Compiled by David Chalmers, Philosophy, Australian National University. Technical support by David Bourget, University of Toronto. For more information see the main page.
Crane, T. 1991. Why indeed? Papineau on supervenience. Analysis 51:32-7. (Google)
Contra Papineau 1989: the assumption of completeness is false or trivial. Maybe the mental is part of a complete physics. With response by Papineau.Elugardo, R. 1988. Against weak psychophysical supervenience. Dialectica 42:129-43. (Google)
Various objections to Kim's arguments for supervenience. Not all internal states relevant to I/O relations are psychological states. Strange.Hendel, G. 2002. On what does the issue of supervenience and psychophysical dependence depend? Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 41. (Google)
Kim, J. 1979. Causality, identity and supervenience in the mind-body problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:31-49. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Supervenience of the mental on the physical is what is required to make mental causation possible. Very nice.Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41:51-70. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 30 | Google)
Internal mental states (i.e. ones that are not rooted outside) supervene on synchronous internal physical states, and internal states are all that is relevant in the explanation of behavior.Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience as a mind-body theory. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:129-47. (Google)
Distinguishes weak (within-world) vs strong (across-worlds) supervenience. Relates to reduction, internal/external mental states, and various theories.Kim, J. 1997. Supervenience, emergence, and realization in the philosophy of mind. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Lewis, H. 1985. Is the mental supervenient on the physical? In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
On some problems with supervenience, the relation between supervenience and reduction, and on reasons for accepting psychophysical supervenience. Loose.Loar, B. 1993. Can we confirm supervenient properties? In (E. Villanueva, ed) Naturalism and Normativity. Ridgeview. (Google)
If mental properties are supervenient but irreducible to physical/functional properties, we can't confirm them. Confirmation requires an indispensable explanatory role, which irreducibility precludes. With comments by Schiffer.Macdonald, C. 1995. Psychophysical supervenience, dependency, and reduction. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Merricks, T. 1998. Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Mind 107: 59-72. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Noonan, H. 1999. Microphysical supervenience and consciousness. Mind 108:755-9. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Papineau, D. 1989. Why supervenience? Analysis 50:66-71. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Psychophysical supervenience follows from completeness of physical laws.Papineau, D. 1995. Arguments for supervenience and physical realization. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Sider, T. 2003. Maximality and microphysical supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:139-149. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Witmer, D. G. 1998. What is wrong with the manifestability argument for supervenience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:84-89. (Google)
Armstrong, D. M. 1982. Metaphysics and supervenience. Critica 42:3-17. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Argues that everything is logically supervenient on the physical. Considers classes, possibilities, numbers, universals, and objects of thought.Bailey, A. 1998. Supervenience and physicalism. Synthese 117:53-73. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Botterell, A. 2002. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: a reply to Campbell. Dialogue 41:155-161. (Google)
Campbell, N. 2002. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: a reply to Botterell. Dialogue 41:163-167. (Google)
Chalmers, D. J. 1996. Supervenience and materialism. In The Conscious Mind (pp. 41-42). Oxford University Press, 1996. (Google)
Charles, D. 1992. Supervenience, composition, and physicalism. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Francescotti, R. M. 1998. Defining "physicalism". Journal of Mind and Behavior 19:51-64. (Google)
Haugeland, J. 1984. Ontological supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:1-12. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Supervenience is all we need for materialism. Various materialist arguments (unity, "nothing but", history, fear of darkness, simplicity, law) don't support physical exhaustion & token identity, over and above supervenience.Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1975. Physicalism: ontology, determination and reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72:551-64. (Cited by 37 | Google)
Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1977. Physicalist materialism. Nous 11:309-45. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Some applications of the earlier treatment: examples of determination without reduction; the statuf of properties and universals; the mental; the life sciences; modalities and essentalism; theoretical equivalence.Hellman, G. 1985. Determination and logical truth. Journal of Philosophy 82:607-16. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth.Hendel, G. 2001. Physicalism, nothing buttery, and supervenience. Ratio 14:252-262. (Google)
Horgan, T. 1981. Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics. Synthese 49:395-413. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that the generality of physics should be a supervenience thesis, not token physicalism. Fodor's token physicalism is untenable but might be saved with an appropriate view of events.Horgan, T. 1982. Supervenience and microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:29-43. (Cited by 28 | Google)
An account of how all facts supervene on microphysical facts, and how all intrinsic facts supervene on intrinsic microphysical facts.Horgan, T. 1984. Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:19-38. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Laplacean demon's job: number crunching, plus cosmic hermeneutics to explain high-level truths. All high-level truths follow from low-level by meaning constraints. Application to theoretical/mentalistic/everyday terms. Nice.Jack, A. 1994. Materialism and supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:426-43. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Supervenience is neither necessary nor sufficient for materialism. With various (contentious) counterexamples. So we need a different formulation.Kirk, R. 1996. Strict implication, supervenience, and physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:244-57. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Argues for strict implication rather than supervenience as a formulation of "minimal physicalism" (unless supervenience is formulated just right).Lewis, D. 1983. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Cited by 158 | Google)
Formulates a definition of materialism: among worlds where no natural properties alien to our worlds are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically. With a lot of other material on universals.Melnyk, A. 1991. Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:573-87. (Cited by 6 | Google)
How can supervenience, as a relationship between ontologically distinct properties, be explained? Modal realism and grand-properties don't work. Eliminativism about supervenient properties is the only possibility.Moreland, J. P. 1999. Should a naturalist be a supervenient physicalist? Metaphilosophy 29:35-57. (Google)
Moser, P, & Trout, J. D. 1996. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53:213-23. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Defines physicalism in terms of claims that microphysical entities constitute everything and that microphysical laws govern everything. With a reply by Crane.Rowlands, M. 1995. Supervenience and Materialism. Avebury. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Seager, W. E. 1988. Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:697-709. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Weak supervenience provides a more tenable form of materialism than strong supervenience, because of inverted spectrum possibilities, etc.Wilson, J. M. 1999. How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 49:33-52. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Wilson, J. M. 2002. Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:53-77. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Witmer, D. G. 1999. Supervenience physicalism and the problem of extras. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37:315-31. (Google)
Bacon, J. 1986. Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility. Philosophical Studies 49:163-76. (Google)
A modal-logic analysis of the relations between various notions of supervenience. Most concepts of supervenience entail necessary co-extension, under certain closure assumptions for properties.Bacon, J. 1995. Weak supervenience supervenes. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bennett, K. 2004. Global supervenience and dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:501-529. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bonevac, D. 1988. Supervenience and ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25:37-47. (Cited by 4 | Google)
A model-theoretic treatment of supervenience, in terms of relations between theories. Supervenience turns out to be equivalent to reduction.Bovens, L. 1994. Principles of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:294-301. (Google)
Divers, J. 1996. Supervenience for operators. Synthese 106:103-12. (Google)
Forrest, P. 1988. Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:1-12. (Cited by 4 | Google)
A nonreductive supervenience hypothesis: supervenient properties are properties of properties, e.g intrinsic goodness is a property of an object's nature.Forrest, P. 1992. Universals and universalisability: An interpretation of Oddie's discussion of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:93-98. (Google)
Grim, P. 1997. Worlds by supervenience: Some further problems. Analysis 2:146-51. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Grimes, T. 1991. Supervenience, determination, and dependency. Philosophical Studies 62:81-92. (Cited by 2 | Google)
On dependency supervenience (B properties determine A properties) versus determination supervenience (A properties need B properties).Grimes, T. 1995. The Tweedledum and Tweedledee of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Humberstone, I. L. 1992. Some structural and logical aspects of the notion of supervenience. Logical Analysis 35:101-37. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kim, J. 1984. Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:153-76. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 97 | Google)
Distinguishes weak and strong supervenience. A mistaken proof that strong and global supervenience are equivalent. Strong supervenience implies a kind of reduction, but not an explanatorily useful reduction.Kim, J. 1987. `Strong' and `global' supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:315-26. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Google)
Reasons why global supervenience doesn't entail strong supervenience, and trying to rescue global supervenience as a useful notion. Suggests a similarity-based notion of global supervenience.Kim, J. 1988. Supervenience for multiple domains. Philosophical Topics 16:129-50. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 11 | Google)
How properties in one domain can supervene on properties in another, with or without co-ordination between domains. Relation to global supervenience.Klagge, J. C. 1995. Supervenience: Model theory or metaphysics? In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marras, A. 1993. Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple. Philosophical Quarterly 43:215-222. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, as necessary coextension doesn't suffice, and is incompatible with reducibility, due to ontological asymmetry.McLaughlin, B. P. 1995. Varieties of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Distinguishes modal-operator and possible-worlds versions of supervenience, and explicates global supervenience and its relation to weak and strong. With remarks on multiple-domain supervenience and the relation to reduction.McLaughlin, B. P. 1997. Supervenience, vagueness, and determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11:209-30. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Melnyk, A. 1997. On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87:277-308. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Moser, P. K. 1992. Physicalism and global supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:71-82. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Argues that global supervenience has epistemological problems -- how could we ever know that it holds, and that certain worlds are impossible?Oddie, G. & Tichy, P. 1990. Resplicing properties in the supervenience base. Philosophical Studies 58:259-69. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Closure under resplicing makes supervenience both too narrow and too wide. Weak supervenience is generally too weak to capture the dependence relation.Oddie, G. 1991. Supervenience and higher-order universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:20-47. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Paull, R. C. & Sider, T. R. 1992. In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:833-53. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Gives a proof of the distinction between strong and global supervenience that improves on Petrie's, and argues contra Kim that global supervenience is a perfectly reasonable dependence relation for physicalism.Petrie, B. 1987. Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:119-30. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Defending global supervenience: it's weaker than strong supervenience, as base properties of other individuals are relevant. It doesn't entail type or token reducibility. On the relation to implicit definability and reduction.Post, J. F. 1995. "Global" supervenient determination: Too permissive? In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Shagrir, O. 1999. More on global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:691-701. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Shagrir, O. 2002. Global supervenience, coincident entities, and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies 109:171-96. (Cited by 1 | Google)
van Cleve, J. 1990. Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58:225-38. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Properties in supervenience relations shouldn't be closed under negation or resplicing, due to bad consequences. With reply by Bacon on resplicing.
Blackburn, S. 1984. Supervenience revisited. In (I. Hacking, ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)
On the incompatibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience and realism. With discussion of various strengths of necessity involved in supervenience claims, and application to moral realism and anomalous monism.Bontly, T. 2002. The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109:75-96. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Currie, G. 1984. Individualism and global supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:345-58. (Cited by 7 | Google)
How social facts supervene on the totality of individual facts. Application to belief, etc.Enc, B. 1996. Nonreducible supervenient causation. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Grimes, T. 1988. The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:152-60. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Supervenience is too weak to function as a dependency relation, as e.g. it can hold in two directions at once.Hare, R. M. 1984. Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-16. (Cited by 8 | Google)
On the universal conditionals that underlie supervenience, and the necessity thereof. A discussion of the necessity of moral, natural kind, and other sorts of supervenience. Contra Davidson, anomalous supervenience is silly.Heil, J. 1995. Supervenience redux. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Hellman, G. 1992. Supervenience/determination a two-way street? Yes, but one of the ways is the wrong way! Journal of Philosophy 89:42-47. (Google)
Reply to Miller 1990. Miller underestimates the modal force of supervenience and invokes irrelevant dispositional properties.Hendel, G. 2001. Supervenience, metaphysical reduction, and metaphysics of properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 39:99-118. (Google)
Horgan, T. 1993. From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102:555-86. (Cited by 54 | Google)
An overview of supervenience, with focus on the problem of explaining supervenience relations. With remarks on mental causation, emergence, physicalism, and reduction.Kim, J. 1978. Supervenience and nomological incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:149-56. (Cited by 33 | Google)
Developing and motivating the notion of supervenience. Investigating the relationship to reducibility and definability (equivalence, under certain conditions), and to microphysical determination.Kim, J. 1984. Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56. (Cited by 9 | Google)
On weak/strong supervenience, and high-level causation via supervenience.Kim, J. 1991. Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21:1-27. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 49 | Google)
A nice overview of supervenience and covariance.Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 149 | Google)
A collection of articles on supervenience and causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, with some added postscripts.Kincaid, H. 1987. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:343-56. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, which is epistemological. The problem's not just huge disjuncts, but also the sharing of bases, no local correlations, and base-properties presupposing supervenient properties.Kincaid, H. 1988. Supervenience and explanation. Synthese 77:251-81. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Argues that lower-level theories can explain supervenient but irreducible higher-level theories, but only under certain conditions, as low-level accounts don't have the relevant kind terms.Klagge, J. C. 1988. Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:461-70. (Cited by 6 | Google)
On supervenience as an ontological relation (via metaphysical necessity) or as an ascriptive relation (via conceptual necessity). The first doesn't preclude the second. Moral realism and mental realism are in the same boat.Loewer, B. 1995. An argument for strong supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Lynch, M. & Glasgow, J. 2003. The impossibility of superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113:201-221. (Cited by 1 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 1983. Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91. (Cited by 6 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 1994. Varieties of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & O. Yalchin, eds) Supervenience: New Essays.
On a number of issues: possible worlds vs modal notions, explicating global supervenience, the relation between weak/strong/global supervenience, multiple-domain supervenience, and implications for reduction.Melnyk, A. 1997. On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87:277-308. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Merricks, T. 1998. Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Mind 107:59-71. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Miller, R. B. 1990. Supervenience is a two-way street. Journal of Philosophy 87:695-701. (Cited by 2 | Google)
If supervening properties can make arbitrarily fine distinctions, then physical properties supervene on moral/aesthetic/mental properties.Noonan, H. 1987. Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37:78-85. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Contra Blackburn 1984 on the possibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience, even with metaphysical necessity; using Nozick's concept structures, or indexical definitions. With application to moral realism.Post, J. F. 1984. On the determinacy of valuation. Philosophical Studies 45:315-33. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Post, J. 2001. Sense and supervenience. Philo 4:123-137. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stalnaker, R. 1996. Varieties of supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Distinguishes "reductionist" and "metaphysical" conceptions of supervenience. Also discusses the relation between strong and global supervenience, degrees of necessity, and the explanatory role of supervenience.Teller, P. 1984. The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62. (Google)
Compares the Hellman/Thompson notion of determination with Kim's development of supervenience. Uses these to investigate the concept of materialism, and argues that materialism isn't contingent.Teller, P. 1985. Is supervenience just disguised reduction? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:93-100. (Cited by 4 | Google)
van Brakel, J. 1996. Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. Synthese 106:253-97. (Cited by 4 | Google)
van Brakel, J. 2005. Supervenience and anomalous monism. Dialectica 53:3-24. (Google)
Zangwill, N. 1997. Explaining supervenience: Moral and mental. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:509-18. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Antony, L. M. & Levine, J. 1997. Reduction with autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Antony, L. M. 1999. Multiple realizability, projectibility, and the reality of mental properties. Philosophical Topics 26:1-24. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Antony, L. M. 2003. Who's afraid of disjunctive properties? Philosophical Issues 13:1-21. (Google)
Bechtel, W. , & Mundale, J. 1999. Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66:175-207. (Cited by 29 | Google)
Bickle, J. 1992. Multiple realizability and psychophysical reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20:47-58. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bickle, J. 1995. Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23:29-39. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Block, N. 1997. Anti-reductionism slaps back. Philosophical Perspectives 11:107-32. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Bolender, J. 1995. Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:129-42. (Google)
Boyd, R. 1999. Kinds, complexity, and multiple realization. Philosophical Studies 95:67-98. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Clapp, L. 2001. Disjunctive properties: multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 98:111-136. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Endicott, R. P. 1991. Macdonald on type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29:209-14. (Google)
Endicott, R. P. 1989. On physical multiple realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70:212-24. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Endicott, R. P. 1993. Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies. Erkenntnis 38:303-21. (Cited by 2 | Google)
On species-specific reductions. These can't reduce standard psychological properties, and problems with intra-species multiple realization can't be circumvented without giving up property reduction for token event identity.Endicott, R. P. 1998. Collapse of the new wave. Journal of Philosophy 95:53-72. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fodor, J. 1997. Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63. (Cited by 75 | Google)
Francescotti, R. M. 1997. What multiple realizability does not show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18:13-28. (Google)
The anti-reductionist argument assumes that functional properties aren't physical properties (not even extrinsic physical properties). This, not multiple realizability, does the work.Gillett, C. ; Rives, B. 2001. Does the argument from realization generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39:79-98. (Google)
Gillett, C. 2003. The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100:591-603. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Heil, J. 1999. Multiple realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36:189-208. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Heil, J. 2003. Multiply realized properties. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Jaworksi, W. 2002. Multiple-realizability, explanation, and the disjunctive move. Philosophical Studies 108:298-308. (Google)
Kim, J. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-26. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 70 | Google)
Multiple realization is compatible with reductionism. Jade (= jadeite or nephrite) isn't a scientific kind, and neither are multiply realizable mental properties. So there's no global psychology, just lots of local reductions.Kim, S. 2002. Testing multiple realizability: A discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69:606-610. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kistler, M. 1999. Multiple realization, reduction and mental properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nelson, A. 1985. Physical properties. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:268-82. (Google)
Some comments on Wilson 1985: some special-science properties may be relevantly different in kind from his expanded physical properties.Macdonald, C. 1992. Psychological type-type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:65-69. (Google)
Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Nous 8:327-42. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't refute type materialism. Mental states may not be anatomically defined neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms.Nasrin, M. 2000. Multiple realizability: Also a difficulty for functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:25-34. (Google)
Polger, T. 2002. Putnam's intuition. Philosophical Studies 109:143-70. (Google)
Ross, P. A. 1999. The limits of physicalism. Philosophy of Science 66:94-116. Schwartz, J. 1992. Who's afraid of multiple realizability?: Functionalism, reductionism, and connectionism. In (J. Dinsmore, ed) The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Google)
Shagrir, O. 1998. Multiple realization, computation and the taxonomy of psychological states. Synthese 114:445-461. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shapiro, L. 2000. Multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97:635-654. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Shapiro, L. 2004. The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wilson, M. 1985. What is this thing called `pain'? -- The philosophy of science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:227-67. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues for type-type identities and for an expanded view of the physical, as properties from physics exhibit the same sort of multiple realizability as functional properties. Sophisticated, with many interesting examples.Witmer, G. 2003. Multiple realizability and psychological laws: Evaluating Kim's challenge. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Zangwill, N. 1995. Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunction. Philosophia 24:321-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Antony, L. 1999. Making room for the mental. Philosophical Studies 95:37-44. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Barrett, J. 1995. Causal relevance and nonreductive physicalism. Erkenntnis 42:339-62. (Google)
