Part 5: Philosophy of Psychology

Part of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: An Annotated Bibliography

Compiled by David Chalmers, Philosophy, Australian National University. Technical support by David Bourget, University of Toronto. For more information see the main page.

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Part 5: Philosophy of Psychology [1087]

Part 5: Philosophy of Psychology

5.1 Folk Psychology and Theory of Mind

5.1a The Nature of Folk Psychology

Bennett, J. 1991. Folk-psychological explanations. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

On requirements for belief/desire explanations: input/output patterns, the unity condition (i.e. no single associated mechanism), and teleological bases for generalizations, e.g. through evolution or educability.
Bermudez, J. L. 2003. The domain of folk psychology. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Blackburn, S. 1992. Theory, observation, and drama. Mind and Language 7:187. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Bogdan, R. G. (ed) 1991. Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Bogdan, R. G. 2003. Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Botterill, G. 1996. Folk psychology and theoretical status. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Churchland, P. M. 1988. Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 17 | Google)

Folk psychology is a theory: defense against objections from logicality, softness of laws, practical function, behavior, and simulation. It needn't be a deductive-nomological theory; e.g. it might be based on prototypes.
Clark, A. 1987. From folk psychology to naive psychology. Cognitive Science 11:139-54. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Folk psychology isn't all that bad. It survived evolution after all.
Collins, J. 2000. Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 13:465-490. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1991. Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

FP is craft, not theory. Opinions rather than beliefs are interesting.
Fletcher, G. 1995. The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Fletcher, G. 1995. Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for psychological science. Philosophical Psychology 8:375-88. (Google)

Godfrey-Smith, P. 2004. On folk psychology and mental representation. In (H. Clapin, ed) Representation in Mind. Elsevier. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Goldman, A. 1992. The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Cited by 69 | Google)

On the psychology of self-ascription of mental states. Functionalism has serious problems, as we don't have direct access to causal roles. Defends a qualia-based account, even for propositional attitudes.
Graham, G. 1987. The origins of folk psychology. Inquiry 30:357-79. (Google)

Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1988. How to be realistic about folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Greenwood, J. D. (ed) 1991. The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Heal, J. 2005. Joint attention and understanding the mind. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Hutto, D. 2004. The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language 19:548-73. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Knobe, J. 2003. Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16:309-325. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Knowles, J. 2002. Is folk psychology different? Erkenntnis 57:199-230. (Google)

Leon, M. 1998. The unnaturalness of the mental: The status of folk psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36:367-92. (Google)

Lycan, W. G. 1997. Folk psychology and its liabilities. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Macdonald, C. 2002. Theories of mind and 'The commonsense view'. Mind and Language 17:467-488. Maibom, H. 2003. The mindreader and the scientist. Mind and Language 18:296-315. (Google)

Malle, B. 2004. How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Margolis, J. 1991. The autonomy of folk psychology. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

McDonough, R. 1991. A culturalist account of folk psychology. In (J. Greenwood, ed) The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Millar, A. 2004. Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Morton, A. 1980. Frames of Mind. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Morton, A. 1991. The inevitability of folk psychology. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Morton, A. 1996. Folk psychology is not a predictive device. Mind 105:119-37. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Campbell, D. 2005. Joint attention and common knowledge. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Pettit, P. 2000. How the folk understand folk psychology. Protosociology 14:26-38. (Google)

Place, U. T. 1996. Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In (W. O'Donahue & R. Kitchener, eds) The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Google)

Pratt, I. 1996. Encoding psychological knowledge. In (P. Millican & A. Clark, eds) Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Preston, J. M. 1989. Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism. Inquiry 32:277-303. (Google)

Defending the claim that folk psychology is an empirical pre-scientific theory, with its own laws. In a particular, a detailed reply to the criticisms in Wilkes 1984.
Robinson, W. S. 1996. Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8:167-87. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Sehon S. R. 1997. Natural kind terms and the status of folk psychology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:333-44. (Google)

Sharpe, R. 1987. The very idea of a folk psychology. Inquiry 30:381-93. (Google)

Smith, B. C. 1996. Does science underwrite our folk psychology? In (W. O'Donahue & R. Kitchener, eds) The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Google)

Stemmer, N. 1995. A behaviorist account to theory and simulation theories of folk psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 23:29-41. (Google)

Sterelny, K. 1998. Intentional agency and the metarepresentation hypothesis. Mind and Language 13:11-28. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Stich, S. P. & Ravenscroft, R. 1994. What is folk psychology? Cognition 50:447-68. Reprinted in (Stich) Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Distinguishes internal and external accounts of folk psychology (mechanisms vs systematizations), and various versions of each of these. Only some are compatible with eliminativist arguments.
Stich, S. & Nichols, S. 2002. Folk psychology. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 58 | Google)

Stich, S. P. 1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 130 | Google)

Beliefs/desires are out, new Syntactic Theory is in.
von Eckardt, B. 1997. The empirical naivete in the current philosophical conception of folk psychology. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Weatherall, P. 1996. What do propositions measure in folk psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9:365-80. (Google)

Wilkes, K. V. 1984. Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense. Inquiry 27:339-61. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wilkes, K. V. 1991. The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology. Synthese 89:15-39. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Common-sense psychology is no theory at all, and not in competition with scientific psychology. CSP is particular, rich, vague; SP is general, austere, precise. CSP will be neither subsumed nor eliminated by SP.
Wilkes, K. V. 1991. The long past and the short history. In (R. Bogdan, ed) Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Argues that commonsense and scientific psychology are quite distinct in their aims, scope, framework, and nature, but have been confused by philosophy. With support from historical considerations.

5.1b The Theory Theory

Bishop, M. A. 2002. The theory theory thrice over: The child as scientist, superscientist, or social institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33:121-36. (Google)

Falvey, K. 1999. A natural history of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:324-345. (Google)

Fine, A. 1996. Science as child's play: Tales from the crib. Philosophy of Science 63:534-37. (Google)

Glymour, C. 2000. Android epistemology for babies. Synthese 122:53-68. (Google)

Gopnik, A. 1990. Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories of mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20:89-114. (Cited by 3 | Google)

On the development of folk-psychological concepts in children. First the appearance/reality distinction, then more complex theories of perception, representation, and belief. Implications for the status of folk psychology.
Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. 1992. Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language 7:145-71. (Google)

Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. M. 1995. Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell.

Gopnik, A. 1997. The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science 63:485-514. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Gopnik, A. and Meltzoff, AN. 1998. Theories vs. modules: To the max and beyond. A reply to Poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols. Mind and Language 13:450-456. (Google)

Gopnik, A. 2003. The theory theory as an alternative to the innateness hypothesis. In (L. Antony, ed) Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell. (Google)

Gordon, R. M. 2000. Sellars's Rylean ancestors revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114. (Google)

Leslie, A. M. & German, T. P. 1995. Knowledge and ability in "theory of mind": A one-eyed overview of a debate. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:249-58. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 120 | Google)

Schwitzgebel, E. 1996. Theories in children and the rest of us. Philosophy of Science Association 3:S202-S210. (Google)

Sellars, W. 1956. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329. Reprinted as Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press, 1997. (Cited by 197 | Google)

Stich, S. & Nichols, S. 1998. Theory theory to the max. Mind and Language 13:421-449. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Zahavi, D. 2004. The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind. In (D. Zahavi, ed) The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Google)

5.1c The Simulation Theory

Adams, F. 2001. Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate. Mind & Language 16:368-392. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Bernier, P. 2002. From simulation to theory. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. (Google)

Campbell, J. 2002. Joint attention and simulation. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Child, W. 2002. Reply to 'Simulation theory and mental concepts'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Currie, G. 1995. Visual imagery as the simulation of vision. Mind and Language 10:25-44. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Currie, G. 1996. Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Currie, G. & Ravenscroft, I. 1997. Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of Science 64:161-80/ (Cited by 9 | Google)

Davies, M. 1992. The mental simulation debate. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Truth and Rationality. Ridgeview. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Davies, M. & Stone, T. (eds) 1995. Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell. (Cited by 67 | Google)

Davies, M. & Stone, T. 2001. Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics 29:127-73. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Decety, J. 2002. Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Dokic, J. 2002. Reply to 'The scope and limit of mental simulation'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Dokic, J. & Proust, J. (eds) 2002. Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Fuller, G. 1995. Simulation and psychological concepts. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Gallagher, S. 2001. The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:83-108. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Gallese, V. 2001. The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:33-50. (Cited by 49 | Google)

Garson, J. 2003. Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? Philosophical Psychology 16:499-515. (Google)

