Compiled by David Chalmers, Philosophy, Australian National University. Technical support by David Bourget, University of Toronto. For more information see the main page.
Fodor, J. A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 807 | Google)
Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate.Fodor, J. A. 1987. Why there still has to be a language of thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity.Fodor, J. A. 1978. Propositional attitudes. Monist 61:501-23. Reprinted in RePresentations (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 37 | Google)
About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought.Fodor, J. 2001. Language, thought and compositionality. Mind and Language 16:1-15. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Abbott, B. 1995. Natural language and thought: Thinking in English. Behavior and Philosophy 23:49-55. (Google)
Aydede, M. 2000. On the type/token relation of mental representations. Facta Philosophica 2:23-50. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bonjour, L. 1991. Is thought a symbolic process? Synthese 89:331-52. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defense against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics.Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Fitzpatrick, J. 1990. Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83:3-29. (Cited by 4 | Google)
No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections.Cain, M. J. 2002. Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy. Polity Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Carruthers, P. 2003. On Fodor's problem. Mind and Language 18:502-523. (Google)
Clapin, H. 1997. Problems with principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78:261-77.
Clark, A. 1988. Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 1:263-78. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Crane, T. 1990. The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5:187-213. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Davies, M. 1992. Aunty's own argument for the language of thought. In (J. Ezquerro & J. Larrazabal, eds) Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1977. A cure for the common code. Mind. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 17 | Google)
Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing.Dennett, D. C. 1975. Brain writing and mind reading. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:403-15. Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 6 | Google)
On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments.Dennett, D. C. 1990. Granny's campaign for safe science. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Google)
A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist.DeWitt, R. 1995. Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought. Psyche 1. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dunlop, C. E. M. 1990. Conceptual dependency as the language of thought. Synthese 82:275-96. (Google)
Relates Schank's conceptual dependency to Fodor's LOT.Egan, M. F. 1991. Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21:379-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short.Field, H. 1978. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13:9-18. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 88 | Google)
Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions.Garson, J. W. 1997. Syntax in a dynamic brain. Synthese 110:343-55. (Cited by 6 | Google)
There are no good arguments for LOT of the form "The brain needs to do X, and X entails LOT". Considers X = concatenation, logical form, tracking, combinatorial encoding. Either LOT is weakened deeply or is unnecessary.Garfield, J. 2000. Thought as language: A metaphor too far. Protosociology 14:85-101. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gauker, C. 1995. Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation between Thought and Language. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Harman, G. 1973. Thought. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 114 | Google)
Harman, G. 1975. Language, thought, and communication. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:270-298. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language.Harman, G. 1977. How to use propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly. (Google)
Harman, G. 1978. Is there mental representation? Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Google)
Hauser, L. 1995. Natural language and thought: Doing without mentalese. Behavior and Philosophy 23:41-47. (Google)
Heil, J. 1981. Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind 90:321-42. (Cited by 14 | Google)
LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation.Johnson, K. 2004. On the systematicity of the language of thought. Journal of Philosophy 101:111-139. (Google)
Kaye, L. J. 1994. The computational account of belief. Erkenntnis 40:137-53. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kaye, L. J. 1995. The languages of thought. Philosophy of Science 62:92-110. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Knowles, J. 1998. The language of thought and natural language understanding. Analysis 58:264-272. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Loar, B. 1982. Must beliefs be sentences? Philosophy of Science Association. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lycan, W. G. 1982. Toward a homuncular theory of believing. Cognition and Brain Theory 4:139-59. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments.Lycan, W. G. 1990. Mental content in linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:147-54. (Google)
Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog.Lycan, W. G. 1993. A deductive argument for the representational theory of thinking. Mind and Language 8:404-22. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Argues from the unboundedness of thinking and the need for a finite stock of elements to something like a language of thought. With remarks on connectionism and instrumentalism, and a reply by Stalnaker.Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. 1997. Regress arguments for the language of thought. Analysis 57:60-66. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Maloney, J. C. 1989. The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Markic, O. 2001. Is language of thought a conceptual necessity?. Acta Analytica 16:53-60. (Google)
Marras, A. 1987. The weak and the strong representational theory of mind: Stich's interpretation of Fodor. Dialogue 26:349-55. (Google)
Matthews, R. J. 1989. The alleged evidence for representationalism. In (S. Silvers, ed) Rerepresentation. Kluwer. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision.Matthews, R. J. 1991. Is there vindication through representationalism? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Google)
Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation.Millikan, R. G. 1993. On mentalese orthography. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 9 | Google)
On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification.Pessin, A. 1995. Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. Philosophical Studies 78:33-53. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail.Pollock, J. 1990. Understanding the language of thought. Philosophical Studies 58:95-120. (Google)
Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional, qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought. With comments by Baker.Rantala, V. & Vaden, T. 1997. Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought. Erkenntnis 46:315-334. (Google)
Rey, G. 1995. A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Rupert, R. 1998. On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought. Synthese 117:95-131. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schiffer, S. 1991. Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it.Schiffer, S. 1994. The language-of-thought relation and its implications. Philosophical Studies 76:263-85. (Google)
Schwartz, G. 1996. Symbols and thought. Synthese 106:399-407. (Google)
Sher, G. 1975. Sentences in the brain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36:94-99. (Google)
On Danto's suggestion that beliefs are like sentences. Conventionality poses problems, as does differentiating between different sorts of attitudes.Stalnaker, R. C. 1990. Mental content and linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:129-46. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sterelny, K. 1983. Mental representation: What language is Brainese? Philosophical Studies, 43:365-82. (Google)
Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism.Stich, S. P. 1978. Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science 45:499-518. (Cited by 35 | Google)
Teng, N. Y. 1999. The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use. Philosophical Studies 94:237-251. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Tienson, J. 1990. Is this any way to be a realist? Philosophical Psychology. (Google)
Warmbrod, K. 1989. Beliefs and sentences in the head. Synthese 2:201-30. (Google)
Weller, C. 1997. Bonjour and mentalese. Synthese 113:251-63. (Google)
Yagisawa, T. 1994. Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's "The language-of-thought relation and its implications". Philosophical Studies 76:287-96. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1978. Brainstorms. MIT Press. (Cited by 342 | Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1971. Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 68:87-106 Reprinted in Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). (Cited by 150 | Google)
Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution.Dennett, D. C. 1981. Making sense of ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12:63-81. Reprinted in The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1987). (Cited by 12 | Google)
Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc.Dennett, D. C. 1987. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press. (Cited by 916 | Google)
Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction).Dennett, D. C. 1988. Precis of The Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
TIS, with commentaries and replies.Dennett, D. C. 1990. The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter.Dennett, D. C. 1991. Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88:27-51. (Cited by 97 | Google)
Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland.Baker, L. R. 1987. Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? In Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. (Google)
Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued.Baker, L. R. 1989. Instrumental intentionality. Philosophy of Science 56:303-16. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bechtel, W. 1985. Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance. Cognitive Science 9:265-92. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety.Byrne, A. 1998. Interpretivism. European Review of Philosophy 3. (Google)
Cam, P. 1984. Dennett on intelligent storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:247-62. (Google)
Clark, A. 1990. Belief, opinion and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology. (Google)
Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on.Cohen, B. 1995. Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76:17-31. (Google)
Cummins, R. 1981. What can be learned from Brainstorms? Philosophical Topics 12:83-92. (Google)
Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context.Davies, D. 1995. Dennett's stance on intentional realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:299-312. (Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1981. Three cheers for Propositional attitudes. In Representations. MIT Press.
Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles.Fodor, J. A. & LePore, E. 1993. Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question.Foss, J. 1994. On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance. Inquiry 37:287-310. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gauker, C. 1988. Objective interpretationism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:136-51. (Google)
Gerrans, P. 2004. Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11:42-48. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haugeland, J. 1993. Pattern and being. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Heitner, R. 2000. Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism. Minds and Machines 10:267-83. (Google)
Hornsby, J. 1992. Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Kenyon, T. 2000. Indeterminacy and realism. In (A. Brook, D. Ross, & D. Thompson, eds) Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. (Google)
Kukla, R. 2000. How to get an interpretivist committed. Protosociology 14:180-221. (Google)
Lyons, W. 1990. Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3:247-69.