Beckermann, A. 1992. Reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 2 | Google)
On varieties of physicalism with respect to reduction: semantic physicalism, identity theory, supervenience, and the denial of emergence. Advocates a version on which physical states realize mental states.Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (eds) 1992. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Boyd, R. 1980. Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. MIT Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)
Clarke, R. 1999. Nonreductive physicalism and the causal powers of the mental. Erkenntnis 51:295-322. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dupre, J. 1988. Materialism, physicalism, and scientism. Philosophical Topics 16:31-56. (Google)
Arguing for a pluralistic conception. With criticism of Churchland's reductionism, Davidson's token identity, and more generally reverential "scientism". Reductionist explanation is not the general rule.Ellis, R. 2000. Consciousness, self-organization, and the process-substratum relation: Rethinking nonreductive physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 13:173-190. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1974. Special sciences. Synthese 28:97-115. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 75 | Google)
Psychological kinds can't be reduced to physical kinds, due to cross-classification, although token physicalism still holds. How to maintain the generality of physics without a reductionist unity of science.Francescotti, R. M. 1998. The nonreductionist's troubles with supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89:105-24. (Google)
Gillett, C. 2003. Nonreductive realization and nonreductive identity: What physicalism does not entail. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Horgan, T. 1993. Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gives four constraints on interlevel connections, and some arguments against reductionism and for the autonomy of psychology. Argues that supervenience fact are themselves in need of explanation.Horgan, T. 1994. Nonreductive materialism. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hunter, D. 2002. Mind-brain identity and the nature of states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:366-86. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kernohan, A. 1988. Non-reductive materialism and the spectrum of mind-body identity theories. Dialogue 27:475-88. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Classifying psychophysical theories by the status (necessary, lawful, anomalous, false) of psychophysical/psychological generalizations. Defending autonomous monism: nonreductive materialism with psychological laws.Kim, J. 1989. The myth of non-reductive materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63(3):31-47. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Google)
Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.Kim, J. 1992. The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Google)
Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward causation violates the causal closure of the physical.Kim, J. 1992. "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation.Kirk, R. 1996. How physicalists can avoid reductionism. Synthese 108:157-70. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Contra Kim, physicalists can avoid reduction by embracing strict implication.Kirk, R. 2001. Nonreductive physicalism and strict implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:544-552. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Knowles, J. 1999. Physicalism, teleology and the miraculous coincidence problem. Philosophical Quarterly 49:164-81. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Margolis, J. 1978. Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism. D. Reidel. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Markic, O. 2002. Nonreductive materialism and the problem of causal exclusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:79-88. (Google)
Marras, A. 1993. Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism. Synthese 95:275-304. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Marras, A. 1994. Nonreductive materialism and mental causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24:465-93. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Melnyk, A. 1995. Two cheers for reductionism, or, the dim prospects for nonreductive materialism. Philosophy of Science 62:370-88. (Google)
Melnyk, A. 1998. The prospects for Kirk's nonreductive physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:323-32. (Google)
Loar, B. 1992. Elimination versus nonreductive physicalism. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Papineau, D. 1992. Irreducibility and teleology. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Non-reductive physicalism is a mystery unless we invoke teleology.Pereboom, D. & Kornblith, H. 1991. The metaphysics of irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63:125-45. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Explicating anti-reductionism: mental causal powers are constituted of physical causal powers, but aren't type- or token-identical to them. Against arguments from local reduction, neuroscience, explanatory exclusion, etc.Pereboom, D. 2002. Robust nonreductive materialism. Journal of Philosophy 99:499-531. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Robinson, H. 2001. Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Silvers, S. 1997. Nonreductive naturalism. Theoria 12:163-84. (Google)
Smith, A. D. 1993. Non-reductive physicalism? In (H. Robinson, ed) Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
A careful discussion of how to characterize physicalism, in terms of identity or supervenience, and argues that physicalism must reduce (bowdlerize) qualia to something they are not, as physicalism requires topic-neutral analyses.Stephan, A. 2001. How to lose the mind-body problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:279-283. (Google)
Ten Elshof, G. 1997. Supervenient difficulties with nonreductive physicalism: A critical analysis of supervenience physicalism. Kinesis 24:3-22. (Google)
van Gulick, R. 1992. Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 6 | Google)
On how a nonreductive materialism can handle problems about mental causation, psychophysical dependencies, and qualia. A teleofunctionalist view with different conceptual frameworks, but mental properties physically realized.Wedgwood, R. 2000. The price of non-reductive physicalism. Nous 34:400-421. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bickle, J. 1995. Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: Some accomplished facts. Philosophical Psychology 8:265-85. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Argues that cognitive theories have already been reduced to neurobiology in some domains, such as associative learning.Bickle, J. 2001. New wave metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and Stephan. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:285-293. (Google)
Churchland, P. M. 1982. Is `thinker' a natural kind? Dialogue 21:223-38. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Psychology shouldn't be autonomous from natural science. By analogy with biology, nature provides (a) conceptual insight, and (b) real constraints, e.g. thermodynamic ones. Biology and psychology are continuous.Crooks, M. 2002. Intertheoretic identification and mind-brain reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23:193-222. (Google)
Fonseca, J. 2004. On Bickle's failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum. Disputatio 17. (Google)
Gaito, J. 1960. Description, explanation, and reductionism in psychology. Psychological Reports 6:203-5. (Google)
Gaito, J. & Leonard, D. 1965. Philosophical and empirical reductionism in psychology. Journal of General Psychology 72:69-75. (Google)
Hardcastle, V. G. 1992. Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences. Philosophy of Science 59:408-28. (Cited by 6 | Google)
The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work.Hyland, M. E. 1995. Against nomological reductionism in psychology: A response to Robinson. New Ideas in Psychology 13:9-11. (Google)
Jessor, R. 1958. The problem of reductionism in psychology. Psychological Review 65:170-78. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Marras, A. 1990. Reduction in psychology. Acta Analytica 6:65-78. (Google)
Martindale, R. L. & Seidel, R. J. 1959. Reductionism: Its prodigal encores. Psychological Reports 5:213-16. (Google)
Montgomery, R. 1990. The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology. Synthese 85:279-314. (Google)
Anti-reductionism needn't be ad hoc (contra Churchland). Although evolution provides some pressure for 1-1 psychophysical mappings, there are significant countervailing forces, e.g. in vision, memory, learning, and language use.Olshewsky, T. M. 1975. Dispositions and reductionism in psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 5:129-44. (Google)
Putnam, H. 1974. Reductionism and the nature of psychology. Cognition 2:131-46. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Richardson, R. C. 1999. Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism. Philosopical Psychology 12:297-307. (Google)
Ross, D. & Spurrett, D. 2004. What to say to a skeptical metaphysician? A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Scott, A. 2004. Reductionism revisited. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(2):51-68. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sloane, E. H. 1945. Reductionism. Psychological Review 52:214-23. (Google)
Witmer, D. G. 2003. Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism. The Philosophical Quarterly 53:181-200. (Google)
Barkin, E. 2003. Relative phenomenalism: Toward a more plausible theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(8):3-13. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Beckermann, A. 1997. Property physicalism, reduction, and realization. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Beckermann, A. 2001. Physicalism and new wave reductionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261. (Google)
Bickle, J. 1996. New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:57-78. (Google)
Bickle, J. 1997. Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave. MIT Press. (Google)
Brooks, D. H. M. 1994. How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:803-14. (Google)
Reduction comes to supervenience plus explicability. Thus biconditionals, multiple realizability, etc, are irrelevant. Biology is already reduced (mostly via functional explanation), and psychology looks promising. Nice.Bunzl, M. 1987. Reductionism and the mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24:181-9. (Google)
On the links between supervenience, reduction, and explanation. Supervenience is compatible with reductive explanation of a localized variety. We don't need laws, but explanatory links.Causey, R. L. 1972. Attribute identities in microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 69:407-22. (Google)
Combes, R. 1988. Ockhamite reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28:325-36. (Google)
Foss, J. 1995. Materialism, reduction, replacement, and the place of consciousness in science. Journal of Philosophy 92:401-29. (Google)
Hill, C. S. 1984. In defense of type materialism. Synthese 59:295-320. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kitcher, P. S. 1980. How to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 47:134-40. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Contra Richardson 1979, a purely functional psychology is irreducible. The genetics analogy is misleading; multiple realizations can't explain high-level laws.Maloney, C. 2001. Reservations about new wave reduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:263-277. (Google)
Marras, A. 2002. Kim on reduction. Erkenntnis 57:231-57. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Millikan, D. 1999. Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95:45-65. (Google)
Papineau, D. 1985. Social facts and psychological facts. In (G. Currie & A. Musgrave, eds) Popper and the Human Sciences. Martinus Nijhoff. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mind is not reducible to body, but societies reduce to individuals. Multiple realization is in tension with predictability. Natural selection resolves the tension for the mental, but cannot for the social.Richardson, R. C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology.Richardson, R. C. 1982. How not to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 49:125-37. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Response to Kitcher 1980. Reductions are usually domain-specific, and high-level regularities are indeed explained.Rueger, A. 2004. Reduction, autonomy, and causal exclusion among physical properties. Synthese 139:1-21. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sarkar, S. 1992. Models of reduction and categories of reductionism. Synthese 91:167-94. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Schweizer, P. 2001. Realization, reduction and psychological autonomy. Synthese 126:383-405. (Google)
Sturgeon, S. 2001. The roots of reductionism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Vicente, A. 2001. Realization, determination and mental causation. Theoria 16:77-94. (Google)
Wimsatt, W. 1976. Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem. In (G. Globus, ed) Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press. (Cited by 47 | Google)
Excellent coverage of the notion of level and its applicability to mind.
Crane, T. 1991. All God has to do. Analysis 51:235-44. (Cited by 3 | Google)
If there are no contingent psychophysical laws, then there are no mental properties. So physicalism/supervenience is false; God had extra work to do.Crane, T. 1993. A definition of physicalism: Reply to Pettit. Analysis 53:224-27. (Google)
Crane, T. & Mellor, D. H. 1990. There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99:185-206. (Cited by 51 | Google)
Physical sciences have no ontological authority over the mental. Considers and dismisses arguments from laws, causation, reduction, supervenience.Crook, S. 2001. Why physics alone cannot define the 'physical': Materialism, metaphysics, and the formulation of physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31:333-360. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Daly, C. 1995. Does physicalism need fixing? Analysis 55:135-41. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Daly, C. 1998. What are physical properties? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79:196-217. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Francescotti, R. 2000. Ontological physicalism and property pluralism: Why they are incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:349-362. (Google)
Gates, G. 2001. Physicalism, empiricism, and positivism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gillett, C. 2001. The methodological role of physicalism: A minimal skepticism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Gillett, C. , & Loewer, B. (eds) 2001. Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hawthorne, J. 2002. Blocking definitions of materialism. Philosophical Studies 110:103-13. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Huttemann, A. 2004. What's Wrong with Microphysicalism. Routledge. (Google)
Jackson, F. 1994. Finding the mind in the natural world. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 23 | Google)
On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties in the natural world. Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be backed by a priori links. With remarks on supervenience. A nice paper.Kim, J. 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. (Google)
Kirk, R. 1979. From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 29:229-37. (Cited by 2 | Google)
If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical facts. A nice argument.Kirk, R. 1982. Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24:131-41. (Google)
Materialism doesn't need a identity thesis. The requirement that mental facts are entailed by physical facts plays the role played by Kripke's requirement of necessary identity, and is more reasonable.Kirk, R. 1996. Physicalism lives. Ratio 9:85-89. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nothing in the arguments of Crane and Mellor 1990 count against a physicalism based on strict implication.Latham, N. 2001. Substance physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Loewer, B. 2001. From physics to physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Madell, G. 1988. Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness, and indexicality. Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position.McGinn, C. 1980. Philosophical materialism. Synthese 44:173-206. Reprinted in The Problem of Consciousness (Blackwell, 1991). (Cited by 2 | Google)
Melnyk, A. 1994. Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. (Google) Advocates "realization physicalism": all properties are either physical or functional properties realized by physical ones
. This achieves unity between sciences better than alternatives, and avoids overdetermination.
Melnyk, A. 1996. Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions. Synthese 105:381-407. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Discusses two formulations of physicalism: requiring high-level properties to be disjunctions of physical states, or to be functional properties realized physically. Tentatively endorses the latter.Melnyk, A. 1997. How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 94:622-637. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Melnyk, A. 2002. Physicalism. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Melnyk, A. 2003. Some evidence for Physicalism. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
Montero, B. 1999. The body problem. Nous 33:183-200. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Montero, B. 2001. Post-physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:61-80. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Montero, B. 2003. Varieties of causal closure. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Moser, P. K. 1996. Physicalism and mental causes: Contra Papineau. Analysis 56:263-67. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nagel, E. 1949. Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 42:515-53. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nimtz, C. & Schutte, M. 2003. On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57:413-22. (Google)
Noordhof, P. 2003. Not old... but not that new either: Explicability, emergence, and the characterisation of materialism. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Papineau, D. 1994. Philosophical Naturalism. Blackwell. (Cited by 112 | Google)
Papineau, D. 2001. The rise of physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Papineau, D. & Huttemann, A. 2005. Physicalism decomposed. Analysis 65:33-39. (Google)
Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53:213-23. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Physicalism is the claim that (1) There are microphysical entities, (2) Microphysical entities constitute everything, (3) There are microphysical regularities, (4) Microphysical regularities govern everything.Pettit, P. 1994. Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws. Analysis 54:253-57. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Pettit, P. 1995. Microphysicalism, dottism, and reduction. Analysis 55:141-46. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Poland, J. 1994. Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Ravenscroft, I. 1997. Physical properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 35:419-431. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rey, G. 2001. Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mind. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Robinson, D. 1991. On Crane and Mellor's argument against physicalism. Mind 100:135-36. (Google)
Robinson, H. (ed) 1993. Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Sheldon, W. H. 1946. Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 43:197-209. (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1978. The content of physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 28:339-41. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Snowdon, P. F. 1989. On formulating materialism and dualism. In (J. Heil, ed) Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer. (Cited by 5 | Google)
A construal of materialism in terms of constitution, not identity. Discusses the entailment between physical properties and mental properties; considers a nonreductive physicalism and a primitive dualism.Sober, E. 1999. Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view. Philosophical Studies 95:135-74. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Spurrett, D. & Papineau, D. 1999. A note on the completeness of "physics". Analysis 59:25-29. (Google)
Spurrett, D. 2001. What physical properties are. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82:201-225. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sturgeon, S. 1998. Physicalism and overdetermination. Mind 107:411-432. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Wilkes, K. V. 1973. Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Witmer, D. G. 2001. Sufficiency claims and physicalism: A formulation. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Witmer, D. G. & Gillett, C. 2001. A 'physical' need: Physicalism and the via negativa. Analysis 61:302-309. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Foster, J. 1994. The token-identity thesis. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Horgan, T. & Tye, M. 1985. Against the token identity theory. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)
We individuate mental events by their causal role, but we can't individuate causes uniquely. So each mental event has multiple physical correlates, and token identity doesn't hold.Hornsby, J. 1981. Which physical events are mental events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Haugeland, J. 1982. Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19:93-103. (Cited by 35 | Google)
Supervenience doesn't imply token identity, and Davidson's argument for token identity equivocates on "event". But weak supervenience (mentally discernible worlds are physically discernible) is all we need. With nice examples.Leder, D. 1985. Troubles with token identity. Philosophical Studies 47:79-94. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Physical/psychological token identity is no good: you can't individuate physical events without psychological predicates.Lurie, Y. 1978. Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56:135-44. (Google)
Can't isolate the physical token of a belief, say, as it's always accompanied by other beliefs. Meaning doesn't come in discrete tokens.Peacocke, C. 1979. Argument for token identity. In Holistic Explanation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Alexander, S. 1920. Space, Time, and Deity. Macmillan. (Cited by 24 | Google)
Atkin A. 1992. On consciousness: What is the role of emergence? Medical Hypotheses 38:311-14. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Beckermann, A. 1992. Supervenience, emergence, and reduction. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 23 | Google)
On varieties of supervenience and of emergence, and of what is required for reduction. Argues that reduction involves general explanatory connections, whereas emergence involves unique and ultimate bridge laws.Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (eds) 1992. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Bedau, M. 1997. Weak emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11:375-399. (Cited by 34 | Google)
Berenda, C. W. 1953. On emergence and prediction. Journal of Philosophy 50:269-74. (Google)
Bergmann, G. 1944. Holism, historicism, and emergence. Philosophy of Science 11:209-21. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 113 | Google)
Bruntrup, G. 1998. Is psychophysical emergentism committed to dualism? The causal efficacy of emergent mental properties. Erkenntnis 48:133-51. (Google)
Bunge, M. 1977. Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience 2:501-9. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Clayton, P. 2004. Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Crane, T. 2001. The significance of emergence. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Garnett, A. C. 1942. Scientific method and the concept of emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39:477-86. (Google)
Haldane, J. 1996. The mystery of emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:261-67. (Google)
A defence of radical emergence against Spencer-Smith 1995.Hasker, W. 1982. Emergentism. Religious Studies 18:473-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hasker, W. 1999. The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Henle, P. 1942. The status of emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39:486-93. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Humphreys, P. 1996. Aspects of emergence. Philosophical Topics 24:53-71. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Humphreys, P. 1997. How properties emerge. Philosophy of Science 64:1-17. (Cited by 24 | Google)
Humphreys, P. 1997. Emergence, not supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64:337-45. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Jones, D. H. 1972. Emergent properties, persons, and the mind-body problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10:423-33. (Google)
Kekes, J. 1966. Physicalism, the identity theory, and the concept of emergence. Philosophy of Science 33:360-75. (Google)
Kim, J. 1999. Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies 95:3-36. (Google)
Klee, J. 1984. Microdeterminism and concepts of emergence. Philosophy of Science 51:44-63. (Google)
Lovejoy, A. O. 1927. The meanings of "emergence" and its modes. In (E. S. Brightman, ed) Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. Longmans, Green, and Co. (Google)
Lowe, E. J. 2000. Causal closure principles and emergentism. Philosophy 75:571-586. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Lowry, A. 1974. A note on emergence. Mind 83:276-77. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mackenzie, W. L. 1926. The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6:56-68. (Google)
Margolis, J. 1986. Emergence. Philosophical Forum 17:271-95. (Cited by 2 | Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 1992. The rise and fall of British emergentism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 61 | Google)
A careful account of British emergentism. Explicates their view of emergent causal powers and laws in terms of fundamental configurational forces, a coherent idea that turned out to be false. An excellent paper.Meehl, P. E. & Sellars, W. 1956. The concept of emergence. In (H. Feigl & M. Scriven, eds) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Morgan, C. L. 1923. Emergent Evolution. Williams and Norgate. (Cited by 50 | Google)
Morris, C. R. 1926. The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6:49-55. (Google)
Newman, D. 1996. Emergence and strange attractors. Philosophy of Science 63:245-61. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Newman, D. V. 2001. Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:180-96. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Newton, N. 2001. Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8:47-59. (Cited by 3 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 1994. Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:91-104. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Argues against Alexander's and van Cleve's accounts of emergence, instead suggesting an account in terms of supervenience, non-structurality, and downward causation.Pap, A. 1951. The concept of absolute emergence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2:302-11. (Google)
