%0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %T The Language of Thought %I Harvard University Press %D 1975 %Z Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why there still has to be a language of thought %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Propositional attitudes %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 501-23 %Z About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. %T Language, thought and compositionality %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 1-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Abbott, B. %T Natural language and thought: Thinking in English %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 49-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T On the type/token relation of mental representations %I %D 2000 %B Facta Philosophica %V 2 %N %P 23-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Bonjour, L. %T Is thought a symbolic process? %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 89 %N %P 331-52 %Z Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defense against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Fitzpatrick, J. %T Explanation and the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 83 %N %P 3-29 %Z No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Cain, M. J. %T Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy %I Polity Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T On Fodor's problem %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 502-523 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clapin, H. %T Problems with principle P %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 261-77 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 263-78 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T The language of thought: No syntax without semantics %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 187-213 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Aunty's own argument for the language of thought %I Kluwer %D 1992 %B Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy %E J. Ezquerro %E J. Larrazabal %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T A cure for the common code %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brain writing and mind reading %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 403-15 %Z On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Granny's campaign for safe science %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A DeWitt, R. %T Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Psyche %V 1 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Conceptual dependency as the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 275-96 %Z Relates Schank's conceptual dependency to Fodor's LOT. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T Propositional attitudes and the language of thought %I %D 1991 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 21 %N %P 379-88 %Z Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Mental representation %I %D 1978 %B Erkenntnis %V 13 %N %P 9-18 %Z Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Syntax in a dynamic brain %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 110 %N %P 343-55 %Z There are no good arguments for LOT of the form "The brain needs to do X, and X entails LOT". Considers X = concatenation, logical form, tracking, combinatorial encoding. Either LOT is weakened deeply or is unnecessary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. %T Thought as language: A metaphor too far %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 85-101 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Gauker, C. %T Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation between Thought and Language %I Princeton University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Harman, G. %T Thought %I Princeton University Press %D 1973 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Language, thought, and communication %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 270-298 %Z Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T How to use propositions %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Is there mental representation? %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Natural language and thought: Doing without mentalese %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 41-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 321-42 %Z LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson, K. %T On the systematicity of the language of thought %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 111-139 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The computational account of belief %I %D 1994 %B Erkenntnis %V 40 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The languages of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 92-110 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Knowles, J. %T The language of thought and natural language understanding %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 264-272 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Must beliefs be sentences? %I %D 1982 %B 1982 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Toward a homuncular theory of believing %I %D 1982 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 4 %N %P 139-59 %Z Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Mental content in linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 147-54 %Z Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T A deductive argument for the representational theory of thinking %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 404-22 %Z Argues from the unboundedness of thinking and the need for a finite stock of elements to something like a language of thought. With remarks on connectionism and instrumentalism, and a reply by Stalnaker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Laurence, S. %A Margolis, E. %T Regress arguments for the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 60-66 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Maloney, J. C. %T The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Markic, O. %T Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? %I %D 2001 %B Acta Analytica %V 16 %N %P 53-60 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The weak and the strong representational theory of mind: Stich's interpretation of Fodor %I %D 1987 %B Dialogue %V 26 %N %P 349-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T The alleged evidence for representationalism %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Rerepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T Is there vindication through representationalism? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T On mentalese orthography %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and his Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pessin, A. %T Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 78 %N %P 33-53 %Z Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollock, J. %T Understanding the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 95-120 %Z Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional, qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought. With comments by Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rantala, V. %A Vaden, T. %T Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 46 %N %P 315-334 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 201-22 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 117 %N %P 95-131 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T The language-of-thought relation and its implications %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 263-85 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, G. %T Symbols and thought %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 106 %N %P 399-407 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sher, G. %T Sentences in the brain %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P 94-99 %Z On Danto's suggestion that beliefs are like sentences. Conventionality poses problems, as does differentiating between different sorts of attitudes. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T Mental content and linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 129-46 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Mental representation: What language is Brainese? %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies, %V 43 %N %P 365-82 %Z Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Beliefs and subdoxastic states %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 499-518 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Teng, N. Y. %T The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 237-251 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Tienson, J. %T Is this any way to be a realist? %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Warmbrod, K. %T Beliefs and sentences in the head %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 2 %N %P 201-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Weller, C. %T Bonjour and mentalese %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 113 %N %P 251-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Yagisawa, T. %T Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's "The language-of-thought relation and its implications" %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 287-96 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brainstorms %I MIT Press %D 1978 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Intentional systems %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 87-106 %Z Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Making sense of ourselves %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 63-81 %Z Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T The Intentional Stance %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction). -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Precis of The Intentional Stance %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z TIS, with commentaries and replies. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) %V 50 %N %P %Z Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Real patterns %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 27-51 %Z Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumental intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 303-16 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance %I %D 1985 %B Cognitive Science %V 9 %N %P 265-92 %Z Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T Interpretivism %I %D 1998 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 3 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Dennett on intelligent storage %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 247-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Belief, opinion and consciousness %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, B. %T Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 76 %N %P 17-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T What can be learned from Brainstorms? %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 83-92 %Z Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Dennett's stance on intentional realism %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 299-312 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Three cheers for propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Representations %Z Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. %T On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Inquiry %V 37 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Objective interpretationism %I %D 1988 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 69 %N %P 136-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 11 %N %P 42-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Pattern and being %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Heitner, R. %T Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 267-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Hornsby, J. %T Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D. Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Kenyon, T. %T Indeterminacy and realism %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, R. %T How to get an interpretivist committed %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 180-221 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyons, W. %T Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 247-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Dennett's logical behaviorism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 189-258 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %T Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 145-157 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T Dennett's little grains of salt %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 1-12 %Z Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A McCulloch, G. %T Intentionality and interpretation %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Narayanan, A. %T The intentional stance and the imitation game %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, N. %T Patterns %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 56-87 %Z Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Price, H. %T Psychology in perspective %I Kluwer %D 1995 %B Philosophy in Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Radner, D. %A Radner, M. %T Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance %I %D 1995 %B International Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P 109-19 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Ratcliffe, M. %T A Kantian stance on the intentional stance %I %D 2001 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 29-52 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richard, M. %T What isn't a belief? %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 291-318 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? %I %D 1980 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 3 %N %P 125-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Seager, W. %T Real patterns and surface metaphysics %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharpe, R. %T Dennett's journey towards panpsychism %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 233-40 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Slors, M. %T Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 93-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Headaches %I %D 1980 %B Philosophical Books %V 21 %N %P 65-73 %Z Critical review of Brainstorms, with response. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Dennett on intentional systems %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 39-62 %Z Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Viger, C. %T Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Webb, S. %T Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 457-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkerson, W. S. %T Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 557-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Yu, P. %A Fuller, G. %T A critique of Dennett %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 66 %N %P 453-76 %Z Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Language, thought, and information processing %I %D 1980 %B Nous %V 14 %N %P 147-70 %Z Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 67-90 %Z Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Stalking the wild epistemic engine %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 5-20 %Z How to dethrone language and still handle content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the speculative nature of our self-conception %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 157-173 %Z Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z 14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk" %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 313-19 %Z Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Evaluating our self-conception %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 211-22 %Z It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives". -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T The threat of cognitive suicide %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Cognitive suicide %I University of Arizona Press %D 1988 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bertolet, R. %T Saving eliminativism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 87-100 %Z Against Baker's cognitive-suicide arguments against eliminativism. We don't know what a replacement theory will look like, but that doesn't show that none is forthcoming. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Revisionary physicalism %I %D 1992 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 7 %N %P 411-30 %Z Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Blunt, P. K. %T A defense of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 32 %N %P 487-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chater, N. %A Oaksford, M. %T The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science %I Blackwell %D 1996 %B The Churchlands and their Critics %E R. McCauley %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Studies %V 56 %N %P 53-75 %Z Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Disappearance and knowledge %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 226-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T The empirical virtues of belief %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 303-23 %Z Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. E. %T A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 105-33 %Z EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. C. %T Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism? %I %D 2001 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 9 %N %P 485-498 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Graham, G. %A Horgan, T. %T Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy %I Ridgeview %D 1992 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Reasons to believe %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Against eliminative materialism: from folk psychology to Volkerpsychologie %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 349-68 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. %T Understanding folk %I %D 1988 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 62 %N %P 222-46 %Z Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 21-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 165-179 %Z A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Woodward, J. %T Folk psychology is here to stay %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Review %V 94 %N %P 197-225 %Z Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Graham, G. %T In defense of Southern Fundamentalism %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 62 %N %P 107-134 %Z FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T The austere ideology of folk psychology %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %A Henderson, D. %T What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %B Mind as a Scientific Object %E C. Erneling %E D. Johnson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horst, S. %T Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief' %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 123-45 %Z Clarifies different senses of "theoretical" and "belief". Some beliefs are relevantly theoretical (dispositional, infra-conscious, unconscious ones), but conscious occurrent beliefs are not, and so can't be eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T In defense of folk psychology %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 31-54 %Z FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not propositional attitudes are good scientific entities. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacoby, H. %T Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states %I %D 1985 %B 1985 %V %N %P %Z Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.) -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T In defense of intentional psychology %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 89-106 %Z The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lahav, R. %T The amazing predictive power of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 70 %N %P 99-105 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lockie, R. %T Transcendental arguments against eliminativism %I %D 2003 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 54 %N %P 569-589 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Testament of a recovering eliminativist %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, G. %T Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 49-70 %Z Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Where does the self-refutation objection take us? %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 453-65 %Z The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Garon, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation %I %D 1991 %B Inquiry %V 34 %N %P 499-508 %Z Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 378-92 %Z A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Resnick, P. %T Intentionality is phlogiston %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Richards, G. %T On the necessary survival of folk psychology %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Topics %V 13 %N %P 60-67 %Z There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, A. %T How is eliminative materialism possible? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, A. %T Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists %I %D 1999 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 59 %N %P 335-358 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T What price neurophilosophy? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1 %N %P 461-68 %Z Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schouten, M. K. D. %A de Jong, H. L. %T Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 489-509 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Reduction, elimination, and the mental %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 203-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 306-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Do true believers exist? %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 229-44 %Z Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions: if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T What is a theory of mental representation? %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 243-61 %Z Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Deconstructing the mind %I %D 1996 %B Deconstructing the Mind %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tait, W. W. %T The myth of the mind %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 65-74 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. A. %T How not to refute eliminative materialism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 101-125 %Z Against transcendental arguments against eliminativism. These fail on their own terms, and even if successful they would not establish causal/explanatory relevance for the attitudes, which is the real key for folk psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Tomberlin, J. %T Whither Southern Fundamentalism? %I , Ridgeview %D 1994 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Trout, J. D. %T Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 87 %N %P 379-400 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Waskan, J. %T Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism %I %D 2003 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 41 %N %P 627-656 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Can there be a rationally compelling argument for anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology? %I Ridgeview %D 1996 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Adler, J. %T Belief's Own Ethics %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Audi, R. %T Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe %I %D 1994 %B Nous %V 28 %N %P 419-34 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Saving Belief %I Princeton University Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T What beliefs are not %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Are beliefs brain states? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Practical realism defended: Replies to critics %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Beckerman, A. %T The real reason for the standard view %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. %T Belief: Form, Content, and Function %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T A natural history of belief %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 324-345 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Beyond belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bogdan, R. J. %T The manufacture of belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bovens, L. %T Do beliefs supervene on degrees of confidence? %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Cohen, L. J. %T Does belief exist? %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology %E A. Clark %E P. Millican %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Crimmins, M. %T Talk about Beliefs %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Crimmins, M. %T Tacitness and virtual beliefs %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 240-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Frankish, K. %T A matter of opinion %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 423-442 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Funkhouser, E. %T Willing belief and the norm of truth %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 179-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Garfield, J. %T Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind %I MIT Press %D 1988 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilbert, M. %T Belief and acceptance as features of groups %I %D 2002 %B Protosociology %V 16 %N %P 35-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Guttenplan, S. %T Belief, knowledge, and the origins of content %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 287-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lehrer, K. %T Belief, acceptance, and cognition %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %B On Believing %E H. Parret %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Tacit belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T It's hard to believe %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 122-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. A. %T Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all the explanatory work at lower cost. With some remarks on subdoxastic states, and the difference between belief and opinion. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcus, R. B. %T The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 113-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Individuating beliefs %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 303-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meijers, A. W. M. %T Believing and accepting as a group %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meihers, A. W. M. %T Belief, Cognition, and the Will %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meijers, A. %T Explaining Beliefs %I University of Chicago Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meyering, T. %T The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Mosterin, J. %T Acceptance without belief %I %D 2002 %B Manuscrito %V 25 %N %P 313-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, A. %T Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 277-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Newen, A. %T Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, D. J. %T Does belief have an aim? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 283-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Parrett, H. %T On Believing %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Rigterink, R. J. %T What are beliefs (if they are anything at all)? %I %D 1991 %B Metaphilosophy %V 22 %N %P 101-14 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sobel, D. %A Copp, D. %T Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 44-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T Can we believe what we do not understand? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 84-100 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T States and beliefs %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 33-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T In-between believing %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 249-75 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Skokowski, P. %T Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy of Science %V 71 %N %P 362-369 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperber, D. %T Intuitive and reflective beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 67-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Stainton, R. %T Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction %I %D 1999 %B Disputatio %V 6 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief %I %D 1983 %B From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds %I %D 2002 %B Theoria %V 68 %N %P 224-49 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Free belief %I %D 2003 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 2 %N %P 327-36 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Can collectives have beliefs? %I %D 1990 %B Acta Philosophica Fennica %V 49 %N %P 454-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 205-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Velleman, D. %T On the aim of belief %I %D 2000 %B 2000 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wedgwood, R. %T The aim of belief %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 267-97 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wray, K. B. %T Collective belief and acceptance %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 319-33 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Arlo Costa, H. %A Collins, J. %A Levi, I. %T Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 2-5 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T Dretske's desires %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 50 %N %P 795-800 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T A desire of one's own %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 100 %N %P 221-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bricke, J. %T Desires, passions, and evaluations %I %D 2000 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 16 %N %P 59-65 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T The physiology of desire %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 13 %N %P 69-88 %Z Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Chan, D. K. %T Are there extrinsic desires? %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 326-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, D. %T Belief, desire, and revision %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 333-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, W. %T Two senses of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Fuery, P. %T Theories of Desire %I Melbourne University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hajek, A. %A Pettit, P. %T Desire beyond belief %I %D 2004 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 77-92 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, C. A. %T Desires and the desirable %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Forum %V 25 %N %P 19-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hubin, D. C. %T Desires, whims, and values %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Ethics %V 7 %N %P 315-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Humberstone, I. L. %T Wanting as believing %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 49-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hulse, D. %A Read, C. %A Schroeder, T. %T The impossibility of conscious desire %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 73-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Kvart, I. %T Beliefs and believing %I %D 1986 %B Theoria %V 52 %N %P 129-45 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Larson, E. %T Needs versus desires %I %D 1994 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 323-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief II %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 105 %N %P 303-13 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Marks, J. %T The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting %I Precedent %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Marks, J. %T On the need for theory of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. R. %T Irresistible desires %I %D 1990 %B Nous %V 24 %N %P 455-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %A Price, H. %T Bare functional desire %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 162-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pojman, L. P. %T Believing and willing %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Price, H. %T Defending desire-as-belief %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 119-27 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, P. W. %T Explaining motivated desires %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 199-207 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, J. M. %T Desires don't cause actions %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 84 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schroeder, T. %T Three Faces of Desire %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schueler, G. F. %T Pro-attitudes and direction of fit %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 277-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schueler, G. F. %T Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 157-180 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Silverman, H. J. %T Philosophy and Desire %I Routledge %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, M. %T Reason and desire %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 88 %N %P 243-58 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Defining desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. W. %T The authority of desire %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Review b %V 96 %N %P 335-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Desire %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind %E S. Guttenplan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Teichmann, R. %T Whyte on the individuation of desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 103-7 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Vadas, M. %T Affective and nonaffective desire %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 273-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Whyte, J. T. %T Weak-kneed desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 107-11 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %T Brain states with attitude %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Attitudes as nonentities %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 175-203 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Balaguer, M. %T Attitudes without propositions %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and phenomenological research %V 58 %N %P 805-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Bennett, J. %T Analysis without noise %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 186 %N %P 84-89 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Radical ascent %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 211-27 %Z The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Beliefs and desires incorporated %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 404-25 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T On gauging attitudes %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 90 %N %P 129-54 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 664-74 %Z Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book %A Falk, A. E. %T Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates %I Hamilton Books, University Press of America %D 2004 %Z A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes: dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and truth-conditions. With arguments for structured representations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Attitudes without psychology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 239-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly, %V 40 %N %P 169-82 %Z Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T The measure of mind %I %D 1994 %B Mind %V 103 %N %P 131-46 %Z A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 47-80 %Z Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions. desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. K. %T Physicalism and intentional attitudes %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 33-41 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Between instrumentalism and brain-writing %I %D 1983 %B Sense and Content %Z Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes, but the language of thought is too strong a requirement. A state's structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Possin, K. %T The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 49 %N %P 405-18 %Z Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Pratt, I. %T Analysis and the attitudes %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What's in a mind? %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 97-122 %Z Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn %I %D 1998 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 35 %N %P 21-37 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 5-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. M. %T Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 103-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription %I %D 1984 %B 1984 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Von Eckardt, B. %A Poland, J. %T In defense of the standard view %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 312-331 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 275-303 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Contents just aren't in the head %I %D 2003 %B Erkenntnis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 146-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Bruns, M. %A Soldati, G. %T Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts %I %D 1997 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 185-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Other bodies %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z On Putnam's Twin Earth. Natural kind terms are not indexical. Even de dicto attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Butler, K. %T Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism %I Kluwer %D 1998 %Z Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T Internalist explorations %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T All the difference in the world %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 1-25 %Z Twins share the same concepts. Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious; contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Methodological reflections on belief %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an empirical theory about belief. Belief contents are distinct from sentence contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, S. %T Arguments for externalism %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Meanings just ain't in the head %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality. Searle's theory requires magic to grasp external contents internally. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T A shocking idea about meaning %I %D 2001 %B Revue Internationale de Philosophie %V 55 %N %P 471-494 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T The nature of thought %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 185-99 %Z Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social. A system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an appropriate learning history. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Farkas, K. %T What is externalism? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 112 %N %P 187-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Putnam, Searle, and externalism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 81 %N %P 27-69 %Z Argues for a moderate externalism by synthesizing Putnam and Searle: internal intension leaves extension indeterminate, but it specifies the facts relevant to filling in the indeterminacy. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Contents just are in the head %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 54 %N %P 321-344 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Koethe, J. %T And they ain't outside the head either %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 27-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Lau, J. %T Externalism about mental content %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Liz, M. %T Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Ludwig, K. %T Externalism, naturalism, and method %I Ridgeview %D 1993 %B Naturalism and Normativity %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Duplicating thoughts %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 92-102 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Mandelkar, S. %T An argument against the externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 375-82 %Z Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so external relations cannot suffice for intentional content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T The spirit of twin earth %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 168-174 %Z Various arguments against Crane 1991 on externalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. %T Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 225-280 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T The internal basis of meaning %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 143-69 %Z Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state, involving de se cognitive attitudes. These states aren't shared by twins, but are still narrow in a strong sense. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Functionalism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 529-49 %Z Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we include inputs and outputs. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Owens, J. %T Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T The problem of the essential indexical %I %D 1979 %B Nous %V 13 %N %P 3-21 %Z Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a relation to a proposition. Belief contents must be at least in part construed relative to a subject. Separate belief object and belief state. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T The meaning of `meaning' %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 131-193 %Z What is in the head doesn't determine the meaning of our terms: my twin on Twin Earth means XYZ where I mean H2O. Content is determined by environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. R. %T Intentionality %I Cambridge University Press %D 1983 %Z Sure, meanings are in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual experience is "the thing that is causing this experience". -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Silvers, S. %T Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Between internalism and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1991 %B Consciousness %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Abilities, concepts, and externalism %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to internalism and externalism. Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized externally but determined internally. Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T Twin earth revisited %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 63 %N %P 297-311 %Z Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoneham, T. %T Temporal externalism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Papers %V 1 %N %P 97-107 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. M. %T Naming natural kinds %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 145 %N %P 65-87 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Wilson, R. %T Individualism %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Yalowitz, S. %T Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 43-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. M. %T Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms %I %D 1976 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 116-27 %Z Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth, using arguments from isotopes and scientific development. Molar properties determine classification. Remarks on historicism and the division of labor. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Social relations and the individuation of thought %I %D 1993 %B Mind %V 102 %N %P 247-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Benejam, A. %T Thought experiments and semantic competence %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bridges, J. %T Davidson's transcendental externalism %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Defending Burge's thought experiment %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 55 %N %P 387-391 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and the mental %I %D 1979 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 73-122 %Z Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc. So mental states are not individuated individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Intellectual norms and foundations of mind %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 697-720 %Z On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community, to which meanings are answerable. Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted. With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. The thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Replies from Tyler Burge. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. Donnellan, K. 2003. Burge's thought experiments %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elugardo, R. %T Burge on content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 367-84 %Z Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forbes, G. %T A dichotomy sustained %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 187-211 %Z Gives a Fregean account of belief semantics to handle the Burge cases, and argues that the *type* of a proposition may be internal even if the token itself is not. With remarks on the relevance to Grice's program. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Frapolli, M. %A Romero, E. %T Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge %I CSLI %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Gauker, C. %T Social externalism and linguistic communication %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T Rethinking Burge's thought experiment %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 145-64 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Grimaltos, T. %T Terms and content %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Hahn, M. %T When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Hahn, M. %A Ramberg, B. %T Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Individualism and interpretation %I %D 1998 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 14 %N %P 31-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Marqueze, J. %T On orthodox and heterodox externalisms %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Curing folk psychology of arthritis %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 323-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nordby, H. %T Davidson on social externalism %I %D 2005 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 86 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Normore, C. %T Burge, Descartes, and us %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Meaning, other people, and the world %I %D 1987 %B Representation and Reality %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual errors %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 203 %N %P 217-31 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Woodfield, A. %T Thought and the social community %I %D 1982 %B Inquiry %V 25 %N %P 435-50 %Z Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber. Content itself is still internal. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Woodfield, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual diversity %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Thought and Language %E J. Preston %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Arjo, D. %T Sticking up for Oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 231-45 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %A Robbins, P. %T Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? %I %D 2001 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T An externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Topics %V 15 %N %P 191-226 %Z Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation. Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content. Causal links are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T "Narrow"-minded breeds inaction %I %D 1992 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 59-70 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions) %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 74-95 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Two thought experiments reviewed %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 284-94 %Z Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Corazza, E. %T Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 307-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T What isn't wrong with folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 1-13 %Z Argues that extrinsic properties can play a respectable role in scientific explanation; e.g. the histories of plants, animals, and devices are relevant in explaining their current behavior. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Where is the mind? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Must psychology be individualistic? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Review %V 100 %N %P 179-203 %Z Maybe, maybe not. Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic. Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 63-109 %Z Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest? -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 98-118 %Z Twin Earth isn't a problem for cognitive science. Intents of utterances, de re/de dicto, etc. Truth conditions aren't in the head, but that's no problem. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Mind and chance %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 533-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? %I %D 1984 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 7 %N %P 233-46 %Z Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T [Explanation] is explanation better %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 154-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. L. %T Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 78-97 %Z Argues against Stich, Fodor, Block: use different taxonomies (narrow/wide) for different purposes. Both are OK, functionalism *and* content survive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Semantics and psychological prototypes %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 70 %N %P 1-18 %Z Relates the individualism debate to Roschian prototype research. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Losonsky, M. %T Emdedded systems vs. individualism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 357-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Weak externalism and psychological reduction %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The Churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 295-309 %Z MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content. Narrow content is OK. With remarks on folk psychology and computation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 451-69 %Z Various problems for computational psychology handling content. It shares the problems of a naturalistic psychology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 343-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A McClamrock, R. %T Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World %I University of Chicago Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 285-290 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 1-9 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well. But this needn't defeat externalism in general. With remarks on self-knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T The explanatory role of belief ascriptions %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 313-32 %Z Uses examples to argue that in explaining behavior we often ascribe beliefs in an individualistic way, even in cases where individual and community use diverge. These contents are at least sometimes expressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T Individualism and semantic development %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 15-35 %Z Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Externalist explanation %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 203-30 %Z Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties. Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries, and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Petrie, B. %T Nonautonomous psychology %I %D 1990 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 539-59 %Z Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes, so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Pettit, P. %T Broad-minded explanation and psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Subject, Thought and Context %E P. Pettit %E J. McDowell %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Against methodological solipsism: The ecological Approach %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T The return of the individual %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 39-57 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Animals and individualism %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 573-91 %Z Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation. Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 23-47 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. C. %T Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 15 %N %P 119-33 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Wallace, J. %A Mason, H. E. %T On some thought experiments about mind and meaning %I CSLI %D 1990 %B Propositional Attitudes %E C. Anderson %E J. Owens %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 55-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A Wilson, R. A. %T Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T Fodor's modal argument %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 41-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %T It isn't what you think: A new idea about intentional causation %I %D 1995 %B Nous %V 29 %N %P 115-26 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Content and context %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 17-32 %Z Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't, no relational properties can. Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Barrett, J. %T Individualism and the cross-contexts test %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 242-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Braun, D. %T Content, causation, and cognitive science %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 375-89 %Z Arguments for the causal significance of broad content. Physical twins can differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too. Hmm. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individuation and causation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 707 %N %P 303-22 %Z Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles, despite being physically identical. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Intentional properties and causation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Psychology: Debates about Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %E G. Macdonald %Z Reply to Fodor 1991. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, causal powers, and context %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 105-14 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Christensen, D. %T Causal powers and conceptual connections %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 163-8 %Z Fodor's modal argument for narrow content rests on a false analogy between cases concerning thoughts and those concerning planets. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A modal argument for narrow content %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 5-26 %Z On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers: when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes. Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T The supervenience of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 68 %N %P 117-135 %Z Mental content can be extrinsic and efficacious. Narrow content strategies don't work, as observation concepts are still extrinsic. One can't screen of the intrinsic part from the rest. Thought-experiments are inconclusive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Mele, A. %T Mental causes %I %D 1991 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 28 %N %P 61-71 %Z Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content. Historical factors can be causally relevant. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and mental causation %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 203-19 %Z Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Klein, M. %T Externalism, content, and causation %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 159-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lalor, B. J. %T It is what you think: intentional potency and anti-individualism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Causal relevance and thought content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 44 %N %P 334-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Conceptual causation %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 525-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T Non-Cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 221-41 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 242-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L. M. %T Fodor, Adams, and causal properties %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 57-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Content and causal powers %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 658-65 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %A Sober, E. %T The causal efficacy of content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 1-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seymour, D. %T Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 43 %N %P 83-89 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturgeon, S. %T Good reasoning and cognitive architecture %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 88-101 %Z Epistemology requires the causal relevance of content, and the relevant content is narrow. On how various architectures might support this causal relevance, by being realized by more specific intrinsic features. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A van Gulick, R. %T Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Individualism, causal powers, and explanation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 68 %N %P 103-39 %Z Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal powers. With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Against a priori arguments for individualism %I %D 1993 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 74 %N %P 60-79 %Z Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Wide causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 251-81 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 313-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory %I %D 1996 %B Analysis %V 56 %N %P 146-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Cain, M. J. %T Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 441-463 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Individualism and perceptual content %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 461-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Individualism, computation, and perceptual content %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 443-59 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Egan, F. %T Intentionality and the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Francescotti, R. M. %T Externalism and the Marr theory of vision %I %D 1991 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 227-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, P. %T Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 86-99 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Patterson, S. %T Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Seeing what is not there %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Review %V 97 %N %P 189-214 %Z Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic. Intentional contents therein are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Defence of a reasonable individualism %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 485-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Review %V 102 %N %P 489-513 %Z Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may classify twins together. Computational-level task descriptions rather than behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T A clearer vision %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 131-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Junk representations %I %D 1997 %B 1997 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Andler, D. %T Can we knock off the shackles of syntax? %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individuation %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 114 %N %P 277-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Computation and content %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Review %V 104 %N %P 181-203 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T In defence of narrow mindedness %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 177-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kazez, J. R. %T Computationalism and the causal role of content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 231-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Individualism and artificial intelligence %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 429-56 %Z Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Computation, content, and cause %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 241-63 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Content, computation, and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Computation as involving content: A response to Egan %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 195-202 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Thought and syntax %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z Syntax is extrinsically determined, as well as semantics. So if broad content is irrelevant to psychology, syntax is too. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Shagrir, O. %T Content, computation and externalism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 369-400 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bar-On, D. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 430-55 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Beebee, H. %T Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 356-74 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Berg, J. %T First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge %I %D 1998 %B Dialectica %V 52 %N %P 41-44 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Davidson on first-person authority and externalism %I %D 1996 %B Inquiry %V 39 %N %P 121-39 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge %I %D 1996 %B Nous %V 30 %N %P 262-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bernecker, S. %T Self-knowledge and closure %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Memory and externalism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical and Phenomenological Research %V 69 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Topics %V 20 %N %P 233-68 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T A trilemma for redeployment %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 22-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T Content and self-knowledge %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Topics %V 17 %N %P 5-26 %Z We can't know our thought-contents by inference (circular), by introspection (because they're relational), or directly, so we can't know them at all. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P, %T Externalism and inference %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Issues %V 2 %N %P 11-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The transparency of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 33-50 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T What the externalist can know a priori %I %D 1997 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 97 %N %P 161-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 149-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 659-676 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 100 %N %P 115-35 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Anti-individualism and agnosticism %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 213-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Brown, J. %T The reductio argument and transmission of warrant %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Scepticism about knowledge of content %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 447-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T What an anti-individualist knows a priori %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 111-18 %Z Contra McKinsey 1991, anti-individualism doesn't lead to a priori knowledge. The belief that water is wet doesn't conceptually entail facts about the external world (e.g. H2O), although it may metaphysically necessitate them. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Semantic answers to skepticism %I %D 1992 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 73 %N %P 200-19 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Skepticism and externalism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophia %V 22 %N %P 169-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review: %V 103 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Trying to get outside your own skin %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 23 %N %P 79-111 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 4 %N %P 287-90 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Two recent approaches to self-knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 13 %N %P 251-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 132-136 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Ambiguity and knowledge of content %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 257-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T A priori knowledge of the world not easily available %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 104 %N %P 109-114 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Anti-individualism and analyticity %I %D 2002 %B Analysis %V 62 %N %P 87-91 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bruckner, A. %T Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner A. %T Brewer on the McKinsey problem %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 41-43 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and self-knowledge %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 649-63 %Z Knowledge of our thoughts is compatible with externalism: its content is self-referential and self-verifying. We needn't be able to explicate the content or its enabling conditions, or rule out twin possibilities. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Memory and self-knowledge %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content %I %D 1997 %B philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 773-800 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism and skepticism %I %D 1998 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 13-34 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Problems for semantic externalism and a priori refutations of skeptical arguments %I %D 2000 %B Dialectica %V 54 %N %P 29-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Chase, J. %T Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Jouenal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 227-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Knowing one's own mind %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E and C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism and armchair knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %B New Essays on the A Priori %E P. Boghossian %E C. Peacocke %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism, self-Knowledge and transmission of warrant %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T The problem of armchair knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Externalism and self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ebbs, G. %T Can we take our words at face value? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 499-530 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ebbs, G. %T Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent? %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 43-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Ebbs, G. %T A puzzle about doubt %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Edwards, J. %T The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E and C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %A Owens, J. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review %V 103 %N %P 107-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T The compatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 137-142 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Falvey, K. %T Memory and knowledge of content %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Fernandez, J. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions %I %D 2004 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 12 %N %P 17-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Frapolli, M. %A Romero, E. %T Anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Fumerton, R. %T Introspection and internalism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Gallois, A. %T Deflationary self-knowledge %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallois, A. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Externalism and skepticism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 81 %N %P 1-26 %Z Externalist anti-skeptical arguments fail as they require us to know a priori that our terms designate natural kinds, and also because they require us to know a priori that externalism is true. A thorough analysis. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's "Privileged access" %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 101-8 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T Asymmetry of access to intentional states %I %D 1994 %B Erkenntnis %V 40 %N %P 185-211 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gertler, B. %T We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does? %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 44-47 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Externalism and knowledge of content %I %D 1996 %B Philsophical Review %V 105 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 13-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Glock, H. J. %A Preston, J. M. %T Externalism and first-person authority %I %D 1995 %B Monist %V 78 %N %P 515-33 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 211-19 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 136-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 165-201 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 100 %N %P 51-79 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 65-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 597-621 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists %I %D 2003 %B Analysis %V 63 %N %P 38-41 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 116 %N %P 53-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Goldberg, S. C. %T What do you know when you know your own thoughts? %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T (Nonstandard) lessons from world-switching cases %I %D 2005 %B Philosophia %V 32 %N %P 85-131 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument %I %D 2005 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 35 %N %P 135-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Hall, L. %T The self-knowledge that externalists leave out %I %D 1998 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 14 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge %I %D 2006 %B Ratio %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1998 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 72 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Privileged access %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 238-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach %I %D 2002 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 83 %N %P 235-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Mental content and hot self-knowledge %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 71-99 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Kobes, B. %T Mental content and hot self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Kraay, K. J. %T Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 56 %N %P 297-317 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation %I %D 2002 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 42-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Larkin, W. S. %T Brute error with respect to content %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 159-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %T Subjectivism and environmentalism %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 197-214 %Z Subjectivism and environmentalism seem to clash on knowledge of content, but it's OK: under environmentalism we still know our contents w/o evidence. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 45-49 %Z Argues that cases of switching between language communities are quite common, so that Warfield's case for externalist self-knowledge doesn't work. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 157-59 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Social externalism and memory: A problem? %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 69-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T On the relevance of slow switching %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 285-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book %A Ludlow, P. %A Martin, N. %T Externalism and Self-Knowledge %I CSLI %D 1998 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and first-person authority %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 99-122 %Z On reconciling externalism with the non-evidential character of first-person knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E P. Smith %E C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Apriorism in the philosophy of language %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 1-32 %Z Argues that we can know the meaning of our words a priori. Analyzes twin earth cases by separating propositional meaning from linguistic meaning, which is indexical, fixes reference, and is knowable a priori. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 9-16 %Z Contra Burge: if there are conceptual connections between wide contents and and the external world, then we can't know wide contents a priori, as otherwise we could know a priori that the world exists. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism %I %D 1994 %B Analysis %V 54 %N %P 124-8 %Z Reply to Brueckner 1992: The claim that belief metaphysically necessitate external facts is trivial. Almost all states do that, for Kripkean reason. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Forms of externalism and privileged access %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 199-224 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T On knowing our own minds %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 52 %N %P 107-16 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McKinsey, M. %T Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Tye, M. %T Externalism, Twin Earth, and self-knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge %E C. Macdonald %E P. Smith %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Tye, M. %T Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Review %V 107 %N %P 349-380 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 74 %N %P 93-118 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Introspecting thoughts %I %D 2001 %B Facta Philosophica %V 3 %N %P 77-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, R. W. %T Externalist self-knowledge and the scope of the a priori %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 67-74 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Moya, C. %T Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nagasawa, Y. %T Externalism and the memory argument %I %D 2002 %B Dialectica %V 56 %N %P 335-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, P. %T Against absence-dependent thoughts %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 92-93 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown argument? %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 48-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: Reply to Brueckner %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nuccetelli, S. %T What anti-individualist cannot know a priori %I %D 1999 %B Analysis %V 59 %N %P 48-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nuccetelli, S. %T Is self-knowledge an entitlement? And why should we care? %I %D 2001 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 39 %N %P 143-155 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Nuccetelli, S. %T Knowing that one knows what one is talking about %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book %A Nuccetelli, S. %T New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Owens, D. %T Externalis, Davidson, and knowledge of comparative content %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey %V 96 %N %P 117-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Pritchard, D. %T McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments %I %D 2002 %B Synthese %V 130 %N %P 279-302 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Pritchard, D. %A Kallestrup, J. %T An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophia %V 2004 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Quesada, D. %T Basic self-knowledge and externalism %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Raffman, D. %T First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Privileged access to the world %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 523-533 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 4 %N %P 358-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T In defense of Burge's thesis %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 107 %N %P 109-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Sufficient absences %I %D 2003 %B Analysis %V 63 %N %P 202-8 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 354-57 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T Boghossian on externalism and inference %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Issues %V 2 %N %P 29-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Spicer, F. %T On the identity of concepts, and the compatibility of externalism and privileged access %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 155-168 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Steup, M. %T Two forms of antiskepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Stroud, B. %T Anti-individualism and scepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoneham, T. %T Boghossian on empty natural kind concepts %I %D 1999 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 99 %N %P 119-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Stueber, K. %T The problem of self-knowledge %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 56 %N %P 269-96 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Szubka, T. %T Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 491-503 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1998 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 72 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 232-37 %Z Boghossian's argument that externalism threatens self-knowledge fails: twin cases needn't be relevant alternatives (unless they are actual), so they don't threaten knowledge of content, by the usual standards of knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Knowing the world and knowing our minds %I %D 1995 %B 1995 %V %N %P %Z Argues that externalism and self-knowledge imply the falsity of skepticism (though externalism alone does not). And arguments against externalist self-knowledge are no better than standard skeptical arguments. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 282-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, C. %T Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Issues %V 10 %N %P 140-63 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Wyler, T. %T First-person authority and singular thoughts %I %D 1994 %B Zeitschrift fur Philosophie Forschung %V 48 %N %P 585-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Drebushenko, D. %A Fuller, G. %A Stecker, R. %T Narrow content: Fodor's folly %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 213-29 %Z Traces and criticizes Fodor's position on narrow content. Argues that narrow content isn't content, and doesn't explain behavior. Fun but arguable. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Fuller, G. %T Names, contents, and causes %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 205-21 %Z Argues that problems with names don't require an appeal to narrow content in explanation. Broad content plus associated descriptions will do the job. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %T Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Representational cognitive science has no need for narrow content -- wide contents and formal properties can do all the work. Argues that the semantics of mental expressions needn't mirror the semantics of language. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 422-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T A farewell to functionalism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 1-14 %Z Argues that type-identical functional states can differ in narrow content, so methodological solipsism fails. Uses the example of identical programs for playing chess and arms negotiations. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Just what do we have in mind? %I %D 1985 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 25-48 %Z Some implausible twin cases trying to show that mental life can vary wildly while preserving physical/computational state. Bizarre. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Content by courtesy %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 197-213 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Saving Belief %I Princeton University Press %D 1987 %Z Lots of arguments against narrow content. Very stimulating, though wrong. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Biro, J. I. %T In defense of social content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 67 %N %P 277-93 %Z Contra Loar 1988, the contents of "that"-clauses often reflects psychological content, even if it sometimes does not. We don't need narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T What narrow content is not %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z There are big problems specifying the "mapping" and the relevant contexts for Fodor's theory noncircularly. Narrow content either collapses into syntax or is too coarse-grained. Nontrivial narrow content must be holistic. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Ruritania revisited %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, C. %T Belief states and narrow content %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 343-67 %Z Criticizes the "bracketing" strategy of Stich and Walker, and argues that intrinsic belief state should be individuated according to how it embeds in different environments. With a comparison with Fodor's related theory. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, C. %T Narrow mental content %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The components of content %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings %E D. Chalmers %Z Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The nature of narrow content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 46-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content %I %D 1986 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 60 %N %P 263-83 %Z Comments on Fodor 1987. Fodor doesn't make a conclusive case against externalism; but narrow content may be promising, and inexpressibility doesn't pose any real problems. With comparisons to neo-Fregean theories. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Beyond belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T The narrow representational theory of mind %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z Not syntactic psychology nor wide psychology, but narrow psychology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Field, H. %T "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Individualism and supervenience %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Science taxonomizes by causal powers, which are locally supervenient, so psychology needs a narrow notion of content. Proposes that a relativized notion -- a function from context to extension -- can do the job. Nice. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Jackson, F. %A and Pettit, P. %T Some content is narrow %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil and A. Mele %Z Argues that folk psychology needs a notion of narrow content to provide robust predictive behavioral generalizations that covers doppelgangers. If not, then some behavioral patterns would be flukey. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Representation and narrow belief %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 99-112 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T Solipsistic semantics %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 595-614 %Z There's no good way to construe narrow content. Phenomenologist strategy is intrinsically wide, and indexicalist strategy can't specify content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T Dual aspect semantics %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Loar, B. %T Social content and psychological content %I University of Arizona Press %D 1987 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Uses examples to argue that psychological content is not fixed by the content of "that"-clauses in belief ascription, and vice versa. We require a subtler kind of narrow content to capture what's going on. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Subjective intentionality %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Topics %V 15 %N %P 89-124 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Saving psychological solipsism %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 61 %N %P 267-83 %Z Contests the "provoked/aggravated assault" example of Baker 1986. If they're doppelgangers, then their narrow content can't differ. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. %T Two routes to narrow content: both dead ends %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 3-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, M. %T Narrow content %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 277-88 %Z Narrow beliefs are de re beliefs about our inputs and outputs. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. %T Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 225-280 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Newman, A. E. %T Two grades of internalism (pass and fail) %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Studies %V 122 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Fodor and Block on narrow content %I %D 1987 %B Representation and Reality %Z Against perceptual-prototype and conceptual-role accounts of narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Quillen, K. %T Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 133-57 %Z Can't get a `mode of presentation' account of narrow content to work, either through description theory or prototypes. Psych should be non-individualist. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T Externalism and narrow content %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z There are levels of narrowness, varying by whether independence is of actual or normal environment. Argues that this can be consistent with externalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T How narrow is narrow content? %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 209-29 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Fodor's character %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book %A Segal, G. %T A Slim Book about Narrow Content %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Narrow content: A defense %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 109-27 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T Narrow content %I CSLI %D 1990 %B Propositional Attitudes %E C. A. Anderson %E J. Owens %Z On some problems with narrow content, contra Loar 1987. Narrow content is hard to spell out with "diagonal" propositions. Loar doesn't show that psychological content is narrow. With some remarks on privileged access. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Narrow content meets fat syntax %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that narrow content is still too coarse-grained for explanation, classifying psychologically distinct states together. Use syntax instead. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Supervenience and levels of meaning %I %D 1989 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 443-58 %Z Argues that the partial character construal of narrow content is not interestingly semantic. It collapses into syntax or phenomenology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem %I %D 1989 %B Nous %V 23 %N %P 355-72 %Z Uses a "fraternal twin earth" thought experiment to show that even de dicto attributions don't supervene on narrow role, and that narrow content can't be explicated descriptively unless it collapses into phenomenalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Vaughan, R. %T Searle's narrow content %I %D 1989 %B Ratio %V 2 %N %P 185-90 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A White, S. %T Partial character and the language of thought %I %D 1982 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 63 %N %P 347-65 %Z Replies to Burge/Stich arguments by introducing partial character -- a function from context to content, analogous to Kaplan's character -- as the semantic property determined by functional state and relevant to explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A White, S. %T Narrow content and narrow interpretation %I %D 1992 %B The Unity of the Self %Z Argues for an account of narrow content in terms of notional worlds, by considering "objective optimality" across worlds. This allows for a sort of narrow radical interpretation. With arguments against Stalnaker. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Social norms and narrow content %I %D 1990 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 425-462 %Z Narrow content theories can't handle the normativity of content. In-depth treatment of Burge cases and of the failures of causal and conceptual-role accounts. Normativity is fundamentally social. A long, interesting paper. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Williamson, T. %T The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 389-410 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %T Masters of our meanings %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 118 %N %P 133-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Byrne, A. %A Pryor, J. %T Bad intensions %I Oxford University Press %D 2006 %B Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications %E M. Garcia-Carpintero %E J. Macia %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The components of content %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings %E D. Chalmers %Z Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T On sense and intension %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 135-82 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The nature of narrow content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 46-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Epistemic two-dimensional semantics %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 118 %N %P 153-226 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies, %V 118 %N %P 83-131 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. %T Kripkean externalism versus conceptual analysis %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 75-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Fernandez, J. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions %I %D 2004 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 12 %N %P 17-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge %I %D 2006 %B Ratio %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Why we need A-intensions %I %D 2004 %B 2004 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Marconi, D. %T Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 143 %N %P 321-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Apriority and conceptual kinematics %I %D 2001 %B Croatian Journal of Philosophy %V 1 %N %P 21-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Nimtz, C. %T Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms %I %D 2004 %B Synthese %V 138 %N %P 125-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Two-dimensional semantics and propositional attitude content %I %D 2003 %B The Things We Mean %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeter, L. %T Gruesome diagonals %I %D 2003 %B Philosophers' Imprint %V 3 %N 3 %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeter, L. %T The rationalist foundations of Chalmers' two-dimensional semantics %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 18 %N %P 227-55 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T On considering a possible world as actual %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T The bounds of cognition %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 43-64 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Case, J. %T Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 387-89 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The extended mind %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 7-19 %Z Advocates a different sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the environment in actively driving cognition. Beliefs can extend into an agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Reasons, robots and the extended mind %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 1-11 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Dartnall, T. %T Does the world leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology %I %D 2005 %B Cognitive Science %V 29 %N %P 135-43 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Mind embodied and embedded %I Academia Sinica %D 1993 %B Mind and Cognition:1993 International Symposium %E Y. Houng %E J. Ho %Z Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. %T Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book %A Hutchins, E. %T Cognition in the Wild %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %A Maglio, P. %T On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action %I %D 1995 %B Cognitive Science %V 18 %N %P 513-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Regan, K. %T Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory %I %D 1992 %B Canadian Journal of Psychology %V 46 %N %P 461-88 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 389-428 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind %I de Gruyter %D 2005 %B The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality %E R. Schantz %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Wide computationalism %I %D 1994 %B Mind %V 103 %N %P 351-72 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Brook, D. %T Substantial mind %I %D 1992 %B South African Journal of Philosophy %V 1 %N %P 15-21 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, D. J. %T Swampman of La Mancha %I %D 1993 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 327-48 %Z An entertaining fable about a swampthing doppelganger of a murder witness. Does he have content? With plot twists about personal identity. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, D. J. %T A furry tile about mental representation %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 185 %N %P 448-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Buekens, F. %T Externalism, content, and causal histories %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 267-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A de Vries, W. A. %T Experience and the swamp creature %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 55-80 %Z Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Drai, D. %T Externalism without identity %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 134 %N %P 463-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Edwards, S. %T Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind %I Avebury %D 1994 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Engel, P. %T Functionalism, belief, and content %I Horwood %D 1987 %B The Mind and the Machine %E Torrance %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Mental content and the division of epistemic labour %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 302-18 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Identity without supervenience %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 59-79 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Houghton, D. %T Mental content and external representations: internalism, anti-internalism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 47 %N %P 159-77 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T Functionalism and broad content %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 318-400 %Z Should construe functionalism broadly rather than narrowly; then can handle the problem of broad content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Katz, J. %T The domino theory %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 3-39 %Z Anti-intensional arguments are not independent but a series of dominos. Quine/Quine/Davidson/Putnam/Burge rise and fall together. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %T Weak externalism and mind-body identity %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 387-404 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and norms %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A McCulloch, G. %T The Mind and its World %I Routledge %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A McGinn, C. %T The structure of content %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z Belief content has two distinct elements, one causal-explanatory, the other truth-related. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T In defense of a different Doppelganger %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Review %V 96 %N %P 521-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 89-117 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Pereboom, D. %T Conceptual structure and the individuation of content %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 401-428 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Preti, C. %T Belief and desire under the elms %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 270-284 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T Semantic externalism and conceptual competence %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 315-33 %Z Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Externalism and token-token identity %I %D 1995 %B Philosophia %V 24 %N %P 359-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Rowlands, M. %T The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes %I Cambridge University Press %D 1999 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rudd, A. %T Two types of externalism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 47 %N %P 501-7 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Externalism and token identity %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 439-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T On what's in the head %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 287-319 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Thomas, J. %T Analogies and the mind of the replica: Sunburn, the little green bug, and the fake plant %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 364-371 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Vahid, H. %T Content externalism and the internalism/externalism debate in justification theory %I %D 2003 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 11 %N %P 89-107 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Voltolini, A. %T On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism %I %D 2005 %B Disputation %V 18 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Walker, V. %T In defense of a different taxonomy: A reply to Owens %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review %V 99 %N %P %Z Contra Owens 1987: wide intentional descriptions and molar bodily descriptions don't exhaust the options. A bracketing strategy gives a narrow intentional taxonomy of mental states. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Externalism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 352-80 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Woodfield, A. %T Two categories of content %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 319-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T The informational turn in philosophy %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 471-501 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Barwise, J. %A Perry, J. %T Situations and Attitudes %I MIT Press %D 1983 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Barwise, J. %T Information and circumstance %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z Defending information against Fodor 1986. Information is objective but relational, and depends on the relevant constraints between representation and environment. Circumstances play a vital role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Barwise, J. %T Unburdening the language of thought %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z From material (formal) info to semantic info via teleology; from semantic information to representation via internal structure. Cute. With a good reply by Israel, and a terse reply by Dretske. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Mind, content and information %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bridges, J. %T Does informational semantics commit Euthypho's fallacy %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Mice, shrews, and misrepresentation %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 90 %N %P 290-310 %Z Uses information theory to analyze misrepresentation. A signal represents what it carries most information about, not what it correlates best with. Treating some signals as noise can increase information content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Coulter, J. %T The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 583-96 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Knowledge and the Flow of Information %I MIT Press %D 1981 %Z Defines knowledge content is in terms of information-flow from events, and applies to various aspects of psychology. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information %I %D 1983 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 6 %N %P 55-90 %Z A summary of the book, with commentary and replies. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Putting information to work %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z On the causal role of information (as opposed to meaning). Information is causally efficacious if considered with respect to learning. With commentary by Brian Smith. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays %I Cambridge University Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Floridi, L. %T Two approaches to the philosophy of information %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 459-469 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Information and association %I %D 1986 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 27 %N %P %Z Transmission of information is no good without the encoding of information. With criticisms of associative networks, which transmit without encoding, and criticism of Barwise & Perry's account of attunement to a relation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A situated grandmother %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Foley, R. %T Dretske's `information-theoretic' account of knowledge %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Frank, M. C. %T Against informational atomism %I %D 2004 %B The Dualist %V 10 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Gjelsvik, O. %T Dretske on knowledge and content %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 86 %N %P 425-41 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Grandy, R. %T Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 191-203 %Z Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology than Dretske's. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Grim, P. %A St. Denis, P. %A Kokalis, T. %T Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 43-66 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Indicator semantics and Dretske's function %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 367-82 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Heller, M. %T Indication and what might have been %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 187-91 %Z We need to analyze indication in terms of "close enough" worlds; the relevant conditionals are "might"-conditionals. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Israel, D. %A Perry, J. %T What is information? %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackendoff, R. %T Information is in the mind of the beholder %I %D 1985 %B Linguistics and Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 23-33 %Z Argues that a representationalist theory of semantics beats a realist one. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Kistler, M. %T Source and channel in the informational theory of mental content %I %D 2000 %B Facta Philosophica %V 2 %N %P 213-36 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Kulvicki, J. %T Isomorphism in information-carrying systems %I %D 2004 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 85 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Loewer, B. %T From information to intentionality %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, W. E. %T The regularity theory of information %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 375-398 %Z Dretske has problems with ruling out alternative possibilities; and there is a gap between information-caused belief and knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Savitt, S. %T Absolute informational content %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 185-90 %Z Makes a distinction between absolute information and information that's relative to other knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sayre, K. M. %T Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science %I %D 1986 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 9 %N %P 121-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sayre, K. M. %T Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 247-69 %Z On problems with a computational approach to content: computers process info(t), the non-semantic content of communication theory, not info(s), or semantic content. Get info(s) from efficient processing of mutual info(t). -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturdee, D. %T The semantic shuffle: Shifting emphasis in Dretske's account of representational content %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 47 %N %P 89-104 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Belief, information and semantic content: A naturalist's lament %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 71 %N %P 97-124 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Usher, M. %T A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 331-334 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Winograd, T. %T Cognition, attunement and modularity %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T A problem for information-theoretic semantics %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 1-29 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Meaning and the world order %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Defends and refines a causal theory, using the notion of asymmetric dependence of a token upon the world. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T A theory of content II %I %D 1990 %B A Theory of Content %Z Defending the asymmetric dependence theory against various objections. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T `X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P 175-83 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 97-104 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T `X' means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 215-31 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Fodor's asymmetric causal dependency theory and proximal projections %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 35 %N %P 433-437 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %A Levine, J. %T The nomic and the robust %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T On a causal theory of content %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Has content been naturalized? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernier, P. %T Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 327-42 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Boghossian, P. %T Naturalizing content %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that Fodor's theory is a type-1 theory, requiring naturalistically specifiable circumstances in which a symbol is only caused by its referent; and that these theories fail for various reasons, e.g. verificationism. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Cain, M. J. %T Fodor's attempt to naturalize mental content %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 520-26 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Cram, H-R. %T Fodor's causal theory of representation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 56-70 %Z Fodor's theory has counterexamples and can't explain its counterfactuals; but we can save it by borrowing from Dretske's account of misrepresentation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibson, M. %T Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 235-59 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Loar, B. %T Can we explain intentionality? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Mental misrepresentation %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 445-58 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. A. %A Summerfield, D. M. %T Robustness without asymmetry: A flaw in Fodor's theory of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 66 %N %P 261-83 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Mariano, L. B. %T Content naturalized %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 96 %N %P 205-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Mendola, J. %T A dilemma for asymmetric dependence %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 232-257 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T Dispositions indisposed: Semantic atomism and Fodor's theory of content %I %D 2000 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 81 %N %P 325-349 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Fodor's theory of content: problems and objections %I %D 1993 %B Phiosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 262-77 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Wallis, C. %T Asymmetric dependence, representation, and cognitive science %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 373-401 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 205-14 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Representation and covariation %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T The LOT of the causal theory of mental content %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 535-542 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Semantics, Wisconsin style %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 231-50 %Z A somewhat sympathetic commentary on the Dretske/Stampe causal theories, but raising the problem of misrepresentation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Information and representation %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Misinformation %I %D 1989 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 533-50 %Z On various attempts to solve the error problem and why they don't work. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Signal, decision, action %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 709-22 %Z World-head reliability is just as important as head-world reliability. With arguments and examples from signal detection theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Lloyd on intrinsic natural representation in simple mechanical minds %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 47-60 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Content: Covariation, control, and contingency %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 241-90 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T What is wrong with correlational psychosemantics %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ray, G. %T Fodor and the inscrutability problem %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 475-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. %T Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation %I %D 1977 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 2 %N %P 42-63 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. %T Verificationism and a causal account of meaning %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 69 %N %P 107-37 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. %T Content, context, and explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Viger, C. D. %T Locking on to the language of thought %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 203-215 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Warmbrod, K. %T Primitive representation and misrepresentation %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 89-101 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Weitzman, L. %T What makes a causal theory of content anti-skeptical? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 299-318 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Rock beats scissors: Historicalism fights back %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 273-81 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Agar, N. %T What do frogs really believe? %I %D 1993 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 1-12 %Z Argues that a teleological account can resolve content indeterminacies, by an appeal to counterfactuals in examining what properties were selected for. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Ariew, A. %T Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, F. %T The teleological theory of content %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 474-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, F. %T A pyrrhic victory for teleonomy %I %D 2002 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 372-77 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, M. %T Darwinian algorithms and indexical representation %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 27-48 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Manuscript %A Dennett, D. C. %T Fear of Darwin's optimizing rationale %I %D 1988 %Z Defends evolutionary theories of content against Fodor. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Evolution, error and intentionality %I %D 1988 %B The Intentional Stance %Z Attacks original intentionality (Fodor/Burge/Dretske/Searle/Kripke) -- our intentionality, if anything, is derived through evolution, and so is as indeterminate as that of an artifact. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Misrepresentation %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z Tries to deal with misrepresentation by appealing to function. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Norms, history, and the mental %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. L. %T What versus how in naturally selected representations %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 349-363 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Psychosemantics, or, Where do truth conditions come from? %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z Truth conditions are "entry conditions" for belief under "normal function". Later repudiated. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T A theory of content I %I %D 1990 %B A Theory of Content %Z Teleological solutions can't work, because of underdetermination and so on. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Hardcastle, V. %T On the normativity of functions %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Joyce, R. %T Moral realism and teleosemantics %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 723-31 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Keeley, B. %T Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception %I %D 1999 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 395-430 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Lalor, B. J. %T Swampman, etiology, and content %I %D 1998 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 215-232 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Levine, J. %T Swampjoe: mind or simulation? %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 86-91 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, G. %T Biology and representation %I %D 1989 %B Mind and Language %V 4 %N %P 186-200 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthen, M. %T Biological functions and perceptual content %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 5-27 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T An evolutionist approach to language %I %D 1979 %B Philosophy Research Archives %V 5 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z An evolutionary account of thought, content, and various intentional phenomena, appealing to proper functions and adaptational role to individuate contents. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 47-80 %Z The content of a desire is its adaptational Proper Function; the content of a belief is its Normal Condition for success. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Biosemantics %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 281-97 %Z Representation content is determined by the consumption of a representation, not its production. The representation-world correspondence is best taken as a normal condition for the consumer's function. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T In defense of proper functions %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 288-302 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Topics %V 18 %N %P 151-61 %Z Contrasting positions on the role of representation production and consumption; also on the role of reliability, articulateness, and learning. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T Speaking up for Darwin %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z A reply to some of Fodor's criticisms of teleological theories in _Psychosemantics_ and elsewhere. With some remarks on Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice %I %D 1993 %Z A collection of papers on teleological semantics and other issues about psychology and mental content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T On swampkinds %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 103-17 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Troubles with Wagner's reading of Millikan %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 86 %N %P 93-96 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T What has natural information to do with intentional representation? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T Biofunctions: Two paradigms %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T Varieties of Meaning %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Misrepresenting and malfunctioning %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 79 %N %P 109-41 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Dretske's innate modesty %I %D 1995 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 74 %N %P 258-74 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Swampman meets swampcow %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 118-29 %Z It's not unreasonable to deny a swampthing beliefs: swampcows aren't cows and swamphearts aren't hearts. Semantic norms are plausibly grounded in biological norms and so in history. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T Dennett on intrinsic intentionality %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 18-23 %Z Contra Dennett 1988, designed creatures can have intrinsic (if not original) intentionality. Overall purpose is dependent on designer's goals, but specific contents need not be. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Representation and explanation %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 51 %N %P 550-72 %Z A teleological theory of belief/desire contents: the satisfaction conditions for a desire are those effects for which it was selected; truth conditions for a belief are circumstances resulting in satisfaction of desires. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Papineau, D. %T Truth and teleology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B Explanation and its Limits %E D. Knowles %Z Best theory is combination of a success-guaranteeing account of truth-conditions with a teleological account of desire. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Teleology and mental states %I %D 1991 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Doubtful intuitions %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 130-32 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Teleosemantics and indeterminacy %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about Swampman %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 279-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Perlman, M. %T Pagan teleology: Adaptational role and the philosophy of mind %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Pickles, D. %T Intentionality, representation, and function %I %D 1989 %B Sussex University, Cognitive Science Research Paper %V 140 %N %P %Z Combining the analysis-relative and historical accounts of function, and using these to give an account of intentionality: representation are produced by conditional productive functions. Argues against Fodor on indeterminacy. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Pietrowski, P. M. %T Intentionality and teleological error %I %D 1992 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 73 %N %P 267-82 %Z Millikan's theory has an implausible consequence: creatures' belief contents can involve properties which they cannot discriminate. With examples. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Price, C. %T Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, D. %A Zawidzki, T. %T Information and teleosemantics %I %D 1994 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 393-419 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rountree, J. %T The plausibility of teleological content ascriptions: A reply to Pietroski %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 404-20 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Teleological semantics %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 106 %N %P 279-304 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. D. %T Mental representations and Millikan's theory of intentionalcontent: Does biology chase causality? %I %D 1999 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 113-140 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Schroeder, T. %T New norms for teleosemantics %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Sehon, S. R. %T Teleology and the nature of mental states %I %D 1994 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 31 %N %P 63-72 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Representation from bottom to top %I %D 1996 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 523-42 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Darwin and disjunction: Foraging theory and univocal assignments of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Sullivan, S. R. %T From natural function to indeterminate content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 69 %N %P 129-37 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Wagner, S. %T Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 81-110 %Z Teleosemantics has big problems with indeterminacy, holism, false belief, and "psychophysical normalcy" in causation. So do all naturalistic stories. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Walsh, D. M. %T Brentano's chestnuts %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Zawidzki, T. %A Ross, D. %T Information and teleosemantics %I %D 1994 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 393-419 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Zawidzki, T. %T Mythological content: A problem for Milikan's teleosemantics %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 535-538 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Advertisement for a semantics for psychology %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 615-78 %Z An in-depth program for conceptual-role semantics, and its role in a two-factor account of meaning. Also a defense of narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Functional role and truth conditions %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 61 %N %P 157-181 %Z A defense of functional role semantics, and an account of its relation to truth-conditional factors. A two-factor theory will handle wide content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. A. %T Inferential-role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction %I %D 1994 %B 1994 %V %N %P %Z No matter how we understand the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the falsity of inferential-role semantics does not follow. The meaning-constitutive inferences needn't be the analytic inferences. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Brandom, R. %T Reasoning and representing %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 65 %N %P 103-127 %Z CRS conflates representation content and attitude content (which depends on a representation's "target"), so can't handle representation content; it makes all content-based explanations vacuous; and it can't handle error properly. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Logic, meaning, and conceptual role %I %D 1977 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 74 %N %P 379-409 %Z Explicates conceptual role in terms of conditional probability, and analyzes meaning as conceptual role plus reference. With remarks on truth, descriptions, and synonymy. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Mental representation %I %D 1978 %B Erkenntnis %V 13 %N %P 9-61 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role %I %D 1991 %B Mind and Language %V 6 %N %P 328-43 %Z Conceptual role semantics isn't compatible with compositional semantics and the denial of an analytic/synthetic distinction, as full conceptual roles aren't compositional, and there's no way to specify a relevant subset. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Meaning and semantics %I New York University Press %D 1974 %B Semantics and Philosophy %E M. Munitz %E P. Unger %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Language, thought, and communication %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1975 %B Language, Mind, and Knowledge %E K. Gunderson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Conceptual role semantics %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 28 %N %P 242-56 %Z Meaning and content is determined by the role of symbols in thought (e.g. inference and perception). With remarks on indeterminacy, context-dependence, the linguistic division of labor, qualia, speech acts, and more. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Functional role and intentionality %I %D 1992 %B Theoria %V 58 %N %P 197-218 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Conceptual role and truth conditions %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 272-83 %Z On the relation between conceptual role and truth-conditions. Contra Harman, truth-conditions are to an extent independent of conceptual role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Loewer B. %T The role of `Conceptual role semantics' %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 305-15 %Z Contra Harman 1982, truth-conditions are central to a semantic theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullagh, M. %T Do inferential roles compose? %I %D 2003 %B Dialectica %V 57 %N %P 431-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Perlman, M. %T The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 495-513 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Putnam on functionalism %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 67 %N %P 111-31 %Z Argues against Putnam 1987 that conceptual role plays an important role in determining meaning. Appeals to the induction theory of Holland et al. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Twin pleas: Probing content and compositionality %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 871-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T On a semantic argument against conceptual role semantics %I %D 1993 %B Analysis %V 53 %N %P 298-304 %Z Contra Fodor and Lepore, meanings can be compositional even if inferential roles are not, as long as meanings only supervene on inferential role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Brook, A. %A Stainton, R. %T Fodor's new theory of content and computation %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 459-74 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Stalking the wild epistemic engine %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 5-18 %Z On "translational" (conceptual) and "calibrational" (referential) content. Relation of content issues to computational issues. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book %A Cummins, R. %T Meaning and Mental Representation %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z Critiques other views, offers interpretational semantics. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book %A Cummins, R. %T Representations, Targets, and Attitudes %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Haugeland on representation and intentionality %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Ways of establishing harmony %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z On the ways in which meanings can come to cohere with their causal roles: learning, natural selection, and design. Criticizes Dretske for undervaluing the latter two: all three are in the same boat. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Aspects of cognitive representation %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z On the reference and content of representations. Reference is determined by causation; content, i.e. representation "as", is determined by functional role, when functioning normally in natural habitat. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind %I %D 2004 %B Philosphical Psychology %V 17 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ryder, D. %T SINBAD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 211-240 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 309-322 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Stalnaker, R. %T How to do semantics for the language of thought %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z On some tensions in Fodor's view of content: e.g. narrow content must be dependent on functional role, which seems to lead to holism. The role of denotational semantics as a defense is unclear. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Usher, M. %T Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations? %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 241-248 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. %T Fodor on inscrutability %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 524-537 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bestor, T. W. %T Naturalizing semantics: New insights or old folly? %I %D 1991 %B Inquiry %V 34 %N %P 285-310 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Beckermann, A. %T Is there a problem about intentionality? %I %D 1996 %B Erkenntnis %V 45 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Book Section %A Bontly, T. %T Should intentionality be naturalized? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Callaway, H. G. %T Intentionality naturalized: Continuity, reconstruction, and instrumentalism %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 147-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T The methodology of naturalistic semantics %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 519-44 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. J. %T Naturalism and the problem of intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 305-22 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Naturalism and intentionality %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 301-26 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Chisholm's legacy on intentionality %I %D 2003 %B Metaphilosophy %V 34 %N %P 649-662 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Madell, G. %T Physicalism and the content of thought %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 107-21 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, C. B. %A Pfeifer, K. %T Intentionality and the non-psychological %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 46 %N %P 531-54 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Silvers, S. %T On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation %I %D 1991 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 49-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %A and Laurence, S. %T Intentionality and naturalism %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 159-82 %Z Argues that a failure to "naturalize" intentionality won't lead to disasters such as irrealism, irrelevance, or non-science, whether naturalization is understood as analysis, property identity, supervenience, or whatever. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Naturalism and the problem of intentionality %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 122-42 %Z There's no deep problem of naturalism about intentionality, as we know it's true already. The real puzzle is that of finding a mechanism to close the gap, e.g. via analysis or essentialism. But naturalism doesn't require that. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aldridge, V. C. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation %I %D 1987 %B Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 375-384 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, B. %T Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies %I %D 1989 %B Dialogue %V 28 %N %P 257-264 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1985 %B Ethics %V 95 %N %P 342-352 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 103-9 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A Hacker, P. %T Critical study: On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A Hacker, P. %T Reply to Mr. Mounce %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 199-204 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Blackburn, S. %T The individual strikes back %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The rule-following considerations %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 507-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The status of content %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review %V 99 %N %P 157-84 %Z Irrealism about mental content (and therefore truth-conditions) can't be made sense of. An error thesis presupposes factual truth-conditions, and a non-factualist thesis presupposes a non-deflationary theory of truth. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The status of content revisited %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 71 %N %P 264-78 %Z Reply to Devitt 1990. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T On misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Canfield, J. %T The community view %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Review %V 105 %N %P 469-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Coates, P. %T Kripke's skeptical paradox: Normativeness and meaning %I %D 1995 %B Mind %V 1986 %N %P 77-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Coates, P. %T Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 171-97 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, A. %T On the paradox Kripke finds in Wittgenstein %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 18 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, F. %T How sceptical is Kripke's "sceptical solution" %I %D 1998 %B Philsophia %V 26 %N %P 119-40 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, S. %T Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein %I %D 1988 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 66 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T Transcendentalism about content %I %D 1990 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 71 %N %P 247-63 %Z Against Boghossian's critique: the eliminativism will express her claim in a new framework, so appeals to truth beg the question. With a response. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %A Rey, G. %T Transcending transcendentalism %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 87-100 %Z Rejoinder to Boghossian 1990. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forbes, G. %T Scepticism and semantic knowledge %I %D 1983 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 84 %N %P 223-37 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T A new skeptical solution %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica: %V 113 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Humpty Dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 191-206 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ginet, C. %T The dispositionalist solutions to Wittgenstein's problem about understanding a rule: Answering Kripke's objection %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldfarb, W. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 471-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacking, I. %T On Kripke's and Goodman's uses of 'grue' %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy %V 68 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanfling, O. %T Was Wittgenstein a sceptic? %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 8 %N %P 1-16 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 2002 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 64 %N %P 157-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Hindriks on rule-following %I %D 2006 %B 2006 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hindriks, F. %T A modest solution to the problem of rule-following %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 121 %N %P 65-98 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, P. %T Kripke on private language %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies: %V 47 %N %P 23-28 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T Semantic primitivism and normativity %I %D 2001 %B Ratio %V 14 %N %P 1-17 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T A reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 257-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horwich, P. %T Wittgenstein and Kripke on the nature of meaning %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 105-121 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphrey, J. %T Kripke's Wittgenstein and the impossibility of private language: The same old story? %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 21 %N %P 197-207 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphrey, J. %T Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein, simplicity and sceptical solutions %I %D 1999 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 37 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Inwagen, P. %T There is no such thing as addition %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 138-159 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism %I %D 2003 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 11 %N %P 25-41 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kober, M. %T Kripkenstein meets the Chinese room: Looking for the place of meaning from a natural point of view %I %D 1998 %B Inquiry %V 41 %N %P 317-332 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kremer, M. %T Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 60 %N %P 571-584 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kusch, M. %T Fodor v. Kripke: Semantic dispositionalism, idealization, and ceteris paribus clauses %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 156-63 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Lance, M. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T The Grammar of Meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Landers, S. %T Wittgenstein, realism, and CLS: Undermining rule scepticism %I %D 1990 %B Law and Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 177-203 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, A. %T Wittgenstein and rule-scepticism %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 38 %N %P 280-304 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Maddy, P. %T Mathematical alchemy %I %D 1986 %B British Journal of Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 555-575 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A McDonough, R. %T Wittgenstein's refutation of meaning-scepticism %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein's Sceptical Problem %I %D 1984 %B Ratio, %V 26 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A McManus, D. %T Boghossian, Miller and Lewis on dispositional theories of meaning. Mind and Language 15:393-399. Miller, A. 1997. Boghossian on reductive dispositionalism about content: The case strengthened %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review, %V 99 %N %P 323-53 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Oderberg, D. S. %T Kripke and "quus". Theoria 53:115-20. pp %I %D 1987 %B 1 %V 15 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T The reality of rule-following %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 1-21 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Preti, C. %T Normativity and meaning: Kripke's skeptical paradox reconsidered %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Forum %V 33 %N %P 39-62 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Puhl, K. (ed.) %T Meaning Scepticism %I de Gruyter %D 1991 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H, %T Why reason can't be naturalized %I %D 1985 %B Realism and Reason %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Read, R. %T The unstatability of Kripkean scepticism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Papers %V 24 %N %P 67-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rudebusch, G. %T Hoffman on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Research Archives %V 12 %N %P 177-182 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sartorelli, J. %T McGinn on content scepticism and Kripke's sceptical argument %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 79-84 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeder, T. %T Donald Davidson's theory of mind is non-normative %I %D 2003 %B Philosopher's Imprint %V 3 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Scruton, R. %T Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 592-602 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. %T Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. %T Skepticism about rules and intentionalilty %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Language %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanker, S. %T Sceptical confusions about rule-following %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 423-29 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T Boomerang defense of rule following %I %D 1992 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 30 %N %P 115-122 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T Modest scepticism about rule-following %I %D 1993 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 486-500 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T The problem of rule-following in compositional semantics %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 97-108 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Soames, S. %T Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol %I %D 1998 %B %V 23 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Soames, S. %T Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 313-48 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stock, G. %T Leibniz and Kripke's sceptical paradox %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 38 %N %P 326-329 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Summerfield, D. M. %T Philosophical Investigations 201: A Wittgensteinian reply to Kripke %I %D 1990 %B Journal of the History of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Summerfield, D. M. %T On taking the rabbit of rule-following out of the hat of representation: A response to Pettit's 'The reality of rule-following' %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Suter, R. %T Saul Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Research Archives %V 12 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Teghrarian, S. %T Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the 'paradox' of meaning. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy %I %D 1994 %B 1994 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Meaning, dispositions, and normativity %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 399-413 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Von Morstein, P. %T Kripke, Wittgenstein and the private language argument %I %D 1980 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 11 %N %P 61-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Werhane, P. %T Skepticism, Rules and Private Languages %I Humanities Press %D 1992 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, G. M. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein and normativity %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, G. M. %T Semantic realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 58 %N %P 99-122 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Winch, P. %T Critical Study: Facts and Superfacts %I %D 1983 %B The Philosophical Quarterly %V 33 %N %P 398-404 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, C. %T Kripke's account of the argument against private language %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 759-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T Kripke's normativity argument %I %D 1997 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 467-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ackermann, D. F. %T Wittgenstein, rules and origin--privacy %I %D 1983 %B Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research %V 1 %N %P 63-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Armstrong, B. %T Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 7 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Ayer, A. J. %T Can there be a private language? %I %D 1954 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 27 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Baker, G. P. %A Hacker, P. M. S. %T Scepticism, Rules and Language %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Baker, G. P. %A Hacker, P. M. S. %T Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity %I %D 1985 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A and Hacker, P. %T Malcolm on language and rules %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy %V 65 %N %P 167-179 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Bar-On, D. %T On the possibility of a solitary language %I %D 1992 %B Nous %V 26 %N %P 27-46 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Bloor, D. %T Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions %I Routledge %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Budd, M. %T Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P 451-79 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T Ruling-out realism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophia %V 15 %N %P 61-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Champlin, T. S. %T Solitary rule-following %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy %V 67 %N %P 285-306 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Craig, E. %T Meaning and privacy %I Blackwell %D 1997 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Language %E B. Hale %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T The second person %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Diamond, C. %T Rules: Looking in the right place. In (D. Phillips & P %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Dwyer, P. %T Freedom and rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 50 %N %P 49-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Ebbs, G. %T Rule-Following and Realism %I Harvard University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Eldridge, R. %T The normal and the normative: Wittgenstein's legacy, Kripke, and Cavell %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 46 %N %P 555-575 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Finkelstein, D. H. %T Wittgenstein on rules and Platonism %I Routledge %D 2000 %B The New Wittgenstein %E A. Crary %E R. Read %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Gottlieb, D. F. %T Wittgenstein's critique of the "Tractatus" view of rules %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 56 %N %P 239-251 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacking, I. %T Rules, scepticism, proof, Wittgenstein. In (I %I %D 1985 %B 1985 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Hale, B. %T Rule-following, objectivity and meaning %I Blackwell %D 1997 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Language %E B. Hale %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanfling, O. %T What does the private language argument prove? %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 34 %N %P 468-481 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Is solitary rule-following possible? %I %D 2004 %B Philosophia %V 32 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Martin, C. B. %T Rules and powers %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 283-312 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Holtzman, S. %A Leich, C. %T Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %I Routledge %D 1981 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Huff, D. %T Family resemblances and rule-governed behavior %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 4 %N %P 1-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Krebs, V. %T Objectivity and meaning: Wittgenstein on following rules %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 177-186 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Wittgenstein on language and rules %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy %V 64 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, C. B. %A Heil, J, %T Rules and powers %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 283-312 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A McDowell, J. %T Non-cognitivism and rule-following %I Routledge %D 1981 %B Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %E S. Holtzman %E C. Leich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Wittgenstein on following a rule %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A McDowell, J. %T Intentionality and interiority in wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A McGinn, C. %T Wittgenstein on Meaning %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Miller, A. %A Wright, C. %T Rule-Following and Meaning %I Acumen %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Minar, E. %T Wittgenstein and the "contingency" of community %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, %V 72 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. %T Malcolm on Wittgenstein on rules %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 101-105 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. %T Beyond the private language argument %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 77-89 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Mounce, H. O. %T Following a rule %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 187-198 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Analyticity and apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine %I %D 1983 %B Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics %I %D 1996 %B Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume %V 70 %N %P 243-264 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Read, R. %T What 'There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word' could possibly mean %I Routledge %D 2000 %B The New Wittgenstein %E A. Crary %E R. Read %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Rhees, R. %T Can there be a private language? %I %D 1954 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume %V 28 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychology %I Kluwer %D 1992 %B The Scientific Enterprise %E E. Ullmann-Margalit %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Stroud, B. %T Wittgenstein and logical necessity %I %D 1965 %B Philosophical Review %V 74 %N %P 504-518 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Stroud, B. %T Mind, meaning and practice %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein %E H. Sluga %E D. Stern %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Tait, W. W. %T Wittgenstein and the 'skeptical paradoxes' %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 475-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Tanney, J. %T Playing the rule-following game %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy %V 75 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Temkin, J. %T A private language argument %I %D 1986 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 24 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Walton, D. %A Strongman, K. T. %T Neonate Crusoes, the private language argument and psychology %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 443-65 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Wittgenstein on representation, privileged objects and private language %I %D 1983 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 57-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Williams, M. %T Blind obedience: Rules, community and the individual %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Rule-following, objectivity and the theory of meaning %I Routledge %D 1981 %B Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %E S. Holtzman %E C. Leich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Reflections on Chomsky %E A. George %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy and intention %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Wright, C. %T Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations %I Harvard University Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T Rules, communities and judgement %I %D 1989 %B Critica %V 21 %N %P 33-58 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Bilgrami, A. %T Norms and meaning %I de Gruyter %D 1993 %B Reflecting Davidson %E R. Stoecker %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The normativity of content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 31-45 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book %A Brandom, R. %T Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment %I Harvard University Press %D 1994 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brandom, R. %T Modality, normativity, and intentionality %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 63 %N %P 611-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Intellectual norms and foundations of mind %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 697-720 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Engel, P. %T Wherein lies the normative dimension in meaning and mental content? %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 100 %N %P 305-321 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Engel, P. %T Intentionality, normativity, and community %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 25-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gampel, E. H. %T The normativity of meaning %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 86 %N %P 221-42 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbard, A. %T Thoughts, norms, and discursive practices: Commentary