McLaughlin, B. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1995. Dennett's logical behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22:189-258. (Google)
McLaughlin, B. 2000. Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire. Protosociology 14:145-157. (Google)
McCulloch, G. 1990. Dennett's little grains of salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40:1-12. (Google)
Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist.McCulloch, G. 1998. Intentionality and interpretation. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Narayanan, A. 1996. The intentional stance and the imitation game. In (P. Millican & A. Clark, eds) Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nelkin, N. 1993. Patterns. Mind and Language 9:56-87. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns.Price, H. 1995. Psychology in perspective. In (M. Michael & J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer. (Google)
Radner, D. & Radner, M. 1995. Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:109-19. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ratcliffe, M. 2001. A Kantian stance on the intentional stance. Biology and Philosophy 16:29-52. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Richard, M. 1995. What isn't a belief? Philosophical Topics 22:291-318. (Google)
Richardson, R. C. 1980. Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35. (Google)
Seager, W. 2000. Real patterns and surface metaphysics. In (A. Brook, D. Ross, & D. Thompson, eds) Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. (Google)
Sharpe, R. 1989. Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32:233-40. (Google)
Slors, M. 1996. Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46:93-98. (Google)
Stich, S. P. 1980. Headaches. Philosophical Books 21:65-73. (Google)
Critical review of Brainstorms, with response.Stich, S. P. 1981. Dennett on Intentional systems. Philosophical Topics 12:39-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990).
Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away.Viger, C. 2000. Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds. In (A. Brook, D. Ross, & D. Thompson, eds) Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. (Google)
Webb, S. 1994. Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance. Philosophical Topics 22:457-70. (Google)
Wilkerson, W. S. 1997. Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 97:557-70. (Google)
Yu, P. & Fuller, G. 1986. A critique of Dennett. Synthese 66:453-76. (Google)
Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology.
Churchland, P. S. 1980. Language, thought, and information processing. Nous 14:147-70. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images.Churchland, P. M. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78:67-90. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 183 | Google)
Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory.Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S. 1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-20. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 17 | Google)
How to dethrone language and still handle content.Churchland, P. M. 1985. On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:157-173. (Google)
Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated.Churchland, P. M. 1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 113 | Google)
14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age.Churchland, P. M. 1993. Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19. (Google)
Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane.Churchland, P. M. 1993. Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8:211-22. (Google)
It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives".Baker, L. R. 1987. The threat of cognitive suicide. In Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. (Google)
Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk.Baker, L. R. 1988. Cognitive suicide. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply.Bertolet, R. 1994. Saving eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7:87-100. (Google)
Against Baker's cognitive-suicide arguments against eliminativism. We don't know what a replacement theory will look like, but that doesn't show that none is forthcoming.Bickle, J. 1992. Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7:411-30. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain.Blunt, P. K. 1992. A defense of folk psychology. International Philosophical Quarterly 32:487-98. (Google)
Chater, N. & Oaksford, M. 1996. The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy. In (W. O'Donahue & R. Kitchener, eds) The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Google)
Clark, A. 1996. Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science. In (R. McCauley, ed) The Churchlands and their Critics. Blackwell. (Google)
Cling, A. 1989. Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56:53-75. (Google)
Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker.Cling, A. 1990. Disappearance and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57:226-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cling, A. 1991. The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23. (Google)
Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features.Foss, J. E. 1985. A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:105-33. (Google)
EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho.Garzon, F. C. 2001. Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism?. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9:485-498. (Google)
Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1992. Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Truth and Rationality. Ridgeview. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Greenwood, J. D. 1991. Reasons to believe. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too.Greenwood, J. D. 1992. Against eliminative materialism: from folk psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5:349-68. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Haldane, J. 1988. Understanding folk. Aristotelian Society Supplement 62:222-46. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience.Hannan, B. 1990. `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18:21-31. (Google)
Hannan, B. 1993. Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8:165-179. (Google)
A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary.Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. 1985. Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94:197-225. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 28 | Google)
Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK.Horgan, T. & Graham, G. 1990. In defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62:107-134. (Cited by 10 | Google)
FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism.Horgan, T. 1993. The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous.Horgan, T. & Henderson, D. 2005. What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In (C. Erneling & D. Johnson, eds) Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Horst, S. 1995. Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104:123-45. (Google)
Clarifies different senses of "theoretical" and "belief". Some beliefs are relevantly theoretical (dispositional, infra-conscious, unconscious ones), but conscious occurrent beliefs are not, and so can't be eliminated.Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. In defense of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59:31-54. (Google)
FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not propositional attitudes are good scientific entities.Jacoby, H. 1985. Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.)Kitcher, P. S. 1984. In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81:89-106. (Cited by 3 | Google)
The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology.Lahav, R. 1992. The amazing predictive power of folk psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:99-105. (Google)
Lockie, R. 2003. Transcendental arguments against eliminativism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54:569-589. (Google)
Melnyk, A. 1996. Testament of a recovering eliminativist. Philosophy of Science 63:S185-93. (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Brien, G. 1987. Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52:49-70. (Google)
Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time.Ramsey, W. 1990. Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33:453-65. (Google)
The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio.Ramsey, W. , Stich, S. P. & Garon, J. 1991. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 51 | Google)
If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system.Reppert, V. 1991. Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34:499-508. (Google)
Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting.Reppert, V. 1992. Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23:378-92. (Google)
A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism.Resnick, P. 1994. Intentionality is phlogiston. In (E. Dietrich, ed) Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press. (Google)
Richards, G. 1996. On the necessary survival of folk psychology. In (W. O'Donahue & R. Kitchener, eds) The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Google)
Robinson, W. S. 1985. Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13:60-67. (Google)
There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce.Rosenberg, A. 1991. How is eliminative materialism possible? In (R. Bogdan, ed) Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief.Rosenberg, A. 1999. Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:335-358. (Google)
Saidel, E. 1992. What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role.Schouten, M. K. D. & de Jong, H. L. 1998. Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision. Philosophical Psychology 11:489-509. (Google)
Schwartz, J. 1991. Reduction, elimination, and the mental. Philosophy of Science 58:203-20. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Stich, S. P. 1991. Do true believers exist? Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:229-44. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions: if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty.Stich, S. P. 1992. What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101:243-61. (Cited by 33 | Google)
Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose.Stich, S. P. 1996. Deconstructing the mind. In Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996. (Cited by 49 | Google)
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Against transcendental arguments against eliminativism. These fail on their own terms, and even if successful they would not establish causal/explanatory relevance for the attitudes, which is the real key for folk psychology.Tomberlin, J. 1994. Whither Southern Fundamentalism? In (E. Villanueva, ed) Truth and Rationality, Ridgeview. (Google)
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Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content.Baker, L. R. 1993. What beliefs are not. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible.Baker, L. R. 2001. Are beliefs brain states? In (A. Meijers, ed) Explaining Beliefs. CSLI. (Google)
Baker, L. R. 2001. Practical realism defended: Replies to critics. In (A. Meijers, ed) Explaining Beliefs. CSLI. (Google)
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What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice.Bogdan, R. J. 1986. The manufacture of belief. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Garfield, J. 1988. Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Lehrer, K. 1983. Belief, acceptance, and cognition. In (H. Parret, ed) On Believing. De Gruyter. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all the explanatory work at lower cost. With some remarks on subdoxastic states, and the difference between belief and opinion.Marcus, R. B. 1995. The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs. Dialectica 49:113-30. (Google)
McKinsey, M. 1994. Individuating beliefs. Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30. (Cited by 6 | Google)
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Meijers, A. (ed) 2001. Explaining Beliefs. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Mosterin, J. 2002. Acceptance without belief. Manuscrito 25:313-35. (Google)
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Robinson, W. S. 1990. States and beliefs. Mind 99:33-51. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, E. 2001. In-between believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51:76 - 82. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, E. 2002. A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Nous 36:249-75. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Skokowski, P. 2004. Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief. Philosophy of Science 71:362-369. (Google)
Sperber, D. 1997. Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12:67-83. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Stainton, R. 1999. Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction. Disputatio 6. (Google)
Stich, S. P. 1983. Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief. In From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Google)