Pepper, S. C. 1926. Emergence. Journal of Philosophy 23:241-45. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Peters, S. L. 1995. Emergent Materialism: A Proposed Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. University Press of America. (Google)
Pihlstrom, S. 1999. What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamenta; issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 18:192-210. (Google)
Pluhar, E. 1978. Emergence and reduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 9:279-89. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ripley, C. 1984. Sperry's concept of consciousness. Inquiry 27:399-423. (Google)
An in-depth analysis of Sperry's views on consciousness. Sperry is not a dualist; he believes in "structural causation" based on emergent properties.Rohrlich, F. 1997. Cognitive emergence. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64:346-58. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rueger, A. 2000. Robust supervenience and emergence. Philosophy of Science 67:466-491. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rueger, A. 2001. Physical emergence, diachronic and synchronic. Synthese 124:297-322. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Russell, E. S. 1926. The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6:39-48. (Google)
Schroder, J. 1998. Emergence: Non-deducibility or downwards causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48:433-52. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 2002. Kim on emergence. Philosophical Studies 58:53-63. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Silberstein, M. 1998. Emergence and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:464-82. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Silberstein, M. & McGeever, J. 1999. The search for ontological emergence. Philosophical Quarterly 49:182-200. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Silberstein, M. 2001. Converging on emergence: Consciousness, causation and explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:61-98. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1981. Physicalism and emergence. Neuroscience 6:109-13. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Spencer-Smith, R. 1995. Reductionism and emergent properties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:113-29. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Distinguishes radical, epistemic, and interactional emergence, favoring the latter. With consideration of qualia as a radical emergent.Sperry, R. W. 1969. A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36. (Cited by 35 | Google)
Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs low-level flow of excitation. Midway between mentalism and materialism.Sperry, R. W. 1991. In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12:221-245. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Stace, W. T. 1939. Novelty, indeterminism, and emergence. Philosophical Review 48:296-310. (Google)
Stephan, A. 1992. Emergence -- a systematic look at its historical facets. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Google)
On different ways of understanding emergence: as nonadditivity, novelty, nonpredictability, nondeducibility; and on problems about qualia and downward causation.Stephan, A. 1997. Armchair arguments against emergence. Erkenntnis 46:305-14. (Google)
Teller, P. 1992. A contemporary look at emergence. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 10 | Google)
An attempt to explicate "emergent" properties in terms of relational properties. Argues that even problem cases, e.g. space-time separation and phenomenal properties, might be treated this way.van Cleve, J. 1990. Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226. (Google)
On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism. A construal of emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience.van Gulick, R. 2001. Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:1-34. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Vandervert, L. R. 1991. On the modeling of emergent interaction: Which will it be, the laws of thermodynamics or Sperry's "wheel" in the subcircuitry? Journal of Mind and Behavior 12:535-39. (Google)
Welshon, R. 2002. Emergence, realization, and supervenience. Philosophical Studies 108:39-51. (Google)
Wimsatt, W. C. 1997. Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence. Philosophy of Science 64:372-84. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Wynn, M. 1999. Emergent phenomena and theistic explanation. International Philosophical Quarterly 39:141-55. (Google)
Almog, J. 2001. What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Averill, E. W. & Keating, B. 1981. Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90:102-7. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Interactionism is compatible with conservation of energy and momentum: the mind exerts a non-physical force on the brain.Bricke, J. 1975. Interaction and physiology. Mind 84:255-9. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Crane, T. 2003. Mental substances. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Efron, A. 1992. Residual asymmetric dualism: A theory of mind-body relations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:113-36. (Google)
Evans, S. 1981. Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19. (Google)
Herbert, R. T. 1998. Dualism/materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 48:159-75. (Google)
Himma, K. E. 2005. When a problem for all in a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. American Philosophical Quarterly. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kim, J. 2003. Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualism. In (T. O'Connor & D. Robb, (eds) Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Langsam, H. 2001. Strategy for dualists. Metaphilosophy 32:395-418. (Google)
Larmer, R. 1986. Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26:277-85. (Google)
Various arguments about interactionism based on conservation of energy. C of E only applies to causally isolated systems, so objections beg the question.Lowe, E. J. 1992. The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:263-76. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior.Lowe, E. J. 1993. The causal autonomy of the mental. Mind 102:629-44. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Mills, E. 1996. Interactionism and overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33:105-115. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Argues that interactionist dualism is compatible with the causal closure of the physical, if we allow causal overdetermination; and there is a strong case for the latter.Mills, E. 1997. Interactionism and physicality. Ratio 10:169-83. (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. & McDonough, J. K. 1998. Numbers, minds, and bodies: A fresh look at mind-body dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:349-371. (Google)
Pap, A. 1952. Semantic analysis and psychophysical dualism. Mind. (Google)
Pietroski, P. M. 1994. Mental causation for dualists. Mind and Language 9:336-66. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Popper, K. R. 1953. Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism. In Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy. Reprinted in Conjectures and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books, 1962. (Google)
Popper, K. R. 1955. A note on the body-mind problem. Analysis 15:131-35. (Google)
Popper, K. R. 1977. Natural selection and the emergence of mind. (Google)
Robinson, H. 2002. Dualism. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rozemond, M. 2002. Descartes's Dualism. Harvard University Press. (Google)
Scheffler, I. 1950. The new dualism: Psychological and physical terms. Journal of Philosophy. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sellars, W. 1954. A note on Popper's argument for dualism. Analysis 15:23-24. (Google)
Sussman, A. 1981. Reflection on the chances for a scientific dualism. Journal of Philosophy 78:95-118. (Google)
Dualism is an empty hypothesis. Everything must be matter, though we may have to expand the notion of matter.Richardson, R. C. 1982. The `scandal' of Cartesian dualism. Mind 91:20-37. (Google)
van Rooijen, K. 1987. Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38:87-92. (Google)
Bolender, J. 2003. A farewell to isms. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Campbell, K. 1983. Abstract particulars and the philosophy of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:129-41. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Caston, V. 1997. Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modern. Philosophical Review 106:309-363. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Francescotti, R. 2002. Understanding physical realization (and what it does not entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23:279-292.
Hedman, C. G. 1970. On correlating brain states with psychological states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:247-51. (Google)
Heil, J. 1992. The Nature of True Minds. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 42 | Google)
Heil, J. & Robb, D. 2003. Mental properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40:175-196. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hendel, G. 2001. Realization. Critica 33:41-70. (Google)
Honderich, T. 1981. Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24:277-303. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich.Kim, J. 2002. Horgan's naturalistic metaphysics of mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:27-52. (Google)
Marras, A. 2001. On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: mind-body identity and supervenience. Synthese 126:407-426. (Google)
McGinn, C. 1978. Mental states, natural kinds and psychophysical laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220. Reprinted in The Problem of Consciousness (Blackwell, 1991). (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues that mental kinds are not natural kinds, and don't have real essences but nominal essences. For this reason, there are no psychophysical laws. With remarks on psychological laws, and the role of behavior.McGinn, M. 2000. Real things and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Psychology 100:303-17. (Google)
Place, U. T. 2000. The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind 1:29-43. (Google)
Schectman, M. 1997. The brain/body problem. Philosophical Psychology 10:149-64. (Google)
Scheerer, E. 1994. Psychoneural isomorphism: Historical background and current relevance. Philosophical Psychology 7:183-210. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 2003. Realization, micro-realization, and coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:1-23. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Skillen, A. 1984. Mind and matter: a problem which refuses dissolution. Mind 93:514-26. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Physical completeness, mental causation, non-reductionism are inconsistent. Ryle and Putnam are closet dualists, and Davidson's an epiphenomenalist.Stemmer, N. 2001. The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior And Philosophy 29:187-202. (Google)
Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Tye, M. 1989. The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
van Gelder, T. 1998. Monism, dualism, pluralism. Mind and Language 13:76-97. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wilson, R. A. 2001. Two views of realization. Philosophical Studies 104:1-31. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 253 | Google)
Mental states should be analyzed as states that are apt to bring about certain kinds of behavior. Analysis of all kinds of mental states as such. With comments on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and consciousness.Armstrong, D. M. 1970. The nature of mind. In (C. Borst, ed) The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 36 | Google)
Mental states are internal states that are apt to cause certain behaviors. A synthesis between the "thesis" of idealism and the "antithesis" of behaviorism. With defense against objections from consciousness.Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, K. 1999. The divide-and-conquer path to analytic functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26:71-89. (Google)
Clark, A. 1986. Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53:535-59. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Psychofunctionalism can evade chauvinism by specifying different functional identifications within each species. Applying same mental terms to each is justified by theory similarity; but it still isn't analytic functionalism.Goldstein, I. 1994. Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:46-62. (Google)
Against functionalism: experiences have intrinsic introspectible acausal properties, such as duration, felt location, and unpleasantness. Both analytic and empirical functionalism fail.Horgan, T. 1984. Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59:321-38. (Google)
Formalizing versions of functionalism, and seeing which entail token physicalism and/or type physicalism. On the most plausible versions, we have token physicalism without type physicalism.Hornsby, J. 1984. On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46:75-96. (Google)
Jackson, F. , Pargetter, R. & Prior, E. W. 1982. Functionalism and type-type identity theories. Philosophical Studies 42:209-25. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Functionalism is compatible with type identity, as e.g. "pain" designates the state-type that fills the right functional role in an organism at a given time, i.e. a brain state. Contra Kripke, pain is not a rigid designator.Kernohan, A. 1990. Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3:235-46. (Google)
Argues that Lewis's functionalism founders on the specification of behavior. Described intentionally => non-materialist; physically => chauvinist.Lewis, D. 1966. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1980). (Cited by 76 | Google)
Causal roles are definitive of mental states. Since physical states fill these causal roles (by the explanatory adequacy of physics), mental states are physical states.Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:249-58. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 120 | Google)
Mental states can be defined, via a Ramsey-sentence analysis of the platitudes of folk psychology, as entities that fill causal roles specified by the analysis. These fillers turn out to be physical.Lewis, D. 1978. Mad pain and martian pain. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. MIT Press. (Cited by 67 | Google)
Accounting for both pains that don't play the usual causal role and for pains that are realized in different substances, by a mixed theory: pain is the physical state that typically occupies a certain causal role in a population.McGinn, C. 1980. Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:35-46. Reprinted in The Problem of Consciousness (Blackwell, 1991). (Cited by 2 | Google)
Functionalism (reducing the mental to its effects on the physical) is no more plausible than phenomenalism (reducing the physical to its effects on the mental).Owens, J. 1982. The failure of Lewis's functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 36:159-73. (Google)
Lewis's original theory leads to Kripkean reference-fixing, so chauvinism. Token functionalism can't deal with paralytics. Species-relative functionalism fails as pain is intrinsic, not extrinsic.Rogler, E. 2000. On David Lewis' philosophy of mind. Protosociology 14:285-311. (Google)
Sayward, C. 1995. Taking actions seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23:51-60. (Google)
Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12:93-119. Reprinted in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984). (Cited by 27 | Google)
Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.Tye, M. 1983. Functionalism and type physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44:161-74. (Google)
Contra Lewis: Functionalism isn't compatible with type physicalism. There are intra-population difficulties with species-relative construals, and individual-relative construals can still have multiple fillers.Weir, A. 2001. More trouble for functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:267-94. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Putnam, H. 1960. Minds and machines. In (S. Hook, ed) Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 78 | Google)
The relationship between mental and physical states is just like that between logical and structural states of Turing Machines, so no great mystery. With comments on privacy and semantic analysis.Putnam, H. 1967. The nature of mental states. In (Capitan & Merrill, eds) Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 66 | Google)
Why mental states are more likely to be functional states (in probabilistic automata) than brain states or behavioral dispositions.Putnam, H. 1967. The mental life of some machines. In (H. Castaneda, ed) Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 17 | Google)
On explaining behavior via TM states, e.g. explaining preference via utility functions. Logical behaviorism assumes rational preference functions. Functional organization is what matters, not physical make-up.Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophy and our mental life. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 62 | Google)
Psychological states aren't TM states after all: we have lots of psych states at once; they depend on learning/memory; disjunctions of TM states are no good. But functional organization rather than physics is still what counts.Putnam, H. 1987. Representation and Reality. MIT Press. (Cited by 220 | Google)
Type functionalism isn't any better than type physicalism, as mental states can be multiply realized as functional states. With what in common?Lycan, W. G. 1974. Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:48-62. (Google)
On abstract vs. physical TMs: Putnam should say that mental states are physical TM states. But then functionalism is compatible with physicalism. On the relation between Putnam's and Armstrong's functionalism.Lycan, W. G. 1979. A New Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35:279-87. (Cited by 3 | Google)
If machine functionalism were true, a homunculus-head would have all the mental states of its homunculus (by the definition of "realization"), which is absurd.Lycan, W. G. 1983. The moral of the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:277-80. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Reply to Elugardo 1983: so how do you specify what count as inputs/outputs?Elugardo, R. 1981. Machine functionalism and the New Lilliputian argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:256-61. (Google)
Criticism of Lycan 1979, and a re-making of the argument.Elugardo, R. 1983. Machine realization and the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:267-75. (Google)
Lycan's New Lilliputian argument fails as inputs/outputs for the homunculus are not the same as inputs/outputs for the full system.Kane, R. H. 1966. Turing machines and mental reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44:344-52. (Google)
Nelson, R. 1974. Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 73:365-86. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues for mechanism rather than functionalism. Criticizes Putnam for hypostasizing mental states, which are disanalogous to mental states. Defending mechanism against Kalke's & Rorty's objections.Rorty, R. 1972. Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 69:203-20. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Logical states don't give us any understanding of mind over and above what the function/structure distinction gives us. In particular, it doesn't help with the understanding of privacy and incorrigibility.Tomberlin, J. 1965. About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:295-99. (Google)
Contra Putnam: logical states are not physical states, and utterances about them are not about physical states.Wagner, S. J. 1988. The liberal and the lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:165-74. (Google)
Contra Lycan: machine functionalism can handle Bolivia and CRT cases by a causal/counterfactual account, and Lilliputian case by assigning mental states to minds, not bodies.
Adams, F. 1979. Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory. Eidos 1:153-79. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Batitsky, V. 1998. A formal rebuttal of the central argument for fnuctionalism. Erkenntnis 49:201-20. (Google)
Bealer, G. 1978. An inconsistency in functionalism. Synthese. (Cited by 3 | Google)
A formal argument showing that functional definitions are equivalent to behavioral definitions.Bealer, G. 1985. Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:283-328. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bealer, G. 1997. Self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 106:69-117. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bealer, G. 2001. The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail. Philosophical Studies 105:281-307. (Google)
Bechtel, W. 1984. Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail. Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 1:43-55. (Google)
The functional level is the appropriate level for psychology, but neurophysiological facts constrain this level and are thus relevant.Ben-Yami, H. 1999. An argument against functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:320-324. (Google)
Biro, J. I. & Shahan, R. W. (eds) 1982. Mind, Brain and Function. Oklahoma University Press. (Google)
Ten papers on functionalism. Originally was Philosophical Topics, volume 12.Block, N. 1980. Functionalism. In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. MIT Press. (Google)
Distinguishes varieties of functionalism, e.g. machine and Ramsey-sentence functionalism; and compares to behaviorism. With a historical overview, and arguments for why functionalism is incompatible with physicalism.Block, N. 1978. Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980).
Distinguishes analytic and empirical functionalism. Both have problems with absent qualia, and inputs/outputs. Analytic functionalism has problems with paralytics, etc; empirical functionalism has problems with Martians.Block, N. & Fodor, J. A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 54 | Google)
Mental states are not physical or behavioral states; could they be functional states? With various arguments against type identity, and against machine-table functionalism.Churchland, P. M. 2005. Functionalism at forty: A critical retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102:33-50. (Google)
Cummins, R. 1975. Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72:741-64. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 160 | Google)
On the role of functional explanation versus other kinds of explanation. Functionalism applies an analytic, not subsumptive strategy.David, M. 1997. Kim's functionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 11:133-48. (Google)
Fischer, J. 1985. Functionalism and propositions. Philosophical Studies 48:295-311. (Google)
Fodor, J. A. 1968. Materialism. In Psychological Explanation. Random House. (Google)
On mental state as inferred theoretical entities, individuated according to their function (cf. valve-lifters). Psychology and neuroscience will mutually constrain each other, giving a relation more complex than reduction.Gendron, B. 1970. On the relation of neurological and psychological theories: A critique of the hardware thesis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8:483-95. (Google)
Argues that functional explanation are reducible to structural explanations.Gertler, B. 2000. Functionalism's methodological predicament. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38:77-94. (Google)
Hornsby, J. 1986. Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour. In (P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hoy, R. C. 1980. Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents. Synthese 44:207-40.n (Google)
Kalke, W. 1969. What's wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's functionalism. Nous 3:83-93. (Google)
There's no absolute functional/structural distinction, as it depends on how you choose boundaries and levels of abstraction.Lycan, W. G. 1981. Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Pursue a multi-leveled homuncular functionalism, with mental states characterized as states of teleologically identified subsystems. Even the identity theorist is a functionalist at a low level.Malcolm, N. 1980. `Functionalism' in philosophical psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:211-30. (Google)
McCullagh, M. 2000. Functionalism and self-consciousness. Mind and Language 15:481-499. (Google)
Pereboom, D. 1991. Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist. Synthese 88:341-58. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Scientific realism requires dispositions of kinds be explained by intrinsic properties. Neural/functional properties won't work, because of reductionism and circularity. Use intrinsic psychological properties instead.Pineda, D. 2001. Functionalism and nonreductive physicalism. Theoria 16:43-63. (Google)
Richardson, R. C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology.Schiffer, S. 1986. Functionalism and belief. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Against functionalism for beliefs. Both common-sense functionalism and psychofunctionalism have problems with finding the right functional theory, distinguishing beliefs, perceptual input conditions, Twin Earth, etc.Shoemaker, S. 2001. Realization and mental causation. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google)
Shope, R. K. 1973. Functional equivalence and the defense of materialism. Philosophical Forum 4:500-12. (Google)
Sober, E. 1990. Putting the function back into functionalism. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Need teleological functionalism, not Turing Machine functionalism.Sober, E. 1985. Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind. Synthese 64:165-93. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Tooley, M. 2001. Functional concepts, referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms. Philosophical Studies 105:251-79. (Google)
van Gulick, R. 1982. Functionalism as a theory of mind. Philosophy Research Archives 185-204. (Cited by 2 | Google)
The structure/function distinction is level-relative, so physiology might be relevant even under functionalism. Problems with automata, and with causal connections to nonintentionally characterized behavior.van Gulick, R. 1980. Functionalism, information and content. Nature and System 2:139-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ward, A. 1989. Philosophical functionalism. Behaviorism 17:155-8. (Google)
Weckert, J. 1990. Functionalism's impotence. Philosophical Inquiry 32-43. (Google)
Weir, A. 2001. More trouble for functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:267-293. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wilkes, K. V. 1981. Functionalism, psychology and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Topics 12:147-67. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Functionalism may be appropriate for cognitive psychology but not for folk psychology, due to differing goals. Neuroscience will play an important role in developing functional theories.Zangwill, N. 1992. Variable realization: not proven. Philosophical Quarterly 42:214-19. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Argues that the possibility of multiple realization has not been established, whether by arguments from imagination, concepts, or empirical facts.
Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co. (Cited by 1083 | Google)
The ancestor of most contemporary philosophy of mind. Among other things, argues that the "ghost in the machine" view of mind is a category mistake, and presents dispositional analyses of many mental concepts.Bestor, T. W. 1979. Gilbert Ryle and the adverbial theory of mind. Personalist 60:233-42. (Google)
Burgos, J. 2004. Realism about behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:69-95. (Google)
Campbell, C. A. 1953. Ryle on the intellect. Philosophical Quarterly 3:115-38. (Google)
Carnap, R. 1959. Psychology in physical language. In (Ayer, ed) Logical Positivism. Free Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Carrier, L. 1973. Professor Shaffer's refutation of behaviourism. Mind 80:249-52. (Google)
Chemero, A. 2002. Reconsidering Ryle: Editor's introduction. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7. (Google)
Chisholm, R. 1955. A note on Carnap's meaning analysis. Philosophical Studies. (Google)
Chisholm, R. 1952. Intentionality and the theory of signs. Philosophical Studies. (Google)
Chisholm, R. 1958. Sentences about believing. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dalrymple, H. 1977. Some logical muddles in behaviorism. Southwestern Philosophical Studies 2:64-72. (Google)
Ewing, A. C. 1953. Professor Ryle's attack on dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:47-78. (Google)
Farrell, B. 1950. Experience. Mind 59:170-98. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Finn, D. R. 1971. Putnam and logical behaviourism. Mind 80:432-36. (Google)
Flanagan, O. J. & McCreadie-Albright, T. 1974. Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism. Philosophical Studies 26:425-30. (Google)
Geach, P. 1957. Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 58 | Google)
Goudge, T. A. 1982. Ryle's last thoughts on thinking. Dialogue 21:125-32. (Google)
Graham, G. 1982. Spartans and behaviorists. Behaviorism 10. (Google)
Defends behaviorism as a scientific hypothesis, so that conceivability arguments aren't relevant, and advocates "penetrability" behaviorism which can appeal to internal physical states.Hamer, C. 1970. Why Ryle is not a behaviourist. Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 17:7-25. (Google)
Hamlyn, D. W. 1953. Behaviour. Philosophy 28:132-45. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hanson, N. R. 1952. Professor Ryle's "mind". Philosophical Quarterly 2:246-48. (Google)
Harzem, P. 2004. Behaviorism for new psychology: What was wrong with behaviorism and what is wrong with it now. Behavior and Philosophy 32:5-12. (Google)
Heidelberger, H. 1966. On characterizing the psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google)
Killeen, P. R. 2004. Minding behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:125-147. (Google)
Kitchener, R. F. 1977. Behavior and behaviorism. Behaviorism 5:11-68. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Jacquette, D. 1985. Logical behaviorism and the simulation of mental episodes. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:325-332. (Google)
Longworth, G. 2003. Where should we look for the mind? Think 5. (Google)
Mace, C. A. 1949. Some implications of analytical behaviourism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. (Google)
Malcolm, N. 1954. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Philosophical Review 43:530-9. (Google)
Mandelbaum, M. 1958. Professor Ryle and psychology. Philosophical Review 67:522-30. (Google)
McLaughlin, B. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1995. Dennett's logical behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22:189-258. (Google)
Miller, D. S. 1911. Is consciousness "a type of behaviour"? Journal of Philosophy 8:322-27. (Google)
Miller, D. S. 1951. "Descartes myth" and "Professor Ryle's fallacy". Journal of Philosophy. (Google)
Nelson, R. 1969. Behaviorism is false. Journal of Philosophy 66:417-52. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Nelson, R. 1975. Behaviorism, finite automata, and stimulus-response theory. Theory and Decision 6:249-67. (Google)
Oosthuizen, D. C. S. 1970. Phenomenological psychology. Mind 79:487-501. (Google)
Park, S. 1994. Reinterpreting Ryle: A nonbehaviorist analysis. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32:265-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Place, U. T. 1993. A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy 20:25-35. (Google)
Price, H. H. 1960. Some objections to behaviorism. In (S. Hook, ed) Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Google)
Putnam, H. 1963. Brains and behavior. In (R. Butler, ed) Analytical Philosophy: Second Series. Blackwell. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 31 | Google)
Quine, W. V. 1975. Mind and verbal dispositions. In (Guttenplan, ed) Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Quine, W. V. 1980. Sellars on behaviorism, language, and meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:26-30. (Google)
Ribes-Inesta, E. 2004. Behavior is abstraction, not ostension: Conceptual and historical remarks on the nature of psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 32:55-68. (Google)
Robinson, H. 1982. Behaviorism and stimulus materialism. In Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Rowlands, M. 1991. A defense of behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 19:93-100. (Google)
Ryle, G. 1979. On Thinking. Blackwell. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Scriven, M. 1956. A study of radical behaviorism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:88-130. (Google)
Sellars, W. 1952. Mind, meaning, and behavior. Philosophical Studies. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shuford, H. 1966. Logical behaviorism and intentionality. Theoria 32:246-51. (Google)
Skinner, B. F. 1945. The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review 52:270-78. (Cited by 75 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Ryle on mechanism and psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 9:349-55. (Google)
Stemmer, N. 1993. Behavioral materialism, the success of folk psychology, and the first-person case. Behavior and Philosophy 20:1-14. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stout, R. 2002. What you know when you know how someone behaves. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7. (Google)
Stout, R. 2003. Behaviourism. Think 5. (Google)
Vendler, Z. 1981. Ryle's thoughts on thinking. Midwest Studies of Philosophy 6:335-43. (Google)
Weitz, M. 1951. Professor Ryle's "logical behaviourism". Journal of Philosophy 48:297-300. (Google)
Whitely, C. A. 1961. Behaviourism. Mind 70:164-74. (Google)
Wisdom, J. 1950. The concept of mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:189-204. (Google)
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. (Cited by 102 | Google)
Wright, J. N. 1959. Mind and the concept of mind. Aristotelian Society Supplement 33:1-22. (Google)
Ziff, P. 1958. About behaviourism. Analysis 18:132-6. (Google)
Feigl, H. 1958. The `mental' and the `physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497. Reprinted as The `Mental' and the `Physical'. University of Minnesota Press, 1967. (Google)
Place, U. T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Google)
The idea that consciousness is a brain process is logically coherent. It's a scientific hypothesis, not a necessary truth. On the "is" of composition vs the "is" of definition, and the fallacy of the internal phenomenal field.Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68:141-56. (Cited by 129 | Google)
Defending the thesis that sensations are contingently identical to brain processes against various objections. Topic-neutral analysis of sensation reports. Materialism beats epiphenomenalism on grounds of simplicity.Abelson, R. 1970. A refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 18:85-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)
The number of possible mental states is infinite (think of any number), whereas there are only finitely many brain states, so they're not identical.Armstrong, D. M. 1968. The headless woman and the defense of materialism. Analysis 29:48-49. (Google)
Likens the anti-materialist position to the "headless woman" fallacy: "I'm not aware the mental states are physical", so "I'm aware that mental states are non-physical".Armstrong, D. M. 1973. Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 40:178-93. (Cited by 3 | Google)
A prima facie case for materialism based on grounds of rational consensus, arising especially from common-sense and scientific evidence. Mental states exist (common-sense) but should be analyzed causally (evidence from science).Aune, B. 1966. Feigl on the mind-body problem. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Google)
Baier, K. 1962. Smart on sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:57-68. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Mental states are necessarily private, and so cannot be physical states, which are public. We have epistemological authority about our mental states.Beloff, J. 1965. The identity hypothesis: A critique. In (J. R. Smythies, ed) Brain and Mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Blumenfeld, J-B. 1979. Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93. (Google)
Argues that phenomenal properties aren't needed to identify sensations with brain-states, and nor are topic-neutral analyses.Borst, C. V. (ed) 1970. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan. (Google)
An anthology of central articles on the identity theory.Bradley, M. C. 1963. Sensations, brain-processes, and colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41:385-93. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brandt, R. 1960. Doubts about the identity theory. In (S. Hook, ed) Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brandt, R. & Kim, J. 1967. The logic of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 66:515-537. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Arguing for an event-identity construal of the identity theory. Comparing the identity theory to the weaker "principle of simultaneous isomorphism". The only reason to accept the identity theory is ontological simplicity.Brodbeck, M. 1966. Mental and physical: Identity versus sameness. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Candlish, S. 1970. Mind, brain, and identity. Mind 79:502-18. (Google)
Carney, J. 1971. The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism. Mind. (Google)
Argues that the identity theory is compatible with linguistic dualism, as the mental and the physical may differ in intensional properties only.Clarke, J. 1971. Mental structure and the identity theory. Mind 80:521-30. (Google)
Coburn, R. 1963. Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60:89-92. (Google)
Coder, D. 1973. The fundamental error of central-state materialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10:289-98. (Google)
On problems with theories that leave the nature of mind open a priori: how can we even understand the possibilities?Cornman, J. 1962. The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy 59:486-92. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Coburn, R. C. 1963. Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60:89. (Google)
Location of mental states by convention (Shaffer 1961) won't work, as it (a) makes mental states public, and (b) conflicts with connections to behavior.Crittenden, C. 1971. Ontology and mind-body identity. Philosophical Forum 2:251-70. (Google)
de Boer, R. 1976. Cartesian categories in mind-body identity theories. Philosophical Forum 7:139-58. (Google)
Double, R. 1981. Central state materialism. Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 28:229-37. (Google)
Enc, B. 1983. In defense of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 80:279-98. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Feigl, H. 1971. Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Garnett, A. C. 1965. Body and mind: the identity thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:77-81. (Google)
Grunbaum, A. 1972. Abelson on Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. Philosophical Studies 23:119-21. (Google)
Gustafson, D. F. 1963. On the identity theory. Analysis 24:30-32. (Google)
Hanratty, G. 1972. The identity theory of Herbert Feigl. Philosophical Studies 20:113-23. (Google)
Harris, E. E. 1966. The neural identity thesis and the person. International Philosophical Quarterly 6:515-37. (Google)
Hedman, C. G. 1970. On correlating brain states with psychological states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:247-51. (Google)
Heil, J. 1970. Sensations, experiences, and brain processes. Philosophy 45:221-6. (Google)
Hinton, J. M. 1967. Illusions and identity. Analysis 27:65-76. (Google)
Hockutt, M. 1967. In defense of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27:366-85. (Google)
Hoffman, R. 1967. Malcolm and Smart on brain-mind identity. Philosophy 42: 128-36. (Google)
Joske, W. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:157-60. (Google)
On topic-neutral reports, after-images, and after-radishes. Such a report requires epistemic access to physical resemblance, which we don't have.Kim, J. 1966. On the psycho-physical identity theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 3:227-35. (Cited by 12 | Google)
There's no empirical support for identity, over and above that for correlation; and unity of science gives no reason to accept identity. The only reason might be that of ontological simplicity.Kim, J. 1972. Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory. Monist 56:178-92. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Deal with phenomenal properties by allowing only mental events, and eliminating mental objects. Identity theories needn't suppose psychophysical laws. With defense against multiple realizability arguments.Kitcher, P. S. 1982. Two versions of the identity theory. Erkenntnis 17:213-28. (Google)
Recasting the identity theory and functionalism, using Kripkean theories of reference, so mental states can refer to physiological or psychological states that we don't yet understand; and qualia problems are handled better.Lewis, D. 1965. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1980).
Mental states are defined by their causal roles. So, by the completeness of physics, they must be physical states.Locke, D. 1971. Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 49:217-31. (Google)
On how materialism, as opposed to a double aspect view, can handle mental features -- by moving them into the world via a realist theory of perception. Remarks on identification of states. After-images, etc, cause problems.Lockwood, M. 1984. Einstein and the identity theory. Analysis. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location.Lubow, N. 1978. Mind-body identity and irreducible properties. Philosophy Research Archives 4:1240. (Google)
Luce, D. R. 1966. Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophy of Science 17:1-7. (Google)
Malcolm, N. 1964. Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue 3:115-25. (Cited by 3 | Google)
The identity theory is meaningless, if identity is analyzed as spatiotemporal coincidence, as thoughts don't have location. Thoughts also require context. Even if identity holds, explaining brain doesn't imply explaining mind.Macdonald, C. 1989. Mind-Body Identity Theories. Routledge. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Malcolm, N. 1964. Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Margolis, J. 1965. Brain processes and sensations. Theoria 31:133-38. (Google)
Meehl, P. 1966. The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity theory and criteria for the mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35:167-80. (Google)
Munsat, S. 1969. Could sensations be processes? Mind 78:247-51. (Google)
Sensations and processes have different logical type, so it is a priori impossible that they should be identical.Nagel, T. 1965. Physicalism. Philosophical Review 74:339-56, 1965. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Noren, S. J. 1970. Identity, materialism, and the problem of the danglers. Metaphilosophy 4:318-44. (Google)
Noren, S. J. 1970. Smart's materialism: The identity thesis and translation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:54-66. (Google)
Norton, R. 1964. On the identity of identity theories. Analysis 25:14-16. (Google)
Pepper, S. 1975. A split in the identity theory. In (C. Cheng, ed) Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press. (Google)
Pitcher, G. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:150-7. (Google)
Identity requires explanation to be accepted, but Smart doesn't provide this. But one can deny identity without claiming dualism -- e.g. a "duck-rabbit" theory of mind/brain. With remarks on the completeness of descriptions.Place, U. T. 1960. Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69:101-4. (Google)
Contra Smart 1959: Materialism is a scientific hypothesis, if we accept certain logical criteria for what a sensation is; otherwise it's just false.Place, U. T. 1972. Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat. Mind. (Google)
Place, U. T. 1988. Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:208-19. (Google)
Comparing contemporary materialism to Pace's 1956 variety. With remarks on whether the thesis is empirical or a priori, and on deciding the issue between materialism and epiphenomenalism.Place, U. T. 1989. Low claim assertions. In (J. Heil, ed) Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer. (Google)
Discusses a paper of Martin's and the genesis of the identity theory, with a focus on `public' and 'private logic' and topic-neutral descriptions.Place, U. T. 2003. Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Presley, C. P. (ed) 1967. The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1978. The refutation of materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8:157-62. (Google)
The identity theory must be false, as pain centers in vitro will not be pains. With a reply by G. Pearce and a rejoinder.Ripley, C. 1969. The identity theory and scientific hypotheses. Dialogue 2:308-10. (Google)
Robinson, H. 1982. The disappearance theory. In Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Rosenbaum, S. 1977. The property objection and the principles of identity. Philosophical Studies 32. (Google)
Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. 1966. On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences. American Philosophical Quarterly 3. (Google)
Schlagel, R. H. 1977. The mind-body identity impasse. American Philosophical Quarterly 14:231-37. (Google)
Scriven, M. 1966. The limitations of the identity theory. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Google)
On the identity theory as a linguistic proposal, compatible with dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism must be false, leaving interactionism.Sellars, W. 1965. The identity approach to the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 18:430-51. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Shaffer, J. 1961. Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy 58:813-22. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Mental states don't have a location, and brain processes do; but we could stipulate a location for mental states. With remarks on possible relations between mental and physical features, states, and concepts.Shaffer, J. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 60:160-6. (Cited by 7 | Google)
We identify mental events by noticing mental features that must be nonphysical, but still might be empirically reducible. Against topic-neutral definitions, and with response to Coburn 1963 on location.Simon, M. A. 1970. Materialism, mental language, and the mind-body identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30:514-32. (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philsophy 38:252-54. (Cited by 129 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1961. Further remarks on Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review.
Reply to Stevenson 1960: There are no irreducible mental properties; they reduce to physical properties via topic-neutral definitions.Smart, J. J. C. 1962. Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70. (Google)
Reply to Baier 1962: epistemological authority is compatible with materialism. Mental state reports are not completely incorrigible, though.Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60:651-62. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Defending topic-neutral analyses of mental reports, and arguing against Wittgensteinian behaviorism via brain-in-vat examples. With remarks on the appeal of materialism and on compatibility with ordinary language.Smart, J. J. C. 1965. The identity thesis: A reply to Professor Garrett. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:82-3. (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1972. Further thoughts on the identity theory. Monist 56:177-92. (Google)
On some problems for the identity theory arising from the intensionality of mental states and from the appeal to properties, and on how to modify the translation form of the theory without embracing the disappearance version.Smythies, J. R. 1994. Requiem for the identity theory. Inquiry 37:311-29. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Sosa, E. 1965. Professor Malcolm on "Scientific materialism and the identity theory". Dialogue 4:422-23. (Google)
Stevenson, J. T. 1960. `Sensations and brain processes': A reply to J. J. C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69:505-10.
