



# Joe Levine' s *Purple Haze*

# HEY JOE

JIMI HENDRIX EXPERIENCE





JIMI HENDRIX

# Physical/Phenomenal Gaps

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- P = the complete microphysical truth
  - Q = a phenomenal truth
  - Q1: Is there an epistemic gap between P and Q?
  - Q2: Is there an ontological gap between P and Q?
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# The Conceivability Argument

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- (1)  $P \& \sim Q$  is conceivable
- (2) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is conceivable,  $P \& \sim Q$  is possible.
- (3) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is possible, materialism is false.

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- (4) Materialism is false.
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A black and white photograph of Jimi Hendrix. He is shown from the chest up, wearing a blue denim jacket over a patterned shirt. He has his eyes closed and mouth open in a passionate expression, holding a white electric guitar. The background is dark, and the lighting highlights his face and the guitar.

# Voodoo Child

THE JIMI HENDRIX COLLECTION

# Refinement 1

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- (1)  $P \& \sim Q$  is ideally conceivable
- (2) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is ideally conceivable,  $P \& \sim Q$  is primarily possible.
- (3) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is primarily possible, materialism is false.

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- (4) Materialism is false.
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# Refinement 2

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- (1) 'p $\neq$ q' is ideally conceivable
  - (2) If 'p $\neq$ q' is ideally conceivable, p and q have distinct properties as MOPs.
  - (3) If p and q have distinct properties as MOPs [for all p], materialism is false.
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- (4) Materialism is false.



# The Conceivability Argument

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- (1)  $P \& \sim Q$  is conceivable
- (2) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is conceivable,  $P \& \sim Q$  is possible.
- (3) If  $P \& \sim Q$  is possible, materialism is false.

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- (4) Materialism is false.
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# Type-A and Type-B Materialism

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- Type-A materialist: denies premise (1)
    - No (ideal) epistemic gap
    - $P \& \sim Q$  conceivable
  - Type-B materialist: denies premise (2)
    - Epistemic gap but no ontological gap
    - $P \& \sim Q$  conceivable but not possible
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*"if 6 was 9"*



A TRIBUTE TO JIMI HENDRIX



# E-Type and NE-Type Materialists

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- NE-type (non-exceptionalists): The phenomenal case is not special
  - Epistemic gap between P and Q (conceivability of  $P \& \sim Q$ ) is analogous to gaps in other domains
  - “Water zombies” ( $P \& \sim W$ ) are conceivable too
- E-type (exceptionalists) The phenomenal case is special
  - The epistemic gap between P and Q (conceivability is not analogous to epistemic gaps in other domains.
  - Water zombies aren't conceivable.



# Puzzle

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- Joe says he's an NE-type materialist.
  - But he also thinks there's a special explanatory gap in the case of consciousness, manifested in the conceivability of zombies.
  - So presumably he thinks there's a sense in which zombies are conceivable but water-zombies are not.
  - Doesn't this force him to be E-type?
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# Partial Answer

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- Joe distinguishes thin and thick conceivability.
  - Both zombies and water-zombies are thinly conceivable:
    - No formal/conceptual contradiction in  $P \& \sim Q$  or  $P \& \sim W$ .
  - Zombies but not water-zombies are thickly conceivable.
    - $P$  is thickly conceivable iff  $P$  plus “non-gappy identities” is thinly conceivable
    - Water-zombies are ruled out by adding non-gappy identity (water =  $H_2O$ )
    - Ruling out zombies requires adding “gappy” identity  $p=q$
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# Priority?

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- The notion of thick conceivability is *derivative* on notion of an explanatory gap. Is this the right way around?
    - (1) Plenty of people (including Levine 1983?) argue *from* conceivability of zombies to an explanatory gap
    - (2) Intuitively, there's a fairly pretheoretical sense of conceivability in which zombies but not water-zombies are conceivable.
    - (3) Joe's approach puts a lot of weight on the notion of "gappy identity" – problematic?
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# Positive Conceivability

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- Desirable: zombies (not not water-zombies) are conceivable in a sense that isn't definitionally dependent on e-gap.
  - My view: zombies (but not water-zombies) are *positively* conceivable:
    - one can *imagine* zombies, form a positive conception of them, imagine a world containing them, etc.
  - Joe can reasonably hold this too
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# Positive/Negative Conceivability

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- Joe's view: water-zombies are thinly but not thickly conceivable
  - Close to: water-zombies are negatively conceivability ( $\sim P$  is not a priori) but not positively conceivable (not imaginable).



