%0 Journal Article %A Turing, A. %T Computing machinery and intelligence %I %D 1950 %B Mind %V 59 %N %P 433-60 %Z Proposes the Imitation game (Turing test) as a test for intelligence: If a machine can't be told apart from a human in a conversation over a teletype, then that's good enough. With responses to various objections. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Alper, G. %T A psychoanalyst takes the Turing test %I %D 1990 %B Psychoanalytic Review %V 77 %N %P 59-68 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Barresi, J. %T Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age %I %D 1987 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 17 %N %P 19-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Psychologism and behaviorism %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Review %V 90 %N %P 5-43 %Z A look-up table could pass the Turing test, and surely isn't intelligent. The TT errs in testing behavior and not mechanisms. A nice, thorough paper. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test %I %D 2001 %B Minds & Machines %V 11 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %A Bello, P. %A Ferrucci, D. %T Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, T. %T The Turing test as a novel form of hermeneutics %I %D 1992 %B International Studies in Philosophy %V 24 %N %P 17-31 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T The Turing test %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 519-539 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Crawford, C. %T Notes on the Turing test %I %D 1994 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 37 %N %P 13-15 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book %A Crockett, L. %T The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI's Mistaken Understanding of Intelligence %I Ablex %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Turing's test %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %B Modelling the Mind %E K. Said %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Can machines think? %I Harper & Row %D 1984 %B How We Know %E M. Shafto %Z Defending the Turing test as a good test for intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Drozdek, A. %T Descartes' Turing test %I %D 2001 %B Epistemologia %V 24 %N %P 5-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Erion, G. J. %T The Cartesian test for automatism %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 29-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A French, R. M. %T Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 53-66 %Z The Turing Test is too hard, as it requires not intelligence but human intelligence. Any machine could be unmasked through careful questioning, but this wouldn't mean that the machine was unintelligent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A French, R. M. %T Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A response %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 59-60 %Z Response to Jacquette 1993. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T The imitation game %I %D 1964 %B Mind %V 73 %N %P 234-45 %Z The Turing test is not broad enough: there's much more to thought than the ability to play the imitation game. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 43-54 %Z On the Total Turing Test (full behavioral equivalence) as a test for mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Levels of functional equivalence in reverse bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing test for artificial life %I %D 1994 %B Artificial Life %V 1 %N 3 %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Turing on reverse-engineering the mind %I %D 1999 %B 1999 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's "Other bodies, other minds" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 219-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Look who's moving the goal posts now %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 41-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. %A Ford, K. %T Turing test considered harmful %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 972-77 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T A coffee-house conversation on the Turing test %I %D 1981 %B 1981 %V %N %P %Z A dialogue on the Turing test. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Who's afraid of the Turing test? %I %D 1993 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 63-74 %Z Defending the Turing test against French 1990. Turing did not intend the test to provide a *necessary* condition for intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T A Turing test conversation %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 231-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Karelis, C. %T Reflections on the Turing test %I %D 1986 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 16 %N %P 161-72 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Kugel, P. %T Computing machines can't be intelligent (...and Turing said so) %I %D 2002 %B Minds and Machines %V 12 %N %P 563-579 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Lee, E. T. %T On the Turing test for artificial intelligence %I %D 1996 %B Kybernetes %V 25 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T Shanon on the Turing test %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T On Turing's Turing Test and why the matter matters %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 59-69 %Z Turing's test is neutral about the structure of the machine that passes it, but it must be practical and reliable (thus excluding Searle's and Block's counterexamples). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T Turing and the fragility and insubstantiality of evolutionary explanations: A puzzle about the unity of Alan Turing's work with some larger implications %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 83-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Mays, W. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1952 %B Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 148-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Michie, D. %T Turing's test and conscious thought %I %D 1993 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 60 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Millar, P. %T On the point of the Imitation Game %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 595-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T An analysis of Turing's test %I %D 1976 %B Philosophical Studies %V 30 %N %P 249-257 %Z The basis of the Turing test is not an operational definition of thinking, but rather an inference to the best explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T Explaining computer behavior %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 34 %N %P 325-7 %Z Reply to Stalker 1978: Mechanistic and mentalistic explanations are no more incompatible than program-based and physical explanations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T The status and future of the Turing test %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 77-93 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Oppy, G. %A Dowe, D. %T The Turing test %I %D 2003 %B 2003 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Turing's rules for the imitation game %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 573-582 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Purthill, R. %T Beating the imitation game %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 290-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Rankin, T. L. %T The Turing paradigm: A critical assessment %I %D 1987 %B Dialogue %V 29 %N %P 50-55 %Z Some obscure remarks on lying, imitation, and the Turing test. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Turing tests for intelligence: Ned Block's defense of psychologism %I %D 1982 %B Philosophical Studies %V 41 %N %P 421-6 %Z A weak argument against Block: input/output function doesn't guarantee a capacity to respond sensibly. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, J. %T Conversation and intelligence %I Routledge & Kegan Paul %D 1982 %B Knowledge and Representation %E B. de Gelder %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sampson, G. %T In defence of Turing %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 592-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sato, Y. %A Ikegami, T. %T Undecidability in the imitation game %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 133-43 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Saygin, A. P. %A Cicekli, I. %A Akman V. %T Turing test: 50 years later %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 463-518 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Schweizer, P. %T The truly total Turing Test %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 263-272 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book %A Shieber, S. %T The Turing Test: Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T A simple comment regarding the Turing test %I %D 1989 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 19 %N %P 249-56 %Z The Turing test presupposes a representational/computational framework for cognition. Not all phenomena can be captured in teletype communication. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Shieber, S. M. %T Lessons from a restricted Turing test %I %D 1994 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 37 %N %P 70-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalker, D. F. %T Why machines can't think: A reply to James Moor %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 34 %N %P 317-20 %Z Contra Moor 1976: The best explanation of computer behavior is mechanistic, not mentalistic. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterrett, S. G. %T Turing's two tests for intelligence %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 541-559 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Stevenson, J. G. %T On the imitation game %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 6 %N %P 131-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Traiger, S. %T Making the right identification in the Turing test %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 561-572 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Waterman, C. %T The Turing test and the argument from analogy for other minds %I %D 1995 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 11 %N %P 15-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Watt, S. %T Naive psychology and the inverted Turing test %I %D 1996 %B Psycoloquy %V 7 %N 14 %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Whitby, B. %T The Turing test: AI's biggest blind alley? %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Zdenek, S. %T Passing Loebner's Turing test: A case of conflicting discourse functions %I %D 2001 %B Minds & Machines %V 11 %N %P 53-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Benacerraf, P. %T God, the Devil, and Godel %I %D 1967 %B Monist %V 51 %N %P 9-32 %Z Discusses and sharpens Lucas's arguments. Argues that the real consequence is that if we are Turing machines, we can't know which. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Bowie, G. %T Lucas' number is finally up %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philosophy Logic, %V 11 %N %P 279-85 %Z Lucas's very Godelization procedure makes him inconsistent, unless he has an independent way to see if any TM is consistent, which he doesn't. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Boyer, D. %T J. R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 33 %N %P 147-59 %Z Remarks on the various ways in which Lucas and a machine might be said to "prove" anything, and the ways in which a machine might simulate Lucas. The argument has all sorts of level confusions, and a bit of circularity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chari, C. %T Further comments on minds, machines and Godel %I %D 1963 %B Philosophy %V 38 %N %P 175-8 %Z Can't reduce the lawless creative process to computation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Minds, machines, and mathematics %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 11-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chihara, C. %T On alleged refutations of mechanism using Godel's incompleteness results %I %D 1972 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 507-26 %Z An analysis of the Lucas/Benacerraf argument. On various senses in which a machine might come to know its own program. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Coder, D. %T Godel's theorem and mechanism %I %D 1969 %B Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 234-7 %Z Only mathematicians understand Godel, so Lucas's argument isn't general; and Turing machines can go wrong. Weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T The abilities of men and machines %I %D 1978 %B Brainstorms %Z There is no unique TM which we are -- there could be many. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Edis, T. %T How Godel's theorem supports the possibility of machine intelligence %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 251-262 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Feferman, S. %T Penrose's Godelian argument %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 21-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Gaifman, H. %T What Godel's incompleteness result does and does not show %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 462-471 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A George, F. %T Minds, machines and Godel: Another reply to Mr. Lucas %I %D 1962 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 62-63 %Z Lucas's argument applies only to deductive machines, not inductive ones. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A George, A. %A Velleman, D. J. %T Leveling the playing field between mind and machine: A reply to McCall %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 456-452 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Good, I. J. %T Human and machine logic %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 18 %N %P 145-6 %Z Even humans can't Godelize forever. On ordinals and transfinite counting. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Good, I. J. %T Godel's theorem is a red herring %I %D 1969 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 357-8 %Z Rejoinder to Lucas 1967: the role of consistency; non-constructible ordinals. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Grush, R. %A Churchland, P. %T Gaps in Penrose's toiling %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanson, W. %T Mechanism and Godel's theorem %I %D 1971 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 22 %N %P 9-16 %Z An analysis of Benacerraf 1967. Benacerraf's "paradox" is illusory; there are no strong consequences of Godel's theorem for mechanism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid %I Basic Books %D 1979 %Z Contra Lucas: we can't Godelize forever; and we're not formal on top level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hutton, A. %T This Godel is killing me %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 3 %N %P 135-44 %Z Gives a statistical argument to the effect that we cannot know that we are consistent; so the Lucas argument cannot go through. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Irvine, A. D. %T Lucas, Lewis, and mechanism -- one more time %I %D 1983 %B Analysis %V 43 %N %P 94-98 %Z Contra Lewis 1979, Lucas can derive the consistency of M even without the premise that he is M. Hmm. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Godel, Lucas, and mechanical models of mind %I %D 1987 %B Computational Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 57-63 %Z A nice analysis of Lucas's argument and the circumstances under which a machine might prove another's Godel sentences. There's no reason to believe that machines and humans are different here. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Metamathematical criteria for minds and machines %I %D 1987 %B Erkenntnis %V 27 %N %P 1-16 %Z A machine will fail a Turing test if it's asked about Godel sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A King, D. %T Is the human mind a Turing machine? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 379-89 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Mental machinery and Godel %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z Lucas's argument fails, as theorems by humans don't correspond to outputs of their formal systems. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Lucas against mechanism %I %D 1969 %B Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 231-3 %Z Lucas needs a rule of inference from sentences to their consistency, yielding Lucas arithmetic. No machine can prove all of Lucas arithmetic, but there's no reason to suppose humans can either, as the rule is infinitary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Lucas against mechanism II %I %D 1979 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 373-6 %Z Reply to Lucas 1970: the dialectical argument fails, as the human's output depends on the premise that it is the machine (to derive M's consistency). With a similar premise, the machine itself can do equally well. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Minds, machines and Godel %I %D 1961 %B Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 112-127 %Z Humans can Godelize any given machine, so we're not a machine. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Human and machine logic: a rejoinder %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 155-6 %Z Reply to Good 1967: a human can trump any given machine, so the human is not the machine, whether or not the human is superior across the board. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf %I %D 1968 %B Monist %V 52 %N %P 145-58 %Z Benacerraf 1967 is empty and omega-inconsistent. Reply to arguments based on difficulty of seeing consistency (e.g. Putnam). Fallacious but engaging. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind: A rejoinder %I %D 1971 %B Philosophy of Science %V 38 %N %P 310-13 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Mechanism: A rejoinder %I %D 1970 %B Philosophy %V 45 %N %P 149-51 %Z Response to Lewis 1969 and Coder 1969. Lewis misses the dialectical nature of the argument. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Lucas, J. R. %T The Freedom of the Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1970 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T This Godel is killing me: A rejoinder %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 6 %N %P 145-8 %Z Contra Hutton, we know -- even if fallibly -- that we are consistent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Lucas against mechanism II: A rejoinder %I %D 1984 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 189-91 %Z Reply to Lewis 1979. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Lucas, J. R. %T Mind, machines and Godel: A retrospect %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z Addresses all the counterarguments. Fun. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyngzeidetson, A. E. %A Solomon, M. K. %T Abstract complexity theory and the mind-machine problem %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 549-54 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyngzeidetson, A. %T Massively parallel distributed processing and a computationalist foundation for cognitive science %I %D 1990 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 41 %N %P %Z A Connection Machine might escape the Lucas argument. Bizarre. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, J. %A Engleman, K. %T The mind's I has two eyes %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy %V 510 %N %P %Z Contra Hofstadter: Lucas can believe his Whitely sentence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Maudlin, T. %T Between the motion and the act.. %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 40-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCall, S. %T Can a Turing machine know that the Godel sentence is true? %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 96 %N %P 525-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCall, S. %T On "seeing" the truth of the Godel sentence %I %D 2001 %B Facta Philosophica %V 3 %N %P 25-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullough, D. %T Can humans escape Godel? %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 57-65 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T [Star] Penrose is wrong %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 66-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Nelson, E. %T Mathematics and the mind %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Penrose, R. %T The Emperor's New Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1989 %Z We are non-algorithmic as we can see Godel sentences of any algorithm. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Penrose, R. %T Precis of The Emperor's New Mind %I %D 1990 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 13 %N %P 643-705 %Z Much debate over the "non-algorithmic insight" in seeing Godel sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Penrose, R. %T Setting the scene: The claim and the issues %I Blackwell %D 1992 %B The Simulation of Human Intelligence %E D. Broadbent %Z An argument from the halting problem to the nonalgorithmicity of mathematical thought. Addresses objections: that the algorithm is unknowable, unsound, everchanging, environmental, or random. New physical laws may be involved. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Penrose, R. %T Shadows of the Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Penrose, R. %T Beyond the doubting of a shadow %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 89-129 %Z A reply to Chalmers, Feferman, Maudlin, McDermott, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Alan Turing and the mathematical objection %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 23-48 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Priest, G. %T Godel's theorem and the mind... again %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T Reflexive reflections %I %D 1985 %B Erkenntnis %V 22 %N %P 143-153 %Z A generalized Godelian argument: if our prescriptive inductive competence is formalizable, then we could not know that such a formalization is correct. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Raatikainen, P. %T McCall's Godelian argument is invalid %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 167-69 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Redhead, M. %T Mathematics and the mind %I %D 2004 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Penrose and mathematical ability %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 80-88 %Z Penrose's argument depends on our knowledge of the validity of the algorithm we use, and here he equivocates between conscious and unconscious algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Schurz, G. %T McCall and Raatikainen on mechanism and incompleteness %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 171-74 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Slezak, P. %T Godel's theorem and the mind %I %D 1982 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 33 %N %P 41-52 %Z General analysis; Lucas commits type/token error; self-ref paradoxes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Slezak, P. %T Descartes's diagonal deduction %I %D 1983 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 34 %N %P 13-36 %Z Cogito was a diagonal argument; connection to Godel, Lucas, Minsky, Nagel. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Godel's theorem, Church's theorem, and mechanism %I %D 1961 %B Synthese %V 13 %N %P 105-10 %Z A machine could escape the Godelian argument by inductively ascertaining its own syntax. With comments on the relevance of ingenuity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Tymoczko, T. %T Why I am not a Turing Machine: Godel's theorem and the philosophy of mind %I Paragon House %D 1991 %B Foundations of Cognitive Science %E J. Garfield %Z Weak defense of Lucas; response to Putnam, Bowie, Dennett. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Wang, H. %T From Mathematics to Philosophy %I London %D 1974 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Webb, J. %T Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1968 %B Philosophy of Science %V 35 %N %P 156-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Webb, J. %T Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics %I Kluwer %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitely, C. %T Minds, machines and Godel: A reply to Mr. Lucas %I %D 1962 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 61-62 %Z Humans get trapped too: "Lucas cannot consistently assert this formula". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Yu, Q. %T Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 145-79 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds, brains and programs %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 417-57 %Z Implementing a program is not sufficient for mentality, as someone could e.g. implement a "Chinese-speaking" program without understanding Chinese. So strong AI is false, and no program is sufficient for consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds, Brains and Science %I Harvard University Press %D 1984 %Z Axiomatizes the argument: Syntax isn't sufficient for semantics, programs are syntactic, minds are semantic, so no program is sufficient for mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds and brains without programs %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %Z More on the arguments against AI, e.g. the Chinese room and considerations about syntax and semantics. Mind is a high-level physical property of brain. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Is the brain's mind a computer program? %I %D 1990 %B Scientific American %V 262 %N 1 %P 26-31 %Z On the status of the Chinese Room argument, ten years on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. R. %T Twenty-one years in the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Adam, A. %T Cyborgs in the Chinese room: Boundaries transgressed and boundaries blurred %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Aleksander, I. %T Neural depictions of "world" and "self": Bringing computational understanding into the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Anderson, D. %T Is the Chinese room the real thing? %I %D 1987 %B Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 389-93 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Boden, M. %T Escaping from the Chinese Room %I %D 1988 %B Computer Models of Mind %Z A procedural account of how computers might have understanding and semantics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T A note on the Chinese room %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 169-72 %Z A fully functional Chinese room is impossible, as it (for instance) could not say what the time is. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Searle's arguments against cognitive science %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Bringsjord, S. %A Noel, R. %T Real robots and the missing thought-experiment in the Chinese room dialectic %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Bynum, T. W. %T Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states %I %D 1985 %B Metaphilosophy %V 16 %N %P 355-77 %Z A chess-playing machine embodied as a robot could have intentional states. Reference requires input/output, computation, and context. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Searle on strong AI %I %D 1990 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 103-8 %Z Criticizes Searle's "conclusion" that brains are needed for intentionality, notes that even a homunculus has intentional states. A misinterpretation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Carleton, L. %T Programs, language understanding, and Searle %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 219-30 %Z Arguing against Searle on a number of fronts, somewhat unconvincingly. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z Gives an account of symbolic vs. subsymbolic computation, and argues that the latter is less vulnerable to the Chinese-room intuition, as representations there are not computational tokens. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Could a machine think? %I %D 1990 %B Scientific American %V 262 %N 1 %P 32-37 %Z Artificial mentality is possible, not through classical AI but through brain-like AI. Argues the syntax/semantics point using an analogy with electromagnetism and luminance. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T What sorts of machines can understand the symbols they use? %I %D 1986 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 60 %N %P 81-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Thought and thought experiments %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 45 %N %P 431-44 %Z Lots of thought experiments like Searle's, against Searle. Searle's argument is like Leibniz's "mill" argument, with similar level confusions. Nice but patchy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Artificial intelligence and personal identity %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 88 %N %P 399-417 %Z In the Chinese room, neither the person nor the system understands: a virtual person does. This person isn't the system, just as a normal person isn't a body. Follows from the "Kornese" room, which has two distinct understanders. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Artificial minds: Cam on Searle %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 329-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Cole, D. J. %T The causal powers of CPUs %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T The curious case of the Chinese gym %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 173-86 %Z Advocates the systems reply, and criticizes Searle's "Chinese Gym" response to connectionism: Searle (like those he accuses) confuses a simulation with the thing being simulated. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Copeland, B. J. %T The Chinese room from a logical point of view %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Coulter, J. %A Sharrock, S. %T The hinterland of the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Fast thinking %I %D 1987 %B The Intentional Stance %Z Argues with Searle on many points. A little weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Searle, programs and functionalism %I %D 1983 %B Nature and System %V 5 %N %P 107-14 %Z The homunculus doesn't have access to the system's intentionality. The syntax/semantics relation is like the neurophysiology/mind relation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Dyer, M. %T Intentionality and computationalism: minds, machines, Searle and Harnad %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 303-19 %Z Reply to Searle/Harnad: systems reply, level confusions, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Dyer, M. %T Finding lost minds %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 329-39 %Z Reply to Harnad 1990: symbols, other minds, physically embodied algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Fields, C. %T Double on Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1984 %B Nature and System %V 6 %N %P 51-54 %Z Double's argument implies that the brain isn't the basis of intentionality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Fisher, J. %T The wrong stuff: Chinese rooms and the nature of understanding %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 11 %N %P 279-99 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room %I Oxford University Press %D 1991 %B The Nature of Mind %E D. Rosenthal %Z The Chinese room isn't even implementing a Turing machine, because it doesn't use proximal causation. With a reply by Searle. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Deconstructing the Chinese room %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 12 %N %P 377-91 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Gozzano, S. %T Consciousness and understanding in the Chinese room %I %D 1995 %B Informatica %V 19 %N %P 653-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanna, P. %T Causal powers and cognition %I %D 1985 %B Mind %V 94 %N %P 53-63 %Z Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers. Weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Minds, machines and Searle %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 5-25 %Z Non-symbolic function is necessary for mentality. Trying hard to work out a theory of why the Chinese Room shows what it does. Nice but wrong. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 321-27 %Z Reply to Dyer 1990: on the differences between real and as-if intentionality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Minds, machines, and Searle 2: What's right and wrong about the Chinese room argument %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Searle's Chinese box: Debunking the Chinese room argument %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 199-226 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Hauser, L. %T Nixin' goes to China %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. %A Harnad, S. %A Perlis, D. %A Block, N. %T Virtual symposium on virtual mind %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P %Z A discussion about the Chinese room, symbol grounding, and so on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Reflections on Searle %I , pp %D 1981 %B The Mind's I %E D. Hofstadter %E D. Dennett %Z Searle is committing a level confusion, and understates the complexity of the case. We can move from the CR to a brain (with a demon) by twiddling knobs, and the systems reply should work equally well in both cases. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Searle's intentionality thesis %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 80 %N %P 267-75 %Z Searle's view implies that intentional causation is not efficient causation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Adventures in the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 605-23 %Z If we had microfunctional correspondence, the CR argument would fail. With points about the status of abstract/biological intentionality. A bit weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Reply to Jacquette %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 701-8 %Z Jacquette misses the point of the argument. Also, biological and abstract intentionality are quite compatible. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 287-304 %Z Reply to Searle on CR, central control, biological intentionality & dualism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jahren, N. %T Can semantics be syntactic? %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 309-28 %Z Against Rapaport's Korean Room argument -- syntax isn't enough. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A King, D. %T Entering the Chinese room with Castaneda's principle (p) %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy Today %V 45 %N %P 168-174 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Korb, K. %T Searle's AI program %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 283-96 %Z The Chinese room doesn't succeed as an argument about semantics. At best it might succeed as an argument about consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T The right stuff %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 349-72 %Z Defends Searle against all kinds of objections. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Searle's abstract argument against strong AI %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 391-419 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Moor, J. H. %T The pseudorealization fallacy and the Chinese Room argument %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z Computational systems must also meet performance criteria. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T Machine understanding and the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 207-15 %Z A program can possess intentionality, even if not consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Obermeier, K. K. %T Wittgenstein on language and artificial intelligence: The Chinese-room thought-experiment revisited %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 56 %N %P 339-50 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Penrose, R. %T Consciousness, computation, and the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Pfeifer, K. %T Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 17 %N %P 347-50 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book %A Preston, J. %A Bishop, M. %T Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Proudfoot, D. %T Wittgenstein's anticipation of the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. %T Searle's experiments with thought %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 271-9 %Z Comments on Cole, and some general material on syntax and semantics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T What's really going on in Searle's `Chinese Room' %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 50 %N %P 169-85 %Z Recommends the systems reply, and a causal account of semantics. Discusses the relevance of wide and narrow notions of content, and the tension between Searle's positive and negative proposals. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AI %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Roberts, L. %T Searle's extension of the Chinese Room to connectionist machines %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 185-7 %Z In arguing against the relevance of the serial/parallel distinction to mental states, Searle becomes a formalist. A nice point. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L-M. %T Unlocking the Chinese Room %I %D 1984 %B Nature and System %V 6 %N %P 221-8 %Z Searle's presence in the room destroys the integrity of the system, so that it is no longer a proper implementation of the program. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Seidel, A. %T Searle on the biological basis of cognition %I %D 1988 %B Analysis %V 48 %N %P 26-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Seidel, A. %T Chinese Rooms A, B and C %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 167-73 %Z A person running the program, with interpretations at hand, would understand. Point-missing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharvy, R. %T Searle on programs and intentionality %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 39-54 %Z Argues against Searle, but misses the point for the most part. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Simon, H. A. %A Eisenstadt, S. A. %T A Chinese room that understands %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T Did Searle attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI? %I Chichester %D 1986 %B Artificial Intelligence and its Applications %E Cohn %E Thomas %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Suits, D. %T Out of the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Computing and Philosophy Newsletter %V 4 %N %P 1-7 %Z Story about homunculi within homunculi. Fun. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Taylor, J. G. %T Do virtual actions avoid the Chinese room? %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Teng, N. Y. %T A cognitive analysis of the Chinese room argument %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 313-24 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1986 %B Behaviorism %V 14 %N %P 139-46 %Z Get semantics computationally via induction and functional roles. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. %T The Chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 285-319 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Weiss, T. %T Closing the Chinese room %I %D 1990 %B Ratio %V 3 %N %P 165-81 %Z Searle-in-the-room isn't in a position to know about the system's first-person states. Intrinsic intentionality is an incoherent notion. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Wheeler, M. %T Changes in the rules: Computers, dynamic systems, and Searle %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitmer, J. M. %T Intentionality, artificial intelligence, and the causal powers of the brain %I %D 1983 %B Auslegung %V 10 %N %P 194-210 %Z Defending Searle's position, with remarks on the "causal powers" argument. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, W. %T Machine consciousness: Plausible idea or semantic distortion? %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N 9 %P 46-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Aleksander, I. %A Dunmall, B. %T Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents I: Preamble %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Angel, L. %T How to Build a Conscious Machine %I Westview Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Angel, L. %T Am I a computer? %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Arrington, R. %T Machines, consciousness, and thought %I %D 1999 %B Idealistic Studies %V 29 %N %P 231-243 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Barnes, E. %T The causal history of computational activity: Maudlin and Olympia %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 304-16 %Z Response to Maudlin 1989. True computation needs active, not passive causation, so Maudlin's machine isn't really computing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Birnbacher, D. %T Artificial consciousness %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Bringsjord, S. %T What Robots Can and Can't Be %I Kluwer %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Bringsjord, S. %T Could, how could we tell if, and should -- androids have inner lives? %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Buttazzo, G. %T Artificial consciousness: Utopia or real possibility? %I %D 2001 %B Computer %V 34 %N %P 24-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Caplain, G. %T Is consciousness a computational property? %I %D 1995 %B Informatica %V 19 %N %P 615-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Coles, L. S. %T Engineering machine consciousness %I %D 1993 %B AI Expert %V 8 %N %P 34-41 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Cotterill, R. %T Cyberchild: A Simulation test-bed for consciousness studies %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A D'Aquili, E. G. %A Newberg, A. B. %T Consciousness and the machine %I %D 1996 %B Zygon %V 31 %N %P 235-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Danto, A. %T On consciousness in machines %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The practical requirements for making a conscious robot %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A %V 349 %N %P 133-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Cog: Steps toward consciousness in robots %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Franklin, S. %T A conscious artifact? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Glennan, S. S. %T Computationalism and the problem of other minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 375-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T Robots, consciousness and programmed behaviour %I %D 1968 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 109-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T Cybernetics and mind-body problems %I %D 1969 %B Inquiry %V 12 %N %P 406-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Gunderson, K. %T Mentality and Machines %I Doubleday %D 1971 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Can a machine be conscious? How? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Hillis, D. %T Can a machine be conscious? %I MIT Press %D 1998 %B Toward a Science of Consciousness II %E S. Hameroff %E A. Kaszniak %E A. Scott %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Holland, O. %A Goodman, R. %T Robots with internal models: A route to machine consciousness? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Sentience, causation and some robots %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 308-21 %Z One could model brain states with monadic states and appropriate connections. But surely that's not intelligent -- the causation has the wrong form. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitamura, T. %A Tahara, T. %A Asami, K. %T How can a robot have consciousness? %I %D 2000 %B Advanced Robotics %V 14 %N %P 263-275 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Kitamura, T. %T What is the self of a robot? On a consciousness architecture for a mobile robot as a model of human consciousness %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T A view of one's own (conscious machines) %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A %V 349 %N %P 147-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Qualitative experience in machines %I Blackwell %D 1998 %B How Computers are Changing Philosophy %E T. Bynum %E J. Moor %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Maudlin, T. %T Computation and consciousness %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 407-32 %Z Computational state is not sufficient for consciousness, as it can be instantiated by a mostly inert object. A nice thought-experiment, raising questions about the relevance of counterfactuals to consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %T Making robots conscious of their mental states %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machine Intelligence 15 %E S. Muggleton %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McGinn, C. %T Could a machine be conscious? %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %E S. Greenfield %Z Of course, as we are machines. But what sort of machines are conscious, and in virtue of what properties? Remarks on artefacts, life, functionalism, and computationalism. So far, we don't know what makes the brain conscious. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Prinz, J. J. %T Level-headed mysterianism and artificial experience %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T On thinking machines and feeling machines %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 18 %N %P 39-51 %Z Machines can think but can't feel, so aren't persons. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T Robots: machines or artificially created life? %I %D 1964 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 61 %N %P 668-91 %Z Various arguments and counter-arguments re machine consciousness and civil liberties. Problems of machine consciousness are analogous to problems of human consciousness. The structural basis of the two may well be the same. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T The mental life of some machines %I Wayne State University Press %D 1967 %B Intentionality, Minds and Perception %E H. Castaneda %Z More on TMs: explaining their psychology via preference functions. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schlagel, R. %T Why not artificial consciousness or thought? %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 3-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Scriven, M. %T The mechanical concept of mind %I %D 1953 %B 1953 %V %N %P %Z To speak of a conscious machine is to commit a semantic mistake. Consciousness presupposes life and non-mechanism. Later retracted. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Sloman, A. %A Chrisley, R. %T Virtual machines and consciousness %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Stubenberg, L. %T What is it like to be Oscar? %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 1-26 %Z Argues that AI systems like Pollock's Oscar needn't be conscious. Blindsight tells us that complex perceptual processing can go on unconsciously. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thompson, D. %T Can a machine be conscious? %I %D 1965 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 16 %N %P %Z Accepting machine consciousness would have few philosophical consequences, whereas rejecting it would tend to commit one to epiphenomenalism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A van de Vete, D. %T The problem of robot consciousness %I %D 1971 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 32 %N %P 149-65 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ziff, P. %T The feelings of robots %I %D 1959 %B 1959 %V %N %P %Z Of course robots can't think: they're not alive, so this gives us good reason not to rely on behavior. With replies by J.J.C. Smart, N. Smart. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility %I %D 1998 %B 1998 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Burks, A. W. %T Logic, computers, and men %I %D 1973 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 46 %N %P 39-57 %Z Arguing that a finite deterministic automaton can perform all natural human functions. With remarks on the logical organization of computers. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T Can there be artificial minds? %I %D 1955 %B Analysis %V 16 %N %P 36-41 %Z Subservience to known or knowable rules is incompatible with mentality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T Narrow versus wide mechanism: Including a re-examination of Turing's views on the mind-machine issue %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 5-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1985 %B How We Know %Z Defends the Turing Test, among other things. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Machines and the mental %I %D 1985 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 59 %N %P 23-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Can intelligence be artificial? %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 201-16 %Z Intelligence requires not just action or thought, but the governance of action by thought, which requires a history. "Wired-up" systems lack the explanatory connection between thought and action, so are not intelligent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T What Computers Can't Do %I Harper and Row %D 1972 %Z Computers follow rules, people don't. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 3-10 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Henley, T. B. %T Natural problems and artificial intelligence %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 43-55 %Z On the philosophical importance of criteria for intelligence. With remarks on Searle, the Turing test, attitudes to AI, and ethical considerations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kearns, J. T. %T Thinking machines: Some fundamental confusions %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 269-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Lanier, J. %T Three objections to the idea of artificial intelligence %I MIT Press %D 1998 %B Toward a Science of Consciousness II %E S. Hameroff %E A. Kaszniak %E A. Scott %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackay, D. M. %T Mind-life behavior in artifacts %I %D 1951 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 105-21 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackay, D. M. %T Mentality in machines %I %D 1952 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 26 %N %P 61-86 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Manning, R. C. %T Why Sherlock Holmes can't be replaced by an expert system %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 19-28 %Z An expert system would lack Holmes' ability to raise the right questions, sort out relevant data, and determine what data are in need of explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mays, W. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1952 %B Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 148-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %T Ascribing mental qualities to machines %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Negley, G. %T Cybernetics and theories of mind %I %D 1951 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 574-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T The ontological argument against the mind-machine hypothesis %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 80 %N %P 131-57 %Z Lucas, Searle, and Penrose all fall prey to "dual-description" fallacies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Proudfoot, D. %T The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition. %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 283-308 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Can humans think? %I %D 1966 %B 1966 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. %T Because mere calculating isn't thinking: Comments on Hauser's "Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and machines %V 3 %N %P 11-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ronald, E. %A Sipper, M. %T Intelligence is not enough: On the socialization of talking machines %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 567-576 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Scriven, M. %T The compleat robot: A prolegomena to androidology %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z A machine could possess every characteristic of human thought: e.g. freedom, creativity, learning, understanding, perceiving, feeling. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Spilsbury, R. J. %T Mentality in machines %I %D 1952 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 26 %N %P 27-60 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Why there is no symbol grounding problem? %I %D 1996 %B Representations, Targets, and Attitudes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T The symbol grounding problem %I %D 1990 %B Physica D %V 42 %N %P 335-346 %Z AI symbols are empty and meaningless. They need to be "grounded" in something, e.g. sensory projection. Maybe connectionism can do the trick? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Connecting object to symbol in modeling cognition %I Springer-Verlag %D 1992 %B Connectionism in Context %E A. Clark %E R. Lutz %Z On the limitations of symbol systems, and the potential for grounding symbols in sensory icons and categorical perception, e.g. with neural networks. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Kosslyn, S. M. %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation without symbol systems %I %D 1984 %B Social Research %V 51 %N %P 1019-1045 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Symbol grounding and the origin of language %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A MacDorman, K. F. %T How to ground symbols adaptively %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %B Two Sciences of Mind %E S. O'Nuillain %E P. McKevitt %E E. MacAogain %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %T Physical symbol systems %I %D 1980 %B Cognitive Science %V 4 %N %P 135-83 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %A Simon, H. A. %T Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search %I %D 1981 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 19 %N %P 113-26 %Z On computer science, AI, & the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Brain symbols and computationalist explanation %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 25-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Sun, R. %T Symbol grounding: a new look at an old idea %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 149-172 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother %I %D 1978 %B Cognition %V 6 %N %P 229-47 %Z Against procedural semantics; it's a rerun of verificationism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Hadley, R. F. %T Truth conditions and procedural semantics %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson-Laird, P. %T Procedural semantics %I %D 1977 %B Cognition %V 5 %N %P 189-214 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson-Laird, P. %T What's wrong with Grandma's guide to procedural semantics: A reply to Jerry Fodor %I %D 1978 %B Cognition %V 9 %N %P 249-61 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T Tarskian semantics, or no notation without denotation %I %D 1978 %B Cognitive Science %V 2 %N %P 277-82 %Z On the virtues of denotational semantics for AI. Notation without denotation, as found in many AI systems, leads to castles in the air. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Perlis, D. %T Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 1: Why %I %D 1991 %B Nous %V 25 %N %P 435-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Perlis, D. %T Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 2: How %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Rapaport, W. J. %T Syntactic semantics: Foundations of computational natural language understanding %I Kluwer %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. J. %T Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 49-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, B. %T On the semantics of clocks %I Kluwer %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, B. %T The correspondence continuum %I %D 1987 %B CSLI- %V 87 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Wilks, Y. %T Some thoughts on procedural semantics %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1982 %B Strategies for Natural Language Processing %E W. Lehnert %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilks, Y. %T Form and content in semantics %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 329-51 %Z Criticism of McDermott's views on semantics, logic and natural language. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Winograd, T. %T Moving the semantic fulcrum %I %D 1985 %B Linguistics and Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 91-104 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Woods, W. %T Procedural semantics as a theory of meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 1981 %B Elements of Discourse Understanding %E A. Joshi %E B. Weber %E I. Sag %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Woods, W. %T Problems in procedural semantics %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Meaning and Cognitive Structure %E Z. Pylyshyn %E W. Demopolous %Z With commentaries by Haugeland, J. D. Fodor. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T In defense of explicit rules %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Argues that we need explicit rules for flexibility, adaptibility, and representational redescription. With remarks on eliminativism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Inexplicit information %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z On various kinds of representation of knowledge or belief without explicit tokens: control-implicit, domain-implicit, and procedural information. The key distinction is representation vs. execution of a rule. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Two notions of implicit rules %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 153-83 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Connectionism, rule-following, and symbolic manipulation %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Some rules are learnt so quickly that representation must be explicit. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T The `explicit-implicit' distinction %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 219-42 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Book Section %A Kirsh, D. %T When is information explicitly represented? %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Skokowski, P. G. %T Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"? %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 333-44 %Z Cummins' account of inexplicit information fails, as even "executed" rules must be represented in the system. With remarks on the Chinese room. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Manuscript %A Bechtel, W. %T Yet another revolution: Defusing the dynamical system theorists' attack on mental representations %I %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brooks, R. %T Intelligence without representation %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 139-159 %Z We don't need explicit representation; the world can do the job instead. Use embodied, complete systems, starting simple and working incrementally. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. and Toribio, J. %T Doing without representing %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 401-31 %Z A discussion of anti-representationalism in situated robotics and the dynamic systems movement (Brooks, Beer, van Gelder). These arguments appeal to overly simple domains, and a modest notion of representation survives. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Keijzer, F. A. %T Doing without representations which specify what to do %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 269-302 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Today the earwig, tomorrow man? %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 161-184 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T What might cognition be if not computation? %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 345-81 %Z Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational and non-representational. Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Book Section %A Chrisley, R. L. %T Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and robotics %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Manuscript %A Dietrich, E. %T Computers, intentionality, and the new dualism %I %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T A framework for misrepresenting knowledge %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z On the problems with context-free symbolic representation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Fields, C. %T Real machines and virtual intentionality: An experimentalist takes on the problem of representational content %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Direct representation %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 80 %N %P 305-22 %Z On Searle's critique of computational explanation, contrasted with Gallistel's use thereof. The real issue is computation on indirect vs. direct representations; direct computationalism is an attractive view. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Connectionism and cognitive architecture %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 3-71 %Z Connectionist models can't explain cognitive systematicity and productivity, as their representations lack compositional structure. The allures of connectionism are illusory; it's best used as an implementation strategy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Explaining systematicity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 115-36 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Aizawa, K. %T The role of the systematicity argument in classicism and connectionism %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %B Two Sciences of Mind %E S. O'Nuallain %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Exhibiting verses explaining systematicity: A reply to Hadley and Hayward %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 39-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 321-41 %Z Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation, as there is much to explain than systematicity. Connectionism and classicism may be compatible even without implementation, in any case. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T Language of thought: The connectionist contribution %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 57-101 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Towards a connectionist cognitive architecture %I %D 1991 %B Mind and Language %V 6 %N %P 252-72 %Z Connectionism can make do with unstructured representations, as long have they have the right causal relations between them. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Connectionism, classical cognitivism, and the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 321-33 %Z Contra Chalmers 1993, F&P's argument doesn't apply at the implementational level. Contra Chater and Oaksford 1990, connectionism can't be purely implementational, but some implementational details can be relevant. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T On Clark on systematicity and connectionism %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 37-44 %Z Argues against Clark on holism and the conceptual truth of systematicity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Compositionality in cognitive models: The real issue %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 78 %N %P 153-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Syntactic transformations on distributed representations %I %D 1990 %B Connection Science %V 2 %N %P 53-62 %Z An experimental demonstration that connectionist models can handle structure-sensitive operations in a non-classical way, transforming structured representations of active sentences to passive sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn were wrong %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 305-319 %Z Points out a structural flaw in F&P's argument, and traces the problem to a lack of appreciation of distributed representation. With some empirical results on structure sensitive processing, and some remarks on explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chater, N. %A Oaksford, M. %T Autonomy, implementation and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn %I %D 1990 %B Cognition %V 34 %N %P 93-107 %Z Implementation can make a difference at the algorithmic level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Christiansen, M. H. %A Chater, N. %T Generalization and connectionist language learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 273-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Systematicity %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 93 %N %P 591-614 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Connectionism and cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn are wrong %I Springer-Verlag %D 1992 %B Connectionism in Context %E A. Clark %E R. Lutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work %I %D 1990 %B Cognition %V 35 %N %P 183-205 %Z Smolensky's weak compositionality is useless; and tensor product architecture can't support systematicity, as nonexistent tokens can't play a causal role. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Connectionism and the problem of systematicity (continued): Why Smolensky's solution still doesn't work %I %D 1997 %B Cognition %V 62 %N %P 109-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T Two spurious varieties of compositionality %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 159-72 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. %T Mentalese not spoken here: Computation, cognition, and causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 413-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Guarini, M. %T Tensor products and split-level architecture: Foundational issues in the classicism-connectionism debate %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Cognition, systematicity, and nomic necessity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Systematicity in connectionist language learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 247-72 %Z Argues that existing connectionist models do not achieve an adequate systematicity in learning; they fail to generalize to handle structures with novel constituents. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Systematicity revisited %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 431-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %A Hayward, M. B. %T Strong semantic systematicity from Hebbian connectionist learning %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 1-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Cognition, systematicity, and nomic necessity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Explaining systematicity: A reply to Kenneth Aizawa %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 12 %N %P 571-79 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hawthorne, J. %T On the compatibility of connectionist and classical models %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 5-16 %Z Localist connectionist models may not be able to handle structured presentation, but appropriate distributed models can. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Structured representations in connectionist systems? %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z A discussion of how connectionism might achieve "effective syntax" without implementing a classical system. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Three-concept monte: Explanation, implementation, and systematicity %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 347-63 %Z F&P deal a sucker bet: on their terms, connectionism could never give a a non-implementational explanation of systematicity, as the notions are construed in a manner specific to classical architectures. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Can connectionists explain systematicity? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 154-77 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Systematicity, conceptual truth, and evolution %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z Against responses to Fodor and Pylyshyn claiming that cognitive theories needn't explain systematicity. Contra Clark, the conceptual truth of systematicity won't help. Contra others, nor will evolution. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T The connectionism/classicism battle to win souls %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P %Z Argues that no connectionist model so far has come close to explaining systematicity. Considers the models of Elman, Chalmers, and Smolensky. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Niklasson, L. F. %A van Gelder, T. %T On being systematically connectionist %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 288-302 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollack, J. B. %T Recursive distributed representations %I %D 1990 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 46 %N %P 77-105 %Z Develops a connectionist architecture -- recursive auto-associative memory -- that can recursively represent compositional structures in distributed form. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Connectionism and the language of thought %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 485-503 %Z F&P's argument confuses constituent structure with logical/sentential structure. Connectionism is a psychotechtonic project, whereas propositional description is a psychosemantic project. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroder, J. %T Knowledge of rules, causal systematicity, and the language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 117 %N %P 313-330 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T The constituent structure of connectionist mental states %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 137-60 %Z F&P ignore distributed representation and interaction effects. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T Tensor product variable binding and the representation of symbolic structures in connectionist systems %I %D 1990 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 46 %N %P 159-216 %Z Develops a connectionist architecture that represents compositional structures as tensor products of distributed representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Connectionism can do compositionality its own way, including both weak compositionality (with context effects) or strong compositionality (via tensor products). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T Constituent structure and explanation in an integrated connectionist/symbolic cognitive architecture %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme %I %D 1990 %B Cognitive Science %V 14 %N %P 355-84 %Z Connectionism can do compositionality functionally. All one needs is the right functional relation between representations; physical concatenation is not necessary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T Classical questions, radical answers %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z On connectionism as a Kuhnian paradigm shift in cognitive science, with emphasis on the implications of functional compositionality and distributed representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Representation and computation in a deflationary assessment of connectionist cognitive science %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 71-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Manuscript %A Clark, A. %T Connectionism, nonconceptual content, and representational redescription %I %D 1989 %Z On some troubles connectionism has with higher-order knowledge. Contrasts Cussins, Karmiloff-Smith on development. Subsymbols without symbols are blind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts, and Representational Change %I MIT Press %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Karmiloff-Smith, A. %T The cognizer's innards: A psychological and philosophical perspective on the development of thought %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 487-519 %Z On the importance of representational redescription, and on the limits of connectionist networks in cross-domain knowledge transfer. What does a true believer need, above behavior: conceptual combination, real-world fluency? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T The role of representation in connectionist explanation of cognitive capacities %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Connectionism isn't really radical. There's no new concept of representation or of learning, and cognition can still be the manipulation of semantically structured representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Cussins, A. %T The connectionist construction of concepts %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %B The Philosophy of AI %E M. Boden %Z Connectionism builds up concepts from the nonconceptual level. From nonconceptual content (e.g. perceptual experiences) to the emergence of objectivity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. %T A connectionist defence of the inscrutability thesis %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 15 %N %P 465-480 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. %T State space semantics and conceptual similarity: reply to Churchland %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 77-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goschke, T. %A Koppelberg, D. %T Connectionism and the semantic content of internal representation %I %D 1990 %B Review of International Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 87-103 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Goschke, T. %A Koppelberg, D. %T The concept of representation and the representation of concepts in connectionist models %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z On correlational semantics and context-dependent representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation and rule-instantiation in connectionist systems %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Some remarks on psychology & physiology. Even connectionism uses psychological concepts. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation in perception and cognition: Connectionist affordances %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haybron, D. M. %T The causal and explanatory role of information stored in connectionist networks %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 361-380 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Laakso, A. %A Cottrell, G. %T Content and cluster analysis: assessing representational similarity in neural systems %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 47-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A O'Brien, G. %A Opie, J. %T Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Toward a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference %I %D 1989 %B Acta Analytica %V 4 %N %P 71-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Rethinking distributed representation %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 9-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 34-66 %Z Argues that talk of representations has no explanatory role in connectionist theory, and can be discarded. It can't be understood along the lines of the teleo-informational or classical frameworks. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Schopman, J. %A Shawky, A. %T Remarks on the impact of connectionism on our thinking about concepts %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Representation in pictorialism and connectionism %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 163-184 %Z Pictorialism isn't compatible with language of thought, but connectionism might be. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T What is the D in PDP? %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Argues that distributed representation is best analyzed in terms of superposition of representation, not in terms of extendedness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Garon, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Connectionism implies eliminativism, as connectionist systems do not have functionally discrete contentful states, and folk psychology is committed to functional discreteness of propositional attitudes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of theories %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Outlines the semantic view of scientific theories, and applies it to the connectionism/eliminativism debate. There's no reason why folk psychology shouldn't be reducible, in a homogeneous or heterogeneous way. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Botterill, G. %T Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist networks %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 899-906 %Z Distinguishes active from dispositional beliefs: the former are realized discretely in activation patterns, the latter nondiscretely in weights, which is all that folk psychology needs. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clapin, H. %T Connectionism isn't magic %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 167-84 %Z Commentary on Ramsey/Stich/Garon. Connectionism has symbols that interact, and has propositional modularity in processing if not in storage. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Beyond eliminativism %I %D 1989 %B Mind and Language %V 4 %N %P 251-79 %Z Connectionism needn't imply eliminativism, as higher levels may have a causal role, if not causal completeness. Also, it may not tell the whole story. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Connectionist minds %I %D 1990 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 90 %N %P 83-102 %Z Responding to eliminativist challenge via cluster analysis and recurrence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge %I %D 1989 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 541-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z Argues that our conception of thought requires causal systematicity, which requires a language of thought. Connectionist systems are not causally systematic, so connectionism leads to eliminativism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Folk psychology and cognitive architecture %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 179-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forster, M. %A Saidel, E. %T Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 437-52 %Z Contra Ramsey, Stich, and Garon, connectionist representations can be seen to be functionally discrete on an appropriate analysis of causal relevance. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A and Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the commitments of folk psychology %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 127-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, G. %T Is connectionism commonsense? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T On the threat of eliminativism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 325-46 %Z A dispositional construal of beliefs and desires can distinguish the relevant active states (via counterfactuals) and is compatible with FP, so internals can't threaten FP. With remarks on Davidson, overdetermination, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Eliminative connectionism: Its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics %I %D 1992 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 21-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder to Forster and Saidel %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 453-61 %Z Upon examination, the model of Forster and Saidel 1994 does not exhibit features that are both distributed and causally discrete. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T On the projectable predicates of connectionist psychology: A case for belief %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. %A Warfield, T. %T Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do connectionist minds have beliefs? %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %A Fuller, G. %T Rules in programming languages and networks %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z The distinction between programming languages and networks is neutral on rule-following, etc, so there's nothing really new about connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Representations without rules, connectionism, and the syntactic argument %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 465-92 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Is the connectionist-logicist debate one of AI's wonderful red herrings? %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 319-49 %Z A detailed analysis purporting to show that connectionism and "logicism" are compatible, as Turing machines can do everything a neural network can. Entertaining, but misunderstands subsymbolic processing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Broadbent, D. %T A question of levels: Comment on McClelland and Rumelhart %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %V 114 %N %P 189-92 %Z Distributed models are at the implementational, not computational, level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Chandrasekaran, B. %A Goel, A. %A Allemang, D. %T Connectionism and information-processing abstractions %I %D 1988 %B AI Magazine %V 24 %N %P %Z Connectionism won't affect AI too much, as AI is concerned with the information-processing (task) level. With greater modularity, connectionism will look more like traditional AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Corbi, J. E. %T Classical and connectionist models: Levels of description %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 141-68 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Dawson, M. R. W. %A Medler, D. A. %A Berkeley, I. S. N. %T PDP networks can provide models that are not mere implementations of classical theories %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 25-40 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T The logical geography of computational approaches: A view from the east pole %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z Drawing the battle-lines: High Church Computationalism at the "East Pole", New Connectionism, Zen Holism, etc, at various locations on the "West Coast". With remarks on connectionism, and on AI as thought-experimentation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Mother Nature versus the walking encyclopedia %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Reiterating the value of connectionism, especially biological plausibility. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book %A Dinsmore, J. %T The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dyer, M. %T Connectionism versus symbolism in high-level cognition %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Garson, J. W. %T What connectionists cannot do: The threat to Classical AI %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Connectionism and classicism aren't necessarily incompatible on symbolic discreteness, causal role, functional discreteness, constituency, representation of rules. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T No representations without rules: The prospects for a compromise between paradigms in cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 25-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Cognition without classical architecture %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 291-306 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Guarini, M. %T A defence of connectionism against the "syntactic" argument %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 128 %N %P 287-317 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Settling into a new paradigm %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 97-113 %Z On connectionism, basketball, and representation without rules. Responses to the "syntactic" and "semantic" arguments against connectionism. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Representation without rules %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 17 %N %P 147-74 %Z Cognition uses structured representations without high-level rules, and connectionism is better at accounting for this. With remarks on exceptions to psychological laws, and the crisis in traditional AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Representations don't need rules: Reply to James Garson %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A McClelland, J. L. %A Rumelhart, D. E. %T Levels indeed! A response to Broadbent %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %V 114 %N %P 193-7 %Z Response to Broadbent 1985: Distributed models are at the algorithmic level. Elucidating the low-level/high-level relation via various analogies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Warfield, F. %T The allure of connectionism reexamined %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 365-400 %Z Argues that symbolic systems such as decision trees are as good at learning and pattern recognition as connectionist networks, and it is just as plausible that they are implemented in the brain. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativism %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Challenges connectionism to explain things that the classical approach seems to handle better: the structure, systematicity, causal role, and grain of propositional attitudes, their rational relations, and conceptual stability. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T On the proper treatment of connectionism %I %D 1988 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 11 %N %P 1-23 %Z Connectionism offers a complete account at the subsymbolic level, rather than an approximate account at the symbolic level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Berkeley, I. %T What the #$%! is a subsymbol? %I %D 2000 %B Minds and machines %V 10 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z Explicates the distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic computation, and argues that connectionism can better handle the emergence of semantics from syntax, doe to the non-atomic nature of its representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Superpositional connectionism: A reply to Marinov %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 271-81 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Book Section %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Artificial intelligence: Subcognition as computation %I Wiley %D 1983 %B The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages %E F. Machlup %Z AI needs statistical emergence. For real semantics, symbols must be decomposable, complex, autonomous -- i.e. active. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marinov, M. %T On the spuriousness of the symbolic/subsymbolic distinction %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 253-70 %Z Argues with Smolensky: symbolic systems such as decision trees have all the positive features of neural networks (flexibility, lack of brittleness), and can represent concepts as sets of subconcepts. With a reply by Clark. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, J. %T Treating connectionism properly: Reflections on Smolensky %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P %Z Rejects Smolensky's PTC, as the proper interaction of the microscopic and macroscopic levels would take a "miracle". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T Connectionist AI, symbolic AI, and the brain %I %D 1987 %B AI Review %V 1 %N %P 95-109 %Z On connectionist networks as subsymbolic dynamic systems. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Are the new PDP models of cognition cognitivist or associationist? %I %D 1985 %B Behaviorism %V 13 %N %P 53-61 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T What happens to accounts of mind-brain relations if we forgo an architecture of rules and representations? %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1986 %N %P %Z On the relationship between connectionism, symbol processing, psychology and neuroscience. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Connectionism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 17-41 %Z Lots of questions about connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Connectionism and rules and representation systems: Are they compatible? %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 5-16 %Z There's room for both styles within a single mind. The rule-based level needn't be autonomous; the connectionist level plays a role in pattern recognition, concepts, and so on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %A Abrahamson, A. %T Beyond the exclusively propositional era %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 223-53 %Z An account of the shift from propositions to pattern recognition in the study of cognition: knowing-how, imagery, categorization, connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Bechtel, W. %A Abrahamsen, A. A. %T Connectionism and the future of folk psychology %I SUNY Press %D 1992 %B Minds: Natural and Artificial %E R. Burton %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T The case for connectionism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 119-54 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 29-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Bradshaw, D. E. %T Connectionism and the specter of representationalism %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Argues that connectionism allows for a more plausible epistemology of perception, compatible with direct realism rather than representationalism. With remarks on Fodor and Pylshyn's argument against Gibson. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the nature of theories: A neurocomputational perspective %I %D 1989 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 14 %N %P %Z Connectionism will revolutionize our review of scientific theories: >From the deductive-nomological view to descent in weight-space. Some cute analogies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the nature of explanation: A PDP approach %I %D 1989 %B A Neurocomputational Perspective %Z We achieve explanatory understanding not through the manipulation of propositions but through the activation of prototypes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Churchland, P. S. %A Sejnowski, T. %T Neural representation and neural computation %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Neural Connections, Mental Computations %E L. Nadel %Z Implications of connectionism and neuroscience for our concept of mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Microcognition %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z All kinds of stuff on connectionism and philosophy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Connectionism, competence and explanation %I %D 1990 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 41 %N %P 195-222 %Z Connectionism separates processing from competence. Instead of hopping down Marr's levels (theory->process), connectionism goes (1) task (2) low-level performance (3) extract theory from process. Cute. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %A Schwarz, G. %T Radical connectionism %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 43-61 %Z On computation and representation in AI and connectionism, and on problems for radical connectionism in reconciling these without denying representation or embracing mystery. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %A Schwarz, G. %T Connectionism, computation, and cognition %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Explicates computationalism, and discusses ways in which connectionism might end up non-computational: if causal states cross-classify representational states, or if transitions between representations aren't computable. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Connectionist and the rationale constraint on cognitive explanations %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 105-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Connectionism, modularity and tacit knowledge %I %D 1989 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 541-55 %Z Argues that connectionist networks don't have tacit knowledge of modular theories (as representations lack the appropriate structure, etc.). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. G. %T Derrida and connectionism: Differance in neural nets %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 183-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T Gibsonian representations and connectionist symbol-processing: prospects for unification %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P 243-52 %Z Gibson is compatible with connectionism. In both, we can have rule-instantiation without rule-following. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %I Kluwer %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Connectionism and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science %I %D 1997 %B Metaphilosophy %V 28 %N %P 1-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphreys, G. W. %T Information-processing systems which embody computational rules: The connectionist approach %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 201-12 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Legg, C. R. %T Connectionism and physiological psychology: A marriage made in heaven? %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 263-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Litch, M. %T Computation, connectionism and modelling the mind %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 357-364 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Lloyd, D. %T Parallel distributed processing and cognition: Only connect? %I %D 1989 %B Simple Minds %Z An overview: local/distributed/featural representations; explanation in connectionism (how to avoid big mush); relation to neuroscience; explicit representations of rules vs weight matrices. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Homuncular functionalism meets PDP %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z On various ways in which connectionism relates to representational homuncular functionalism, e.g. on implementation, eliminativism, and explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Macdonald, C. %T Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Plunkett, K. %T Connectionism today %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 185-194 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %T Connectionism and three levels of nativism %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 177-205 %Z How connectionism bears on the nativism debate. Conclusion: not too much. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Rumelhart, D. M. %T Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, J. %T Connectionism and cognition %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z Criticism of Churchland's connectionist epistemology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Sehon, S. %T Connectionism and the causal theory of action explanation %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 511-532 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Are connectionist models cognitive? %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z In some senses of "cognitive", yes; in other senses, no. Phenomenological, theoretical, and sociological perspectives. Toward meaning-laden models. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Connectionism %I %D 1990 %B The Representational Theory of Mind %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Waskan, J. %A Bechtel, W. %T Directions in connectionist research: Tractable computations without syntactically structured representations %I %D 1997 %B Metaphilosophy %V 28 %N %P 31-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Representational trajectories in connectionist learning %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 317-32 %Z On how to get connectionist networks to learn about structured task domains. Concentrates on incremental learning, and other developmental/scaffolding strategies. With remarks on systematicity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Thornton, S. %T Trading spaces: Computation, representation, and the limits of uninformed learning %I %D 1997 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 20 %N %P 57-66 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Manuscript %A Cliff, D. %T Computational neuroethology: A provisional manifesto %I %D 1990 %Z Criticizes connectionism for not being sufficiently rooted in neuroscience, and for not being grounded in the world. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Dawson, M. R. W. %A Schopflocher, D. P. %T Autonomous processing in parallel distributed processing networks %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 199-219 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanson, S. %A Burr, D. %T What connectionist models learn %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z What's new to connectionism is not learning or representation but the way that learning and representation interact. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaplan, S. %A Weaver, M. %A French, R. M. %T Active symbols and internal models: Towards a cognitive connectionism %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Addresses behaviorist/associationist charges. Connectionism needs recurrent circuits to support active symbols. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Putting a price on cognition %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 119-35 %Z On the importance of variable binding, and why it's hard with connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Lachter, J. %A Bever, T. %T The relation between linguistic structure and associative theories of language learning %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 195-247 %Z Criticism of connectionist language models. They build in too much. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Mills, S. %T Connectionism, the classical theory of cognition, and the hundred step constraint %I %D 1989 %B Acta Analytica %V 4 %N %P 5-38 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Philosophical issues in Edelman's neural darwinism %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 195-208 %Z On the relationship between ND, PDP and AI. All are computational. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Oaksford, M. %A Chater, N. %A Stenning, K. %T Connectionism, classical cognitive science and experimental psychology %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Connectionism is better at explaining empirical findings about mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Pinker, S. %A Prince, A. %T On language and connectionism %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 73-193 %Z Extremely thorough criticism of the R&M past-tense-learning model, with arguments on why connectionism can't handle linguistic rules. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Manuscript %A Bechtel, W. %T Yet another revolution? Defusing the dynamical system theorists' attack on mental representations %I %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Time and mind %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 354-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 441-63 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T Computation and dynamical models of mind %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 531-41 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 100 %N %P 493-520 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. E. %T Introduction to the epistemology of the brain: Indeterminacy, micro-specificity, chaos, and openness %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 45-57 %Z On the brain as a vector-processing system, and the problems raised by indeterminacy, chaos, and so on. With morals for cognitive science. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Freeman, W. %T Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 18 %N %P 291-304 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Chaos and free will %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 365-74 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 301-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Syntax in a dynamic brain %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 110 %N %P 343-355 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Chaotic emergence and the language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 303-315 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Giunti, M. %T Dynamic models of cognition %I MIT Press %D 1995 %B Mind as Motion %E T. van Gelder %E R. Port %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book %A Giunti, M. %T Computers, Dynamical Systems, and the Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Toward a noncomputational cognitive science %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience %V 4 %N %P 299-310 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Hooker, C. A. %A Christensen, W. D. %T Towards a new science of the mind: Wide content and the metaphysics of organizational properties in nonlinear dynamic models %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 98-109 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Cognitive systems as dynamic systems %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 27-43 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T A nonclassical framework for cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 305-45 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Keijzer, F. A. %A Bem, S. %T Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 323-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Rockwell, T. %T Attractor spaces as modules: A semi-eliminative reduction of symbolic AI to dynamic systems theory %I %D 2005 %B Minds and Machines %V 15 %N %P 23-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Schonbein, W. %T Cognition and the power of continuous dynamical systems %I %D 2005 %B Minds and Machines %V 15 %N %P 57-71 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T The mind as a control system %I Cambridge University Press %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Cognitive Science %E C. Hookway %E D. Peterson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book %A van Gelder, T. %A Port, R. %T Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T What might cognition be if not computation? %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 345-81 %Z Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational and non-representational. Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T Connectionism, dynamics, and the philosophy of mind %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science %I %D 1998 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 21 %N %P 615-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Weiskopf, D. %T The place of time in cognition %I %D 2004 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 87-105 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Buchanan, B. %T AI as an experimental science %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Bundy, A. %T What kind of field is AI? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook %E D. Partridge %E Y. Wilks %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T AI as philosophy and as psychology %I Humanities Press %D 1978 %B Philosophical Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z AI as detailed armchair psychology and as thought-experimental epistemology. Implications for mind: e.g. a solution to the problem of homuncular regress. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Glymour, C. %T AI is philosophy %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %T Is AI an empirical science? %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 56-60 %Z No, AI is an a priori science that uses empirical methods; its status is similar to that of mathematics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %T Medium AI and experimental science %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 493-5012 %Z On the status of "medium AI", the study of intelligence in computational systems (not just humans). Contra to many, this is not an empirical science, but a combination of (experimental) mathematics and engineering. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Nakashima, H. %T AI as complex information processing %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 57-80 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 1-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleeremans, A. %A French, R. M. %T From chicken squawking to cognition: Levels of description and the computational approach in psychology %I %D 1996 %B Psychologica Belgica %V 36 %N %P 5-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book %A Foster, C. %T Algorithms, abstraction and implementation %I Academic Press %D 1990 %Z Outlines a theory of the equivalence of algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Levels of description in nonclassical cognitive science %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy %V 34 %N %P %Z Generalizes Marr's levels to: cognitive state-transitions, mathematical state-transitions, implementation. Discusses these with respect to connectionism, dynamical systems, and computation below the cognitive level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Thesis %A Houng, Y. %T Classicism, connectionism and the concept of level %I %D 1990 %Z On levels of organization vs. levels of analysis. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book %A Marr, D. %T Vision %I Freeman %D 1982 %Z Defines computational, algorithmic and implementational levels. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Marr's three levels: a re-evaluation %I %D 1990 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 185-196 %Z On different kinds of level-shifts: organizational and contextual changes. There are more than three levels available. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %T The knowledge level %I %D 1982 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 18 %N %P 81-132 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book Section %A Newell, A. %T The symbol level and the knowledge level %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Meaning and Cognitive Structure %E Z. Pylyshyn %E W. Demopolous %Z With commentaries by Smith, Dennett. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Explanation in computational psychology: Language, perception and level 1.5 %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 101-23 %Z Psychological explanation is typically somewhere between the computational and algorithmic levels. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Sticklen, J. %T Problem-solving architectures at the knowledge level %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 233-247 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Cognitive wheels: The frame problem of AI %I Cambridge University Press %D 1984 %B Minds, Machines and Evolution %E Hookaway %Z General overview. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %A Dreyfus, S. %T How to stop worrying about the frame problem even though it's computationally insoluble %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is an artifact of computational explicitness. Contrast human commonsense know-how, with relevance built in. Comparison to expert/novice distinction. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Fetzer, J. H. %T The frame problem: Artificial intelligence meets David Hume %I %D 1990 %B International Journal of Expert Systems %V 3 %N %P 219-232 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of the spheres %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is Hamlet's problem: when to stop thinking. It's equivalent to the general problem of non-demonstrative inference. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T An overview of the frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z The FP may be a consequence of the explicit/implicit rep distinction. Use "complicit" reps instead, and changes will be carried along intrinsically. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Hayes, P. %T What the frame problem is and isn't %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is a relatively narrow problem, Some, e.g. Fodor, wrongly equate FP with the "Generalized AI Problem". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Janlert, L. %T Modeling change: The frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Korb, K. %T The frame problem: An AI fairy tale %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 317-351 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Lormand, E. %T The holorobophobe's dilemma %I Ablex %D 1994 %B The Robot's Dilemma Revisited %E K. Ford %E Z. Pylylshyn %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Lormand, E. %T Framing the frame problem %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 353-74 %Z Criticizes Dennett's, Haugeland's and Fodor's construals of the FP. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Maloney, J. C. %T In praise of narrow minds %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %A Hayes, P. %T Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence %I Edinburgh University Press %D 1969 %B Machine Intelligence 4 %E Meltzer %E Michie %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A McDermott, D. %T We've been framed: Or, Why AI is innocent of the frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z Solve frame problem by using the sleeping-dog strategy -- keeping things fixed unless there's a reason to suppose otherwise. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Murphy, D. %T Folk psychology meets the frame problem %I %D 2001 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics %V 32 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollock, JL. %T Reasoning about change and persistence: A solution to the frame problem %I %D 1997 %B Nous %V 31 %N %P 143-169 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T The Robot's Dilemma %I Ablex %D 1987 %Z Lots of papers on the frame problem. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Birnbaum, L. %T Rigor mortis: A response to Nilsson's `Logic and artificial intelligence' %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 57-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %A French, R. M. %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T High-level perception, representation, and analogy: A critique of AI methodology %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z AI must integrate perception and cognition in the interest of flexible representation. Current models ignore perception and the development of representation, but this cannot be separated from later cognitive processes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T A biological metaphor %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 45-64 %Z AI should look at biology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T The kludge in the machine %I %D 1987 %B Mind and Language %V 2 %N %P 277-300 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Dascal, M. %T Why does language matter to artificial intelligence? %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P 145-174 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T From micro-worlds to knowledge: AI at an impasse %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z Micro-worlds don't test true understanding, and frames and scripts are doomed to leave out too much. Explicit representation can't capture intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Dreyfus, H. L. %A Dreyfus, S. E. %T Making a mind versus modeling the brain: AI at a crossroads %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z History of AI (boo) and connectionism (qualified hooray). And Husserl/ Heidegger/Wittgenstein. Quite nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T The many uses of `belief' in AI %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 55-74 %Z Various AI approaches to belief: syntactic, propositional/meaning-based, information, tractability, discoverability, and degree of confidence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T Understanding natural language %I %D 1979 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 619-32 %Z AI will need holism: interpretational, common-sense, situational, existential. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Foundations of AI: The big issues %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 3-30 %Z Identifying the dividing lines: pre-eminence of knowledge, embodiment, language-like kinematics, role of learning, uniformity of architecture. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Marr, D. %T Artificial intelligence: A personal view %I %D 1977 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 9 %N %P 37-48 %Z AI usually comes up with Type 2 (algorithmic) theories, when Type 1 (info processing) theories might be more useful -- at least if they exist. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A McDermott, D. %T Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z Problems in AI methodology: wishful mnemonics, oversimplifying natural language concepts, and never implementing programs. Entertaining. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T A critique of pure reason %I %D 1987 %B Computational Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 151-60 %Z Criticism of logicism (i.e. reliance on deduction) in AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Nilsson, N. %T Logic and artificial intelligence %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 31-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book %A Partridge, D. %A Wilks, Y. %T The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %Z Lots of papers on various aspects of AI methodology. Quite thorough. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T Heidegger and artificial intelligence %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 43-69 %Z On the non-represented background to everyday activity, and environmental interaction in cognition. Criticizes cognitivism, connectionism, looks at Agre/Chapman/Brooks, ethology, anthropology for support. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Complexity and the study of artificial and human intelligence %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book %A Ringle, M. %T Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %Z 10 papers on philosophy of AI, psychology and knowledge representation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Rationalism, expertise, and the Dreyfuses' critique of AI research %I %D 1991 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 271-90 %Z Defending limited rationalism: i.e. a theory of intelligence below the conceptual level but above the neuronal level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Agre, P. %T The practical logic of computer work %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T Feeling fine about the mind %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 381-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Bickhard, M. %T Troubles with computationalism %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T The computer model of mind %I , Vol %D 1990 %B An Invitation to Cognitive Science %E D. Osherson %E E. Smith %Z Overview of computationalism. Relationship to intentionality, LOT, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Boden, M. %T What is computational psychology? %I %D 1984 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 58 %N %P 17-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Computation, among other things, is beneath us %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 469-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %A Zenzen, M. %T Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 113 %N %P 285-320 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Confirmation and the computational paradigm, or, why do you think they call it artificial intelligence? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 155-81 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Manuscript %A Chalmers, D. J. %T A computational foundation for the study of cognition %I %D 1994 %Z Argues for theses of computational sufficiency and computational explanation, resting on the fact that computation provides an abstract specification of causal organization. With replies to many anti-computationalist worries. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, J. %T Turing machines and the mind-body problem %I %D 1972 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 23 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Copeland, J. %T Narrow versus wide mechanism %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Programs in the explanation of behavior %I %D 1977 %B Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 269-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Demopoulos, W. %T On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 79-96 %Z On analog/digital, representational/nonrepresentational, direct/indirect. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %T Computationalism %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z What computationalism is, as opposed to computerism & cognitivism. Implies: intentionality isn't special, and we don't make decisions. With commentary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %T Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 79 %N %P 119-41 %Z Argues that computational explanation requires the attribution of semantic content. Addresses Stich's arguments against content, and argues that computers are not formal symbol manipulators. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T The computational model of the mind and philosophical functionalism %I %D 1987 %B Behaviorism %V 15 %N %P 131-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Machines and the mental %I %D 1985 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 59 %N %P 23-33 %Z Machines can't even add, let alone think, as the symbols they use aren't meaningful to them. They would need real information based on perceptual embodiment, and conceptual capacities, for meaning to play a real role. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Mental algorithms: Are minds computational systems? %I %D 1994 %B Pragmatics and Cognition %V 21 %N %P 1-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Computation and reduction %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. %T The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 123-34 %Z Computationalism is false, as it can't distinguish the ability to solve a maxe for the ability to solve it's mirror image. An embodied computational taxonomy is needed, rather than software alone. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; Cognition isn't %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 379-90 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Authentic intentionality %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Horst, S. %T Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind %I University of California Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Horst, S. %T Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 347-381 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Mellor, D. H. %T What is computational psychology? II %I %D 1984 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 58 %N %P 37-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Mellor, D. H. %T How much of the mind is a computer %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z Only belief is computational: rest of mind is not. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Machine models for cognitive science %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z Argues contra Pylyshyn 1984 that finite state automata are good models for cognitive science: they are semantically interpretable and process symbols. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents %I %D 2004 %B 2004 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states %I %D 2004 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Science %V 35 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Pollock, J. %T How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 111-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computation and Cognition %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z A thorough account of the symbolic/computational view of cognition. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computational models and empirical constraints %I %D 1978 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 1 %N %P 98-128 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computing and cognitive science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Foundations of Cognitive Science %E M. Posner %Z An overview of the computational view of mind. On symbols, levels, control structures, levels of correspondence for computational models, and empirical methods for determining degrees of equivalence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Scheutz, M. %T Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. Scheutz, M. 2002. Computationalism: The next generation %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, S. C. %T Computationalism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 467-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, B. C. %T The foundations of computing %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Computational functional psychology: problems and prospects %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z Various points on pros and cons of computational psychology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Tibbetts, P. %T Residual dualism in computational theories of mind %I %D 1996 %B Dialectica %V 50 %N %P 37-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, M. %T Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 11 %N %P 642-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Bishop, M. %T Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Boyle, C. F. %T Computation as an intrinsic property %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 451-67 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T On implementing a computation %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 391-402 %Z Gives an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation: the causal structure of the system must mirror the formal structure of the computation. Answers objections by Searle and others. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 309-33 %Z Argues that Putnam's "proof" that every ordinary open system implements every finite automaton is fallacious. It can be patched up, but an appropriate account of implementation resists these difficulties. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chrisley, R. L. %T Why everything doesn't realize every computation %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 403-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleland, C. %T Is the Church-Turing thesis true? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 283-312 %Z Many physically realized functions can't be computeted by Turing machines: e.g. "mundane procedures" and continuous functions. So the C-T thesis is false of these, and maybe even of number-theoretic functions. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleland, C. E. %T Effective procedures and computable functions %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 9-23 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T What is computation? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 335-59 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Endicott, R. P. %T Searle, syntax, and observer-relativity %I %D 1996 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 101-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Goel, V. %T Notationality and the information processing mind %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 129-166 %Z Adapts Goodman's notational systems to explicate computational information processing. What is/isn't a physical notational system (e.g. LOT, symbol systems, connectionism) and why. How to reconcile notational/mental content? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Computationalism %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 303-17 %Z Pragmatic factors are vital in connecting the theory of computation with empirical theory, and particularly in determining whether a given system counts as performing a given computation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Syntax, semantics, physics %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horsten, L. %T The Church-Turing thesis and effective mundane procedures %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 1-8 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Ingarden, R. %T Open systems and consciousness: A philosophical discussion %I %D 2002 %B Open Systems & Information Dynamics %V 9 %N %P 125-151 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A MacLennan, B. %T "Words lie in our way" %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 421-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Maclennan, B. %T Transcending Turing computability %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 3-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 215-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Scheutz, M. %T When physical systems realize functions %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 161-196 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Is the brain a digital computer? %I %D 1990 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 64 %N %P 21-37 %Z Syntax isn't intrinsic to physics, so computational ascriptions are assigned by observer. Syntax has no causal powers. Brain doesn't process information. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Shagrir, O. %T Two dogmas of computationalism %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 321-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Stabler, E. %T Kripke on functionalism and automata %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 1-22 %Z Disputes Kripke's argument that there is no objective way of determining when a system computes a given function, due to infinite domains and unreliability. Stipulating normal background conditions is sufficient. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Suber, P. %T What is software? %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Speculative Philosophy %V 2 %N %P 89-119 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Welch, P. D. %T On the possibility, or otherwise, of hypercomputation %I %D 2004 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Bergadano, F. %T Machine learning and the foundations of inductive inference %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 31-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Beavers, A. F. %T Phenomenology and artificial intelligence %I %D 2002 %B Metaphilosophy %V 33 %N %P 70-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Button, G. %A Coulter, J. %A Lee, J. R. E. %A Sharrock, W. %T Computers, Minds, and Conduct %I Polity Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Artificial intelligence %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits %I Kluwer %D 1990 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Gips, J. %T Toward the ethical robot %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Haugeland, J. %T Mind Design %I MIT Press %D 1981 %Z 12 papers on the foundations of AI and cognitive science. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. J. %A Ford, K. M. %A Adams-Webber, J. R. %T Human reasoning about artificial intelligence %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 4 %N %P 247-63 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Krellenstein, M. %T A reply to `Parallel computation and the mind-body problem' %I %D 1987 %B Cognitive Science %V 11 %N %P 155-7 %Z Thagard 1986 is wrong: speed and the like make no fundamental difference. With Thagard's reply: it makes a difference in practice, if not in principle. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Lacey, N. %A Lee, M. %T The epistemological foundations of artificial agents. Minds and Machines 13:339-365. Lee, M. & Lacey, N. 2003. The influence of epistemology on the design of artificial agents %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 367-395 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Moody, T. C. %T Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence %I Prentice-Hall %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T AI, anthropocentrism, and the evolution of "intelligence." %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 259-277 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Robinson, W. S. %T Computers, Minds, and Robots %I Temple University Press %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, S. %T Inductive learning by machines %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 64 %N %P 37-64 %Z A nice paper on the relationship between techniques of theory formation from machine learning and philosophical problems of induction and knowledge. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Artificial Intelligence and Human Reason: A Teleological Critique %I Columbia University Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiaffonati, V. %T A framework for the foundation of the philosophy of artificial intelligence %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 537-552 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Sloman, A. %T The Computer Revolution in Philosophy %I Harvester %D 1978 %Z All about how the computer should change the way we think about the mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T The irrelevance of Turing machines to artificial intelligence %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Parallel computation and the mind-body problem %I %D 1986 %B Cognitive Science %V 10 %N %P 301-18 %Z Parallelism does make a difference. Some somewhat anti-functionalist points. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Philosophy and machine learning %I %D 1990 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 261-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Philosophical and computational models of explanation %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 64 %N %P 87-104 %Z A comparison of philosophical and AI approaches to explanation: deductive, statistical, schematic, analogical, causal, and linguistic. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Winograd, T. %A Flores, F. %T Understanding Computers and Cognition %I Addison-Wesley %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U