Toribio, J. 2002. Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds. Theoria 68:224-49. (Google)
Toribio, J. 2003. Free belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2:327-36. (Google)
Tuomela, R. 1990. Can collectives have beliefs? Acta Philosophica Fennica 49:454-72. (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gulick, R. 1994. Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? Philosophical Studies 76:205-15. (Google)
Velleman, D. 2000. On the aim of belief. In The Possibility of Practical Reason. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Wedgwood, R. 2002. The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Wray, K. B. 2001. Collective belief and acceptance. Synthese 129:319-33. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Arlo Costa, H. , Collins, J. & Levi, I. 1995. Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference. Analysis 55:2-5. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bratman, M. 1990. Dretske's desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:795-800. (Google)
Bratman, M. 2003. A desire of one's own. Journal of Philosophy 100:221-42. (Google)
Bricke, J. 2000. Desires, passions, and evaluations. Southwest Philosophy Review 16:59-65. (Google)
Butler, K. 1992. The physiology of desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:69-88. (Google)
Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind.Chan, D. K. 2004. Are there extrinsic desires? Nous 38:326-50. (Google)
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Davis, W. 1986. Two senses of desire. In (J. Marks, ed) The Ways of Desire. Precedent. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fuery, P. 1995. Theories of Desire. Melbourne University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hajek, A. & Pettit, P. 2004. Desire beyond belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:77-92. (Google)
Hoffman, C. A. 1993. Desires and the desirable. Philosophical Forum 25:19-32. (Google)
Hubin, D. C. 2003. Desires, whims, and values. Journal of Ethics 7:315-35. (Google)
Humberstone, I. L. 1987. Wanting as believing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:49-62. (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Kvart, I. 1986. Beliefs and believing. Theoria 52:129-45. (Google)
Larson, E. 1994. Needs versus desires. Dialogue 37:1-10. (Google)
Lewis, D. 1988. Desire as belief. Mind 97:323-32. (Cited by 13 | Google)
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Marks, J. 1986. The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting. Precedent. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Pettit, P. & Price, H. 1989. Bare functional desire. Analysis 49:162-69. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Pojman, L. P. 1985. Believing and willing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15:37-56. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Price, H. 1989. Defending desire-as-belief. Mind 98:119-27. (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Schroeder, T. 2004. Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Schueler, G. F. 1991. Pro-attitudes and direction of fit. Mind 100:277-81. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schueler, G. F. 1995. Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, E. 1999. Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research. Philosophical Psychology 12:157-180. (Google)
Silverman, H. J. 2000. Philosophy and Desire. Routledge. (Google)
Smith, M. 1988. Reason and desire. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:243-58. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stampe, D. W. 1986. Defining desire. In (J. Marks, ed) The Ways of Desire. Precedent. (Google)
Stampe, D. W. 1987. The authority of desire. Philosophical Review b96:335-81. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Stampe, D. W. 1994. Desire. In (S. Guttenplan, ed) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Teichmann, R. 1992. Whyte on the individuation of desires. Analysis 52:103-7. (Google)
Vadas, M. 1984. Affective and nonaffective desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:273-80. (Google)
Whyte, J. T. 1992. Weak-kneed desires. Analysis 52:107-11. (Google)
Antony, L. 2001. Brain states with attitude. In (A. Meijers, ed) Explaining Beliefs. CSLI. (Google)
Baker, L. R. 1994. Attitudes as nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76:175-203. (Google)
Balaguer, M. 1998. Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and phenomenological research 58:805-26. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bennett, J. 1991. Analysis without noise. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution.Ben-Yami, H. 1997. Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 186:84-89. (Google)
Clark, A. 1991. Radical ascent. Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:211-27. (Google)
The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables.Clark, A. 1994. Beliefs and desires incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91:404-25. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Davies, D. 1995. Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement. Acta Analytica 10:37-56. (Google)
Davies, D. 1998. On gauging attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90:129-54. (Google)
Egan, M. F. 1989. What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 56:664-74. (Google)
Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc.Falk, A. E. 2004. Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America. Fodor, J. A. 1986. Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent bauntie's vade-mecum. Mind 94:76-100. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990). (Google)
A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes: dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and truth-conditions. With arguments for structured representations.Gauker, C. 2003. Attitudes without psychology. Facta Philosophica 5:239-56. (Google)
Jacquette, D. 1990. Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly, 40:169-82. (Google)
Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True.Matthews, R. J. 1994. The measure of mind. Mind 103:131-46. (Cited by 10 | Google)
A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement.Millikan, R. G. 1986. Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95:47-80. (Cited by 24 | Google)
Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions. desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations.Moser, P. K. 1990. Physicalism and intentional attitudes. Behavior and Philosophy 18:33-41. (Google)
Peacocke, C. 1983. Between instrumentalism and brain-writing. In Sense and Content. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes, but the language of thought is too strong a requirement. A state's structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states.Possin, K. 1986. The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophical Studies 49:405-18. (Google)
Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway.Pratt, I. 1993. Analysis and the attitudes. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press. (Google)
Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1987. What's in a mind? Synthese 70:97-122. (Google)
Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function.Saidel, E. 1998. Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:21-37. (Google)
Schwartz, J. 1992. Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type. Topoi 11:5-26. (Google)
Smith, D. M. 1994. Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states. Philosophical Studies 74:103-20. (Google)
Stich, S. P. 1984. Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. (Google)
Von Eckardt, B. & Poland, J. 2000. In defense of the standard view. Protosociology 14:312-331. (Google)
Brown, J. 1998. Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities. Mind 107:275-303. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Brueckner, A. 2003. Contents just aren't in the head. Erkenntnis 58:1-6. (Google)
Brueckner, A. 1995. The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism. Analysis 55:146-48. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bruns, M. & Soldati, G. 1997. Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts. Dialectica 48:185-208. (Google)
Burge, T. 1982. Other bodies. In (A. Woodfield, ed) Thought and Object. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 62 | Google)
On Putnam's Twin Earth. Natural kind terms are not indexical. Even de dicto attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things.Butler, K. 1998. Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer. Campbell, J. 1982. Extension and psychic state: Twin Earth revisited. Philosophical Studies 42:67-89. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter.Chomsky, N. 2003. Internalist explorations. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Twins share the same concepts. Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious; contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning.Cummins, R. 1991. Methodological reflections on belief. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an empirical theory about belief. Belief contents are distinct from sentence contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics.Davis, S. 2003. Arguments for externalism. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. (Google)
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Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality. Searle's theory requires magic to grasp external contents internally.Devitt, M. 2001. A shocking idea about meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55:471-494. (Google)
Dretske, F. 1993. The nature of thought. Philosophical Studies 70:185-99. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social. A system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an appropriate learning history.Farkas, K. 2003. What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112:187-208. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Argues for a moderate externalism by synthesizing Putnam and Searle: internal intension leaves extension indeterminate, but it specifies the facts relevant to filling in the indeterminacy.Horowitz, A. 2001. Contents just are in the head. Erkenntnis 54:321-344. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Koethe, J. 1992. And they ain't outside the head either. Synthese 90:27-53. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Mandelkar, S. 1991. An argument against the externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Psychology 4:375-82. (Google)
Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so external relations cannot suffice for intentional content.McCulloch, G. 1992. The spirit of twin earth. Analysis 52:168-174. (Google)
Various arguments against Crane 1991 on externalism.McGilvray, J. 1998. Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head. Mind and Language 13:225-280. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state, involving de se cognitive attitudes. These states aren't shared by twins, but are still narrow in a strong sense.Owens, J. 1983. Functionalism and the propositional attitudes. Nous 17:529-49. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we include inputs and outputs.Owens, J. 2003. Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)
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Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a relation to a proposition. Belief contents must be at least in part construed relative to a subject. Separate belief object and belief state.Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of `meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 585 | Google)
What is in the head doesn't determine the meaning of our terms: my twin on Twin Earth means XYZ where I mean H2O. Content is determined by environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes.Searle, J. R. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 305 | Google)
Sure, meanings are in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual experience is "the thing that is causing this experience".Silvers, S. 2003. Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. (Google)
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On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to internalism and externalism. Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized externally but determined internally. Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge.Stalnaker, R. 1993. Twin earth revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:297-311. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution.Stoneham, T. 2003. Temporal externalism. Philosophical Papers 1:97-107. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Yalowitz, S. 2002. Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding. Philosophical Studies 102:43-92. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zemach, E. M. 1976. Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms. Journal of Philosophy 73:116-27. (Google)
Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth, using arguments from isotopes and scientific development. Molar properties determine classification. Remarks on historicism and the division of labor.