Identity theory implies nomological danglers, due to the irreducibility of defining mental properties.Stoutland, F. 1971. Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google)
The identity thesis isn't ontologically simpler than dualism: we still need a dualism of properties, and explanatory danglers. Not much turns on the issue, except in teleological explanation.Sosa, E. 1965. Professor Malcolm on `Scientific materialism and the identity theory'. Dialogue 3:422-23. (Google)
Contra Malcolm 1965: explaining brain will explain mind, if the explanation is conjoined with the identity statement. With rejoinder from Malcolm.Swartz, N. 1974. Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3:405-17. (Google)
Swinburne, R. 1993. Are mental events identical with brain events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19:173-181. (Google)
Property identity theses fail due to meaning differences, and event identity these fail due to a lack of entailment relations. Rebuts objections from weaker identity criteria and analogies with scientific identification.Taylor, C. 1967. Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review 76:201-13. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Teichmann, J. 1967. The contingent identity of minds and brains. Mind 76:404-15. (Google)
Thalberg, I. 1978. A novel approach to mind-brain identity. Philosophy of Science 3:255-72. (Google)
Suggests a theory in which neural states are components of, but not identical to, overall psychological states. This can accommodate raw feels if necessary as a further component, but is mostly materialistic.Thomson, J. J. 1969. The identity theory. In (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, & M. White, eds) Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. St. Martin's Press. (Google)
Tomberlin, J. E. 1965. About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53:295-9. (Google)
Watkins, J. W. N. 1978. A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In (J. Eccles, ed) Mind and Brain. Paragon House. (Google)
Weismann, D. 1965. A note on the identity thesis. Mind 74:571-77. (Google)
Whitely, C. H. 1970. The mind-brain identity hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 20:193-99. (Google)
Wolfe, J. & Nathan, G. J. 1968. The identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Dialogue 7:469-72. (Google)
Ziedins, R. 1971. Identification of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events. American Philosophical Quarterly 8:13-23. (Google)
Austin, J. W. 1975. Rorty's materialism. Auslegung 3:20-28. (Google)
Bernstein, R. 1968. The challenge of scientific materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 8:252-75. (Google)
Bush, E. 1974. Rorty revisited. Philosophical Studies 25:33-42. (Google)
Cam, P. 1978. "Rorty revisited", or "Rorty revised". Philosophical Studies 33:377-86. (Google)
Carter, W. R. 1974. On incorrigibility and eliminative materialism. Philosophical Studies 28:113-21. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cornman, J. 1968. On the elimination of `sensations' and sensations. Review of Metaphysics 22:15-35. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Donovan, C. 1978. Eliminative materialism reconsidered. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8. (Google)
Doppelt, G. 1977. Incorrigibility, the mental, and materialism. Philosophy Research Archives. (Google)
Everitt, N. 1981. A problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 90:428-34. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Everitt, N. 1983. How not to solve A problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 92:590-92.
Feyerabend, P. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 40:295-6. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 11 | Google)
Identity theory implies dualism, though its acceptance of mental properties. Instead we should eliminate talk of mental processes altogether, or redefine them in physiological terms.Feyerabend, P. 1963. Materialism and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 17:49-67. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Globus, G. 1989. The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In (M. Maxwell & C. Savage, eds) Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell. University Press of America. (Google)
Godow, R. 1976. Eliminative materialism and denotation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36. (Google)
Goodman, R. B. 1974. A note on eliminative materialism. Journal of Critical Analysis 5:80-83. (Google)
Hiley, D. R. 1978. Is eliminative materialism materialistic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38:325-37. (Google)
Hiley, D. R. 1980. The disappearance theory and the denotation argument. Philosophical Studies 37:307-20. (Google)
Lycan, W. G. & Pappas, G. 1972. What is eliminative materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149-59. (Google)
Lycan, W. G. 1976. Quine's materialism. Philosophia 6:101-30. (Google)
Quine, W. V. 1966. On mental entities. In The Ways of Paradox. Random House. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Richardson, R. C. 1981. Disappearance and the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:473-85. (Google)
Rorty, R. 1965. Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. Review of Metaphysics 19:24-54. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Rorty, R. 1970. In defense of eliminative materialism. Review of Metaphysics 24:112-21. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Rosenthal, D. M. 1980. Keeoing matter in mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:295-322. (Google)
Savitt, S. 1974. Rorty's disappearance theory. Philosophical Studies 28:433-36. (Google)
Shirley, E. S. 1974. Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 25:73-75. (Google)
Sikora, R. I. 1974. Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:191-93. (Google)
Sikora, R. I. 1975. Rorty's new mark of the mental. Analysis 35:192-94. (Google)
Steiling, K. 1976. The elimination of sensations and the loss of philosophy. Auslegung 3:20-28. (Google)
Antony, M. V. 2003. Davidson's argument for monism. Synthese 135:1-12. (Google)
Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In (L. Foster & J. Swanson, eds) Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. Reprinted in Essays on Action and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980). (Cited by 175 | Google)
Arguing for anomalous monism: no strict psychophysical laws, no strict psychological laws, and token identity without type identity. Mental events can still cause, via subsumption under physical laws.Davidson, D. 1973. The material mind. In (P. Suppes, ed) Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. North-Holland. Reprinted in Essays on Action and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980). (Cited by 12 | Google)
The psychological supervenes on the physical but is not reducible to it, because of the holistic nature of intentional attribution. So building a perfect physical model may not explain psychology.Davidson, D. 1974. Psychology as philosophy. In (S. Brown, ed) Philosophy of Psychology. Harper & Row. Reprinted in Essays on Action and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980). (Cited by 33 | Google)
On the differing constitutive standards of mental and physical concepts. Attribution of mental concepts is holistic, and presupposes a background of rationality, etc. With examples from decision theory.Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 438 | Google)
A collection of papers on action, causation and the philosophy of psychology.Davidson, D. 1987. Problems in the explanation of action. In (P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, & J. Norman, eds) Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Remarks on how mental properties can explain action without strict laws. The mental is a conceptual, not an ontological category, governed by normative standards, and not reducible to the non-normative.Davidson, D. 1992. Thinking causes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 26 | Google)
Davidson, D. 1995. Laws and cause. Dialectica 49:263-79. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Davidson, D. 1999. The emergence of thought. Erkenntnis 51:511-21. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Antony, L. 1989. Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98:153-87. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Criticism of Davidson's argument for rational causation. Reasons must cause in virtue of their rational properties. Token identities can't exist, due to normativity. Quinean psychology can't yield rational explanations.Bickle, J. 1992. Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59:217-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Campbell, N. 1997. The standard objection to anomalous monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:373-82. (Google)
Campbell, N. 1998. Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52:23-39. (Google)
Cheng, K. 1997. Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:81-95. (Google)
Child, W. 1993. Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Anomalism is compatible with supervenience, if it is construed as denying psychophysical laws useful for explaining behavior. It is incompatible with token identity, though. With much on the uncodifiability of rationality.Cooper, W. E. 1980. Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9:36-40. (Google)
Daniel, S. G. 1999. Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:225-237. (Google)
Elgin, C. 1980. Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55. (Google)
Garrett, B. J. 1999. Davidson on causal relevance. Ratio 12:14-33. (Google)
Goldberg, B. 1977. A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32:175-80. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws.Herstein, G. L. 2005. Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws. Synthese 145:45-63. (Google)
Hess, P. 1981. Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41:77-81. (Google)
Anomalous monism implies that mental properties don't cause anything.Honderich, T. 1982. The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42:59-64. (Cited by 17 | Google)
If anomalous monism is true, mental events may cause, but their mental properties aren't causally relevant.Hum, D. D. 1998. Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52:45-61. (Google)
Jackman, H. 2000. Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws. In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind. Philosophy Documentation Center. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Johnston, M. 1985. Why having a mind matters. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Anomalous monism loses out to Australian materialism. It can't be a priori, it leads to exhaustive monism, it doesn't support a new view of free action, and it implies the causal irrelevance of the mental.Kalderon, M. E. 1987. Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52:71-90. (Google)
Davidson's view leads to epiphenomenalism about content, as it can't support the appropriate counterfactuals. Strong supervenience might be a way out, but that is inconsistent with anomalism.Kernohan, A. 1985. Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42. (Google)
Kim, J. 1985. Psychophysical laws. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 9 | Google)
How there can be psychophysical generalizations but no laws -- they might lack modal force. On the relation between psychophysical anomalism and psychological anomalism. Casting Davidson as a Kantian dualist.Kim, J. 1993. Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Klagge, J. C. 1990. Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85:339-52. (Google)
Anomalous supervenience is consistent, at the cost of anti-realism about the mental. Supervenience is a constraint on interpretation, but needn't support counterfactuals as different interpretation schemes are possible,Klee, R. 1992. Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43:389-403. (Google)
Problems with holism and ceteris paribus laws aren't unique to psychology. One finds the same thing in the physical sciences. So rationality plays no special role, and psychological laws are as reasonable as physical laws.Kuczynski, J. M. 1998. A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 36:491-504. (Google)
Latham, N. 1999. Davidson and Kim on Psychophysical laws. Synthese 118:121-44.
LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1987. Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 630-42. (Cited by 21 | Google)
Anomalous monism is not committed to epiphenomenalism, as even non-strict laws can ground counterfactuals and so support the causal relevance of mental properties.Lycan, W. G. 1981. Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12:9-38. (Cited by 5 | Google)
A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc.McDowell, J. 1985. Functionalism and anomalous monism. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 39 | Google)
Against Loar's functionalist reductionism: it doesn't begin to capture the normative role of rationality or the subjectivity of the mental.McLaughlin, B. P. 1985. Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)
A very thorough summary of Davidson's views. Highly recommended.McLaughlin, B. P. & LePore, E. (eds) 1985. Actions and Events. Blackwell. (Cited by 17 | Google)
30 essays on Davidson.McLaughlin, B. P. 1992. On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Comments on Davidson 1992. Davidson can respond to critics accepting causal relevance of mental properties and still denying strict laws. Davidson misconstrues his critics' positions on supervenience.Melchert, N. 1986. What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 80:265-74. (Google)
Davidson is concerned with intentional, not phenomenal states; and his characterization of these is just as physical states under a certain description. So he avoids epiphenomenalism (contra e.g. Honderich 1982).Miller, A. 1993. Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:335-44. (Google)
Kim's version of Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws cannot work. Elucidating the notion of a constitutive principle.Nasrin, M. 2004. Anomalous monism in Carnap's Aufbau. Erkenntnis 60:283-293. (Google)
Noren, S. J. 1979. Anomalous monism, events, and `the mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40:64-74. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Patterson, S. A. 1996. The anomalism of psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:37-52. (Google)
Preyer, G. 2000. Primary reasons: From radical interpretation to a pure anomalism of the mental. Protosociology 14:158-179. (Google)
Robinson, H. 2001. Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Rosenberg, A. 1985. Davidson's unintended attack on psychology. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) Action and Events. Blackwell. (Google)
Anomalous monism implies that there aren't even heteronomic psychological generalizations, as variables can't be independently measured.Rowlands, M. 1990. Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 295-310. (Google)
Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base.Seager, W. E. 1981. The anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:389-401. (Google)
Elucidating Davidson's argument, focusing on the argument against strict psychophysical laws. Generalizations involve disjunctive kinds and so are heteronomic and not law-like.Seager, W. E. 1991. Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51:93-98. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Argues contra Kim that supervenience is compatible with anomalous monism: the the disjunctive generalizations aren't lawlike, as they aren't confirmed by their instances.Shea, N. 2003. Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? The Philosophical Quarterly 53:201-213. (Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1985. Davidson's minimal Materialism. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
Some comments on holism, indeterminacy, anomalism, and materialism.Smith, P. 1982. Bad news for anomalous monism? Analysis 42:220-4. (Google)
Response to Honderich 1982: physical events are individuated as mental states by virtue of their causal role, so the mental is causally relevant.Sosa, E. 1993. Davidson's thinking causes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Stanton, W. L. 1983. Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:72-9. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law.Suppes, P. 1985. Davidson's views on psychology as a science. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Various: physics is indeterministic and intensional, animals have beliefs, psychology has derived laws, and decision-theory doesn't need speech.Tiffany, E. C. 2001. The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103:258-314. (Google)
van Gulick, R. 1980. Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404. (Google)
Rationality constraints don't introduce an irreducibly normative element into intentional attributions. Rationality serves as a condition of adequacy for psychophysical theories, but it doesn't rule them out.Vermazen, B. & Hintikka, M. (eds) 1985. Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
12 essays on Davidson, with replies.Walsh, D. M. 1998. Wide content individualism. Mind 107:625-652. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Welshon, R. 1999. Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:103-120. (Google)
Yalowitz, S. 1997. Rationality and the argument for anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 87:235-58. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Yalowitz, S. 1998. Causation in the argument for anomalous monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28:183-226. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Zangwill, N. 1993. Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71:59-79. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Antony, L. 1991. The causal relevance of the mental. Mind and Language 6:295-327. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Audi, R. 1993. Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baker, L. R. 1993. Metaphysics and mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)
Mental causation is incompatible with strong supervenience and causal closure of physics, as we can't distinguish high-level causes from non-causes. So reject the metaphysics and make explanation prior to causation.Barrett, J. 1994. Rationalizing explanation and causally relevant mental properties. Philosophical Studies 74:77-102. (Google)
Bennett, K. 2003. Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it. Nous 37:471-97. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Blackburn, S. 1991. Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar prevention. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Arguing for the causal efficacy and scientific respectability of higher-order states, such as functional-role states. To require appeal to particular physical states is to succumb to a "Tractarian" view of physical primacy.Block, N. 1989. Can the mind change the world? In (G. Boolos, ed) Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 47 | Google)
Rescuing content from epiphenomenalism via functional role argument; but then functional roles aren't really causally efficacious (cf. dormitive virtue), so epi all over again? Roles vs fillers, causation vs explanation.Block, N. 1995. Reply: Causation and two kinds of laws. In (C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds) Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Block, N. 2003. Do causal powers drain away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:133-150. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bontly, T. D. 2002. The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109:75-96. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Braun, D. 1995. Causally relevant properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:447-75. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brewer, B. 1995. Compulsion by reason (Mental Causation II). Aristotelian Society Supplement 69:237-53.
Buckley, R. 2001. Physicalism and the problem of mental causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:155-174. (Google)
Burge, T. 1993. Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)
Mental causation is not a real worry, but the to-do shows that materialist metaphysics has shed little light on it. It needs to be understood at the mental level. With remarks on exclusion arguments and token identity.Crane, T. 1990. On an alleged analogy between numbers and propositions. Analysis 50:224-30. (Cited by 4 | Google)
How can a relation to a proposition (an abstract object) be causally efficacious? Analogy with numbers doesn't work: weight properties are only pseudo-relational, depending on units, but propositions are absolute.Crane, T. 1992. Mental causation and mental reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:185-202. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be.Crane, T. 1995. The mental causation debate (Mental causation I). Aristotelian Society Supplement 69:211-36.
Argues that mental causation is a deep problem for constitutive (but not identity) forms of physicalism. The only way out is to argue that it is a different variety of causation. But then what motivates physicalism?Crane, T. 2001. Jacob on mental causation. Acta Analytica 16:15-21. (Google)
Dretske, F. 1993. Mental events as structuring causes of behavior. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)
Mental events are structuring causes of behavior; biological events are triggering causes, dependent on previous mental structuring. This allows extrinsic properties to play a causal role.Ehring, D. 1996. Mental causation, determinables, and property instances. Nous 30:461-80. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Ehring, D. 2003. Part-whole physicalism and mental causation. Synthese 136:359-388. (Google)
Elder, C. 1999. Physicalism and the fallacy of composition. Philosophical Quarterly 50:332-43. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Elder, C. 2001. Mental causation versus physical causation: no contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:110-127. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Elder, C. 2001. Materialism and the mediated causation of behavior. Philosophical Studies 103:165-75. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, R. D. 2001. Can dynamical systems explain mental causation?. Journal of Mind And Behavior 22:311-334. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Garrett, B. J. 1998. Pluralism, causation, and overdetermination. Synthese 116:355-78. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gibb, S. C. 2004. The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:464-75. (Google)
Hardcastle, V. G. 1998. On the matter of minds and mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1-25. (Google)
Heil, J. 1992. Mentality and causality. Topoi 11:103-110. (Google)
On various problems with mental causation, and the relationship between psychology ans philosophy.Heil, J. 2002. Mental causation. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 50 | Google)
Honderich, T. 1993. The union theory and anti-individualism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
The identity theory and psychoneural correlation can't handle mental causation; only the union theory can. Anti-individualism causes problems, but should be rejected in any case.Horgan, T. 1989. Mental quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74. (Cited by 25 | Google)
How mental events are causally relevant qua mental: via an account of "qua" causation in general, using counterfactuals on "pertinently similar worlds".Horgan, T. 1997. Kim on mental causation and causal exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11:165-84. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Horgan, T. 2001. Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem. Theoria 16:95-116. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Hornsby, J. 1993. Agency and causal explanation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. Causation and the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:195-214. (Cited by 10 | Google)
A defense of functional role as a causally efficacious property of physical states. With application to connectionism & eliminativism.Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. Program explanation: A general perspective. Analysis 50:107-17. (Cited by 35 | Google)
Jackson, F. 1995. Essentialism, mental properties, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. (Cited by 4 | Google)
How can content properties be causes, given that content is a matter of functional role and that functional properties are not causes? Defends a type-identity answer against various objections.Jackson, F. 1996. Mental causation. Mind 105:377-413. (Cited by 25 | Google)
A "state of the art" review paper, concentrating on problems posed by autonomy, functionalism, and externalism, and advocating a sort of identity theory. With discussion of a "map-system" view vs. a language of thought.Kazez, J. R. 1995. Can counterfactuals save mental causation? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73:71-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kim, J. 1984. Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:257-70. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 43 | Google)
Psychological causation, like all macrocausation, is supervenient epiphenomenal causation.Kim, J. 1992. The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Google)
Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward causation violates the causal closure of the physical.Kim, J. 1992. "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation.Kim, J. 1993. Mental causation in a physical world. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Science and Knowledge. Ridgeview. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kim, J. 1994. `Second-order' properties and mental causation. Manuscript. (Google)
Kim, J. 1995. Mental causation: What? Me worry? In (E. Villanueva, ed) Content. Ridgeview. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kim, J. 1997. Does the problem of mental causation generalize? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97:281-97. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kim, J. 1999. Supervenient properties and micro-based concepts: A reply to Noordhof. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:115-118. (Google)
Kim, J. 2000. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press. (Cited by 123 | Google)
Kim, J. 2003. Blocking causal drainage and other maintenance chores with mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:151-176. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Lackey, J. 2002. Explanation and mental causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40. (Google)
Leiter, B. & Miller, A. 1994. Mind doesn't matter yet. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:220-28. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Argues that the arguments of Fodor and LePore & Loewer don't succeed in defeating the threat of epiphenomenalism.Leiter, B. & Miller, A. 1998. Closet dualism and mental causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28:161-181. (Google)
LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989. More on making mind matter. Philosophical Topics 17:175-91. (Cited by 20 | Google)
On the problems that irreducibility -- multiple realizability, normativity, and non-supervenience -- poses for mental causation. Criticizes Kim's supervenient causation and Fodor's causal powers, and looks to "quasation".Lowe, E. J. 2003. Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causation. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1986. Mental causes and explanation of action. Philosophical Quarterly 36:145-58. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1991. Mental causation and nonreductive monism. Analysis 51:23-32. (Google)
Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1995. How to be psychologically relevant. In (C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds) Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Macdonald, G. 1992. The nature of naturalism. Aristotelian Society Supplement 66:225-44. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Marcus, E. 2005. Mental causation in a physical world. Philosophical Studies 122:27-50. (Google)
Marcus, E. 2001. Mental causation: unnaturalized but not unnatural. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63:57-83. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Marras, A. 1994. Nonreductive materialism and mental causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24:465-93. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Marras, A. 1997. The causal relevance of mental properties. Philosophia 25:389-400. (Google)
Marras, A. 1998. Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:439-451. (Google)
Marras, A. 2003. Methodological and ontological aspects of the mental causation problem. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
McGrath, M. 1998. Proportionality and mental causation: A fit? Philosophical Perspectives 12:167-176. (Google)
McLaughlin, B. P. 1989. Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Physical comprehensiveness and mental/physical non-reductionism don't imply mental inefficacy; nor does anomalous monism. Non-physical types can still can be causal, though they must be accompanied by physical causation.Menzies, P. 2003. The causal efficacy of mental states. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Nannini, S. 2004. Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalising theory. In (A. Peruzzi, ed) Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. (Google)
Noordhof, P. 1997. Making the change: The functionalist's way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48:233-50. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Noordhof, P. 1998. Do tropes resolve the problem of mental causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48:221-26. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Noordhof, P. 1999. Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:115-18. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Noordhof, P. 2002. Personal dualism and the argument from differential vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31:63-86. (Google)
Pettit, P. 1992. The nature of naturalism. Aristotelian Society Supplement 66:245-66. (Cited by 4 | Google)
On making sense of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties under naturalism. They're relevant at the program level, not quite in the way that basic properies are. With remarks on Macdonald's objections.Pietroski, P. & Menzies, P. 2003. Causing actions. Mind and Language 18:440-446. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Raymont, P. 2001. Are mental properties causally relevant?. Dialogue 40:509-528. (Google)
Raymont, P. 2003. Kim on closure, exclusion, and nonreductive physicalism. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Robb, D. 1997. The properties of mental causation. Philosophical Quarterly 187:178-94. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Robb, D. 2001. Reply to Noordhof on mental causation. Philosophical Quarterly 51:90-94. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Robinson, W. S. 1979. Do pains make a difference to our behavior? American Philosophical Quarterly 16:327-34. (Google)
On Goldman's (1969) argument that dualism and causal closure are compatible with mental causation. Goldman establishes only hypothetical necessity, not causal necessitySabates, M. H. 2001. Varieties of exclusion. Theoria 16:13-42. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Schroder, J. 2002. The supervenience argument and the generalization problem. Erkenntnis 56:319-28. (Google)
Searle, J. R. 1984. Intentionality and its place in nature. Synthese 61:3-16. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Intentionality is caused by the physical, and causes. More a 1P emphasis.Sosa, E. 1984. Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:271-81. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Interactionist dualism is out, supervenient causation is in. But there are problems with mental events' causal relevance qua mental, especially for anomalous monism. Cf: a loud shot causes death, but loudness isn't relevant.Stueber, K. R. 2005. Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation. Philosophical Studies 122:243-77. (Google)
Suster, D. 2001. Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism. Acta Analytica 16:23-43. (Google)
Thomasson, A. 1998. A nonreductivist solution to mental causation. Philosophical Studies 89:181-95. (Google)
Tienson, J. 2002. Higher-order causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:89-101. (Google)
Tuomela, R. 1998. A defense of mental causation. Philosophical Studies 90:1-34. (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gulick, R. 1993. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Google)
On three arguments against mental causation, from strict laws, non-local supervenience, and especially exclusion. Mental properties are stable, recurring high-level patterns with their own causal relevance.Vicente, A. 2004. The overdetermination argument revisited. Minds and Machines 14:331-47. (Google)
Walter, S. & Heckmann, H. 2003. Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Google)
Worley, S. 1997. Determination and mental causation. Erkenntnis 46:281-304. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Yablo, S. 1992. Mental causation. Philosophical Review 101:245-280. (Cited by 77 | Google)
Argues that mental events/properties stand to physical events/properties as determinable to determinates, solving the exclusion problem. Some mental events are *better* candidates for the cause of action than physical events.Yablo, S. 2001. Superproportionality and mind-body relations. Theoria 16:65-75. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Yablo, S. 2003. Causal relevance. Philosophical Issues 13:316-28. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Zangwill, N. 1996. Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap. Synthese 106:67-101. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Argues that anomalous monism is compatible with mental causation: supervenience is necessary and sufficient for causal efficacy.