# Two Conceivability Arguments

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- Positive conceivability argument (PCA):
    - (1) Zombies are positively conceivable
    - (2) Positive conceivability entails possibility
    - (3) Zombies are possible
  
  - Negative conceivability argument (NCA):
    - (1) Zombies are negatively conceivable
    - (2) Negative conceivability entails possibility
    - (3) Zombies are possible
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# Divided Response

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- In effect, Joe must give
    - E-type response to the positive conceivability argument
    - NE-type response to the negative conceivability argument.
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# Positive Conceivability Argument

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- Joe: zombies (but not water-zombies) are thickly (positively?) conceivable
    - So needs to give E-type response here.
    - But doesn't give any such response
    - In fact, says that E-type responses are “can easily seem to be ad hoc”?
  - Q: Why isn't Joe (in effect) forced to be equally ad hoc in responding to PCA? And how will this be justified?
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# Negative Conceivability Argument

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- Joe: Water-zombies are negatively conceivable too.
  - There is no a priori entailment from P to W
  - ‘Water’, ‘consciousness’, etc, all have non-ascriptive modes of presentations
    - They support very few a priori/conceptual connections
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# A Priori Entailments

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- My view: there are a priori entailments from PQTI (physics, qualia, that' s-all, indexicals) to W (water-truths)
    - See Chalmers and Jackson 2001
  - Basic idea: knowing PQTI enables one to know macro truths about appearance, behavior, composition, distribution, etc, which enables one to know truths about water, without further empirical information.
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# Joe's View

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- Levine 1993 accepts “quasi-analytic” entailment of water-truths by underlying truths.
  - Levine 2002 denies an a priori/analytic entailment.
  - He concedes some strong epistemic disanalogies between deducibility of water and consciousness truths, though:
    - Allows “armchair” knowability of water-truths but not consciousness-truths without further empirical work.
    - Knowledge argument also provides disanalogy in knowability of water/consciousness truths given base truths?
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# THE WIND CRIES MARRY


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JIM HENDRIX



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# Semantic/Substantive Questions

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- Further Joe elsewhere articulates a disanalogy between questions about consciousness and about (e.g.) water, given full knowledge of underlying facts:
    - Questions about consciousness are “substantive”
    - Questions about water are “semantic”
  - Cf: Carnapian questions of fact and of meaning?
    - Suggests something reminiscent of a conceptual/semantic entailment in one case but not the other
  - I think: this situation yields a priori entailment
  - At least, is a strong epistemic disanalogy that deserves attention in analyzing the conceivability argument.
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# Theory of Reference?

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- Joe suggests briefly: these judgments about high-level truth and reference may be mediated by theory of reference, which is a posteriori
  - Response:
    - (1) Judgments about cases aren't mediated by theory of reference; rather, knowledge of theory of reference is mediated by judgments about cases
    - (2) The theory of reference is in the relevant sense a priori, since we can arrive at it by non-empirical reflection on ways the world might turn out
    - (3) When the theory of reference is responsive to empirical information, we still have an a priori inferences from the empirical information to the conclusion about reference.
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# Psychoanalytic Conclusion

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- Joe's torment: how to reconcile the highly distinctive epistemic gap with the absence of an ontological gap?
  - His official NE-type response allows him to paper over the epistemic gap in this context.
  - But deep down Joe is really E-type: there's a distinctive epistemic gap with respect to both consciousness and deducibility.
  - So, Joe needs to either (i) come out of the closet as an E-type responder (and give the response), or (ii) accept his glorious destiny as an anti-physicalist.
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Jim Hendrix - Fillmore East - NYC - May 10, 1968

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The **Ami** Hendrix experience



Ami Hendrix experience