Antony, M. V. 1993. Social relations and the individuation of thought. Mind 102:247-61. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc. So mental states are not individuated individualistically.Burge, T. 1986. Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83:697-720. (Cited by 30 | Google)
On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community, to which meanings are answerable. Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted. With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value.Burge, T. 2003. Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)
Burge, T. 2003. Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. The thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)
Burge, T. 2003. The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)
Burge, T. 2003. Replies from Tyler Burge. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. Donnellan, K. 2003. Burge's thought experiments. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. (Google)
Elugardo, R. 1993. Burge on content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:367-84. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible.Forbes, G. 1987. A dichotomy sustained. Philosophical Studies 51:187-211. (Google)
Gives a Fregean account of belief semantics to handle the Burge cases, and argues that the *type* of a proposition may be internal even if the token itself is not. With remarks on the relevance to Grice's program.Frapolli, M. & Romero, E. (eds) 2003. Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. CSLI. (Google)
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Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber. Content itself is still internal.Woodfield, A. 1998. Social externalism and conceptual diversity. In (J. Preston, ed) Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation. Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content. Causal links are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions.Buller, D. J. 1992. "Narrow"-minded breeds inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20:59-70. (Google)
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Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position.Burge, T. 1986. Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95:3-45. (Cited by 93 | Google)
Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr.Corazza, E. 1994. Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations. Dialectica 48:307-36. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Maybe, maybe not. Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic. Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr.Fodor, J. A. 1980. Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109. Reprinted in RePresentations (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 129 | Google)
Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest?Fodor, J. A. 1982. Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:98-118. (Cited by 13 | Google)
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Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism.Hardcastle, V. G. 1997. [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64:154-60. (Google)
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Relates the individualism debate to Roschian prototype research.Losonsky, M. 1995. Emdedded systems vs. individualism. Minds and Machines 5:357-71. (Google)
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MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content. Narrow content is OK. With remarks on folk psychology and computation.Maloney, J. C. 1985. Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Philosophy of Science 52:451-69. (Google)
Various problems for computational psychology handling content. It shares the problems of a naturalistic psychology.McClamrock, R. 1991. Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4:343-54. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well. But this needn't defeat externalism in general. With remarks on self-knowledge.Patterson, S. 1990. The explanatory role of belief ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 59:313-32. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Uses examples to argue that in explaining behavior we often ascribe beliefs in an individualistic way, even in cases where individual and community use diverge. These contents are at least sometimes expressible.Patterson, S. 1991. Individualism and semantic development. Philosophy of Science 58:15-35. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically.Peacocke, C. 1993. Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties. Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries, and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc.Petrie, B. 1990. Nonautonomous psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:539-59. (Google)
Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes, so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails.Pettit, P. 1986. Broad-minded explanation and psychology. In (P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation. Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions.Tuomela, R. 1989. Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology. Philosophy of Science 56:23-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't, no relational properties can. Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job.Barrett, J. 1997. Individualism and the cross-contexts test. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78:242-60. (Google)
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Arguments for the causal significance of broad content. Physical twins can differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too. Hmm.Burge, T. 1989. Individuation and causation in psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707:303-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles, despite being physically identical.Burge, T. 1995. Intentional properties and causation. In (C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds) Philosophy of Psychology: Debates about Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Reply to Fodor 1991.Butler, K. 1996. Content, causal powers, and context. Philosophy of Science 63:105-14. (Google)
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Fodor's modal argument for narrow content rests on a false analogy between cases concerning thoughts and those concerning planets.Fodor, J. A. 1991. A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88:5-26. (Cited by 28 | Google)
On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers: when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes. Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers.Garcia-Carpintero, M. 1994. The supervenience of mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mental content can be extrinsic and efficacious. Narrow content strategies don't work, as observation concepts are still extrinsic. One can't screen of the intrinsic part from the rest. Thought-experiments are inconclusive.Heil, J. & Mele, A. 1991. Mental causes. American Philosophical Quarterly 28:61-71. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content. Historical factors can be causally relevant.Jacob, P. 1992. Externalism and mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system.Klein, M. 1996. Externalism, content, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:159-76. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Epistemology requires the causal relevance of content, and the relevant content is narrow. On how various architectures might support this causal relevance, by being realized by more specific intrinsic features.van Gulick, R. 1989. Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In (S. Silvers, ed) ReRepresentation. Kluwer. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties.Wilson, R. A. 1992. Individualism, causal powers, and explanation. Philosophical Studies 68:103-39. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal powers. With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections.Wilson, R. A. 1993. Against a priori arguments for Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74:60-79.
Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation.Yablo, S. 1997. Wide causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11:251-81. (Cited by 14 | Google)
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Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr.Butler, K. 1996. Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision. Mind and Language 11:313-37. (Google)
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Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic. Intentional contents therein are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific attribution.Segal, G. 1991. Defence of a reasonable individualism. Mind 100:485-94. (Cited by 11 | Google)
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Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may classify twins together. Computational-level task descriptions rather than behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role.Shapiro, L. A. 1997. A clearer vision. Philosophy of Science 64:131-53. (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors.Miscevic, N. 1996. Computation, content, and cause. Philosophical Studies 82:241-63. (Google)
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Syntax is extrinsically determined, as well as semantics. So if broad content is irrelevant to psychology, syntax is too.Shagrir, O. 2001. Content, computation and externalism. Mind 110:369-400. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Goldberg, S. C. 1999. The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:136-56. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 1999. The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge. Synthese 118:165-201. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2000. Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy. Philosophical Studies 100:51-79. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2002. Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 1:65-76. (Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2002. Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? Nous 36:597-621. (Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2003. On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists. Analysis 63:38-41. (Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2003. Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116:53-78. (Google)
Goldberg, S. C. 2003. What do you know when you know your own thoughts? In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)
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Goldberg, S. C. 2005. The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35:135-48. (Google)
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Haukioja, J. 2006. Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge. Ratio 19. (Google)
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Hohwy, J. 2002. Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83:235-52. (Google)
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Kobes, B. 2003. Mental content and hot self-knowledge. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press.
Kraay, K. J. 2002. Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56:297-317. (Google)
Langsam, H. 2002. Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:42-61. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Larkin, W. S. 1999. Brute error with respect to content. Philosophical Studies 94:159-71. (Google)
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Subjectivism and environmentalism seem to clash on knowledge of content, but it's OK: under environmentalism we still know our contents w/o evidence.Ludlow, P. 1995. Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching. Analysis 55:45-49. (Google)
Argues that cases of switching between language communities are quite common, so that Warfield's case for externalist self-knowledge doesn't work.Ludlow, P. 1995. Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55:157-59. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Ludlow, P. 1995. Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10:69-76. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ludlow, P. 1997. On the relevance of slow switching. Analysis 57:285-86. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ludlow, P. & Martin, N. 1998. Externalism and Self-Knowledge. CSLI. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Macdonald, C. 1995. Externalism and first-person authority. Synthese 104:99-122. (Cited by 2 | Google)
On reconciling externalism with the non-evidential character of first-person knowledge.Macdonald, C. 1998. Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. In (C. Wright, P. Smith, & C. Macdonald, eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
McKinsey, M. 1987. Apriorism in the philosophy of language. Philosophical Studies 52:1-32. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues that we can know the meaning of our words a priori. Analyzes twin earth cases by separating propositional meaning from linguistic meaning, which is indexical, fixes reference, and is knowable a priori.McKinsey, M. 1991. Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 51:9-16. (Cited by 48 | Google)
Contra Burge: if there are conceptual connections between wide contents and and the external world, then we can't know wide contents a priori, as otherwise we could know a priori that the world exists.McKinsey, M. 1994. Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism. Analysis 54:124-8. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Reply to Brueckner 1992: The claim that belief metaphysically necessitate external facts is trivial. Almost all states do that, for Kripkean reason.McKinsey, M. 2002. Forms of externalism and privileged access. Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224. (Google)
McKinsey, M. 2002. On knowing our own minds. Philosophical Quarterly 52:107-16. (Cited by 1 | Google)
McKinsey, M. 2003. Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority. In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. & Tye, M. 1998. Externalism, Twin Earth, and self-knowledge. In (C. Macdonald, P. Smith, & C. Wright, eds) Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. , & Tye, M. 1998. Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? Philosophical Review 107:349-380. (Cited by 13 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 2000. Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:93-118. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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McLaughlin, B. P. 2003. McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism. In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)
Miller, R. W. 1997. Externalist self-knowledge and the scope of the a priori. Analysis 57:67-74. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Moya, C. 2003. Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. (Google)
Nagasawa, Y. 2002. Externalism and the memory argument. Dialectica 56:335-46. (Google)
Noonan, P. 2004. Against absence-dependent thoughts. Analysis 64:92-93. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Noordhof, P. 2005. The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65. (Google)
Nuccetelli, S. 1999. What anti-individualist cannot know a priori. Analysis 59:48-51. (Google)
Nuccetelli, S. 2001. Is self-knowledge an entitlement? And why should we care?. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39:143-155. (Google)
Nuccetelli, S. 2003. Knowing that one knows what one is talking about. In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)
Nuccetelli, S. (ed) 2003. New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Owens, D. 2003. Externalis, Davidson, and knowledge of comparative content. In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)
Peacocke, C. 1996. Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96:117-58. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Pritchard, D. 2002. McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments. Synthese 130:279-302. (Google)
Pritchard, D. & Kallestrup, J. 2004. An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism. Philosophia 2004. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Quesada, D. 2003. Basic self-knowledge and externalism. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind CSLI. (Google)
Raffman, D. 1998. First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs. In (C. Wright, B. Smith, & C. Macdonald, eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Sawyer, S. 1998. Privileged access to the world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:523-533. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Sawyer, S. 1999. Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4:358-78. (Google)
Sawyer, S. 2002. In defense of Burge's thesis. Philosophical Studies 107:109-28. (Google)
Sawyer, S. 2003. Sufficient absences. Analysis 63:202-8. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Sawyer, S. 2004. Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions. Analysis 64:354-57. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schiffer, S. 1992. Boghossian on Externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:29-38.