Gianfranco, S. 2002. Reply to 'From simulation to theory'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Goldman, A. 1989. Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 99 | Google)

Goldman, A. 1992. In defense of the simulation theory. Mind and Language 7:104-119. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 61 | Google)

Goldman, A. 1996. Simulation and interpersonal utility. In (L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Goldman, A. 2000. Folk psychology and mental concepts. Protosociology 14:4-25. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Goldman, A. 2002. Simulation theory and mental concepts. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Goldman, A. 2002. The mentalizing folk. Protosociology 16:7-34. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Goldman, A. 2006. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Gordon, R. M. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 141 | Google)

FP is a strategy for prediction via simulation; an ability, not a theory.
Gordon, R. M. 1992. The simulation theory: objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language 7:11-34. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Gordon, R. M. & Barker, J. A. 1994. Autism and the "theory of mind" debate. In (G. Graham & G. L. Stephens, eds) Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Gordon, R. M. 1995. Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 36 | Google)

Gordon, R. M. 1996. Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. In (L. May, M. Friedman, & A. Clark, eds) Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Gordon, R. M. 1996. `Radical' simulationism. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Greenwood, J. D. 1999. Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No "instance of the fingerpost". Mind and Language 14:32-56. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Heal, J. 1986. Replication and functionalism. In (J. Butterfield, ed) Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 42 | Google)

Heal, J. 1994. Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? In (C. Peacocke, ed) Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Heal, J. 1995. How to think about thinking. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Heal, J. 1996. Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11:44-67. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Heal, J. 1996. Simulation, theory, and content. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Heal, J. 1998. Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach. Mind and Language 13:477-498. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Heal, J. 2000. Other minds, rationality, and analogy. Aristotelian Society Supplement 74:1-19. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Heal, J. 2000. Understanding other minds from the inside. Protosociology 14:39-55. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Hoerl, C. 2002. Reply to 'Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Jacob, P. 2002. The scope and limit of mental simulation. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Jeannerod, M. & Pacherie, E. 2004. Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19:113-146. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Kuhberger, A, Perner, J. , Schulte, M. , & Leingruber, R. 1995. Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? Mind and Language 10:423-36. (Google)

LeBar, M. 2001. Simulation, theory, and emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14:423-434. (Google)

Levin, J. 1995. Folk psychology and the simulationist challenge. Acta Analytica 10:77-100. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ludwig, P. 2002. Reply to 'Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition?' In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Nichols, S. , Stich, S. , & Leslie, A. 1995. Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation. Mind and Language 10:437-45. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Nichols, S. , Stich, S. , Leslie, A. , Klein, D. 1996. Varieties of off-line simulation. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 1998. Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal. Mind and Language 13:499-512. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Pacherie, E. 2002. Reply to 'Joint attention and simulaton'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Pelletier, J. 2002. Reply to 'Varieties of simulation'. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Google)

Perner, J. 1994. The necessity and impossibility of simulation. In (C. Peacocke, ed) Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Perner, J. 1996. Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Proust, J. 2002. Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pust, J. 1999. External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory. Mind and Language 14:113-130. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ravenscroft, I. 2003. Simulation, collapse and Humean motivation. Mind and Language 18:162-174. Recanati, F. 2002. Varieties of simulation. In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Saxe, R. 2005. Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(4):174-79. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Sharpe, R. A. 1997. One cheer for the simulation theory. Inquiry 40:115-31. (Google)

Stich, S. P. & Nichols, S. 1993. Folk psychology: simulation or tacit theory? Mind and Language 7:35-71. Reprinted in (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Folk Psychology. Blackwell. (Cited by 58 | Google)

Stich, S. P. & Nichols, S. 1995. Second thoughts on simulation. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Stich, S. P. & Nichols, S. 1997. Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation. Mind and Language 12:297-326. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Stone, T. & Davies, M. 1996. The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Wilkerson, W. S. 2001. Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: the interpretive moment. Philosophical Psychology 14:141-153. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Wringe, B. 2003. Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy 11:353-374. (Google)

5.1d Theory of Mind, Misc

Andrews, K. 2002. Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Arkway, A. 2000. The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies 98:115-137. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 1996. Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory. In (P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds) Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. 1996. Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 119 | Google)

Cruz, J. L. H. 1998. Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 13:323-340. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Currie, G. 1998. Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting. Mind and Language 13:35-55. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Davies, M. & Stone, T. (eds) 1995. Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell. (Cited by 49 | Google)

Freeman, N. H. 1995. Theories of mind in collision: Plausibility and authority. In (M. Davies & T. Stone, eds) Mental Simulation. Blackwell. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Eilan, N. , Hoerl, C. , McCormack, T. , & Roessler, J. 2005. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Eilan, N. 2005. Joint attention, communication, and mind. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Henderson, D. 1996. Simulation theory versus theory theory: A difference without a difference in explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34:65-93. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1999. All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate. Philosophical Papers 28:77-96. (Google)

Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2003. Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 35 | Google)

Peacocke, C. 2005. Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge. In (N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Perner, J. , Gschaider, A. , Kuhberger, A. & Schrofner, S. 1999. Predicting others through simulation or by theory? A method to decide. Mind and Language 14:57-79.

Ruffman, T. 1996. Do children understand the mind by means of a simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference. Mind and Language 11:388-414. (Google)

Scholl, B. J. & Leslie, A. M. 1999. Modularity, development and "theory of mind." Mind and Language 14:131-153. (Google)

5.2 Issues in Cognitive Science

5.2a Nativism (Chomsky, etc)

Antony, L. 2001. Empty heads?. Mind and Language 16:193-214. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Ariew, A. 1996. Innateness and canalization. Philosophy of Science Supplement 63:19-27. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Atherton, M. & Schwarz, R. 1974. Linguistic innateness and its evidence. Journal of Philosophy 71:6. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Chomsky, N. 1967. Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas. Synthese 17:2-11. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Chomsky, N. 1969. Linguistics and philosophy. In (S. Hook, ed) Language and Philosophy. New York University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Reply to Putnam 1967: Putnam underestimates complexity of grammar, etc.
Chomsky, N. 1975. On cognitive capacity. In Reflections on Language. Pantheon Books. (Google)

Chomsky, N. 1980. Discussion of Putnam's comments. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Chomsky, N. & Fodor, J. A. 1980. The inductivist fallacy. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Churchland, P. S. 1978. Fodor on language learning. Synthese 38:149-59. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Collins, J. 2003. Cowie on the poverty of stimulus. Synthese 136:159-190. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cowie, F. 1997. The logical problem of language acquisition. Synthese 111:17-51. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cowie, F. 1998. What's Within? Oxford University Press. (Google)

Cowie, F. 1998. Mad dog nativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49:227-252. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cowie, F. 2001. On cussing in church: in defense of What's Within?. Mind and Language 16:231-245.

Cummins, D. D. 1996. Evidence for the innateness of deontic reasoning. Mind and Language 11:160-90. (Cited by 41 | Google)

De Rosa, R. 2000. On Fodor's claim that classical empiricists and rationalists agree on the innateness of ideas. Protosociology 14:240-269. (Google)

Harman, G. 1969. Linguistic competence and empiricism. In (S. Hook, ed) Language and Philosophy. New York University Press. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. , Bever, T. & Garrett, M. 1974. The specificity of language skills. In The Psychology of Language. McGraw-Hill. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. 2001. Doing without What's Within: Fiona Cowie's critique of nativism. Mind 110:99-148. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1980. Reply to Putnam. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1981. The present status of the innateness controversy. In Representations. MIT Press. (Cited by 79 | Google)

Concepts are undefinable, so primitive, so innate (plus gloss).
Fodor, J. A. 1980. On the impossibility of acquiring `more powerful' structures. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Johnson, K. 2004. Gold's theorem and cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 70. (Google)

Katz, J. 1966. Innate ideas. In The Philosophy of Language. Harper & Row. (Google)

Overview; poverty of stimulus, unobservable features => rationalism.
Katz, J. 2000. Realistic Rationalism. MIT Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Kaye, L. J. 1993. Are most of our concepts innate? Synthese 2:187-217. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Khalidi, M. A. 2001. Innateness and domain-specificity. Philosophical Studies 105:191-210. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Khalidi, M. A. 2002. Nature and nurture in cognition. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53:251-272. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Laurence, S. , & Margolis, E. 2001. The poverty of the stimulus argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52:217-276. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Laurence, S. & Margolis, E. 2003. Radical concept nativism. Cognition 86:25-55. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Lidz, J. & Waxman, S. 2004. Reaffirming the poverty of the stimulus argument: A reply to the replies. Cognition 93:157-165. (Google)