Agar, N. 2003. Functionalism and personal identity. Nous 37:52-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baillie, J. 1993. Recent work on personal identity. Philosophical Books 34:193-206. (Google)
Baillie, J. 1997. Personal identity and mental content. Philosophical Psychology 10:323-33. (Google)
Baker, L. R. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)
Beck, S. 2001. Let's exist again (like we did last Summer). South African Journal of Philosophy 20:159-170.
Brennan, A. 1982. Personal identity and personal survival. Analysis 42:44-50. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brennan, A. 1984. Survival. Synthese 59:339-62. (Google)
Brennan, A. 1987. Discontinuity and identity. Nous 21:241-60. (Google)
Brennan, A. 1988. Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brooks, D. H. M. 1986. Group minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:456-70. (Google)
Campbell, S. 2001. Is connectedess necessary to what mattres in survival? Ration 14:193-202. (Google)
Campbell, S. 2004. Rapid psychological change. Analysis 64:256-264. (Google)
Campbell, S. 2004. Can you survive a brain-zap? Theoria 70. (Google)
Carter, W. 1999. Will I be a dead person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cartwright, H. M. 1987. Ruminations on an account of personal identity. In (J. J. Thomson, ed) On Being and Saying: Essays on Honor of Richard Cartwright. MIT Press. (Google)
Cartwright, H. M. 1993. On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity. Synthese 95:241-273. (Google)
Cockburn, D. (ed) 1991. Human Beings. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Coleman, S. 2000. Thought experiments and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 98:51-66. (Google)
Cowley, F. 1971. The identity of a person and his body. Journal of Philosophy 68:678-683. (Google)
Dainton, B. 1996. Survival and experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:17-36. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davis, L. H. 1998. Functionalism and personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:781-804. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Davis, L. H. 2001. Functionalism, the brain, and personal identity. Philosophical Studies 102:259-79. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1978. Where am I? In Brainstorms. MIT Press. (Google)
Eklund, M. 2002. Personal identity and conceptual incoherence. Nous 36:465-485. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Elliot, R. 1991. Personal identity and the causal continuity requirement. Philosophical Quarterly 41:55-75. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ganeri, J. 2000. Cross-modality and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:639-658. (Google)
Garrett B. 1990. Personal identity and extrinsicness. Philosophical Studies 59:177-194. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Garrett, B. 1991. Personal identity and reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:361-373. (Google)
Garrett, B. 1992. Persons and values. Philosophical Quarterly 42:337-44. (Google)
Glover, J. 1988. I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity. Penguin. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Hamilton, A. 1995. A new look at personal identity. Philosophical Quarterly 45:332-349. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Harris, H. (ed) 1995. Identity. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Harris, H. 1995. An experimentalist looks at identity. In (H. Harris, ed) Identity. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hasker, W. 1999. The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Hershenov, D. 2005. Do dead bodies pose a problem for biological approaches to personal identity? Mind 114. (Google)
Hope, T. 1994. Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness. Philosophy 37:131-143. (Google)
Johnston, M. 1992. Reasons and reductionism. Philosophical Review 3:589-618. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kolak, D. & Martin, R. 1987. Personal identity and causality: Becoming unglued. American Philosophical Quarterly. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kolak, D. 1993. The metaphysics and metapsychology of personal identity: Why thought experiments matter in deciding who we are. American Philosophical Quarterly 30:39-50. (Google)
Kolak, D. & Martin, R. (eds) 1991. Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Macmillan. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Langsam, H. 2001. Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact. Erkenntnis 54:247-271. (Google)
Mackie, D. 1999. Animalism vs. Lockeanism: No contest. Philosophical Quarterly 49:369-76. (Google)
Mackie, D. 1999. Personal identity and dead people. Philosophical Studies 95:219-42. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Madell, G. 1981. The Identity of the Self. Edinburgh University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Madell, G. 1991. Personal identity and the idea of a human being. Philosophy 29:127-142. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Martin, R. 1992. Self-interest and survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 29:319-30. (Google)
Martin, R. & Barresi, J. 2004. Naturalizing the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century. Routledge. (Google)
Matthews, S. 2000. Survival and separation. Philosophical Studies 98:279-303. (Cited by 2 | Google)
McCall, C. 1990. Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being. Avebury. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Merricks, T. 2000. Perdurance and psychological continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:195-199. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Miri, M. 1973. Memory and personal identity. Mind 82:1-21. (Google)
Nerlich, G. C. 1958. Sameness, difference, and continuity. Analysis. (Google)
Noonan, H. 1989. Personal Identity. Routledge. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Noonan, H. 1993. Chisholm, persons, and identity. Philosophical Studies 69:35-58. (Google)
Noonan, H. 2003. Personal Identity. Routledge.
Nozick, R. 1981. The identity of the self. In Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press. (Google)
Olson E. 1994. Is Psychology relevant to personal identity? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:173-186. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Olson, E. T. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Olson, E. 2001. Personal identity and the radiation argument. Analysis 61:38-44. (Google)
Olson, E. 2002. Personal identity. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. Olson, E. 2002. What does functionalism tell us about Personal identity. Nous 36:682-697. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Olson, E. 2004. Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:265-74. (Google)
Peacocke, A. & Gillett, G. (eds) 1987. Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Penelhum, T. 1959. Personal identity, memory, and survival. Journal of Philosophy. (Google)
Penelhum, T. 1971. The importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68:667-78. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Perrett, R. W. & Barton, C. 1999. Personal identity, reductionism, and the necessity of origins. Erkenntnis 51:277-94. (Google)
Perry, J. 1972. Can the self divide? Journal of Philosophy 69:463-88. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Perry, J. (ed) 1975. Personal Identity. University of California Press. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Perry, J. 1975. Personal identity, memory, and the problem of circularity. In (J. Perry, ed) Personal Identity. University of California Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Perry, J. 1976. The importance of being identical. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Perry, J. 1978. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Hackett. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Persson, I. 2004. Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind. Ratio 17:390-408. (Google)
Pogue, J. E. 1993. Identity, survival, and the reasonableness of replication. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:45-70. (Google)
Rea, M. & Silver, D. 2000. Personal identity and psychological continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:185-194. (Google)
Rey, G. 1976. Survival. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Google)
Rieber, S. 1998. The concept of personal identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:581-594. (Google)
Robert, M. 1983. Lewis's theory of personal identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:58-67. (Google)
Rorty, A. (ed) 1976. The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Seager, W. 2001. The constructed and the secret self. In (A. Brook & R. DeVidi, eds) Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shalom, A. 1985. The Body-Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity. Humanities Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Schechtman, M. 1990. Personhood and personal identity. Journal of Philosophy 87:71-92. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Schechtman, M. 2004. Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 41:87-106. (Google)
Seager, W. 2001. The constructed and the secret self. In (A. Brook & R. DeVidi, eds) Self-reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 1959. Personal identity and memory. Journal of Philosophy 56:868-902. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 1970. Persons and their pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 7:269-85. (Cited by 19 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. & Swinburne, S. 1984. Personal Identity: Great Debates in Philosophy. Blackwell. (Cited by 30 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 2003. Self, body, and coincidence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 63:287-306. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Shoemaker, S. 2004. Functionalism and personal identity: A reply. (Google)
Shorter, J. M. 1962. More about bodily continuity and personal identity. Analysis 22:79-85. (Google)
Sidelle, A. 1999. On the prospects for a theory of personal identity. Philosophical Topics 26:351-72. (Google)
Strawson, G. 2004. Against narrativity. Ration 17. (Google)
Unger, P. 1990. Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 26 | Google)
van Fraassen, B. 2004. Transcendence of the ego (the nonexistent knight). Ratio 17:453-77.
Vesey, P. 1974. Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
White, S. 1989. Metapsychological relativism and the self. Journal of Philosophy 86:298-323. (Google)
Whiting, J. 1986. Friends and future selves. Philosophical Review 95:547-80. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Wilkes, K. V. 1988. Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Williams, B. 1957. Personal identity and individuation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:229-52. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Williams, B. 1973. Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 54 | Google)
Zemach, E. 1987. Looking out for number one. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Zuboff, A. 1978. Moment universals and personal identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:141-55. (Google)
Zuboff, A. 1990. One self: The logic of experience. Inquiry 33:39-68. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Alter, T. & Rachels, S. 2002. Epistemicism and the combined spectrum. Ratio 17:241-55. (Google)
Baillie, J. 1993. What matters in survival. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:255-61. (Google)
Baillie, J. 1996. Identity, relation R, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77:263-267. (Google)
Beck, S. 1989. Parfit and the Russians (personal identity and moral concepts). Analysis 49:205-209.
Bodansky, E. 1987. Parfit on selves and their interests. Analysis 47:47-50. (Google)
Brennan, A. A. 1987. Survival and importance. Analysis 47:225-30. (Google)
Brueckner, A. 1993. Parfit on what matters in survival. Philosophical Studies 70:1-22. (Google)
Bushnell, D. E. 1993. Identity, psychological continuity, and rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24. (Google)
Campbell, S. 2000. Strawson, Parfit and impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30:207-225. (Google)
Cassam, Q. 1993. Parfit on persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37. (Google)
Chappell, T. 1995. Personal identity, R-relatedness, and the empty question argument. Philosophical Quarterly 45:88-92. (Google)
Chappell, T. 1998. Reductionism about persons; and what matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98:41-58. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Collins, A. W. 1997. Personal identity and the coherence of q-memory. Philosophical Quarterly 47:73-80. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Curzer, H. 1991. An ambiguity in Parfit's theory of personal identity. Ratio 4:16-24. (Google)
Dancy, J. (ed). 1997. Reading Parfit. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Doepke, F. 1990. The practical importance of personal identity. Logos 83-91. (Google)
Ehring, D. 1987. Survival and trivial facts. Analysis 47:50-54. (Google)
Ehring, D. 1995. Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73:337-346. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ehring, D. 1999. Fission, fusion, and the Parfit revolution. Philosophical Studies 94:329-32. (Google)
Fields, L. 1987. Parfit on personal identity and desert. Philosophical Quarterly 37:432-41. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gendler, T. 2002. Personal identity and thought-experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52:34-54. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gillett, G. 1987. Reasoning about persons. In (A. Peacocke & G. Gillett, eds) Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell. (Google)
Goodenough, J. M. 1996. Parfit and the Sorites paradox. Philosophical Studies 2:113-20. (Google)
Haugen, D. 1995. Personal identity and concern for the future. Philosophia 24:481-492. (Google)
Hirsch, E. 1991. Divided minds. Philosophical Review 1:3-30. (Google)
Johnston, M. 1989. Fission and the facts. Philosophical Perspectives 3:369-97. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Korsgaard, C. 1989. Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18:103-31. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Lee, W. 1990. Personal identity, the temporality of agency, and moral responsibility. Auslegung 16:17-29. (Google)
Lewis, D. 1976. Survival and identity. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 58 | Google)
Madell, G. 1985. Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo. Analysis 45:105-9. (Google)
Maddy, P. 1979. Is the importance of identity derivative? Philosophical Studies 35:151-70. (Google)
Matthews, G. B. 1977. Surviving as. Analysis 37:53-58. (Google)
Martin, R. 1987. Memory, connecting, and what matters in survival. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65:82-97. (Google)
Measor, N. 1980. On what matters in survival. Mind 89:406-11. (Google)
Merricks, T. 1997. Fission and personal identity over time. Philosophical Studies 88:163-186. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Northoff, G. 2000. Are "q-memories" empirically realistic?: A neurophilosophical approach. Philosophical Psychology 13:191-211. (Google)
Oaklander, L. N. 1987. Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 96:525-29. (Google)
Parfit, D. 1971. Personal identity. Philosophical Review 80:3-27. (Cited by 54 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1971. On the importance of self-identity. Journal of Philosophy 68:683-90. (Google)
Parfit, D. 1973. Later selves and moral principles. In (A. Montefiore, ed) Philosophy and Personal Relations. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1976. Lewis, Perry, and what matters. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1982. Personal identity and rationality. Synthese 53. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 586 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1995. The unimportance of identity. In (H. Harris, ed) Identity. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1999. Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes. Philosophical Topics 26:217-70. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Robinson, J. 1988. Personal identity and survival. Journal of Philosophy 85:319-28. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rovane, C. 1990. Branching self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 99:355-95. (Google)
Seibt, J. 2002. Fission, sameness, and survival: Parfit's branch line argument revisited. Metaphysica 1(2):95-134. (Google)
Siderits, M. 1988. Ehring on Parfit's relation R. Analysis 48:29-32.
Slors, M. 2001. Personal identity, memory, and circularity: An alternative for q-memory. Journal of Philosophy 98:186-214. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sprigge, T. L. S. 1988. Personal and impersonal identity. Mind 97:29-49. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Storl, H. 1992. The problematic nature of parfitian persons. Personalist Forum 8:123-31. (Google)
Stone, J. 1988. Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:519-32. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wolf, S. 1986. Self-interest and interest in selves. Ethics 96:704-20. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Aune, B. 1994. Speaking of selves. Philosophical Quarterly 44:279-93. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barresi, J. 1999. On becoming a person. Philosophical Psychology 12:79-98. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bertocci, P. A. 1978. The essence of a person. Monist 61:28-41. (Google)
Biro, J. I. 1981. Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons. Nature and System 3:173-80. (Google)
Campbell, S. 2001. Persons and substances. Philosophical Studies 104:253-67. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chisholm, R. M. 1976. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court. (Cited by 58 | Google)
Dainton, B. 2004. The self and the phenomenal. Ratio 17:365-89. (Google)
Degrazia, D. 2002. Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply. Philosophical Forum 33:81-99. (Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1976. Conditions of personhood.Lewis, D. 1976. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 31 | Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1989. The origins of selves. Cogito 3:163-73. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Ganeri, J. 2004. An irrealist theory of self. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12. (Google)
Hasker, W. 2004. The constitution view of persons: A critique. International Philosophical Quarterly 44. (Google)
Heinimaa, M. 2000. Ambiguities in the psychiatric use of the concepts of the person: An analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7:125-136. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. 1991. Real selves: Persons as a substantial kind. Philosophy 29:87-107. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Johnston, M. 1987. Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 84:59-83. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Margolis, J. 1988. Minds, selves, and persons. Topoi 7:31-45. (Cited by 1 | Google)
McInerney, P. K. 1998. Persons and psychological systems. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:179-193. (Google)
McInerney, P. K. 2000. Conceptions of persons and persons through time. American Philosophical Quarterly 37:121-134. (Google)
Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)
Oderberg, D. 1989. Johnston on Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 86:137-41.