Spicer, F. 2004. On the identity of concepts, and the compatibility of externalism and privileged access. American Philosophical Quarterly 41:155-168. (Google)
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Stoneham, T. 1999. Boghossian on empty natural kind concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:119-22. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Stueber, K. 2002. The problem of self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56:269-96. (Google)
Szubka, T. 2000. Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content. Philosophical Psychology 13:491-503. (Google)
Tye, M. 1998. Externalism and memory. Aristotelian Society Supplement 72:77-94. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Warfield, T. A. 1992. Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible. Analysis 52:232-37. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Boghossian's argument that externalism threatens self-knowledge fails: twin cases needn't be relevant alternatives (unless they are actual), so they don't threaten knowledge of content, by the usual standards of knowledge.Warfield, T. A. 1995. Knowing the world and knowing our minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Argues that externalism and self-knowledge imply the falsity of skepticism (though externalism alone does not). And arguments against externalist self-knowledge are no better than standard skeptical arguments.Warfield, T. A. 1997. Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching. Analysis 57:282-84. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wright, C. 2000. Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof. Philosophical Issues 10:140-63. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Wright, C. 2003. Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference. In (S. Nuccetelli, ed) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wyler, T. 1994. First-person authority and singular thoughts. Zeitschrift fur Philosophie Forschung 48:585-94. (Google)
Adams, F. , Drebushenko, D. , Fuller, G. & Stecker, R. 1990. Narrow content: Fodor's folly. Mind and Language 5:213-29. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Traces and criticizes Fodor's position on narrow content. Argues that narrow content isn't content, and doesn't explain behavior. Fun but arguable.Adams, F. & Fuller, G. 1992. Names, contents, and causes. Mind and Language 7:205-21. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that problems with names don't require an appeal to narrow content in explanation. Broad content plus associated descriptions will do the job.Antony, L. 1989. Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science. In (G. Boolos, ed) Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Representational cognitive science has no need for narrow content -- wide contents and formal properties can do all the work. Argues that the semantics of mental expressions needn't mirror the semantics of language.Aydede, M. 1997. Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? Mind and Language 12:422-58. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Baker, L. R. 1985. A farewell to functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48:1-14. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that type-identical functional states can differ in narrow content, so methodological solipsism fails. Uses the example of identical programs for playing chess and arms negotiations.Baker, L. R. 1985. Just what do we have in mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:25-48. (Google)
Some implausible twin cases trying to show that mental life can vary wildly while preserving physical/computational state. Bizarre.Baker, L. R. 1986. Content by courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84:197-213. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Baker, L. R. 1987. Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Lots of arguments against narrow content. Very stimulating, though wrong.Biro, J. I. 1992. In defense of social content. Philosophical Studies 67:277-93. (Google)
Contra Loar 1988, the contents of "that"-clauses often reflects psychological content, even if it sometimes does not. We don't need narrow content.Block, N. 1991. What narrow content is not. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 21 | Google)
There are big problems specifying the "mapping" and the relevant contexts for Fodor's theory noncircularly. Narrow content either collapses into syntax or is too coarse-grained. Nontrivial narrow content must be holistic.Block, N. 1995. Ruritania revisited. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Content. Ridgeview. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brown, C. 1993. Belief states and narrow content. Mind and Language 8:343-67. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Criticizes the "bracketing" strategy of Stich and Walker, and argues that intrinsic belief state should be individuated according to how it embeds in different environments. With a comparison with Fodor's related theory.Brown, C. 2002. Narrow mental content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Google)
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. The components of content. In (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation.Chalmers, D. J. 2003. The nature of narrow content. Philosophical Issues 13:46-66. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Davies, M. 1986. Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83. (Google)
Comments on Fodor 1987. Fodor doesn't make a conclusive case against externalism; but narrow content may be promising, and inexpressibility doesn't pose any real problems. With comparisons to neo-Fregean theories.Dennett, D. C. 1983. Beyond belief. In (A. Woodfield, ed) Thought and Object. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1987). (Cited by 35 | Google)
What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice.Devitt, M. 1990. The narrow representational theory of mind. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Not syntactic psychology nor wide psychology, but narrow psychology.Field, H. 1989. "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1987. Individualism and supervenience. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press. (Google)
Science taxonomizes by causal powers, which are locally supervenient, so psychology needs a narrow notion of content. Proposes that a relativized notion -- a function from context to extension -- can do the job. Nice.Jackson, F. , and Pettit, P. 1993. Some content is narrow. In (J. Heil and A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Argues that folk psychology needs a notion of narrow content to provide robust predictive behavioral generalizations that covers doppelgangers. If not, then some behavioral patterns would be flukey.Jackson, F. 2003. Representation and narrow belief. Philosophical Issues 13:99-112. (Google)
LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1986. Solipsistic semantics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:595-614. (Cited by 6 | Google)
There's no good way to construe narrow content. Phenomenologist strategy is intrinsically wide, and indexicalist strategy can't specify content.LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989. Dual aspect semantics. In (S. Silvers, ed) ReRepresentation. Kluwer. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Loar, B. 1987. Social content and psychological content. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. (Cited by 35 | Google)
Uses examples to argue that psychological content is not fixed by the content of "that"-clauses in belief ascription, and vice versa. We require a subtler kind of narrow content to capture what's going on.Loar, B. 1987. Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15:89-124. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Maloney, J. C. 1991. Saving psychological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61:267-83. (Google)
Contests the "provoked/aggravated assault" example of Baker 1986. If they're doppelgangers, then their narrow content can't differ.Manfredi, P. 1993. Two routes to narrow content: both dead ends. Philosophical Psychology 6:3-22. (Google)
McDermott, M. 1986. Narrow content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:277-88. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Narrow beliefs are de re beliefs about our inputs and outputs.McGilvray, J. 1998. Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head. Mind and Language 13:225-280. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Newman, A. E. 2005. Two grades of internalism (pass and fail). Philosophical Studies 122.