Marcus, G. 2004. Birth of the Mind: How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates the Complexity of Human Thought. Basic Books. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Matthews, R. J. 2001. Cowie's anti-nativism. Mind and Language 16:215-230. (Google)

Mehler, J. & Fox, R. (eds) 1985. Neonate Cognition: Beyond the Blooming Buzzing Confusion. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed) 1980. Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 114 | Google)

An excellent collection of papers & responses by Piaget, Chomsky and others.
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1986. The rise of selective theories: A case study and some lessons from immunology. In (W. Demopoulos, ed) Language Learning and Concept Acquisition. Ablex. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1989. Evolution, selection, and cognition: From learning to parameter setting in biology and in the study of language. Cognition 31:1-44. (Cited by 35 | Google)

Why learning is selective and not instructive. Biological analogies, linguistic evidence. Dispense with "learning" as a scientific term.
Pitt, D. 2000. Nativism and the theory of content. Protosociology 14:222-239. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Putnam, H. 1967. The `Innateness Hypothesis' and explanatory models in linguistics. Synthese 17:12-22. Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975). (Cited by 20 | Google)

Contra nativism: disputes (1) surprising universals (2) explanation of universals (3) ease of learning (4) relevance of IQ-independence.
Putnam, H. 1980. What is innate and why. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Putnam, H. 1980. Comments on Chomsky's and Fodor's replies. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. (Google)

Quartz, S. 2003. Innateness and the brain. Biology and Philosophy 18:13-40. (Google)

Ramsey, W. & Stich, S. P. 1990. Connectionism and three levels of nativism. Synthese 82:177-205. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Identifies minimal nativism vs anti-empiricism vs rationalism. Considers the relevance of connectionist networks. Some nativist arguments may survive.
Samet, J. 1986. Troubles with Fodor's nativism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:575-594. (Google)
Concepts can be acquired without being learned by symbol-manipulation.
Samet, J. & Flanagan, O. J. 1989. Innate representations. In (S. Silvers, ed) Rerepresentation. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Sampson, G. 1978. Linguistic universals as evidence for empiricism. Journal of Linguistics. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Explain universals via Popper/Simon empirical model.
Samuels, R. 1998. What brains won't tell us about the mind: A critique of the neurobiological argument against representational nativism. Mind and Language 13:548-570. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Samuels, R. 2002. Nativism in cognitive science. Mind and Language 17:233-65. Samuels, R. 2004. Innateness in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Science 8:136-141. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Schwartz, R. 1995. Is mathematical competence innate? Philosophy of Science 62:227-40. (Google)

Sterelny, K. 1989. Fodor's nativism. Philosophical Studies 55:119-41. (Google)

Stich, S. P. (ed) 1975. Innate Ideas. University of California Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Stich, S. P. 1979. Between Chomskian rationalism and Popperian empiricism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30:329-47. (Google)

Can take middle ground. Anti-empiricism doesn't imply rationalism.
Viger, C. 2005. Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness. Mind and Language 20:313-25. (Google)

5.2b Modularity (Fodor, etc)

Appelbaum, I. 1998. Fodor, modularity, and speech perception. Philosophical Psychology 11:317-330. (Google)

Arbib, M. 1989. Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor. In (P. Slezak, ed) Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. (Google)

Against Fodor: modules are smaller, interact strongly, not domain-specific.
Atkinson, A. & Wheeler, M. 2004. The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition. Mind and Language 19:147-176. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Barrett, H. C. 2005. Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity. Mind and Language 20:259-87. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Bennett, L. J. 1990. Modularity of mind revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41:429-36. (Google)

Remarks on Shanon and Fodor.
Browne, D. 1996. Cognitive versatility. Minds and Machines 6:507-23. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Bruner, J. 1957. On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review 65:14-21. (Cited by 213 | Google)

Overview of the original studies on top-down effects in perception.
Cam, P. 1988. Modularity, rationality, and higher cognition. Philosophical Studies 53:279-94. (Google)

Cam, P. 1990. Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusion. Analysis 50:231-5. (Google)

Carruthers, P. 2003. Moderately massive modularity. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Mind and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2004. Practical reasoning in a modular mind. Mind and Language 19:259-278. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Chien, A. J. 1996. Why the mind may not be modular. Minds and Machines 6:1-32. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Churchland, P. M. 1979. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 132 | Google)

Our perception is deeply theory-laden, and potentially very plastic.
Churchland, P. M. 1988. Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55:167-87. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 24 | Google)
Contra Fodor 1984: observation is theory-laden (built-in or not); supported by neurophysiological evidence; perceptual systems have long-term plasticity.
Collins, J. 2005. Faculty disputes. Mind and Language 19:503-33. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Collins, J. 2005. On the input problem for massive modularity. Minds and Machines 15:1-22. (Google)

Currie, G. & Sterelny, K. 2000. How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philosophical Quarterly 50:145-160. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Currie, G. & Ravenscroft, I. 2002. Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)

DesAutels, P. 1995. Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's perceptual plasticity. Philosophical Psychology 8:25-33. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 1331 | Google)

Perception happens in informationally encapsulated, domain-specific modules. Central systems aren't encapsulated, and so may be impossible to understand.
Fodor, J. A. 1985. Precis of The Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:1-42. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990).
Summary of MOM (with commentary and reply in the BBS printing).
Fodor, J. A. 1986. The modularity of mind. In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) Meaning and Cognitive Structure. Ablex. (Cited by 1331 | Google)
Informal discussion of modularity. With commentaries by Fahlman, Caplan.
Fodor, J. A. 1984. Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51:23-43. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990). (Cited by 27 | Google)
Argues for an observation/theory distinction, and against belief affecting perception.
Fodor, J. A. 1988. A reply to Churchland's `Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55:188-98. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990). (Google)
Churchland is up the creek without a paddle.
Fodor, J. A. 1989. Why should the mind be modular? In (A. George, ed) Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990). (Cited by 8 | Google)

Garfield, J. (ed) 1987. Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. MIT Press. (Cited by 30 | Google)

A collection of papers on modularity in language and vision.
Gray, R. 2001. Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14:65-82. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Meyering, T. C. 1994. Fodor's modularity: A new name for an old dilemma. Philosophical Psychology 7:39-62. (Google)

Mameli, M. 2002. Modules and mindreaders. Biology and Philosophy 16:377-93. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Okasha, S. 2003. Fodor on cognition, modularity, and adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70:68-88. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Olsson, E. 1997. Coherence and the modularity of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:404-11. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Parsell, M. 2005. Context-sensitive inference, modularity, and the assumption of formal processing. Philosophical Psychology 18:45-58. (Google)

Pylyshyn, Z. 1999. Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:341-365. (Cited by 81 | Google)

Rollins, M. 1994. Deep plasticity: The encoding approach to perceptual change. Philosophy of Science 61:39-54. (Google)

Ross, J. 1990. Against postulating central systems in the mind. Philosophy of Science 57:297-312. (Google)

Fodor's arguments for unencapsulated central systems are no good; AI is possible after all.
Shanon, B. 1988. Remarks on the modularity of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39:331-52. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Criticism of Fodor. Modularity is dynamic, and can be central.
Turvey, M. T. , Shaw, R. E. , Reed, E. S. , & Mace, W. M. 1981. Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9:237-304.

