functionalism", where functional organization doesn't completely determine qualia (e.g. Shoemaker/Block). The only tenable options are pure functionalism or transcendental dualism. Nice.

White, S. 1989. Transcendentalism and its discontents. Philosophical Topics 17:231-61. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Taking transcendental dualism seriously. Privileged access provides strong arguments against objective theories, but it turns out that transcendentalism can't explain it any better, so maybe embrace objective theories after all.

Wright, E. 1995. More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-hood analogy. Synthese 97:365-82. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Zuboff, A. 1994. What is a mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:183-205. (Google)

Replacing a brain chunk while preserving causal role must preserve experience;

Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia

Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia [1523]

Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia

1.1 Consciousness

1.1a Consciousness -- General

1.1b The Concept of Consciousness

1.2 Explaining Consciousness?

1.2a Subjectivity and Objectivity (Nagel) [see also 1.3a]

1.2b The Explanatory Gap (Levine)

1.2c `Hard' and `Easy' Problems (Chalmers) [see also 3.1]

1.2d Cognitive Closure (McGinn)

1.2e Miscellaneous

1.3 Materialism and Dualism

1.3a The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [see also 1.2a]

1.3b Zombies & Modal Arguments [see also 1.2c, 1.3a, 1.3c, 1.3d, 1.7e]

1.3c Essentialist Arguments (Kripke) [see also 1.3b, 1.3d]

1.3d Arguments from Disembodiment [see also 1.3b, 1.3c]

1.3e Consciousness and Physicalism, Misc [see also 1.2, 1.3, 1.7b, 3.5b]

1.3f Consciousness and Dualism [see also 1.2c, 1.3, 3.4d]

1.3g Mind-Body Problem, General

1.4 Specific Views on Consciousness [see also 1.2, 1.3, 1.5b]

1.4a Higher-Order Thought Approaches (Rosenthal, etc) [see also 6.2i]

1.4b Self-Representational Approaches [see also 1.6a]

1.4c Dennett on Consciousness [see also 1.7c]

1.4d Functionalism [see also 1.4a, 1.4c, 1.5b, 1.8, 3.4]

1.4e Eliminativism [see also 1.7c, 2.1c, 3.5c]

1.4f Epiphenomenalism [see also 1.3a, 1.3f, 1.6e, 3.6]

1.4g Interactionism [see also 1.3f, 3.3d]

1.4h Panpsychism [see also 1.4i]

1.4i Russellian Monism (Russell, etc) [see also 1.4h]

1.5 Consciousness and Content

1.5a Consciousness and Intentionality (Searle, etc)

1.5b Representationalism

1.5c The Content of Perceptual Experience

1.5d Nonconceptual Content

1.5e Internalism and Externalism about Experience [see also 2.2]

1.5f Phenomenal Concepts

1.5g Miscellaneous

1.6 Aspects of Consciousness

1.6a Self-Consciousness [see also 1.4b, 3.7, 6.2q, 6.4d]

1.6b The Unity of Consciousness [see also 3.7d, 6.1e, 6.1g]

1.6c Homogeneity of Consciousness (Sellars, etc)

1.6d Knowledge of Consciousness [see also 1.3a, 1.8a, 3.9, 6.2i]

1.6e The Function of Consciousness [see also 1.4f, 6.4a]

1.7 Qualia

1.7a General

1.7b Qualia and Materialism [see also 1.2, 1.3]

1.7c Eliminativism about Qualia [see also 1.4e]

1.7d The Inverted Spectrum

1.7e Absent Qualia (Block, etc) [see also 1.3b]

1.7f Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [see also 1.6d]

1.7g Functionalism and Qualia, General