Putnam, H. 1987. Fodor and Block on narrow content. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Against perceptual-prototype and conceptual-role accounts of narrow content.Quillen, K. 1986. Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation. Mind and Language 1:133-57. (Google)
Can't get a `mode of presentation' account of narrow content to work, either through description theory or prototypes. Psych should be non-individualist.Recanati, F. 1990. Externalism and narrow content. Nous. (Google)
There are levels of narrowness, varying by whether independence is of actual or normal environment. Argues that this can be consistent with externalism.Recanati, F. 1994. How narrow is narrow content? Dialectica 48:209-29. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schiffer, S. 1989. Fodor's character. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Google)
Segal, G. 2000. A Slim Book about Narrow Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 33 | Google)
Silverberg, A. 1995. Narrow content: A defense. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:109-27. (Google)
Stalnaker, R. C. 1990. Narrow content. In (C. A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) Propositional Attitudes. CSLI. (Cited by 18 | Google)
On some problems with narrow content, contra Loar 1987. Narrow content is hard to spell out with "diagonal" propositions. Loar doesn't show that psychological content is narrow. With some remarks on privileged access.Stich, S. P. 1991. Narrow content meets fat syntax. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Argues that narrow content is still too coarse-grained for explanation, classifying psychologically distinct states together. Use syntax instead.Taylor, K. 1989. Supervenience and levels of meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:443-58. (Google)
Argues that the partial character construal of narrow content is not interestingly semantic. It collapses into syntax or phenomenology.Taylor, K. 1989. Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem. Nous 23:355-72. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Uses a "fraternal twin earth" thought experiment to show that even de dicto attributions don't supervene on narrow role, and that narrow content can't be explicated descriptively unless it collapses into phenomenalism.Vaughan, R. 1989. Searle's narrow content. Ratio 2:185-90. (Google)
White, S. 1982. Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:347-65. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Replies to Burge/Stich arguments by introducing partial character -- a function from context to content, analogous to Kaplan's character -- as the semantic property determined by functional state and relevant to explanation.White, S. 1992. Narrow content and narrow interpretation. In The Unity of the Self. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues for an account of narrow content in terms of notional worlds, by considering "objective optimality" across worlds. This allows for a sort of narrow radical interpretation. With arguments against Stalnaker.Williams, M. 1990. Social norms and narrow content. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:425-462. (Google)
Narrow content theories can't handle the normativity of content. In-depth treatment of Burge cases and of the failures of causal and conceptual-role accounts. Normativity is fundamentally social. A long, interesting paper.Williamson, T. 1998. The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues. Philosophical Perspectives 12:389-410. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2004. Masters of our meanings. Philosophical Studies 118:133-52. (Google)
Byrne, A. & Pryor, J. 2006. Bad intensions. In (M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia, eds) Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. The components of content. In (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation.Chalmers, D. J. 2002. On sense and intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82. (Cited by 29 | Google)
Chalmers, D. J. 2003. The nature of narrow content. Philosophical Issues 13:46-66. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Chalmers, D. J. 2004. Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies 118:153-226. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Davies, M. 2004. Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. Philosophical Studies, 118:83-131. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Fernandez, J. 2004. Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions. European Journal of Philosophy 12:17-37. (Google)
Haukioja, J. 2006. Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge. Ratio 19. (Google)
Jackson, F. 2004. Why we need A-intensions. Philosophical Studies. (Google)
Marconi, D. 2005. Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem. Synthese 143:321-49. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Miscevic, N. 2001. Apriority and conceptual kinematics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1:21-48. (Google)
Nimtz, C. 2004. Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms. Synthese 138:125-48. (Google)
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Schroeter, L. 2004. The rationalist foundations of Chalmers' two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies 18:227-55. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stalnaker, R. 2001. On considering a possible world as actual. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. (Cited by 15 | Google)
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Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. J. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58:7-19. (Cited by 82 | Google)
Advocates a different sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the environment in actively driving cognition. Beliefs can extend into an agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way.Clark, A. 2001. Reasons, robots and The extended mind. Mind and Language 16:121045.
Clark, A. 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 45 | Google)
Clark, A. 2005. Intrinsic content, active memory, and The extended mind. Analysis 65:1-11.
Dartnall, T. 2005. Does the world leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology. Cognitive Science 29:135-43. (Google)
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Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm.Hurley, S. 1998. Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism. Analysis 58:1-6. (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Brown, D. J. 1993. Swampman of La Mancha. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23:327-48. (Google)
An entertaining fable about a swampthing doppelganger of a murder witness. Does he have content? With plot twists about personal identity.Brown, D. J. 1996. A furry tile about mental representation. Philosophical Quarterly 185:448-66. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds.Drai, D. 2003. Externalism without identity. Synthese 134:463-75. (Google)
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Should construe functionalism broadly rather than narrowly; then can handle the problem of broad content.Katz, J. 1990. The domino theory. Philosophical Studies 58:3-39. (Google)
Anti-intensional arguments are not independent but a series of dominos. Quine/Quine/Davidson/Putnam/Burge rise and fall together.Macdonald, C. 1990. Weak externalism and mind-body identity. Mind 99:387-404. (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Belief content has two distinct elements, one causal-explanatory, the other truth-related.Owens, J. 1987. In defense of a different Doppelganger. Philosophical Review 96:521-54. (Google)
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Rey, G. 1992. Semantic externalism and conceptual competence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:315-33. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems.Rowlands, M. 1995. Externalism and token-token identity. Philosophia 24:359-75. (Google)
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Walker, V. 1990. In defense of a different taxonomy: A reply to Owens. Philosophical Review 99. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Contra Owens 1987: wide intentional descriptions and molar bodily descriptions don't exhaust the options. A bracketing strategy gives a narrow intentional taxonomy of mental states.Williams, M. 1990. Externalism and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Quarterly 40:352-80. (Google)
Woodfield, A. 1986. Two categories of content. Mind and Language 1:319-54. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Adams, F. 2003. The informational turn in philosophy. Minds and Machines 13:471-501. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barwise, J. & Perry, J. 1983. Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press. (Cited by 934 | Google)
Barwise, J. 1986. Information and circumstance. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Defending information against Fodor 1986. Information is objective but relational, and depends on the relevant constraints between representation and environment. Circumstances play a vital role.Barwise, J. 1987. Unburdening the language of thought. Mind and Language. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Bogdan, R. J. 1988. Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account. Mind and Language. (Cited by 3 | Google)
From material (formal) info to semantic info via teleology; from semantic information to representation via internal structure. Cute. With a good reply by Israel, and a terse reply by Dretske.Bogdan, R. J. 1987. Mind, content and information. Synthese. (Google)
Bridges, J. 2005. Does informational semantics commit Euthypho's fallacy. Nous. (Google)
Clark, A. 1993. Mice, shrews, and misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy 90:290-310. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Uses information theory to analyze misrepresentation. A signal represents what it carries most information about, not what it correlates best with. Treating some signals as noise can increase information content.Coulter, J. 1995. The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences. Minds and Machines 5:583-96. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press. (Cited by 606 | Google)
Defines knowledge content is in terms of information-flow from events, and applies to various aspects of psychology.Dretske, F. 1983. Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:55-90.