Ullman, S. 1980. Against direct perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:333-81. (Cited by 49 | Google)

Vaina, L. M. 1990. What and where in the human visual system: Two hierarchies of visual modules. Synthese 83:49-91. (Google)

5.2c Evolution of Cognition

Ariew, A. 2003. Natural selection doesn't work that way: Jerry Fodor vs. evolutionary psychology on gradualism and saltationism. Mind and Language 18:478-483. (Google)

Atran, S. 2005. Adaptationism for human cognition: Strong, spurious, or weak? Mind and Language 20:39-67. (Google)

Atkinson, A. P. & Wheeler, M. 2004. The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition. Mind and Language 19:147-76. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Atkinson, A. P. , & Wheeler, M. 2003. Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning. In (D. Over, ed) Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press. (Google)

Barkow, J. , Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (eds) 1992. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 518 | Google)

Bergstrom, C. & Godfrey-Smith, P. 1998. On the evolution of behavioral complexity in individuals and populations. Biology and Philosophy 13:205-31. (Google)

Buller, D. J. 1999. DeFreuding evolutionary psychology: Adaptation and human motivation. In (V. Hardcastle, ed) Where Biology Meets Philosophy. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Buller, D. J. 2000. A guided tour of evolutionary psychology. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Buller, D. J. 2005. Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Buller, D. J. 2005. Evolutionary psychology: The emperor's new paradigm. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Buller, D. J. & Hardcastle, V. G. 2000. Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity. Brain and Mind 1:307-25. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Buss, D. M. 1999. Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. Allyn and Bacon. (Cited by 253 | Google)

Calvin, W. 2004. A Brief History of the Mind: From Apes to Intellect and Beyond. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1987. From evolution to behavior: Evolutionary psychology as the missing link. In (J. Dupre, ed) The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality. MIT Press. (Cited by 115 | Google)

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1994. Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: Toward an evolutionary rigorous cognitive science. Cognition 50:41-77. (Cited by 81 | Google)

Cummins, D. D. & Cummins, R. 1999. Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation. Cognition 73:B37-53. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Davies, P. S. 1999. The conflict of evolutionary psychology. In (V. Hardcastle, ed) Where Biology Meets Psychology. MIT Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Downes, S. 2002. Some recent developments in evolutionary approaches to the study of human cognition and behavior. Biology and Philosophy 16:575-94. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ferguson, S. 2002. Methodology in evolutionary psychology. Biology and Philosophy 17:635-50. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Forster, M. & Shapiro, L. 2000. Prediction and accommodation in evolutionary psychology. Psychological Inquiry 11:31-33. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Franks, B. 2005. The role of "the environment" in cognitive and evolutionary psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18:59-82. (Google)

Gerrans, P. 2002. The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. Biology and Philosophy 17:305-21. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Godfrey-Smith, P. 1996. Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 76 | Google)

Godfrey-Smith, P. 2002. On the evolution of representational and interpretive capacities. Monist 85:50-69. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Godfrey-Smith, P. 2002. Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition. In (R. Sternberg and J. Kaufman, eds) The Evolution of Intelligence. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Grantham, T. A. & Nichols, S. 1999. Evolutionary psychology: Ultimate explanations and Panglossian predictions. In (V. Hardcastle, ed) Where Biology Meets Psychology. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. 1999. Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Humphrey, N. 2003. The Inner Eye: Social Intelligence in Evolution. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Humphrey, N. 2003. The Mind Made Flesh: Essays from the Frontiers of Psychology and Evolution. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Levy, N. 2004. Evolutionary psychology, human universals, and the standard social science model. Biology and Philosophy 19:459-72. (Google)

Lloyd, E. A. 1999. Evolutionary psychology: The burdens or proof. Biology and Philosophy 14:211-33. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Mameli, M. 2002. Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution. Biology and Philosophy 16:595-626. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Over, D. 2002. The rationality of evolutionary psychology. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pinker, S. & Bloom, P. 1990. Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:707-27. (Cited by 335 | Google)

Plantinga, A. 2004. Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:602-619. (Google)

Plotkin, H. 2001. Evolution and the human mind: How far can we go? In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Radcliffe Richards, J. 2000. Human Nature after Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Samuels, R. 1998: Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, 575-602.

Scher, S. J. & Rauscher, F. 2002. Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Perspectives. Kluwer. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Shapiro, L. & Epstein, W. 1998. Evolutionary theory meets cognitive psychology: A more selective perspective. Mind and Language 13:171-94. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Shapiro, L. 2001. Mind the adaptation. In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Sperber, D. 1996. Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Cited by 282 | Google)

Sterelny, K. 2003. Thought in a Hostile World. Blackwell. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Sterelny, K. 2003. Darwinian concepts in the philosophy of mind. In (J. Hodges & G. Radick, eds) The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Stotz, K. C. & Griffiths, P. E. 2002. Dancing in the dark: Evolutionary psychology and the argument from design. In (S. Scher & F. Rauscher, eds) Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches. Kluwer. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. 1998. Evolutionizing the cognitive sciences: A reply to Shapiro and Epstein. Mind and Language 13:195-204. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Walsh, D. M. 2001. Naturalism, Evolution and the Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Weber, B. & Depew, D. (eds) 2003. Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Wheeler, M. & Atkinson, A. P. 2001. Domains, brains and evolution. In (D. Walsh, ed) Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wilson, D. S. , Dietrich, E. & Clark, A. B. 2003. On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18:669-81. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Wright, R. 1994. The Moral Animal. Pantheon Books. (Cited by 219 | Google)

5.2d Rationality

Bermudez, J. 2002. Rationality and psychological explanation without language. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. Bermudez, J. & Millar, A. (eds) 2002. Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Noordhof, P. 2002. Imagining objects and imagining experiences. Mind and Language 17:426-455. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Biro, J. & Ludwig, K. 1994. Are there more than minimal a priori limits on irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:89-102. (Google)

Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. 2002. The rational analysis of human cognition. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. (Google)

Cherniak, C. 1986. Minimal Rationality. MIT Press. (Cited by 175 | Google)

Cherniak, C. 1981. Minimal rationality. Mind 90:161-83. (Cited by 175 | Google)

Cherniak, C. 1983. Rationality and the structure of memory. Synthese 57:163-86. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cohen, L. J. 1979. On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? Cognition 7:385-407. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Cohen, L. J. 1980. Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8:89-92. (Google)

Cohen, L. J. 1981. Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Cited by 122 | Google)

Cohen, L. J. 1986. The Dialogue of Reason. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Cook, K. S. & Levi, M. 1990. The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 37 | Google)

Davidson, D. 1985. Incoherence and irrationality. Dialectica 39:345-54. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Davidson, D. 1995. Could there be a science of rationality? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3:1-16. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Feldman, R. 1988. Rationality, reliability, and natural selection. Philosophy of Science 55:218-27. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Fetzer, J. H. 1990. Evolution, rationality and testability. Synthese 82:423-39. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Gardner, S. 1996. Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Gibbard, A. 2002. Normative explanations: Invoking rationality to explain happenings. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. (Google)

Harman, G. 1986. Change in View. MIT Press. (Cited by 119 | Google)

Holt, L. 1999. Rationality is still hard work: Some further notes on the disruptive effects of deliberation. Philosophical Psychology 12:215-219. (Google)

Kahneman, D. , Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (eds) 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1961 | Google)

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1979. On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7:409-11. (Google)

Kelly, T. 2002. The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110:163-96. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Levi, I. 2002. Commitment and change of view. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. (Google)

Lowe, E. 2002. The rational and the real: Some doubts about the programme of 'Rational analysis'. In (J. Bermudez and A. Millar, eds) Reason and Nature. Clarendon. (Google)

Manktelow, K. & Over, D. 1987. Reasoning and rationality. Mind and Language 2:199-219. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Matthen, M. 2002. Human rationality and the unique origin constraint. In (A. Ariew, ed) Functions. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Mele, A. R. 1987. Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 43 | Google)

Millar, A. 2001. Rationality and higher-order intentionality. Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Nisbett, R. & Ross, L. 1980. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall. (Cited by 728 | Google)

Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 146 | Google)

Papineau, D. 2003. The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Reiner, R. 1995. Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality. Minds and Machines 5:373-89. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Rust, J. 1990. Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Searle, J. 2003. Rationality in Action. MIT Press. (Cited by 76 | Google)

Scholl, B. J. 1997. Reasoning, rationality, and architectural resolution. Philosophical Psychology 10:451-470. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Scott-Kakures, D. 1996. Self-deception and internal irrationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:31-56. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Sober, E. 1981. The evolution of rationality. Synthese 46:95-120. (Cited by 13 | Google)

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Stein, E. 1996. Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 37 | Google)

Stich, S. P. 1985. Could man be an irrational animal? Synthese 64:115-35. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Wason, P. 1966. Reasoning. In (Foss, ed) New Horizons in Psychology. Penguin. (Cited by 223 | Google)

5.2e Embodiment [see also 2.2]

Agre, P. 1995. Computation and embodied agency. Informatica 19:527-35. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ballard, D. 1991. Animate vision. Artificial Intelligence 48:57-86. (Cited by 381 | Google)

Beer, R. 1995. A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction. Artificial Intelligence 72:173-215. (Cited by 169 | Google)

Bermudez, J. L. , Marcel, A. , & Eilan, N. (eds) 1995. The Body and the Self. MIT Press. (Cited by 44 | Google)

Buckley, J. & Hall, L. 1999. Self-knowledge and embodiment. Southwest Philosophy Review 15. (Google)

Cassam, Q. 1995. Introspection and bodily self-ascription. In (J. Bermudez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan, eds) The Body and the Self. MIT Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Cassam, Q. 2002. Representing bodies. Ratio 15:315-334. (Google)

Chrisley, R. L. 1994. Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and robotics. In (K. M. Ford, C. Glymour, & P. Hayes, eds) Android Epistemology. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Clark, A. 1987. Being there: Why implementation matters to cognitive science. AI Review 1:231-44. (Cited by 616 | Google)

On the importance of embodiment of systems in cognition.
Clark, A. 1995. Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time success. Philosophical Perspectives 9:89-104. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Clark, A. 1997. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. MIT Press. (Cited by 616 | Google)

Clark, A. 1997. Embodiment and the philosophy of mind. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. J. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58:7-19. (Cited by 82 | Google)

Advocates a sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the environment in actively driving cognition. Beliefs can extend into an agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way.
Clark, A. 2001. Reasons, robots and The extended mind. Mind and Language 16:121045.

Clark, A. 2003. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press. Clark, A. 2004. Embodiment and the philosophy of mind. In (A. Peruzzi, ed) Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. (Cited by 45 | Google)

Cussins, A. 1992. Content, embodiment, and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails. Mind 101:651-88. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Gibson, J. J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin. (Cited by 2479 | Google)

Haugeland, J. 1993. Mind embodied and embedded. In (Y. Houng & J. Ho, eds) Mind and Cognition:1993 International Symposium. Academia Sinica. (Cited by 27 | Google)

Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm.
Hendriks-Jansen, H. 1996. Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution, and Human Thought. MIT Press. (Cited by 154 | Google)

Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press. (Cited by 1531 | Google)

Johnson, M. L. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 493 | Google)

Johnson, M. L. 1995. Incarnate mind. Minds and Machines 5:533-45. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Loren, L. A. & Dietrich, E. 1997. Merleau-Ponty, embodied cognition, and the problem of intentionality. Cybernetics and Systems 28:345-58. (Cited by 4 | Google)

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McClamrock, R. 1995. Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 43 | Google)

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5.2f Animal Cognition [see also 6.4c, 6.4d]

Allen, C. 1997. Animal cognition and animal minds. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

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Allen, C. & Bekoff, M. 1995. Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior. Mind and Language 10:313-328. (Google)

Allen, C. & Bekoff, M. 1997. Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press. (Cited by 49 | Google)

Allen, C. & Hauser, M. 1991. Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes. Philosophy of Science 58:221-40. Reprinted in Allen & Jamison 1996.

Bateson, P. P. G. & Klopfer, P. H. 1991. Perspectives in Ethology, Volume 9: Human Understanding and Animal Awareness. Plenum Press. (Google)

Beer, C. G. 1992. Conceptual issues in cognitive ethology. Advances in the Study of Behavior 21:69-109. (Cited by 5 | Google)

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Bekoff, M. 1999. Social cognition: Exchanging and sharing information on the run. Erkenntnis 51:617-632. (Cited by 1 | Google)

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Bermudez, J. L. 2003. Ascribing thoughts to non-linguistic creatures. Facta Philosophica 5:313-34. (Google)

Cheney, D. L. & Seyfarth, R. M. 1990. How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 263 | Google)

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Crisp, R. 1996. Evolution and psychological unity. In (M. Bekoff & D. Jamieson, eds) Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

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Griffin, D. R. 1992. Animal Minds. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 112 | Google)

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5.2g Psychopathology

Adshead, G. 1999. Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 99:41-44. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. 2004. Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11: 1-11. (Google)

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5.3 Aspects of Mind

5.3a Pain and Pleasure

Aydede, M. 2000. An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:537-570. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Aydede, M. 2001. Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2:29-73. (Cited by 10 | Google)

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5.3b Emotions

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Reisberg, D. & Chambers, D. 1991. Neither pictures nor propositions: What can we learn from a mental image? Canadian Journal of Psychology 45:336-52. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Rey, G. 1981. What are mental images? In (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Richardson, A. 1969. Mental Imagery. Routledge. (Cited by 40 | Google)

Rollins, M. 1989. Mental Imagery: On the Limits of Cognitive Science. Yale University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

Russow, L. 1985. Dennett, mental images and images in context. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:581-94. (Google)

Schwartz, R. 1980. Imagery: There is more to it than meets the eye. Philosophy of Science Association 1980. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Shepard, R. & Cooper, L. 1982. Mental Images and their Transformations. MIT Press. (Cited by 265 | Google)

Shier, D. 1997. How can pictures be propositions? Ratio 10:65-75. (Google)

Sterelny, K. 1986. The imagery debate. Philosophy of Science 53:560-83. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). (Cited by 8 | Google)

Stevenson, L. 2003. Twelve conceptions of imagination. British Journal of Aesthetics 43:238-59. (Google)

Thomas, N. J. T. 1997. Are theories of imagination theories of imagery? Manuscript. (Google)

Tye, M. 1984. The debate about mental imagery. Journal of Philosophy 81:678-91. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Tye, M. 1988. The picture theory of images. Philosophical Review. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Tye, M. 1991. The Imagery Debate. MIT Press, (Cited by 82 | Google)

Woody, M. J. 2003. The unconscious as a hermeneutic myth: A defense of the imagination. In (J. Philips & J. Morley, eds) Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Wright, E. 1983. Inspecting images. Philosophy 58:57-72. (Cited by 4 | Google)

5.3f Color [see also 1.3a, 1.7a, 1.7d]

Armstrong, D. M. 1969. Colour realism and the argument from microscopes. In (R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Arstila, V. 2003. True colors, false theories. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81:41-61. (Google)

Averill, E. W. 1985. Color and the anthropocentric problem. Journal of Philosophy 82:281-303. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Averill, E. W. 1992. The relational nature of color. Philosophical Review 101:551-88. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Bigelow, J. Collins, J. & Pargetter, R. 1990. Colouring in the world. Mind 99:279-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Boghossian, P. & Velleman, J. D. 1989. Color as a secondary quality. Mind 98:81-103. (Google)

Boghossian, P. & Velleman, J. D. 1991. Physicalist theories of color. Philosophical Review 100:67-106. (Cited by 20 | Google)

Boghossian, P. 2002. Seeking the real. Philosophical Studies 108:223-38. (Google)

Broackes, J. 1992. The autonomy of colour. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, ed) Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Broackes, J. 1997. The Nature of Colour. Routledge. (Google)

Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. 1997. Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. 1997. Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. 1997. Colors and reflectances. In (A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert, eds) Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 42 | Google)

Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. 2004. Hardin, Tye, and color physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 101:37-43. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Byrne, A. 2001. Do colors look like dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others. Philosophical Quarterly 51. (Google)

Byrne, A. 2002. Yes, Virginia, lemons are yellow. Philosophical Studies 108:213-22. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Byrne, A. 2003. Color and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:641-665. Campbell, J. 1993. A simple view of colour. In (J. Haldane & C. Wright, ed) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Campbell, K. 1969. Colours. In (R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Campbell, K. 1982. The implications of Land's theory of colour vision. In (L. Cohen, ed) Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6. North-Holland. (Google)

Campbell, K. 1993. David Armstrong and realism about colour. In (J. Bacon, K. Campbell, & L. Reinhardt, eds) Ontology, Causality, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Clark, A. 1996. True theories, false colors. Philosophy of Science Supplement 63:143-50. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Cohen, J. 2003. Color: A functionalist approach. Philosophical Studies 113:1-42. Cohen, J. 2003. On the structural properties of the colors. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81:78-95. (Google)

De Anna, G. 2002. The simple view of colour and the reference of perceptual terms. Philosophy 77:87-108. (Google)

Dedrick, D. 1995. Objectivism and the evolutionary value of color vision. Dialogue 34:35-44. (Google)

Dedrick, D. 1996. Can color be reduced to anything? Philosophy of Science Supplement 3:134-42. (Google)

Edwards, J. 2003. A reply to De Anna on the simple view of colour. Philosophy 78:99-114. (Google)

Ellis, J. 2005. Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:53-73. (Google)

Foster, D. 2003. Does colour constancy exist? Trends in Cognitive Science 7:439-443. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Foti, V. M. 1990. The dimension of color. International Studies in Philosophy 22:13-28. (Google)

Gilbert, P. 1987. Westphal and Wittgenstein on White. Mind 76:399-403. (Google)

Gilbert, P. 1989. Reflections on white: A rejoinder to Westphal. Mind 98:423-6. (Google)

Gold, I. 1999. Dispositions and the central problem of color. (Google)

Gold, I. 1999. On Lewis on Naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:365-370. (Google)

Gold, I. 1999. Dispositions and the central problem of color. Philosophical Studies 93:21-44. (Google)