Olson, E. 1998. Human atoms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:396-406. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Peterson, J. 1985. Persons and the problem of interaction. Modern Schoolman 62:131-38. (Google)
Rorty, A. O. 1976. A literary postscript: Characters, persons, selves, individuals. In (A. Rorty, ed) The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shoemaker, D. W. 1999. Selves and moral units. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:391-419. (Google)
Shoemaker, S. 1999. Self, body, and coincidence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 73:287-306.
Smart, B. 1976. Synchronous and diachronous selves. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6:13-33. (Google)
Sosa, E. 1999. The essentials of persons. Dialectica 53:227-41. (Google)
Steinhart, E. 2001. Persons versus brains: Biological intelligence in human organisms. Biology and Philosophy 16:3-27. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Strawson, P. 1958. Persons. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:330-53. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Stone, J. 2005. Why there are still no people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70. (Google)
Unger, P. 1979. I do not exist. In (G. Macdonald, ed) Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Unger, P. 1979. Why there are no people. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:177-222. (Cited by 10 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 2004. The self: The incredulous stare articulated. Ratio 17:478-91. (Google)
Vincent, A. 1989. Can groups be persons? Review of Metaphysics 42:687-715. (Cited by 3 | Google)
White, S. 2004. Skepticism, deflation and the rediscovery of the self. Monist 87. (Google)
Wiggins, D. 1987. The person as object of science, as subject of experience, and as locus of value. In (A. Peacocke & G. Gillett, eds) Persons and Personality. Blackwell. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baillie, J. 1991. Split brains and single minds. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:11-18. (Google)
Davis, L. 1997. Cerebral hemispheres. Philosophical Studies 87:207-22. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gill, J. H. 1980. Of split brains and tacit knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20:49-58. (Google)
Gillett, G. 1986. Brain bisection and personal identity. Mind 95:224-9. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Greenwood, J. D. 1993. Split brains and singular personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:285-306. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Marks, C. 1980. Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Martin, R. 1995. Fission rejuvenation. Philosophical Studies 80:17-40. (Google)
Merricks, T. 1997. Fission and personal identity over time. Philosophical Studies 88:163-186. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mills E. 1993. Dividing without reducing: Bodily fission and personal identity. Mind 102:37-51. (Google)
Moor, J. 1982. Split brains and atomic persons. Philosophy of Science 49:91-106. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Morin, A. 2001. The split brain debate revisited: on the importance of language and self recognition for right hemispheric consciousness. Journal Of Mind and Behavior 22:107-118. (Google)
Nagel, T. 1971. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22:396-413. Reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979). (Cited by 25 | Google)
Parfit, D. 1987. Divided minds and the nature of persons. In (C. Blakemore & S. Greenfield, eds) Mindwaves. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1973. Brain bisection and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24:339-55. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1973. Multiple identity. Personalist 54:203-13. (Google)
Puccetti, R. 1975. The mute self: A reaction to DeWitt's alternative account of the split-brain data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27:65-73. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1981. The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1989. Two brains, two minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40:137-44. (Google)
Puccetti, R. 1993. Mind with a double brain. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:675-92. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Puccetti, R. 1993. Dennett on the split-brain. Psycoloquy 4(52). (Cited by 13 | Google)
Robinson, D. N. 1976. What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at "split-brain" man. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27:73-8. (Google)
Shaffer, J. 1977. Personal identity: The implications of brain bisection and brain transplants. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2:147-61. (Google)
Sperry, R. W. 1984. Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain. Neuropsychologia 22:611-73. (Cited by 32 | Google)
Apter, A. 1991. The problem of who: Multiple personality, personal identity, and the double brain. Philosophical Psychology 4:219-48. (Google)
Benner, D. G. , Evans, C. S. 1984. Unity and multiplicity in hypnosis, commissurotomy, and multiple personality disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Boden, M. A. 1994. Multiple personality and computational models. Philosophy 37:103-114. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Braude, S. E. 1991. First-person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. (Google)
Braude, S. E. 1996. Multiple personality disorder and moral responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3:37-54. (Google)
Brown, M. T. 2001. Multiple personality and personal identity. Philosophical Psychology 14:435-47. (Google)
Clark, S. R. L. 1991. How many selves make me? Philosophy 29:213-33. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3:21-28. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Flanagan, O. 1994. Multiple identity, character transformation, and self-reclamation. In (G. Graham & G. Stephens, eds) Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gillett, G. 1986. Multiple personality and the concept of a person. New Ideas in Psychology 4:173-84. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gillett, G. 1997. A discursive account of multiple personality disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4:213-22. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hacking, I. 1991. Two souls in one body. Critical Inquiry 17:838-67. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hacking, I. 1995. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 153 | Google)
Humphrey, N. & Dennett, D. C. 1989. Speaking for ourselves. Raritan 9:68-98. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kolak, D. 1993. Finding our selves: Identification, identity, and multiple personality. Philosophical Psychology 6:363-86. (Google)
Lizza, J. P. 1993. Multiple personality and personal identity revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:263-274. (Google)
Matthews, S. 1998. Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11:67-88. (Google)
Radden, J. 1996. Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality. MIT Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Wilkes, K. V. 1981. Multiple personalty and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32:331-48. (Google)
Wilkes, K. V. 1991. How many selves make me? Philosophy 66:235-43. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Albritton, R. 1985. Freedom of the will and freedom of action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:239-51. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Almeida, M. & Bernstein, M. 2003. Lucky libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22:93-119. (Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. Causality and Determinism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1976. `Soft' determinism. In (G. Ryle, ed) Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press. (Google)
Audi, R. 1974. Moral responsibility, freedom, and compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11:1-14. (Google)
Aune, B. 1970. Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer. Analysis 30:77-83. (Google)
Ayer, A. J. 1954. Freedom and necessity. In Philosophical Essays. St. Martin's Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. 1980. Free will and rationality. In (Z. van Straaten, ed) Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ayers, M. 1968. The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Balaguer, M. 1999. Libertarianism as a scientifically respectable view. Philosophical Studies 93:189-211. (Google)
Balaguer, M. 2002. A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will. Nous 38:379-406. (Google)
Benn, S. 1988. A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 31 | Google)
Benson, S. 1987. Freedom and value. Journal of Philosophy 84:465-87. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Benson, S. 1994. Free agency and self-worth. Journal of Philosophy 91:650-58. (Google)
Bergmann, F. 1977. On Being Free. University of Notre Dame Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Benstein, M. 1992. Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press. (Google)
Bernstein, M. 1995. Kanean libertarianism. Southwest Philosophical Review 11:151-57. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bernstein, M. 2002. Fatalism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Berofsky, B. (ed) 1966. Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Berofsky, B. 1971. Determinism. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Berofsky, B. 1987. Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Berofsky, B. 2000. Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:135-40. (Google)
Berofsky, B. 2002. Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bishop, J. 1983. Agent-causation. Mind 92:61-79. (Google)
Bishop, J. 1986. Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive? Synthese 67:225-47. (Google)
Bishop, J. 1993. Compatibilism and the free will defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:104-20. (Google)
Bishop, R. C. 2002. Chaos, indeterminism, and free will. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Blumenfeld, D. 1971. The principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 67:339-44. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Blumenfeld, D. 1988. Freedom and mind control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25:215-27. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bok, H. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)
BonJour, L. 1976. Deeterminism, libertarianism, and agent causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14:145-56. (Google)
Campbell, C. A. 1951. Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? Mind 60:441-65. (Google)
Campbell, C. A. 1967. In Defense of Free Will. Allen and Unwin. (Google)
Campbell, J. K. 1997. A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67:339-44. (Google)
Carlson, E. 2002. In defense of the Mind argument. Philosophia 29:393-400. (Google)
Churchland, P. S. 1981. Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90:99-101. (Google)
Clarke, R. 1992. Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 66:53-72. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, R. 1993. Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will. Nous 27:191-203. (Cited by 23 | Google)
Clarke, R. 1996. Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action. Philosophical Topics 24:19-48. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Clarke, R. 1997. On the possibility of rational free action. Philosophical Studies 88:37-57. (Google)
Clarke, R. 2000. Modest libertarianism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:21-46. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, R. 2002. Libertarian views: Critical survey of noncausal and event-causal accounts of free agency. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Clarke, R. 2002. Free will. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)
Clarke, R. 2002. Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cover, J. & Hawthorne, J. 1996. Free agency and materialism. In (D. Howard-Snyder & J. Jordan, eds) Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Crisp, T. & Warfield, T. 2000. The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 61:173-185. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Davidson, D. 1973. Freedom to act. In (T. Honderich, ed) Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge. (Cited by 22 | Google)
Daw, R. & Alter, T. 2001. Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102:345-57. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1978. On giving libertarians what they say they want. In Brainstorms. MIT Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Dennett, D. C. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press. (Cited by 156 | Google)
Dilman, I. 1999. Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dorschel, A. 2002. The authority of the will. The Philosophical Forum 33:425-442. (Google)
Double, R. 1989. Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56:163-73. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Double, R. 1991. The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 22 | Google)
Double, R. 1991. Determinism and the experience of freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:1-8. (Google)
Double, R. 1992. How rational must free will be? Metaphilosophy 23:268-78. (Google)
Double, R. 1994. How to frame the free will problem. Philosophical Studies 75:149-72. (Google)
Double, R. 1996. Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Double, R. 1997. Misdirection on the free will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:359-68. (Google)
Double, R. 1999. In defense of the smart aleck: A reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:305-9. (Google)
Double, R. 2002. Metaethics, metaphilosophy, and free will subjectivism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Double, R. 2002. Metaethics, metaphilosophy and free will subjectivism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Double, R. 2004. The ethical advantages of free will subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69. (Google)
Duggan, T. & Gert, B. 1979. Free will as the ability to will. Nous 13:197-217. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dupre, J. 1996. The solution to the problem of freedom of the will. Philosophical Perspectives 10:385-402. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dworkin, G. 1970. Acting freely. Nous 4:367-83. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Dworkin, G. (ed) 1970. Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Prentice-Hall. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Eccles, J. 1976. Brain and free will. In (G. Globus, ed) Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press. (Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. 1998. Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument. Synthese 115:333-54. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. 1998. Protecting incompatibilist free action. American Philosophical Quarterly 35:281-91. (Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. 2000. Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. (ed) 2001. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. 2002. Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ekstrom, L. W. 2003. Free will, chance, and mystery. Philosophical Studies 22:153-80. (Google)
Falk, A. 1981. On some modal confusions in compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 18:141-48. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Finch, A. & Warfield, T. 1998. The Mind argument and libertarianism. Mind 107:515-28. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Fine, A. 1993. Indeterminism and the freedom of the will. In (J. Earman, ed) Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fisher, C. M. 2001. If there were no free will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366. (Google)
Fischer, J. M. 1982. Responsibility and control. Journal of Philsophy 79:24-40. (Cited by 41 | Google)
Ficsher, J. M. 1983. Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43:127-37. (Google)
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. 1992. When the will is free. Philosophical Perspectives 6:423-51. (Google)
Fischer, J. M. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control. Blackwell. (Cited by 36 | Google)
Fischer, J. M. 1996. A new compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:49-66. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. 1996. Free will and the modal principle. Philosophical Studies 3:213-30. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 41 | Google)
Fischer, J. M. 2002. Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Flint, T. 1987. Compatibilism and the argument from unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84:423-40. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Foley, R. 1978. Compatibilism. Kind 87:421-28. (Google)
Foot, P. 1957. Free will as involving determinism. Philosophical Review 66:439-50. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Forrest, P. 1985. Backwards causation in defense of free will. Mind 94:210-17. (Google)
Fowler, C. 1996. A pragmatic defense of free will. Journal of Value Inquiry 30:247-60. (Google)
Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 65:829-39. (Cited by 80 | Google)
Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68:5-20. (Cited by 216 | Google)
Furlong, F. W. 1981. Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gallois, A. 1977. Van Inwagen on free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 32:99-105. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Garson, J. W. 1995. Chaos and free will. Philosophical Psychology 8:365-74. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gillett, G. 2001. Free will and events in the brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22:287-310. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ginet, C. 1980. The conditional analysis of freedom. In (P. van Inwagen, ed) Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ginet, C. 1983. In defense of incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44:391-400. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Ginet, C. 1989. Reasons explanation of action: An incompatibilist account. Philosophical Perspectives 3. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ginet, C. 1990. On Action. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 62 | Google)
Ginet, C. 1996. In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ginet, C. 2002. Reasons and explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Goldman, A. 1968. Actions, predictions, and books of life. American Philosophical Quarterly. (Google)
Goldman, A. 1969. The compatibility of mechanism and purpose. Philosophical Review 78:468-82. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gomberg, P. 1975. Free will as ultimate responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:205-12. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gosselin, P. 1987. The principle of alternative possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:91-104. (Google)
Griffiths, A. P. 1989. Is free will incompatible with something or other? Philosophy 24:101-19. (Google)
Greenspan, P. S. 1978. Behavior control and freedom of action. Philosophical Review 87:225-40. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Greenspan, P. S. 1993. Free will and the genome project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22:31-43. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Grunbaum, A. 1971. Free will and the laws of human behavior. American Philosophical Quarterly 8:299-317. (Google)
Haji, I. & Cuypers, S. 2001. Libertarian free will and CNC manipulation. Dialectica 55:221-238. (Google)
Haji, I. 2002. Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Heinaman, R. 1986. Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:266-76. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Heller, M. 1996. The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:333-37. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hill, C. S. 1984. Watsonian freedom and the freedom of the will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62:294-98. (Google)
Hill, C. S. 1992. Van Inwagen on the consequence argument. Analysis 52:49-55. (Google)
Hobart, R. E. 1934. Free will as involving determinism and inconceivable without it. Mind 43:1-27. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Hodgson, D. 1991. The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Hodgson, D. 2002. Consciousness, quantum physics, and free will. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Hodgson, D. 2002. Physics, consciousness and free will. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hodgson, D. 2005. A plain person's free will. [With commentaries and replies.] Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(1):3-19. (Google)
Honderich, T. (ed) 1973. Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Honderich, T. 1988. A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 30 | Google)
Honderich, T. 1993. How Free Are You? Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Honderich, T. 1996. Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the smart aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:855-62. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Honderich, T. 2002. Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Honderich, T. 2002. How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. Oxford University Press. Honderich, T. 2002. Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Hook, S. (ed) 1958. Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Horgan, T. 1985. Compatibilism and the consequence argument. Philosophical Studies 47:339-56. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Hospers, J. 1950. Meaning and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10:307-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Howard, G. S. 1993. Steps toward a science of free will. Counseling and Values 37:116-28. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Huby, P. 1967. The first discovery of the free will issue. Philosophy 42:333-62. (Google)
Kane, R. 1985. Free Will and Values. SUNY Press. (Cited by 26 | Google)
Kane, R. 1988. Libertarianism and rationality revisited. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:441-60. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kane, R. 1989. Two kinds of incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69:219-54. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kane, R. 1994. Free will: The illusive ideal. Philosophical Studies 75:25-60. (Google)
Kane, R. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 85 | Google)
Kane, R. 1996. Free will, responsibility, and will-setting. Philosophical Topics 24:67-90. (Google)
Kane, R. 1999. Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96:217-40. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Kane, R. 2000. The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities. Philosopical Perspectives 14:57-80. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kane, R. (ed) 2001. Free Will. Blackwell. (Google)
Kane, R. (ed) 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Kane, R. 2002. Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Kane, R. 2002. The contours of contemporary free will debates. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Kane, R. (ed) 2002. The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Kane, R. 2002. Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Kapitan, T. 1986. Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:230-51. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kapitan, T. 1991. Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 63:231-43. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kapitan, T. 1996. Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will. Philosophical Perspectives 10:419-45. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kapitan, T. 2000. Autonomy and manipulated freedom. Philosopical Perspectives 14:81-104. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kapitan, T. 2002. A master argument for incompatibilism? In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kapitan, T. 2002. A master argument for incompatibilism? In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kenny, A. 1976. Will, Freedom, and Power. Blackwell. (Cited by 37 | Google)
Kenny, A. 1978. Free Will and Responsibility. Routledge. (Google)
Klein, M. 1990. Determinism, blameworthiness, and deprivation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Koons, R. 2002. Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33:81-99. (Google)
Ladd, J. 1952. Free will and voluntary action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12:392-405. (Google)
Lahav, R. 1991. Between pre-determinism and arbitrariness: A Bergsonian approach to free will. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29:487-99. (Google)
Lamb, J. W. 1977. On a proof of incompatibilism. Philosophical Review 86:20-35. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Lamb, J. W. 1993. Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 90:517-27. (Google)
Lehrer, K. 1964. 'Could' and determinism. Analysis 24:159-60. (Google)
Lehrer, K. (ed) 1966. Freedom and Determinism. Random House. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lehrer, K. 1966. An empirical disproof of determinism. In (K. Lehrer, ed) Freedom and Determinism. Random House. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lehrer, K. 1976. 'Can' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis. In (M. Brand & D. Walton, eds) Action Theory. Reidel. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Levy, K. 2001. The main problem with USC libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105:107-127. (Google)
Levy, D. 2003. Neural holism and free will. Philosophical Psychology 16:205-229. (Google)
Lewis, D. 1981. Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47:113-21. (Cited by 30 | Google)
Libet, B. 1999. Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:47-57. (Cited by 28 | Google)
Libet, B. , Freeman, A. , & Sutherland, K. 1999. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 15 | Google)
Libet, B. 2001. Consciousness, free action and the brain: Commentary on John Searle's article (with reply from Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:59-65. (Google)
Libet, B. 2002. Do we have free will? In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Locke, D. 1975. Three concepts of free action. Aristotelian Society Supplement 75:95-112. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Loewer, B. 1996. Freedom from physics: Quantum mechanics and free will. Philosophical Topics 24:91-112. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Lowe, E. 2001. Event causation and agent causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:1-20. (Google)