A summary of the book, with commentary and replies.Dretske, F. 1990. Putting information to work. In (P. Hanson, ed) Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
On the causal role of information (as opposed to meaning). Information is causally efficacious if considered with respect to learning. With commentary by Brian Smith.Dretske, F. 2000. Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google)
Floridi, L. 2003. Two approaches to the philosophy of information. Minds and Machines 13:459-469. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1986. Information and association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Transmission of information is no good without the encoding of information. With criticisms of associative networks, which transmit without encoding, and criticism of Barwise & Perry's account of attunement to a relation.Fodor, J. A. 1987. A situated grandmother. Mind and Language. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Foley, R. 1987. Dretske's `information-theoretic' account of knowledge. Synthese. (Google)
Frank, M. C. 2004. Against informational atomism. The Dualist 10. (Google)
Gjelsvik, O. 1991. Dretske on knowledge and content. Synthese 86:425-41. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grandy, R. 1987. Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized. Synthese 70:191-203. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology than Dretske's.Grim, P. , St. Denis, P. , & Kokalis, T. 2004. Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets. Minds and Machines 14:43-66. (Google)
Hardcastle, V. G. 1994. Indicator semantics and Dretske's function. Philosophical Psychology 7:367-82. (Google)
Heller, M. 1991. Indication and what might have been. Analysis 51:187-91. (Google)
We need to analyze indication in terms of "close enough" worlds; the relevant conditionals are "might"-conditionals.Israel, D. & Perry, J. 1990. What is information? In (P. Hanson, ed) Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press. (Cited by 34 | Google)
Jackendoff, R. 1985. Information is in the mind of the beholder. Linguistics and Philosophy 8:23-33. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Argues that a representationalist theory of semantics beats a realist one.Kistler, M. 2000. Source and channel in the informational theory of mental content. Facta Philosophica 2:213-36. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kulvicki, J. 2004. Isomorphism in information-carrying systems. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85. (Google)
Loewer, B. 1987. From information to intentionality. Synthese. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Morris, W. E. 1990. The regularity theory of information. Synthese 82:375-398. (Google)
Dretske has problems with ruling out alternative possibilities; and there is a gap between information-caused belief and knowledge.Savitt, S. 1987. Absolute informational content. Synthese 70:185-90. (Google)
Makes a distinction between absolute information and information that's relative to other knowledge.Sayre, K. M. 1986. Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:121-38. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Sayre, K. M. 1987. Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content. Synthese 70:247-69. (Cited by 3 | Google)
On problems with a computational approach to content: computers process info(t), the non-semantic content of communication theory, not info(s), or semantic content. Get info(s) from efficient processing of mutual info(t).Sturdee, D. 1997. The semantic shuffle: Shifting emphasis in Dretske's account of representational content. Erkenntnis 47:89-104. (Google)
Taylor, K. 1987. Belief, information and semantic content: A naturalist's lament. Synthese 71:97-124. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Usher, M. 2001. A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation. Mind and Language 16:331-334. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Winograd, T. 1987. Cognition, attunement and modularity. Mind and Language. (Google)
Zalabardo, J. L. 1995. A problem for information-theoretic semantics. Synthese 105:1-29. (Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1987. Meaning and the world order. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press. (Google)
Defends and refines a causal theory, using the notion of asymmetric dependence of a token upon the world.Fodor, J. A. 1990. A theory of content II. In A Theory of Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)
Defending the asymmetric dependence theory against various objections.Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1992. `X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style. Minds and Machines 2:175-83. (Google)
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1993. Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem". Minds and Machines 3:97-104. (Google)
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1994. `X' means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics. Minds and Machines 4:215-31. (Google)
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1997. Fodor's asymmetric causal dependency theory and proximal projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35:433-437. (Google)
Antony, L. & Levine, J. 1991. The nomic and the robust. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Baker, L. R. 1990. On a causal theory of content. Philosophical Perspectives. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baker, L. R. 1991. Has content been naturalized? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bernier, P. 1993. Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence. Mind and Language 8:327-42. (Google)
Boghossian, P. 1991. Naturalizing content. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Argues that Fodor's theory is a type-1 theory, requiring naturalistically specifiable circumstances in which a symbol is only caused by its referent; and that these theories fail for various reasons, e.g. verificationism.Cain, M. J. 1999. Fodor's attempt to naturalize mental content. Philosophical Quarterly 49:520-26. (Google)
Cram, H-R. 1992. Fodor's causal theory of representation. Philosophical Quarterly 42:56-70. (Google)
Fodor's theory has counterexamples and can't explain its counterfactuals; but we can save it by borrowing from Dretske's account of misrepresentation.Gibson, M. 1996. Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning. Philosophical Psychology 9:235-59. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Loar, B. 1991. Can we explain intentionality? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Maloney, J. C. 1990. Mental misrepresentation. Philosophy of Science 57:445-58. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Manfredi, P. A. & Summerfield, D. M. 1992. Robustness without asymmetry: A flaw in Fodor's theory of content. Philosophical Studies 66:261-83. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Mariano, L. B. 1999. Content naturalized. Philosophical Studies 96:205-38. (Google)
Mendola, J. 2003. A dilemma for asymmetric dependence. Nous 37:232-257. (Google)
Rupert, R. 2000. Dispositions indisposed: Semantic atomism and Fodor's theory of content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:325-349. (Google)
Seager, W. E. 1993. Fodor's theory of content: problems and objections. Phiosophy of Science 60:262-77. (Google)
Wallis, C. 1995. Asymmetric dependence, representation, and cognitive science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:373-401. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Warfield, T. A. 1994. Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. Minds and Machines 4:205-14. (Google)
Aizawa, K. 1994. Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation. Mind and Language 9:1-24. (Google)
Cummins, R. 1989. Representation and covariation. In (S. Silvers, ed) ReRepresentation. Kluwer. (Google)
Cummins, R. 1997. The LOT of the causal theory of mental content. Journal of Philosophy 94:535-542. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1984. Semantics, Wisconsin style. Synthese 59:231-50. Reprinted in RePresentations (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 29 | Google)
A somewhat sympathetic commentary on the Dretske/Stampe causal theories, but raising the problem of misrepresentation.Fodor, J. A. 1990. Information and representation. In (P. Hanson, ed) Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Godfrey-Smith, P. 1989. Misinformation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19:533-50. (Cited by 11 | Google)
On various attempts to solve the error problem and why they don't work.Godfrey-Smith, P. 1991. Signal, decision, action. Journal of Philosophy 88:709-22. (Cited by 9 | Google)
World-head reliability is just as important as head-world reliability. With arguments and examples from signal detection theory.Jacquette, D. 1996. Lloyd on intrinsic natural representation in simple mechanical minds. Minds and Machines 6:47-60. (Google)
Maloney, J. C. 1994. Content: Covariation, control, and contingency. Synthese 100:241-90. (Cited by 2 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 1987. What is wrong with correlational psychosemantics. Synthese. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ray, G. 1997. Fodor and the inscrutability problem. Mind and Language 12:475-89. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stampe, D. 1977. Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2:42-63. (Cited by 50 | Google)
Stampe, D. 1986. Verificationism and a causal account of meaning. Synthese 69:107-37. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Stampe, D. 1991. Content, context, and explanation. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Google)
Viger, C. D. 2001. Locking on to the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 14:203-215. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Warmbrod, K. 1992. Primitive representation and misrepresentation. Topoi 11:89-101. (Google)
Weitzman, L. 1996. What makes a causal theory of content anti-skeptical? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:299-318. (Google)
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. 1997. Rock beats scissors: Historicalism fights back. Analysis 57:273-81. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Agar, N. 1993. What do frogs really believe? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:1-12. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Argues that a teleological account can resolve content indeterminacies, by an appeal to counterfactuals in examining what properties were selected for.Ariew, A. (ed) 2002. Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press. Bogdan, R. 1994. Grounds for Cognition: How Goal-Guided Behavior Shapes the Mind. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. 1997. The teleological theory of content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:474-89. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. 2002. A pyrrhic victory for teleonomy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:372-77. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Clarke, M. 1996. Darwinian algorithms and indexical representation. Philosophy of Science 63:27-48. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1988. Fear of Darwin's optimizing rationale. Manuscript. (Google)
Defends evolutionary theories of content against Fodor.Dennett, D. C. 1988. Evolution, error and intentionality. In The Intentional Stance. MIT Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Attacks original intentionality (Fodor/Burge/Dretske/Searle/Kripke) -- our intentionality, if anything, is derived through evolution, and so is as indeterminate as that of an artifact.Dretske, F. 1986. Misrepresentation. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 92 | Google)
Tries to deal with misrepresentation by appealing to function.Dretske, F. 2001. Norms, history, and the mental. In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Elder, C. L. 1998. What versus how in naturally selected representations. Mind 107:349-363. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1990. Psychosemantics, or, Where do truth conditions come from? In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Truth conditions are "entry conditions" for belief under "normal function". Later repudiated.Fodor, J. A. 1990. A theory of content I. In A Theory of Content. MIT Press. (Google)
Teleological solutions can't work, because of underdetermination and so on.Hardcastle, V. 2002. On the normativity of functions. In (A. Ariew, ed) Functions. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Joyce, R. 2002. Moral realism and teleosemantics. Biology and Philosophy 16:723-31. (Google)
Keeley, B. 1999. Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception. Biology and Philosophy 14:395-430. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Lalor, B. J. 1998. Swampman, etiology, and content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36:215-232. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Levine, J. 1996. Swampjoe: mind or simulation? Mind and Language 11:86-91. (Google)