Hall, R. J. 1996. The evolution of color vision without colors. Philosophy of Science Supplement 63:125-33. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1983. Colors, normal observers and standard conditions. Journal of Philosophy 80:806-13. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1984. A new look at color. American Philosophical Quarterly 21:125-33. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1984. Are scientific objects colored? Mind 93:491-500. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1985. The resemblances of colors. Philosophical Studies 48:35-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1985. Frank talk about the colors of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1988. Color for Philosophers. Hackett. (Cited by 74 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1988. Phenomenal colors and sorites. Nous 22:213-34. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1989. Could white be green? Mind 390:285-8. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1989. Idle colors and busy spectra. Analysis 49:47-8. (Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1990. Color and illusion. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 1993. van Brakel and the not-so-naked emperor. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:137-50. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Hardin, C. L. 2004. A green thought in a green shade. Harvard Review of Philosophy. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Harvey, J. 1992. Challenging the obvious: The logic of color concepts. Philosophia 21:277-94. (Google)

Harvey, J. 2000. Colour-dispositionalism and its recent critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61:137-156. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Hazen, A. P. 1999. On naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:224-231. (Google)

Hilbert, D. R. 1987. Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. CSLI Press. (Cited by 38 | Google)

Hilbert, D. R. 1992. What is color vision? Philosophical Studies 68:351-70. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Holman, E. L. 2002. Color eliminativism and color experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83:38-56. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1996. The primary quality view of color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219. (Cited by 20 | Google)

Jackson, F. 1998. Colour, disjunctions, programming. Analysis 58:86-88. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Jackson, F. & Pargetter, R. 1987. An objectivist's guide to subjectivism about color. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41:127-v41. (Google)

Jacovides, M. 2000. Cambridge changes of color. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:142-164. (Google)

Johnston, M. 1992. How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies 68:221-263. (Cited by 70 | Google)

Kliewer, G. 1998. Neutral color concepts. Philosophical Studies 91:21-41. (Google)

Kraut, R. 1992. The objectivity of color and the color of objectivity. Philosophical Studies 3:265-87. (Google)

Langsam, H. 2000. Why colours do look like dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 50:68-75. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Landesman, C. 1989. Color and Consciousness: An Essay in Metaphysics. Temple University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Leon, M. 2002. Colour wars: Dividing the spoils. Philosophy 77:175-192. (Google)

Levin, J. 2000. Dispositional theories of color and the claims of common sense. Philosophical Studies 100:151-174. (Google)

Lewis, D. 1997. Naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:325-42. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Maund, J. B. 1981. Colour: A case for conceptual fission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59:308-22. (Google)

Maund, J. B. 1991. The nature of color. History of Philosophy Quarterly 8:253-63. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Maund, J. B. 1995. Colours: Their Nature and Representation. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Mausfeld, R. 2004. Color Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 17 | Google)

McFarland, D. & Miller, A. 1998. Jackson on colour as a primary quality. Analysis 58:76-85. (Cited by 4 | Google)

McFarland, D. & Miller, A. 2000. Disjunctions, programming and the Australian view of colour. Analysis 60:209-212. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McGilvray, J. A. 1983. To color. Synthese 54:37-70. (Cited by 2 | Google)

McGilvray, J. A. 1994. Constant colors in the head. Synthese 100:197-239. (Cited by 7 | Google)

McGinn, C. 1996. Another look at color. Journal of Philoophy 93:537-53. (Cited by 32 | Google)

McGinn, M. 1991. Westphal on the physical basis of color incompatibility. Analysis 4:218-22. (Google)

McGinn, M. 1991. On two recent accounts of color. Philosophical Quarterly 41:316-24. (Google)

Miller, A. 2001. The missing-explanation argument revisited. Analysis 61:76-86. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Montgomery, R. 1996. The indeterminacy of color vision. Synthese 106:167-203. (Google)

Myin, E. 2001. Color and the duplication assumption. Synthese 129:61-77. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Nida-Rumelin, M. 1997. The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist view. In (M. Anduschus, A. Newen, & W. Kunne, eds) Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press. (Google)

Persson, S. 2003. Colours with a Humean face. Philosophia 4.1. (Google)

Ross, P. W. 1999. The appearance and nature of color. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37:227-252. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Ross, P. 2000. The relativity of color. Synthese 123:105-130. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2002. A light theory of color. Philosophical Studies 110:267-284. (Google)

Smart, J. J. C. 1975. On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colors. In (C. Cheng, ed) Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. University Press of Hawaii. (Cited by 21 | Google)

Smart, J. J. C. 1995. `Looks red' and dangerous talk. Philosophy 70545-54. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Smith, M. A. 1993. Color, transparency, mind-independence. In (J. Haldane & C. Wright, ed) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. (Google)

Smith, P. 1987. Subjectivity and colour vision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:245-81. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Spackman, J. 2002. Color, relativism, and realism. Philosophical Studies 108:251-88. (Google)

Spohn, W. 1997. The character of color predicates: A materialist view. In (M. Anduschus, A. Newen, & W. Kunne, eds) Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Strawson, G. 1989. Red and `red'. Synthese 78:193-232. (Google)

Stroud, B. 2000. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Stroud-Drinkwater, C. 1994. The naive theory of color. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:345-54. (Google)

Thompson, E. , Palacios, A. , & Varela, F. J. 1992. Ways of coloring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Cited by 71 | Google)

Thompson, E. 1995. Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual content. Synthese 104:1-32. (Google)

Thompson, E. 1995. Colour Vision. Routledge. (Cited by 25 | Google)

Tolliver, J. T. 1996. Interior colors. Philosophical Topics 22:411-41. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. van Brakel, J. 1993. The plasticity of categories: The case of color. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:103-135. (Cited by 95 | Google)

Watkins, M. 1999. Do animals see colors? An anthropocentrist's guide to animals, the color blind, and far away places. Philosophical Studies 94:189-209. (Google)

Watkins, M. 2005. Seeing red: The metaphysics of colours without the physics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:33-52. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Webster, W. R. 2002. Wavelength theory of color strikes back: The return of the physical. Synthese 132:303-34. (Google)

Webster, W. R. 2003. Revelation and transparency in colour vision refuted: A case of mind/brain identity and another bridge over the explanatory gap. Synthese 133:419-39. (Google)

Westphal, J. 1982. Brown: Remarks on color. Inquiry 25:417-33. (Google)

Westphal, J. 1986. White. Mind 95:310-28. (Google)

Westphal, J. 1989. Black. Mind 98:585-9. (Google)

Westphal, J. 1991. Colour: A Philosophical Introduction. Blackwell. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Whitmyer, VG. 1999. Ecological color. Philosophical Psychology 12:197-214. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Wittgenstein, L. 1977. Remarks on Colour. University of California Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)

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5.4 Philosophy of Psychology, General

5.4a Psychological Laws [see also 3.5d]

Antony, L. 1995. Law and order in psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:429-46. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Braithwaite, M. 1949. Causal laws in psychology. Aristotelian Society Supplement 23:45-60. (Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1991. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100:19-34. (Google)

Ceteris paribus means that every realizing state has completing conditions. Even absolute exceptions are OK, as long as they're not across-the-board.
Fodor, J. A. 1989. Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17:59-79. Reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990). (Cited by 47 | Google)
Non-strict psychological laws are compatible with the (nomologically sufficient) causal responsibility of mental properties. So there's no need for epiphobia. With comments on the relation between laws and mechanisms.
Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1990. Soft laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Argues that any laws in intentional psychology have ineliminable same-level exceptions; the Kuhnian crisis in cognitive science gives evidence for this. But ceteris paribus laws provide perfectly good theoretical explanation.
Lycan, W. G. 1981. Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12:9-38. (Cited by 5 | Google)
A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc.
Mace, C. A. 1949. Causal laws in psychology. Aristotelian Society Supplement 23:61-68. (Google)

Marcello, G. 2000. Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws. Philosophy of Science 67:301-315. (Google)

Mott, P. 1992. Fodor and ceteris paribus laws. Mind 101:335-46. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Pietroski, P. & Rey, G. 1995. When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46:81-110. (Cited by 26 | Google)

Schiffer, S. 1991. Ceteris paribus laws. Mind 100:1-17. (Cited by 27 | Google)

There are no ceteris paribus laws, as there's no satisfactory way to cash the "unless" cause. But psychology doesn't need laws, anyway.
Silverberg, A. 1996. Psychological laws and nonmonotonic logic. Erkenntnis 44:199-224. (Google)

Silverberg, A. 2003. Psychological laws. Erkenntnis 58:275-302. (Google)

Warfield, T. A. 1993. Folk-psychological ceteris-paribus laws. Philosophical Studies 71:99-112. (Google)

5.4b Explanation in Cognitive Science

Cummins, R. 1982. The internal manual model of psychological explanation. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:257-68. (Google)

Cummins, R. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. MIT Press. (Cited by 114 | Google)

Psychological explanation is typically via functional analysis, not causal subsumption. On interpretation, computation, and an analysis of cognition and intentionality. With remarks on Dretske, Searle, Titchener, Hull, Freud.
Fodor, J. A. 1968. Psychological Explanation. Random House. (Cited by 54 | Google)

Fodor, J. A. 1968. The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65:627-40. Reprinted in RePresentations (MIT Press, 1980). (Cited by 30 | Google)

Franks, B. 1995. On explanation in cognitive science: Competence, idealization, and the failure of the classical cascade. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46:475-502. (Google)

Gilman, D. 1993. Optimization and simplicity: Marr's theory of vision and biological explanation. Synthese 107:293-323. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Contra Kitcher 1988, much of Marr's theory doesn't depend on optimization; in any case, optimization isn't so bad. With remarks on interdisciplinarity.
Heil, J. 1986. Formalism and psychological explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:1-10. (Google)
On the tension between formal explanation and representational explanation.
Kim, J. 1989. Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108. Reprinted in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1993). (Cited by 40 | Google)
Discusses the principle: there cannot be two independent explanations of the same phenomena. With application to purposive explanation of behavior, theory reduction, and eliminativism, and a discussion of explanatory realism.
Kim, J. 1990. Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation. In (E. Villanueva, ed) Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google)
On the problems posed by explanatory exclusion, and possible solutions. With focus on the problems as they arise for Dretske's and Davidson's theories.
Knight, D. 1997. A poetics of psychological explanation. Metaphilosophy 28:63-80. (Google)

Millikan, R. G. 1993. Explanation in biopsychology. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Montgomery, R. 1995. Explanation and evaluation in cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 62:261-82. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Montgomery, R. 1998. Grades of explanation in cognitive science. Synthese 114:463-495. (Google)

Morris, M. 1986. Causes of behavior. Philosophical Quarterly 36:123-44. (Google)

Moser, P. 1994. Naturalism and psychological explanation. Philosophical Psychology 7:63-84. (Google)

Owens, J. 1998. Psychological explanation and causal deviancy. Synthese 115:143-169. (Google)

Sober, E. 1978. Psychologism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 8:165-91. (Cited by 4 | Google)

5.4c Philosophy of Neuroscience [see also 6.1j]

Avison, M. J. 2002. Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Absolutely nothing. Brain and Mind 3:367-73. (Google)

Bechtel, W. 1983. A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind. Philosophical Studies 44:319-30. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Arguing for the notion of functional architecture as a bridge whereby neural components can be components of cognitive processes.
Bechtel, W. 2001. Cognitive neuroscienec: Relating neural mechanisms and cognition. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Google)

Bechtel, W. 2001. Decomposing and localizing vision: An exemplar for cognitive neuroscience. In (W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam, eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Bechtel, W. & Stufflebeam, R. 2001. Epistemic issues in procuring evidence about the brain: The importance of research instruments and techniques. In (W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam, eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Google)

Bechtel, W. 2002. Decomposing the mind-brain: A long-term pursuit. Brain and Mind 3:229-42. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Bechtel, W. 2002. Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important?. Philosophy of Science 69:548-558. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Bechtel, W. , Mandik, P. , Mundale, J. , and Stufflebeam, R. S. (eds) 2001. Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Bogen, J. 2001. Functional imaging evidence: Some epistemic hotspots. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Google)

Bub, J. 1994. Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged patients. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:837-55. (Google)

Butler, K. 1994. Neural constraints in cognitive science. Minds and Machines 4:129-62. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Changeux, J. & Ricoeur, P. 2002. What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. Princeton. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Cherniak, C. 1991. Meta-neuroanatomy: The myth of the unbounded mind/brain. In (E. Agazzi, ed) Philosophy and the Origin and Evolution of the Universe. (Google)

Cherniak, C. 1994. Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy. Philosophical Studies 73:89-107. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Argues that we can understand the brain under the hypothesis that it is optimized to "save wire", due to bounded resources: organization predicts placement. With remarks on the relation between cognitive and neural levels.
Churchland, P. M. 1986. Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind 95:279-309. Reprinted in A Neurocomputational Perspective (MIT Press, 1989). (Cited by 29 | Google)
Some cute examples of neurophysiological reductions using state-spaces.
Churchland, P. M. 1995. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. MIT Press. (Cited by 193 | Google)

Churchland, P. S. 1980. A perspective on mind-brain research. Journal of Philosophy 77:185-207. (Cited by 9 | Google)

The brain can tell us a lot about the mind. With examples.
Churchland, P. S. 1982. Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of science. Neuroscience 7:1041-7. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Churchland, P. S. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press. (Cited by 202 | Google)

All about neuroscience, philosophy and prospects for their interaction.
Churchland, P. S. & Sejnowski, T. 1989. Neural representation and neural computation. In (L. Nadel, ed) Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press. (Cited by 25 | Google)
About how neuroscience and connectionism affect our conception of mind.
Churchland, P. S. 1987. Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84:546-53. (Cited by 17 | Google)
On paradigm shifts, biology, evolution, connectionism, etc.
Churchland, P. S. 2002. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press. (Cited by 15 | Google)

Clark, A. 1980. Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionism in Psychology. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Craver, C. F & Darden, L. 2001. Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory. In (P. K. Machamer, R. Grush, and P. McLaughlin, eds) Theory and Method in Neuroscience. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Craver, C. F. 2002. Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory. Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69:S83-97. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Craver, C. F. 2003. The making of a memory mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36:153-95. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Cruse, H. 2001. The explanatory power and limits of simulation models in the neurosciences. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Daugman, J. G. 2001. Brain metaphor and brain theory. In (W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam, eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Garson, J. 2003. The introduction of information into neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 70:926-936. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Glymour, C. 1994. On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:815-35. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Grush, R. 2001. The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Grush, R. 2003. In defense of some "Cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation. Biology and Philosophy 18:53-92. (Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. 1992. Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences. Philosophy of Science 59:408-28. (Cited by 6 | Google)

The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work.
Hardcastle, V. G. & Stewart, C. M. 2001. Theory structure in neuroscience. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. & Stewart, C. M. 2002. What do brain data really show? Philosophy of Science 69:572-582. (Google)

Hardcastle, V. G. & Stewart, C. M. 2004. Neuroscience and the art of single-cell recordings. Biology and Philosophy 18:195-208. (Google)

Hatfield, G. 1988. Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints. Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46. (Google)

Hatfield, G. 1999. Mental functions as constraints on neurophysiology: Biology and psychology of vision. In (V. Hardcastle, ed) Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press (Google)

Hatfield, G. 2000. The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint. Philosophy of Science 67:388-404. (Google)

Keeley, B. 1999. Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception. Biology and Philosophy 14:395-430. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Keeley, B. 2000. Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science. Philosophy of Science 60:S404-417. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Klagge, J. C. 1989. Wittgenstein and neuroscience. Synthese 78:319-43. (Google)

Wittgenstein wouldn't have liked the Churchlands, as neuro might be chaos, and too much neuro might undermine our self-conception nihilistically.
Kobes, B. 1991. On a model for psycho-neural coevolution. Behavior and Philosophy 19:1-17. (Google)

Lloyd, D. 2000. Terra cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind. Brain and Mind 1:93-116. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Lloyd, D. 2002. Studying the mind from the inside out. Brain and Mind 3:243-59. (Google)

Machamer, P. , McLaughlin, P. & Grush, R. (eds) 2001. Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Madell, G. 1986. Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response. Inquiry. (Google)

Manier, E. 1986. Problems in the development of cognitive neuroscience: Effective communication between scientific domains. Philosophy of Science Association 1986, 1:183-97. (Google)

McCauley, R. 1986. Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology. Philosophy of Science 53:179-99. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Incommensurable theories don't necessarily require elimination, if their relationship is synchronic/interlevel, rather than diachronic/intralevel.
Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Nous 8:327-42. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't refute type materialism. Mental states may not be anatomically defined neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms.
Mundale, J. & Bechtel, W. 1996. Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function. Minds and Machines 6:481-505. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Mundale, J. 2001. Neuroanatomical foundations of cognition: Connecting the neuronal level with the study of higher brain areas. In (W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam, eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Google)