on Brandom %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 699-717 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbard, A. %T Thoughts and norms %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 83-98 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gluer, K. %T Sense and prescriptivity %I %D 1999 %B Acta Analytica %V 14 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Hattiangadi, A. %T Making it implicit: Brandom on rule-following %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 66 %N %P 419-31 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Timmons, M. %T Metaphysical naturalism, semantic normativity, and meta-semantic irrealism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Issues %V 4 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Naturalism and semantic normativity %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Issues %V 4 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Loeffler, R. %T Normative phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom's practice-based explanation of meaning %I %D 2005 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 32-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book Section %A Millar, A. %T The normativity of meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 2002 %B Logic, Thought, and Language %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Normativity and judgment %I %D 1999 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 73 %N %P 16-43 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Content and norms in a natural world %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosen, G. %T Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 63 %N %P 611-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Brandom on the normativity of meaning %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 68 %N %P 141-60 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. C. %T Meaning, normativity, and reductive naturalism %I %D 2001 %B Sorites %V 12 %N %P 60-65 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Tanney, J. %T Normativity and judgment II %I %D 1999 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 73 %N %P 45-61 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Semantic responsibility %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Explorations %V 1 %N %P 39-58 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. M. %T Semantic normativity %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 203-26 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Abbott, B. %T Fodor and Lepore on meaning similarity and compositionality %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 454-6 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Becker, K. %T On the perfectly general nature of instability in meaning holism %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 635-640 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Why holism is harmless and necessary %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 105-126 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T An argument for holism %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 95 %N %P 151-70 %Z Uses Putnam's "Ruritania" example to argue that narrow content, if it exists, is holistic. Twins in different communities start with same narrow content, diverge by acquiring new beliefs; so belief change affects narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Callaway, H. G. %T Meaning holism and semantic realism %I %D 1992 %B Dialectica %V 46 %N %P 41-59 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Conceptual similarity across sensory and neural diversity: The Fodor/Lepore challenge answered %I %D 1998 %B Journal Of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 5-32 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cozzo, C. %T Does epistemological holism lead to meaning holism? %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 25-45 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T A critique of the case for semantic holism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 281-306 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Semantic localism: Who needs a principled basis? %I Holder-Pichler-Tempsky %D 1994 %B Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences %E R. Casati %E B. Smith %E S. White %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Esfeld, M. %T Holism and analytic philosophy %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 365-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I Blackwell %D 1992 %Z Rebutting arguments for meaning holism: those based on confirmation holism (Quine), normativity of interpretation (Davidson, Dennett, Lewis), and functional-role semantics (Block, Field, Churchland). -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Precis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 637-682 %Z A discussion of Holism with comments by Devitt, Rey, McLaughlin, Brandom, and Churchland, and a reply by Fodor and Lepore. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Holism without meaning: A critical review of Fodor and Lepore's Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 441-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Harrell, M. %T Confirmation holism and semantic holism %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 109 %N %P 63-101 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Semantic holism: Still a good buy %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 68 %N %P 325-39 %Z A critique of Fodor and Lepore. Distinguishes versions of holism, and argues for a weak version. Real thinkers are subjects, which imposes constraints on the interrelations of thoughts. Science fiction is irrelevant here. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Moderate holism and the instability thesis %I %D 1999 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 36 %N %P 361-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %A Kukla, R. %T Meaning holism and intentional psychology %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 173 %N %P %Z Contra Fodor, meaning holism is compatible with intentional psychology. Most psychological generalizations quantify over contents, rather than appealing to specific contents. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lormand, E. %T How to be a meaning holist %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 93 %N %P 51-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Margolis, E. %A Laurence, S. %T Multiple meanings and stability of content %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 255-63 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Holism without tears: Local and global effects in cognitive processing %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 258-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, M. %T Quine's holism and functionalist holism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 977-1025 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, A. %T Does "belief holism" show that reductive dispositionalism about content could not be true? %I %D 2003 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 77 %N %P 73-90 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, R. B. %T One bad and one not very good argument against holism %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 234-40 %Z A nice criticism of Fodor and Lepore's arguments that holism implies (a) the nonexistence of intentional laws and (b) the nonlearnability of language. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pagin, P. %T Is compositionality compatible with holism? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 11-33 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Penco, C. %T Holism, strawberries, and hair dryers %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 47-54 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T Fodor and Lepore on holism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 73 %N %P 123-58 %Z The argument from anatomism and the failure of the analytic/synthetic distinction to holism fails. On the many different interpretations of holism and anatomism: there is a reasonable molecularist position. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Senor, T. D. %T Two-factor theories, meaning holism, and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to Fodor %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 133-51 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Meaning holism and intentional content %I %D 1994 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 75 %N %P 29-53 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Talmage, C. J. L. %A Mercer, M. %T Meaning holism and interpretability %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 301-15 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Talmage, C. J. L. %T Semantic localism and the locality of content %I %D 1998 %B Erkenntnis %V 48 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %T Causal contents %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z On Dretske's account of the causal role of content. Addresses some objections: Dennett's worries about intrinsic intentionality, Fodor's about external causal powers, and some worries about syntax. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Dretske on the explanatory role of belief %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 99-111 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Does semantics run the psyche? %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 687-700 %Z A critique of Fodor. Semantics per se doesn't cause. Also, Fodor's is an account of the what, not the how, of semantics. Somewhat bizarre. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Mental meaning in psychological explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z Criticizes Dretske's account of the role of content, especially because of its dependence on an organism's history; also, it may not cohere with work in cognitive science. Argues for an interpretational, not a causal account. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Why Fodor can't have it both ways %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T The explanatory role of content %I University of Arizona Press %D 1987 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Content must explain why (not how) an internal state caused a certain output. The explanation is given in terms of what a state has historically indicated. With thermostats and sea-snails as examples. Comments by Cummins, and reply. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes %I MIT Press %D 1988 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Does meaning matter? %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 203-8 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusion %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T The explanatory role of content: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 223-29 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 167-177 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Burge on mentalistic explanations, or why I am still epiphobic %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. L. %T Content and the subtle extensionality of "... explains ..." %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 320-32 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Banish DisContent %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T Dretske on the causal efficacy of meaning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 181-202 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Why semantic properties won't earn their keep %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 50 %N %P 223-36 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Hassrick, B. %T Fred Dretske on the explanatory role of semantic content %I %D 1995 %B Conference %V 6 %N %P 59-66 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %T Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z Distinguishes three problems of mental causation (extrinsic factors, exclusion of the nonphysical, anomalism). Criticizes Dretske's theory (can't handle unlearnt or here-and-now reasons), offers a counterfactual account. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T The prospects for Dretske's account of the explanatory role of belief %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 203-15 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for Dretske %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 216-22 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Perry, J. %A Israel, D. %T Fodor and psychological explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What's in a mind? %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 97-122 %Z We must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function, as we need representation to capture generalizations about behavior; particularly due to the information-sensitivity and stimulus-independence of behavior. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Slater, C. %T Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 163-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Wallis, C. %T Using representation to explain %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Ward, A. %T The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism %I %D 2001 %B Disputatio %V 11 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Realism without internalism: A critique of Searle on intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 57-72 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Blackman, L. L. %T Mind as intentionality alone %I %D 2002 %B Metaphysica %V 3 %N 2 %P 41-64 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Crane, T. %T Intentionality as the mark of the mental %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T Intentional objects %I %D 2001 %B Ratio %V 14 %N %P 298-317 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T The Intentionality All-Stars %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 383-427 %Z Intentionality around the diamond: neoCartesianism, neobehaviorism, neopragmatism. 1B=Fodor/Pylyshyn, 2B=Dennett/Quine, 3B=Heidegger/Sellars. SS=Wittgenstein. RF=Searle, CF=Skinner, LF=Rorty/Derrida. Lots of fun. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book %A Jacob, P. %T What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-intentional World %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Lecture III: Intentionality as a relation %I %D 1998 %B Journal Of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 471-491 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mumford, S. %T Intentionality and the physical: A new theory of disposition ascription %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 215-25 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Inentionality as the mark of the dispositional %I %D 1996 %B Dialectica %V 50 %N %P 91-120 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Intentionality and the physical: A reply to Mumford %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 225-30 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %A Chisholm, R. %T Intentionality and the mental: A correspondence %I %D 1957 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 507-39 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. C. %T What is so magical about a theory of intrinsic intentionality? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Papers %V 32 %N %P 83-96 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T Lewis on intentionality %I %D 2004 %B Australian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 199-212 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T Real intentionality %I %D 2004 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 3 %N %P 287-313 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Weir, A. %T Objective content %I %D 2003 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 77 %N %P 47-72 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %T Mental representation %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickhard, M. %T Representational content in humans and machines %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 5 %N %P 285-33 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Bickhard, M. H. %T The dynamic emergence of representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Blachowicz, J. %T Analog representation beyond mental imagery %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 55-84 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Chomsky, N. %T Rules and representations %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 1-61 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Christensen, W. D. %A Hooker C. A. %T Representation and the meaning of life %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Clapin, H. %T Philosophy and Mental Representation %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Clapin, H. %T Tacit representation in functional architecture %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Clapin, H. %T Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time success %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 89-104 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T The roots of 'norm-hungriness'. In (H. Clapin, ed) Philosophy and Mental Representation. Oxford University Press. Clark, A. 2002. Minds, brains, and tools %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: A response to Morris %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 31-42 %Z Morris 1991 is wrong: formal individuation is easy, and objectively determinate content isn't needed. External grounding is also irrelevant. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %A Poirier, P. %T Representation and indication %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dalenoort, G. J. %T Toward a general theory of representation %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P 229-237 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %A Markman, A. %T Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 95-119 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why paramecia don't have mental representations %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 3-23 %Z Because paramecia can't respond to non-nomic properties of the stimulus. Perceptual categories vs. sensory manifolds. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Freeman, W. %A Skarda, C. A. %T Representations: who needs them? %I Guilford Press %D 1990 %B Brain Organization and Memory %E J. McGaugh %E J. Weinberger %E G. Lynch %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Representations and cognitive science %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 261-77 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Goldman, A. %T Constraints on representation %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Grush, R. %T The architecture of representation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 5-23 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Computation, representation and content in noncognitive theories of perception %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hogan, M. %T What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 307-27 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackendoff, R. %T The problem of reality %I %D 1991 %B Nous %V 25 %N %P 411-33 %Z On the philosophical (inward-out) vs. psychological (outward-in) approaches to the mind-world relation; the psychological approach is more useful in understanding representation. Internal reality is an imperfect construction. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacobson, A. %T Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 189-204 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, R. %T Cognitive models and representation %I %D 1992 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 43 %N %P 219-32 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, D. %T Mental representation from the bottom up %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 23-78 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Ideas of representation %I Ridgeview %D 1989 %B Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams %E Weissbord %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Troubles with representationalism %I %D 1984 %B Social Research %V 51 %N %P 1065-97 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A McCulloch, G. %T Mental representation and mental presentation %I Cambridge University Press %D 2002 %B Logic, Thought, and Language %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Pushmi-pullyu representations %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 185-200 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, M. %T Why there are no mental representations %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 1-30 %Z There can be no non-stipulative content to non-semantically individuated tokens. Mostly a critique of Cummins; also Fodor and Dennett. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Internal representation: Prologue to a theory of intentionality %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 171-212 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sedivy, S. %T Minds: Contents without vehicles %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 17 %N %P 149-181 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Representations -- senses and reasons %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 355-74 %Z On different senses of "representation" -- external, experiential, mental locus, substrate of meaning, mediating functions, technicalpsychological. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Shanon, B. %T The Representational and the Presentational: An Essay on Cognition and the Study of Mind %I Prentice-Hall %D 1993 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Mental representations %I %D 1976 %B Synthese %V 33 %N %P 101-48 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Basic minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 251-70 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tegtmeier, E. %T Intentionality is not representation %I %D 2005 %B Metaphysica %V 6 %N 1 %P 77-84 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Travis, C. %T Unshadowed Thought: Representation in Thought and Language %I Harvard University Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Mental representation: A functionalist view %I %D 1982 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 63 %N %P 3-20 %Z On the distinction between representation and representation-use. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wallis, C. %T Representation and the imperfect ideal %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 407-28 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A von Eckardt, B. %T The explanatory need for mental representations in cognitive science. Mind and Language 18:427-439. 2.6 Concepts