Lucas, J. R. 1970. The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lycan, W. G. 2003. Free will and the burden of proof. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Machina, K. 1994. Challenges for compatibilism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:213-22. (Google)
MacKay, D. M. 1967. Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mackie, P. 2003. Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise. Nous 37:672-689. (Google)
Magill, K. 1997. Experience and Freedom: Self-Determination without Illusions. Macmillan. (Google)
Malcolm, N. 1968. The conceivability of mechanism. Philosophical Review 77:45-72. (Cited by 18 | Google)
Margenau, H. 1931. The uncertainty principle and free will. Science. (Google)
Mayr, U. 2004. Conflict, consciousness, and control. Trends in Cognitive Science 8:145-148. (Cited by 1 | Google)
McCall, S. 1984. Freedom defined as the power to decide. American Philosophical Quarterly 21:329-38. (Google)
McCann, H. 1998. The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
McCrone, J. 1999. A bifold model of free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:241-59. (Google)
McIntyre, A. 1994. Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency. Philosophical Review 103: 453-88. (Google)
McKay, T. & Johnson, D. 1996. A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24:113-22. (Cited by 19 | Google)
McKenna, M. 1998. Does strong compatibilism survive Frankfurt-style counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 91:259-64. (Google)
McKenna, M. & Widerker, D. (eds) 2002. Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate Press. (Google)
Melden, A. I. 1961. Free Action. Routledge. (Cited by 22 | Google)
Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 59 | Google)
Mele, A. 1996. Soft libertarianism and Frankfurt-style scenarios. Philosophical Topics 24:123-41. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mele, A. & Robb, D. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 107:97-112. (Cited by 17 | Google)
Mele, A. 1999. Kane, luck, and the significance of free will. Philosophical Explorations 2:96-104. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mele, A. 2002. Autonomy, self-control and weakness of will. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Moore, G. E. 1912. Free will. In Ethics. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Morden, M. 1990. Free will, self-causation, and strange loops. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68:59-73. (Google)
Moreland, J. P. 2002. Timothy O'Connor and the harmony thesis: A critique. Metaphysica 3(2):5-40. (Google)
Morgan, V. 2001. The metaphysics of naturalism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75:409-431. (Google)
Morgenbesser, S. & Walsh, J. J. (eds) 1962. Freedom and Responsibility. Prentice-Hall. (Google)
Nahmias, E. , Morris, S. & Nadelhoffer, T. 2004. The phenomenology of free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7-8):180-98. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Narveson, J. 1977. Compatibilism defended. Philosophical Studies 32:83-7. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Nathan, N. 1992. Will and World. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Naylor, M. B. 1984. Frankfurt on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies 46:249-58. (Google)
Neely, W. 1974. Freedom and desire. Philosophical Review 83:32-54. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Nelkin, D. 2001. The consequence argument and the "mind" argument. Analysis 61:107-115. (Google)
Nichols, S. 2004. The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts. Mind and Language 19:473-502. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Nowell-Smith, P. 1948. Free will and moral responsibility. Mind 57:45-61. (Cited by 5 | Google)
O'Connor, D. J. 1971. Free Will. Anchor Books. (Google)
O'Connor, T. 1993. Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:499-26. (Cited by 2 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 1993. On the transfer of necessity. Nous 27:204-18. (Cited by 13 | Google)
O'Connor, T. (ed) 1995. Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 1995. Agent causation. In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 1996. Why agent causation? Philosophical Topics 24:143-58. (Cited by 14 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 2000. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 34 | Google)
O'Connor, T. 2002. Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. & Pettit, P. 1996. Strategies for free will compatibilists. Analysis 56:191-201. (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, B. 1980. The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Peacocke, C. 1998. Free will. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Pereboom, D. 1995. Determinism al dente. Nous 29:21-45. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Pereboom, D. 2000. Alternative possibilities and causal histories. Philosopical Perspectives 14:119-138. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pereboom, D. 2001. Living without Free Will. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Pereboom, D. 2002. Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)
Perszyk, K. J. 1999. Compatibilism and the free will defence: A reply to Bishop. Australasian Journal of Philosopy 77:92-105. (Google)
Popper, K. 1983. Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 92:103-4. (Google)
Ravizza, M. 1994. Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75:61-93. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rowe, W. 1987. Two concepts of freedom. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61:43-64. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Russell, P. 2002. Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the new compatibilism. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rychlak, J. F. 1976. Can psychology be objective about free will? Philosophical Psychologist 10:2-9. Revised version in New Ideas in Psychology 1:213-29, 1983. (Google)
Rychlak, J. F. 1994. Four kinds of determinism and "free will": A response to Viney and Crosby. New Ideas in Psychology 12:143-46. (Google)
Rychlak, J. F. 1994. Is free will a process or a content: Both? neither? Are we free to take a position on this question? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14:62-72. (Google)
Sappington, A. A. 1990. Recent psychological approaches to the free will versus determinism controversy. Psychological Bulletin 108:19-29. (Google)
Searle, J. 2000. Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:3-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Searle, J. R. 2001. Free will as a problem in neurobiology. Philosophy 76:491-514. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Settle, T. 1993. How determinism refutes compatibilism. Religious Studies 29:353-62. (Google)
Shatz, D. 1985. Free will and the structure of motivation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:451-82. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Siderits, M. 1987. Beyond compatibilism: A Buddhist approach to freedom and determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 24:149-59. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Slife, B. D. 1994. Free will and time: That "stuck" feeling. Journal of Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology 14:1-12. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Slote, M. A. 1969. Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria. Inquiry 12:317-38. (Google)
Slote, M. 1980. Understanding free will. Journal of Philosophy 77:136-51. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Slote, M. 1982. Selective necessity and the free will problem. Journal of Philosophy 74:5-24. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Free will, praise and blame. Mind 70:291-306. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Smilansky, S. 1990. Is libertarian free will worth wanting? Philosophical Investigations 13:273-76. (Google)
Smilansky, S. 1990. Van Inwagen on the "obviousness" of libertarian moral responsibility. Analysis 50:29-33. (Google)
Smilansky, S. 1993. Does the free will debate rest on a mistake? Philosophical Papers 22:173-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smilansky, S. 2000. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Smilansky, S. 2001. Free will: From nature to illusion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:71-95. (Google)
Smilansky, S. 2002. Free will, fundamental dualism,and the centrality of illusion. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smilansky, S. 2003. Free will and the mystery of modesty. American Philosophical Quarterly 40:105-118. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Smilansky, S. 2003. Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115:257-82. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Smith, M. 1997. A theory of freedom and responsibility. In (G. Cullity & B. Gaut, eds) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Sobel, J. H. 1998. Puzzles for the Will. University of Toronto Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Spence, S. A. 1996. Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3:75-90. (Cited by 25 | Google)
Stampe, D. W. & Gibson, M. I. 1992. Of one's own free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:529-56. (Google)
Stone, J. 1998. Free will as a gift from God. Philosophical Studies 92:257-81. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Strasser, M. 1988. Frankfurt, Aristotle, and PAP. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:235-46. (Google)
Strawson, G. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 48 | Google)
Strawson, G. 1989. Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism. Inquiry 32:3-27. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Strawson, G. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75:5-24. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Strawson, G. 2000. The unhelpfulness of determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:149-56. (Google)
Strawson, G. 2002. The bounds of freedom. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Strawson, G. 2002. Dreams of final responsibility. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Strawson, P. F. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1-25. (Cited by 123 | Google)
Stump, E. 1990. Intellect, will, and the principle of alternative possibilities. In (M. Beaty, ed) Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press. (Google)
Stump, E. 1996. Persons, identification, and freedom. Philosophical Topics 24:183-214. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Stump, E. 1999. Alternative pssibilities and moral responsibility: The flicker of freedom. Journal of Ethics 3:299-324. (Google)
Stump, E. & Fischer, J. 2000. Transfer principles and moral responsibility. Philosopical Perspectives 14:47-56. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Swanton, C. 1992. Freedom: A Coherence Theory. Hackett. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Talbott, T. 1988. On free agency and the concept of power. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:241-54. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Taylor, C. & Dennett, D. C. 2002. Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Thorp, J. 1980. Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Thornton, M. 1990. Do We Have Free Will? St. Martin's Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Thorp, J. 1980. Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Trusted, J. 1984. Free Will and Responsibilty. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Unger, P. 2002. Free will and scientifiphicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1974. A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism. Theoria 24:9-22. (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1975. The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies 27:185-99. (Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1978. Ability and responsibility. Philosophical Review 87:201-24. (Cited by 13 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1980. Compatibilism and the burden of proof. Analysis 40:98-100. (Cited by 1 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 116 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1989. When is the will free? Philosophical Perspectives 3. (Cited by 14 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1990. Logic and the free will problem. Social Theory and Practice 16:277-90. (Cited by 1 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 1994. When the will is not free. Philosophical Studies 75:95-113. (Cited by 6 | Google)
van Inwagen, P. 2000. Free will remains a mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20. (Cited by 14 | Google)
van Rensselaer Wilson, H. 1955. Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52:134-58. (Google)
Vander-Laan, D. 2001. A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 103:201-215. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Velmans, M. 2003. Preconscious free will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(12):42-61. (Google)
Vesey, G. 1989. Responsibility and free will. Philosophy 24:85-100. (Google)
Vihvelin, K. 1988. The modal argument for incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 53:227-44. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Vihvelin, K. 1991. Frrdon, causation, and counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 64:161-84. (Google)
Vihvelin, K. 2000. Freedom, foreknowledge, and the principle of alternate possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30:1-23. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Vihvelin, K. 2000. Libertarian compatibilism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:139-166. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Viney, D. W. & Crosby, D. A. 1994. Free will in process perspective. New Ideas in Psychology 12:129-41. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Waller, B. N. 1989. Uneven starts and just deserts (fatalism and free will). Analysis 49:209-13.
Waller, B. 1990. Freedom without Responsibility. Temple University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Walter, H. 2001. Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Waller, B. 2003. A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible. Philosophical Studies 112:209-224. (Google)
Walter, H. 2002. Neurophilosophy of free will. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Warfield, T. 1996. Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible. Philosophical Topics 24:215-26. (Google)
Warfield, T. 2000. Causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible: A new argument for incompatibilism. Philosopical Perspectives 14:167-180. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Watson, G. 1975. Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72:205-20. (Cited by 53 | Google)
Watson, G. (ed) 1982. Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 33 | Google)
Watson, G. 1987. Free action and free will. Mind 96:154-72. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Wegner, D. 2003. The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. (Cited by 111 | Google)
Wegner, D. 2004. Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will (and commentaries and reply). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27.
Westcott, M. R. 1977. Free will: An exercise in metaphysical truth or psychological consequences. Canadian Psychological Review 18:249-63. (Cited by 1 | Google)
White, M. 1993. The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Widerker, D. 1987. On an argument for incompatibilism. Analysis 47:37-41. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Widerker, D. 1995. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle f alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review 104:247-61. (Google)
Widerker, D. 2000. Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look. Philosopical Perspectives 14:181-202. (Google)
Widerker, D. 2002. Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples. In (R. Kane, ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Williams, C. 1980. Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. Hackett. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilton, R. 2000. Consciousness, Free Will, and the Explanation of Human Behavior. E. Mellen Press. (Google)
Wolf, S. 1980. Asymmetrical freedom. Journal of Philosophy 77:151-66. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Wolf, S. 1981. The importance of free will. Mind 90:366-78. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom within Reason. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 37 | Google)
Yaffe, G. 2000. Free will and agency at its best. Philosopical Perspectives 14:203-230. (Google)
Zagzebski, L. 2000. Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities? Philosopical Perspectives 14:231-248. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Zhu, J. 2004. Is the conscious will an illusion? Disputatio 16. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. 1981. Hierarchical motivation and the freedom of the will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:354-68. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. 1994. Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73:209-23. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zimmerman, D. 2003. That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomy. Nous 37:638-671. (Google)
Alexander, P. 1959. Other people's experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. (Google)
Allen, A. H. B. , 1952. Other minds. Mind 61:328-348. (Google)
Ameriks, K. 1973. Plantinga and other minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16:285-91. (Google)
Aune, B. 1961. The problem of other minds. Philosophical Review. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Aune, B. 1986. Other minds after twenty years. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. (Google)
Austin, J. 1946. Other minds. Aristotelian Society Supplement 20:148-87. (Cited by 38 | Google)
Avramides, A. 2001. Other Minds. Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. 1953. One's knowledge of other minds. Theoria. (Google)
Ayer, A. J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth. (Cited by 81 | Google)
Baron- Cohen, S. , Tager-Flusberg, H. , Cohen, D. J. 1994. Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 170 | Google)
Bilgrami, A. 1994. Other minds. In (J. Dancy & E. Sosa, eds) A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell. (Google)
Bowman, A. 1953. Knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 50:328-32. (Google)
Buck, R. 1962. Non-other minds. In (R. Butler, ed) Analytic Philosophy. Barnes and Noble. (Google)
Buford, T. O. 1970. Essays on Other Minds. University of Illinois Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Castaneda, H. 1962. Criteria, analogy, and knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy. (Google)
Chihara, C. & Fodor, J. 1965. Operationalism and ordinary language: A critique of Wittgenstein. American Philosophical Quarterly 2:281-95. (Cited by 7 | Google)
de Vignemont, F. 2004. The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3:97-114. (Google)
Dretske, F. 1973. Perception and other minds. Nous 7:34-44. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Duhrssen, A. 1963. Philosophic alienation and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Review. (Google)
Engel, M. 1993. The problem of other minds: a reliable solution. Acta Analytica 11:87-109. (Google)
Everett, T. 2000. Other voices, other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78:213-222. (Google)
Feigl, H. 1959. Other minds and the egocentric predicament. Journal of Philosophy 56:980-87. (Google)
Gallagher, K. 1964. Intersubjective knowledge. In (Sheed & Ward, eds) The Philosophy of Knowledge. (Google)
Gardner, S. 1994. Other minds and embodiment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:35-52. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Glasgow, W. D. & Pilkington, G. W. 1970. Other minds on evidential necessity. Mind 79:431-35. (Google)
Glennan, S. S. 1995. Computationalism and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Psychology 8:375-88. (Google)
Goodman, R. 1985. Cavell and the problem of other minds. Philosophical Topics 13:43-52. (Google)
Hacker, P. M. S. 1972. Other minds and Professor Ayer's concept of a person. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32:341-354. (Google)
Hampshire, S. 1952. The analogy of feeling. Mind 61:1-12. (Google)
Harnad, S. 1991. Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines 1:43-54. (Cited by 79 | Google)
On the Total Turing Test (full behavioral equivalence) as a test for mind.Heal, J. 1997. Understanding other minds from inside. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)
Heal, J. 2000. Other minds, rationality and analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74:1-19. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hoffman, R. 1960. The problem of other minds - genuine or pseudo? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20:503-512. (Google)
Hyslop, A. 1973. Criteria and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51:105-14. (Google)
Hyslop, A. 1976. Other minds as theoretical entities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54:158-61. (Google)
Hyslop, A. 1979. A multiple case inference and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57:330-36. (Google)
Hyslop, A. 1995. Other Minds. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hyslop, A. & Jackson, F. C. 1972. The analogical inference to other minds. American Philosophical Quarterly 9:168-76. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Jones, J. R. 1950. Our knowledge of other persons. Philosophy 25. (Google)
Jorgensen, J. 1949. Remarks concerning the concept of mind and the problem of other people's minds. Theoria. (Google)
Kurthen, M. Moskopp, D. , Linke, D. B. & Reuter, B. M. 1991. The locked-in syndrome and the behaviorist epistemology of other minds. Theoretical Medicine 12:69-79. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lenman, J. 1994. Beliefs about other minds: A pragmatic justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:223-34. (Google)
Levin, M. 1984. Why we believe in other minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44:343-59. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Locke, D. 1968. Myself and Others: A Study in our Knowledge of Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Locke, D. 1973. Just what is wrong with the argument from analogy? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51:153-56. (Google)
Maclachlan, D. L. C. 1993. Strawson and the argument for other minds. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:149-157. (Google)
Malcolm, N. 1958. Knowledge of other minds. Journal of Philosophy. (Cited by 10 | Google)
McGinn, C. 1984. What is the problem of other minds? Aristotelian Society Proceedings 58:119-37. (Google)
McGinn, M. 1998. The real problem of others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein on scepticism about other minds. European Journal of Philosophy 6:45-58 (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meiland, J. W. 1966. Analogy, verification, and other minds. Mind 75:564-568. (Google)
Melnyk, A. 1994. Inference to the best explanation and other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 4:482-91. (Google)
Mellor, W. W. 1956. Three problems about other minds. Mind 65:200-217. (Google)
Morick, H. (ed) 1967. Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Humanities Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Narveson, A. H. 1966. Evidential necessity and other minds. Mind 75. (Google)
Ostein, P. A. 1974. God, other minds, and the inference to the best explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:149-62. (Google)
Pap, A. 1951. Other minds and the principle of verifiability. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 5:280-306. (Google)
Pargetter, R. 1984. The scientific inference to other minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62:158-63. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Peacocke, C. 1984. Consciousness and other minds. Aristotelian Society Supplement 58:97-117. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Plantinga, A. 1966. Induction and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 19:441-61. (Google)
Plantinga, A. 1967. God and Other Minds. Cornell University Press. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Plantinga, A. 1968. Induction and other minds II. Review of Metaphysics 12:524-33. (Google)
Price, H. H. 1938. Our evidence for the existence of other minds. Philosophy 13:425-56. (Google)
Roessler, J. 2005. Joint attention and the problem of other minds. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Russell, B. 1948. Analogy. In Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Simon and Schuster. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sagal, P. & Borg, G. 1993. The range principle and the problem of other minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:477-91. (Google)
Shoemaker, S. 1965. Ziff's other minds. Journal of Philosophy 62:587-89. (Google)
Sikora, R. I. 1977. The argument from analogy is not an argument for other mnds. American Philosophical Quarterly 14:137-41. (Google)
Slote, M. 1966. Induction and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 20:341-60. (Google)
Smythe, T. 1983. Our knowledge of other minds. Philosophia 13:35-52. (Google)
Sober, E. 2000. Evolution and the problem of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 97:365-387. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Spencer, W. 1930. Our Knowledge of Other Minds. Yale University Press. (Google)
Sprigge, T. L. S. 1992. Ayer on other minds. In (L. Hahn, ed) The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer. Open Court. (Google)
Stemmer, N. 1987. The hypothesis of other minds: Is it the best explanation? Philosophical Studies 51:109-121. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Temkin, J. 1990. Wittgenstein on criteria and other minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:561-93. (Google)
Thalberg, I. 1969. Other times, other places, other minds. Philosophical Studies 20. (Google)
Thomson, J. F. 1951. The argument from analogy and the problem of other minds. Mind 60:336-50. (Google)
Weinberg, J. 1946. Our knowledge of other minds. Philosophical Review 60. (Google)
Weinzweig, M. 1962. Our knowledge of other minds: a pseudo-problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23:250-255. (Google)
Wellman, C. 1961. Our criteria for third-person psychological sentences. Journal of Philosophy 58:281-93. (Google)
Wikforss, A. 2004. Direct knowledge and other minds. (Plus reply by John McDowell). Theoria 70. (Google)
Wisdom, J. 1946. Other minds. Aristotelian Society Supplement 20:122-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wisdom, J. 1968. Other Minds. University of California Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zemach, E. 1966. Sensations, raw feels, and other minds. Review of Metaphysics 20:317-40. (Google)
Ziff, P. 1965. The simplicity of other minds. Journal of Philosophy 42:575-84. (Cited by 2 | Google)