Mundale, J. 2002. Concepts of localization: Balkanization in the brain. Brain and Mind 3:313-30. (Google)

Northoff, G. 2001. "Brain-paradox" and "embeddment": Do we need a "philosophy of the brain"? Brain and Mind 195-211. (Google)

Northoff, G. 2004. Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem. John Benjamins. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Ravenscroft, I. 1998. Neuroscience and the mind. Mind and Language 13:132-137. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Revonsuo, A. 2001. On the nature of explanation in the neurosciences. In (P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, & R. Grush, eds) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh wPress. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Rockwell, W. T. 1994. On what the mind is identical with. Philosophical Psychology 7:307-23. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Argues that the mind is not identical with the brain -- at the very least, it's the central nervous system, and perhaps more. "Brain" does not denote a natural kind in neurophysiology.
Schutter, D. , van Honk, J. & Panksepp, J. 2004. Introducing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and its property of causal inference in investigating brain-function relationships. Synthese 141:155-73. (Google)

Smith, A. 1986. Brain-mind philosophy. Inquiry 29:203-15. (Google)

Skarda, S. 1986. Explaining behavior: Bringing the brain back in. Inquiry 29:187-201. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Stoljar, D. & Gold, S. 1998. On biological and cognitive neuroscience. Mind and Language 13:110-31. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Stone, T. & Davies, M. 1993. Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44:589-622. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Stufflebeam, R. S. & Bechtel, W. 1997. PET: Exploring the myth and the method. Philsophy of Science 64:95-106. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Stufflebeam, R. S. 2001. Brain matters: A case against representations in the brain. In (W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam, eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Tibbetts, P. 2004. The concept of voluntary motor control in the recent neuroscientific literature. Synthese 141:247-76. (Google)

Uttal, W. R. 2001. The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press. (Cited by 48 | Google)

Uttal, W. R. 2002. Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Plenty, but not everything. Brain and Mind 3:375-79. (Google)

van Orden, G. C. 1997. Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64:85-94. (Cited by 18 | Google)

von Eckardt, B. 1984. Cognitive psychology and principled skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 81:67-88. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Cognitive psychology can transmogrify itself, who needs neuroscience?

5.4d Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc

Aizawa, K. 2002. Cognitive architecture. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Bealer, G. 1987. The boundary between philosophy and cognitive science. Journal of Philosophy 86:553-55. (Google)

Philosophy is autonomous: empirical considerations can't affect it.
Bermudez, J. 2005. Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. (Google)

Bickle, J. 2002. Philosophy of mind and the sciences. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Boden, M. 2001. The philosopgt of cognitive science. In (A. O'Hear, ed) Philosophy at the New Millenium. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Bogdan, R. 2000. Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.

Chater, N. & Vitanyi, P. 2003. Simplicity: A unifying principle in cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Science 7:19-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Davies, M. 1986. Tacit knowledge and the structure of thought and language. In (C. Travis, ed) Meaning and Interpretation. Blackwell. (Cited by 16 | Google)

Davies, M. 1989. Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. In (A. George, ed) Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Dupuy, J. 2000. The Mechanization of the Mind: On the Origins of Cognitive Science. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Erneling, C. 2004. The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Feest, U. 2003. Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology. Philosophy of Science 70:937-948. (Google)

Fetzer, J. H. 1991. Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Paragon House. (Cited by 19 | Google)

Flanagan, O. J. 1984. The Science of the Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 66 | Google)

Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. 1981. How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson's `ecological approach'. Cognition 9:139-96. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Fodor, J. 2000. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 33 | Google)

Hardcastle, V. 1996. How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. SUNY Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Harnad, S. 1982. Neoconstructivism: A unifying constraint for cognitive science. In (T. Simon & R. Scholes, eds) Language, Mind, and Brain. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Google)

Hatfield, G. 2002. Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology. Mind and Language 17:207-232. (Cited by 2 | Google)

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Hooker, C. A. 1975. The information-processing approach to the brain-mind and its philosophical ramifications. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36:1-15. (Google)

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Kukla, A. 1989. Non-empirical issues in psychology. American Psychologist 44:485-94. (Google)

On the role of non-empirical advances in psychology: e.g. in theory construction, coherence analysis, conceptual innovation, with the aid of logically necessary truths and the contingent/pragmatic a priori.
Lloyd, D. 1989. Simple Minds. MIT Press. (Cited by 34 | Google)

O'Nuillain, S. 1995. The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science. Ablex. (Google)

O'Nuillain, S. , McKevitt, P. & MacAogain, E. (eds) 1997. Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins. (Google)

Pickering, M. & Chater, N. 1995. Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology. Minds and Machines 5. (Google)

Pinker, S. 2005. So how does the mind work? [With response by Fodor and reply.] Mind and Language 20:1-38. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Preston, B. 1994. Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative? Synthese 100:167-96. (Cited by 1 | Google)

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van Gelder, T. 1998. The roles of philosophy in cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 11:117-36. (Cited by 2 | Google)

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5.5 Philosophy of Mind, General

Armstrong, D. 1999. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Baker, L. R. 1989. Recent work in the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Books 30:1-9. (Google)

A general overview.
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Bealer, G. 1986. The logical status of mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Bechtel, W. 1988. Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 28 | Google)

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Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. 1997. Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 53 | Google)

Burge, T. 1992. Philosophy of language and mind: 1950-1990. Philosophical Review 100:3-52. (Google)

An overview of the last 40 years of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, covering many issues and trends.
Carruthers, P. 1986. Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind. SUNY Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Carruthers, P. 2003. The Nature of Mind. Routledge. (Google)

Churchland, P. M. 1984. Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 212 | Google)

Crane, T. 2001. Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 28 | Google)

Crane, T. 2003. The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation. Routledge. (Cited by 22 | Google)

Cunningham, S. 2000. What Is a Mind?: An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Hackett. (Google)

Dennett, D. C. 1978. Current issues in the philosophy of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:249-261. (Cited by 13 | Google)

An overview of everything, circa 1978: logical behaviorism, functionalism, the identity theory, qualia, meaning, and so on, with bibliography.
Dodwell, P. 2000. Brave New Mind: A Thoughtful Inquiry into the Nature and Meaning of Mental Life. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Graham, G. 1993. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Blackwell. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Guttenplan, S. 2000. Mind's Landscape: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Publishers. (Google)

Haldane, J. J. 1994. Analytical philosophy and the nature of mind: Time for another rebirth? In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell. (Google)

Haldane, J. 2000. The state and fate of contemporary philosophy of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 37:301-21. (Cited by 1 | Google)

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Harman, G. 1989. Some philosophical issues in cognitive science. In (M. Posner, ed) Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Heal, J. 2003. Mind, Reason, and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

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Hornsby, J. 2001. Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)

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Lowe, E. J. 2000. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)

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McCullock, G. 2002. The Life of the Mind. Routledge. (Google)

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O'Connor, T. & Robb, D. (eds) 2003. Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. Olafson, F. 2001. Naturalism and the Human Condition: Against (Cited by 1 | Google)

Peruzzi, A. (ed) 2004. Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. (Google)

Phillips, H. 1995. Vicissitudes of the I: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall. (Google)

Putnam, H. 2000. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. Columbia University Press. (Cited by 29 | Google)

Quine, W. V. 1985. States of mind. Journal of Philosophy 82:5-8. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Rey, G. 1997. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Blackwell. (Cited by 47 | Google)

Rorty, R. 1982. Contemporary philosophy of mind. Synthese 53:323-48. (Cited by 3 | Google)

In praise of the "Ryle-Dennett" tradition, and the elimination of dualism from the philosophy of mind.
Rorty, R. 1993. Consciousness, intentionality, and pragmatism. In (S. Christensen & D. Turner, eds) Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 1 | Google)
A pragmatist perspective on the recent history of the philosophy of mind, focusing on consciousness, intentionality, and mental representation, and on debates between Fodor, Dennett, Searle, Putnam, and Davidson.
Searle, J. 2004. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press. Searle, J. 2000. Mind, Language and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World. HarperCollins. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Sellars, W. 1956. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329. Reprinted as Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press, 1997. (Cited by 197 | Google)

Shaffer, J. A. 1964. Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Shoemaker, S. 2004. Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 41 | Google)

Smith, N. ed. 2002. Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Smith, P. & Jones, O. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google)

Sprague, E. 1999. Persons and their Minds: A Philosophical Investigation. Westview Press. (Google)

Szasz, T. 2002. The Meaning of Mind: Language, Morality, and Neuroscience. Syracuse University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)