Macdonald, G. 1989. Biology and representation. Mind and Language 4:186-200. (Google)
Matthen, M. 1988. Biological functions and perceptual content. Journal of Philosophy 85:5-27. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Millikan, R. G. 1979. An evolutionist approach to language. Philosophy Research Archives 5. (Google)
Millikan, R. G. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press. (Cited by 369 | Google)
An evolutionary account of thought, content, and various intentional phenomena, appealing to proper functions and adaptational role to individuate contents.Millikan, R. G. 1986. Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95:47-80. (Cited by 24 | Google)
The content of a desire is its adaptational Proper Function; the content of a belief is its Normal Condition for success.Millikan, R. G. 1989. Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy 86:281-97. (Cited by 69 | Google)
Representation content is determined by the consumption of a representation, not its production. The representation-world correspondence is best taken as a normal condition for the consumer's function.Millikan, R. G. 1989. In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science 56:288-302. (Cited by 70 | Google)
Millikan, R. G. 1990. Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics. Philosophical Topics 18:151-61. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Contrasting positions on the role of representation production and consumption; also on the role of reliability, articulateness, and learning.Millikan, R. G. 1991. Speaking up for Darwin. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google)
A reply to some of Fodor's criticisms of teleological theories in _Psychosemantics_ and elsewhere. With some remarks on Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory.Millikan, R. G. 1993. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. MIT Press, (Cited by 169 | Google)
A collection of papers on teleological semantics and other issues about psychology and mental content.Millikan, R. G. 1996. On swampkinds. Mind and Language 11:103-17. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Millikan, R. G. 1997. Troubles with Wagner's reading of Millikan. Philosophical Studies 86:93-96. (Google)
Millikan, R. G. 2001. What has natural information to do with intentional representation? In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Millikan, R. G. 2002. Biofunctions: Two paradigms. In (A. Ariew, ed) Functions. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Millikan, R. G. 2004. Varieties of Meaning. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Neander, K. 1995. Misrepresenting and malfunctioning. Philosophical Studies 79:109-41. (Cited by 29 | Google)
Neander, K. 1995. Dretske's innate modesty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:258-74. (Google)
Neander, K. 1996. Swampman meets swampcow. Mind and Language 11:118-29. (Cited by 11 | Google)
It's not unreasonable to deny a swampthing beliefs: swampcows aren't cows and swamphearts aren't hearts. Semantic norms are plausibly grounded in biological norms and so in history.Newton, N. 1992. Dennett on intrinsic intentionality. Analysis 52:18-23. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Contra Dennett 1988, designed creatures can have intrinsic (if not original) intentionality. Overall purpose is dependent on designer's goals, but specific contents need not be.Papineau, D. 1984. Representation and explanation. Philosophy of Science 51:550-72. (Cited by 16 | Google)
A teleological theory of belief/desire contents: the satisfaction conditions for a desire are those effects for which it was selected; truth conditions for a belief are circumstances resulting in satisfaction of desires.Papineau, D. 1990. Truth and teleology. In (D. Knowles, ed) Explanation and its Limits. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Best theory is combination of a success-guaranteeing account of truth-conditions with a teleological account of desire.Papineau, D. 1991. Teleology and mental states. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65. (Google)
Papineau, D. 1996. Doubtful intuitions. Mind and Language 11:130-32. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Papineau, D. 1998. Teleosemantics and indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:1-14. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Papineau, D. 2001. The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about Swampman. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:279-89. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Perlman, M. 2002. Pagan teleology: Adaptational role and the philosophy of mind. In (A. Ariew, ed) Functions. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Pickles, D. 1989. Intentionality, representation, and function. Sussex University, Cognitive Science Research Paper 140. (Google)
Combining the analysis-relative and historical accounts of function, and using these to give an account of intentionality: representation are produced by conditional productive functions. Argues against Fodor on indeterminacy.Pietrowski, P. M. 1992. Intentionality and teleological error. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:267-82. (Google)
Millikan's theory has an implausible consequence: creatures' belief contents can involve properties which they cannot discriminate. With examples.Price, C. 2001. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Ross, D. & Zawidzki, T. 1994. Information and teleosemantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32:393-419. (Google)
Rountree, J. 1997. The plausibility of teleological content ascriptions: A reply to Pietroski. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78:404-20. (Google)
Rowlands, M. 1996. Teleological semantics. Mind 106:279-304. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Rupert, R. D. 1999. Mental representations and Millikan's theory of intentionalcontent: Does biology chase causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37:113-140. (Google)
Schroeder, T. 2004. New norms for teleosemantics. In (H. Clapin, ed) Representation in Mind. Elsevier. (Google)
Sehon, S. R. 1994. Teleology and the nature of mental states. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:63-72. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Shapiro, L. 1996. Representation from bottom to top. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:523-42. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shapiro, L. 1992. Darwin and disjunction: Foraging theory and univocal assignments of content. Philosophy of Science Association 1992, 1:469-80. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Sullivan, S. R. 1993. From natural function to indeterminate content. Philosophical Studies 69:129-37. (Google)
Wagner, S. 1996. Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism. Philosophical Studies 82:81-110. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Teleosemantics has big problems with indeterminacy, holism, false belief, and "psychophysical normalcy" in causation. So do all naturalistic stories.Walsh, D. M. 2002. Brentano's chestnuts. In (A. Ariew, ed) Functions. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Zawidzki, T. & Ross, D. 1994. Information and teleosemantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32:393-419. (Google)
Zawidzki, T. 2003. Mythological content: A problem for Milikan's teleosemantics. Philosophical Psychology 16:535-538. (Google)
Block, N. 1986. Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:615-78. (Cited by 129 | Google)
An in-depth program for conceptual-role semantics, and its role in a two-factor account of meaning. Also a defense of narrow content.Block, N. 1988. Functional role and truth conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181. (Cited by 11 | Google)
A defense of functional role semantics, and an account of its relation to truth-conditional factors. A two-factor theory will handle wide content.Boghossian, P. A. 1994. Inferential-role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 5 | Google)
No matter how we understand the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the falsity of inferential-role semantics does not follow. The meaning-constitutive inferences needn't be the analytic inferences.Brandom, R. 1994. Reasoning and representing. In (M. Michael & J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer. (Google)
Cummins, R. 1992. Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content. Philosophical Studies 65:103-127. (Cited by 3 | Google)
CRS conflates representation content and attitude content (which depends on a representation's "target"), so can't handle representation content; it makes all content-based explanations vacuous; and it can't handle error properly.Field, H. 1977. Logic, meaning, and conceptual role. Journal of Philosophy 74:379-409. (Cited by 75 | Google)
Explicates conceptual role in terms of conditional probability, and analyzes meaning as conceptual role plus reference. With remarks on truth, descriptions, and synonymy.Field, H. 1978. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13:9-61. (Cited by 88 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. & LePore, E. 1991. Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role. Mind and Language 6:328-43. (Cited by 26 | Google)
Conceptual role semantics isn't compatible with compositional semantics and the denial of an analytic/synthetic distinction, as full conceptual roles aren't compositional, and there's no way to specify a relevant subset.Harman, G. 1974. Meaning and semantics. In (M. Munitz & P. Unger, eds) Semantics and Philosophy. New York University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Harman, G. 1975. Language, thought, and communication. In (K. Gunderson, ed) Language, Mind, and Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Harman, G. 1982. Conceptual role semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28:242-56. (Cited by 44 | Google)
Meaning and content is determined by the role of symbols in thought (e.g. inference and perception). With remarks on indeterminacy, context-dependence, the linguistic division of labor, qualia, speech acts, and more.Horowitz, A. 1992. Functional role and intentionality. Theoria 58:197-218. (Google)
Loar, B. 1982. Conceptual role and truth conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:272-83. (Cited by 13 | Google)
On the relation between conceptual role and truth-conditions. Contra Harman, truth-conditions are to an extent independent of conceptual role.Loewer B. 1982. The role of `Conceptual role semantics'. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:305-15. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Contra Harman 1982, truth-conditions are central to a semantic theory.McCullagh, M. 2003. Do inferential roles compose? Dialectica 57:431-38. (Google)
Perlman, M. 1997. The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories. Minds and Machines 7:495-513. (Google)
Silverberg, A. 1992. Putnam on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 67:111-31. (Google)
Argues against Putnam 1987 that conceptual role plays an important role in determining meaning. Appeals to the induction theory of Holland et al.Toribio, J. 1997. Twin pleas: Probing content and compositionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57:871-89. (Google)
Warfield, T. A. 1993. On a semantic argument against conceptual role semantics. Analysis 53:298-304. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Contra Fodor and Lepore, meanings can be compositional even if inferential roles are not, as long as meanings only supervene on inferential role.
Brook, A. & Stainton, R. 1997. Fodor's new theory of content and computation. Mind and Language 12:459-74. (Google)
Churchland, P. M. & Churchland, P. S. 1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-18. (Cited by 17 | Google)
On "translational" (conceptual) and "calibrational" (referential) content. Relation of content issues to computational issues.Cummins, R. 1989. Meaning and Mental Representation. MIT Press. (Cited by 146 | Google)
Critiques other views, offers interpretational semantics.Cummins, R. 1996. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. MIT Press. (Cited by 69 | Google)
Cummins, R. 2002. Haugeland on representation and intentionality. In (H. Clapin, ed) Philosophy and Mental Representation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1991. Ways of establishing harmony. In (B. McLaughlin, ed) Dretske and his Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)
On the ways in which meanings can come to cohere with their causal roles: learning, natural selection, and design. Criticizes Dretske for undervaluing the latter two: all three are in the same boat.Dretske, F. 1986. Aspects of cognitive representation. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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