Responses to articles on my work

Note: I stopped updating the responses around 2005. I think I still stand by most of them, though.

This page is mostly for brief responses to published or forthcoming articles that discuss my work. I've starred [*] the more technical entries so nonphilosophers can skip them. (The first entry is probably the best place for nonphilosophers to start.) These responses are "unofficial", but if you'd like to use them in an article, feel free to ask. See also online discussions of my work for some further papers and other discussion (without responses).

Table of contents: A link on the author's name goes to an entry further down on this page.

Other articles: Some other published or presented articles addressing my work, which I may or may not respond to at some point:

Journal of Consciousness Studies symposium on the "hard problem". (Articles by Baars, Bilodeau, Churchland, Clark, Clarke, Crick & Koch, Dennett, Hameroff & Penrose, Hardcastle, Hodgson, Hut & Shepard, Libet, Lowe, MacLennan, McGinn, Mills, O'Hara & Scutt, Price, Robinson, Rosenberg, Seager, Shear, Stapp, Varela, Velmans, Warner.)

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research symposium on The Conscious Mind. (Articles by Hill & McLaughlin, Loar, Shoemaker, Yablo.)

Reviews of The Conscious Mind.

Katalin Balog, Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Philosophical Review108:497-528, 1999.

Tim Bayne, Chalmers on the justification of phenomenal judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:407-19.

*George Bealer, Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance. In (T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mark Bishop, Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism. In (J. Preston and J.M. Bishop, eds) Views into the Chinese Room. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mark Bishop, Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers. Consciousness and Cognition, 11:642-52, 2002.

*Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108:1-46, 1999.

*Andrew Botterell, Conceiving what is not there. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:21-42, 2001.

*David Braddon-Mitchell. Qualia and analytic conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100:111-35, 2003.

*Anthony Brueckner. Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism. Analysis 61:187-93, 2001.

*Alex Byrne, Cosmic hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives 13:347-83, 1999.

*Alex Byrne, Chalmers on epistemic content. SOFIA conference on Metaphysics of Mind, December 2001.

*Alex Byrne, Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110:199-240, 2002.

Alex Byrne and Ned Hall, Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics. Philosophy of Science 66:370-90, 1999.

*Alex Byrne and Jim Pryor, Bad intensions. Barcelona conference on Two-Dimensionalism, June 2001.

Patricia Churchland, The hornswoggle problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 402-8, 1996.

Paul Churchland. The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy 93:211-28, 1996.

Daniel Dennett, Facing backward on the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 4-6, 1996.

Daniel Dennett, The fantasy of first-person science. Northwestern University, February 2001.

William Greenberg, On Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance and his `dancing qualia' and `fading qualia' thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:53-58, 1998.

*John Hawthorne, Advice to physicalists. Philosophical Studies 109:17-52, 2002.

*John Hawthorne, Direct reference and dancing qualia. In (T. Alter and S. Walter) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (OUP, 2006).

*Christopher Hill. Chalmers on the a priority of modal knowledge. Analysis 58:20-26, 1998.

Christopher Hill. Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies 87:61-85, 1999.

*Jenann Ismael. Science and the phenomenal. Philosophy of Science 66:351-69, 1999.

*Mark Johnston. Manifest kinds. Journal of Philosophy 94:564-83, 1997.

Robert Kirk. Why there couldn't be zombies. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73:1-16, 1999.

Noa Latham. Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies 98:71-97, 2000. (Abstract)

*Joseph Levine, Review of The Conscious Mind. Mind 107:877-881, 1998.

*Joseph Levine, "Lately things don't seem the same": The conceivability argument. Chapter 2 of Purple Haze. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Harry Lewis, Consciousness: Inexplicable - and useless too? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:59-66, 1998.

*Penelope Mackie, Deep contingency and necessary a posteriori truth. Analysis 62:225-36, 2002.

*Diego Marconi, Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem.

*Andrew Melnyk, Physicalism unfalsified: Chalmers' inconclusive conceivability argument. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

David Papineau, Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press, 2006.

John Perry. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press, 2001.

John Perry. Response to commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January 2004.

*Mark Rowlands, Consciousness and supervenience. Chapter 2 of The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

*Stephen Schiffer, Mental content and epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Pacific APA, March 2002.

Paul Skokowski, "I, zombie". Consciousness and Cognition 11:1-9, 2002.

Tamler Sommers, Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars. PSYCHE 8(22), 2002.

Robert Stalnaker. What is it like to be a zombie? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, 2002.

*Robert Stalnaker. On considering a possible world as actual. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 2001.

*Scott Sturgeon, Zombies and ghosts. Chapter 5 of Matters of Mind. Routledge, 2000.

Nigel Thomas. Zombie killer. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott, eds) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press, 1998.

Robert van Gulick, Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought-experiments. In Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press, 2000.

Bram van Heuveln, Eric Dietrich, & Michiharu Oshima, Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines 8:237-49, 1998.

Tillmann Vierkant, Zombie Mary and the blue banana. PSYCHE 8(19), 2002.

*Sara Worley, Conceivability, possibility, and physicalism. Analysis 63:15-23, 2003.

*Stephen Yablo, Textbook Kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:98-122.

*Stephen Yablo, Coulda, woulda, shoulda. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Go to: