Curriculum Vitae David John Chalmers Department of Philosophy New York University New York, NY 10003, USA. Personal Date of birth: April 20, 1966. Nationality: Australian. E-mail: [mylastname] at nyu dot edu Education
  • 1983-1986: University of Adelaide. Honours Degree of Bachelor of Science, in Pure Mathematics.
  • 1987-1988: University of Oxford. Graduate student in Mathematics.
    • 1989-1993: Indiana University. Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Employment
      1989-1993: Research Assistant, Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
    • 1993-1995: McDonnell Fellow, Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology, Washington University.
    • 1995-1997: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz.
    • 1997-1998: Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz.
    • 1998: Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Cruz.
    • 1999-2004: Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona.
    • 1999-2001: Associate Director, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona
    • 2002-2004: Director, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona
    • 2004: Regents Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona.
    • 2004-2009: ARC Federation Fellow and Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University.
    • 2004-2014: Director, Centre for Consciousness, Australian National University.
    • 2009-2017: Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University.
    • 2009-2012: Visiting Professor of Philosophy, New York University.
    • 2012-2015: Professor of Philosophy, New York University
    • 2012-: Co-Director, Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, New York University
    • 2015-: University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science, New York University
    • 2018-: Honorary Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University
    Awards and Honors
    • Rhodes Scholarship, 1987
    • Stanton Prize, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2004
    • Federation Fellowship, Australian Research Council, 2004
    • President, Australian Association of Philosophy, 2006-07
    • Fellow, Australian Academy of Humanities, 2006
    • Jon Barwise Prize for Philosophy and Computing, 2008
    • John Locke Lecturer, Oxford University, 2010
    • Fellow, Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 2011
    • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2013
    • Peter Baume Award, Australian National University, 2013
    • President, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2014.
    • Jean Nicod Prize, Institut Jean Nicod, 2015
    • Apostolos P. Stefanopoulos Prize, 2018
    • Marc Sanders Prize, American Philosophical Association, 2020
    • President, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), 2022-23
    Teaching Courses taught:
    • Consciousness (Washington U, Fall 1993; UCSC, Winter 1997)
    • Mental Content (Washington U, Fall 1994)
    • Philosophy of Mind (UCSC, Fall 1995, Fall 1996, Fall 1997, Fall 1998)
    • Introduction to Philosophy (UCSC, Winter 1996)
    • Philosophy of Time (UCSC, Winter 1996)
    • Computers and Minds (UCSC, Spring 1996, Spring 1997)
    • Paradoxes and Dilemmas (UCSC, Winter 1998)
    • Rationality, Identity, and Morality (UCSC, Winter 1998)
    • The Meaning of Life (UCSC, Spring 1998)
    • Philosophy of the Universe (UCSC, Fall 1998)
    • Mind and Modality (Arizona, Spring 1999)
    • Foundational Issues in the Science of Consciousness (Arizona, Fall 1999)
    • Philosophical Perspectives on the Individual (Arizona, Fall 1999, Spring 2003)
    • Reason, Meaning, and Possibility (Arizona, Spring 2002)
    • Perceptual Experience (Arizona, Spring 2004)
    • Structuralism (ANU, 2010)
    • Quantum Mechanics and Free Will (ANU, 2011 and 2012, joint with Craig Savage and John Hutchinson)
    • Constructing the World (NYU, Fall 2009)
    • The Grounds of Intentionality (NYU, Fall 2010, joint with Ted Sider)
    • Thesis Preparation (NYU, Fall 2011, Fall 2014)
    • Structuralism and Skepticism (NYU, Fall 2012)
    • Philosophical Analysis (NYU, Fall 2013, joint with Michael Strevens)
    • Advanced Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (NYU, Fall 2015 and Fall 2018, joint with Ned Block)
    • Minds and Machines (NYU, Spring 2016, Fall 2018, Fall 2019, Fall 2021, Fall 2022)
    • Philosophy of Technology (NYU, Fall 2016, joint with Matthew Liao)
    • Proseminar (NYU, Fall 2017, joint with Jane Friedman)
    • Proseminar (NYU, Fall 2019, joint with Dick Foley)
    • Theories of Content (NYU, Spring 2021, joint with Ned Block)
    • Conceptualizing the World (NYU, Fall 2021, joint with Michael Strevens)
    • Proseminar (NYU, Spring 2023, joint with Matt Mandelkern)
    Books (Authored) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, 1996. The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2010. Constructing the World. Oxford University Press, 2012. Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. W. W. Norton, 2022. Books (Edited) Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates (with S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak). MIT Press, 2000. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002. Second edition, 2021. Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press, 2009. Journal Articles and Book Chapters Chalmers, D. J., “Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations”. Connection Science 2: 53-62, 1990. Chalmers, D. J., “Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong: The Simplest Refutation”. Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1990. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Chalmers, D. J., “The Evolution of Learning: An Experiment in Genetic Connectionism”. In Connectionist Models: Proceedings of the 1990 Summer School Workshop, 1990. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann. Chalmers, D. J., “Computing the Thinkable” (commentary on R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 658-9, 1990. Chalmers, D. J., French, R. M., & Hofstadter, D. R., “High-Level Perception, Representation, and Analogy: A Critique of Artificial Intelligence Methodology”. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4:185-211, 1992. Reprinted in (D. R. Hofstadter) Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies. Basic Books. Chalmers, D. J., “Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room”. In (J. Dinsmore, ed.) The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, pp. 25-48. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992. Chalmers, D. J., “Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study” (commentary on A. Goldman, “The Psychology of Folk Psychology”). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993. Chalmers, D. J., “Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong”. Philosophical Psychology 6:305-19, 1993. Chalmers, D. J. “On Implementing a Computation”. Minds and Machines, 4:391-402, 1994. Chalmers, D. J. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-19, 1995. Reprinted in (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A.Scott, eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1996). Reprinted in J. Shear (ed.) Explaining Consciousness: the Hard Problem (MIT Press, 1997). Reprinted in (J. Heil, ed) Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford University Press, 2003). Reprinted in (J. Vacca, ed) The World’s 20 Greatest Unsolved Problems (Prentice-Hall, 2004). Reprinted in (R. Carter) Exploring Consciousness (University of California Press, 2002). Reprinted in (M. Eckert, ed) Theories of Mind: Introductory Readings (Rowman and Littlefield). Reprinted (as “The Hard Problem of Consciousness” and “Naturalistic Dualism”) in (M. Velmans and S. Schneider, eds) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007). Chalmers, D. J. “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”. In (T. Metzinger, ed.) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995. Reprinted in (T. O’Connor & D. Robb, eds) Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2003). Chalmers, D. J. “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience”. Scientific American, 237(6):62-68, December 1995. Reprinted in (P. van Inwagen & D. Zimmerman, eds) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Reprinted in (T. Schick & L. Vaughn, eds) Doing Philosophy: An Introduction through Thought-Experiments. Reprinted in (A. Damasio, ed) The Scientific American Book of the Brain (Lyons Press, 2001). Reprinted in (W. Lawhead( Philosophical Questions (McGraw-Hill, 2003). Reprinted in (L. Bonjour & A. Baker, eds) Philosophical Problems: An Annotated Anthology (Longman, 2004). Reprinted in (B. Beedles & M. Petracca, eds) Academic Communities/Disciplinary Conventions (Prentice-Hall, 2001). Reprinted in (B. Gertler & L. Shapiro, eds) Arguing About the Mind (Routledge, 2007). Chalmers, D. J. “Minds, Machines, and Mathematics”. Psyche, 2:11-20, 1995. Chalmers, D. J. “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?”. Synthese 108:309-33, 1996. Chalmers, D. J. “Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience?”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:148-49, 1997. Reprinted in (N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates MIT Press, 1997. Chalmers, D.J. “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4(1), 1997. Reprinted in (J. Shear, ed.), Explaining Consciousness: the Hard Problem. MIT Press, 1997. Chalmers, D.J. “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A.Scott, eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press, 1998. Chalmers, D.J. “The Problems of Consciousness”. In (H. Jasper, ed) Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Raven-Lippincott, 1998. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D.J. “The Extended Mind”. Analysis 58:10-23, 1998. Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 1998. Reprinted in (D.J. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, 2002). Reprinted in (B. Gertler & L. Shapiro, eds) Arguing About the Mind (Routledge, 2007). Reprinted in (W.G. Lycan and J. Prinz, eds.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 2007). Chalmers, D.J. “Precis of The Conscious Mind“. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1999. Chalmers, D.J. “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, 1999. Chalmers, D. J., “Is There Synonymy in Ockham’s Mental Language?”. In (P. V. Spade, ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Chalmers, D.J. “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?”. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues, pp. 17-39. MIT Press, 2000. Reprinted in (A. Noe & E. Thompson, eds) Vision and Mind: Selected Readings. MIT Press, 2002. Chalmers, D.J. & Jackson, F. “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”. Philosophical Review, 110:315-61, 2001. Chalmers, D.J. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”. In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 145-200. Oxford University Press, 2002. Chalmers, D.J. “The Components of Content”. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002. Chalmers, D.J. “The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox.” Analysis 62:155-57, 2002. Chalmers, D.J. “On Sense and Intension.” Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82, 2002. Reprinted in (M. Davidson, ed) On Sense and Direct Reference: Readings in the Philosophy of Language (McGraw-Hill, 2007). Chalmers, D.J. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, pp. 220-72. Oxford University Press, 2003. Chalmers, D.J. “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In (S. Stich & F., Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell, 2003. Also in (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002. Reprinted (abridged) in (W. Lycan & J. Prinz, eds) Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 2007). Bayne, T. & Chalmers, D.J. “What is the Unity of Consciousness?” In (A. Cleeremans, ed) The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation, pp. 23-58. Oxford University Press, 2003. Chalmers, D.J. “The Nature of Narrow Content”. Philosophical Issues 13: 46-66, 2003. Chalmers, D.J. “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Philosophy Section of thematrix.com, 2003. Reprinted in (C. Grau, ed) Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press, 2005. Chalmers, D.J. “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Philosophical Studies 118:153-226, 2004. Chalmers, D.J. “Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:182-90, 2004. Chalmers, D.J. “The Representational Character of Experience”. In (B. Leiter, ed) The Future for Philosophy, pp. 153-81. Oxford University Press, 2004. Chalmers, D.J. “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?” In (M. Gazzaniga, ed) The Cognitive Neurosciences III, pp. 1111-19. MIT Press, 2004. Chalmers, D.J. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument”. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism, pp. 269-98. MIT Press, 2004. Chalmers, D.J. “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. In (M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia, eds) Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press, 2006. Chalmers, D.J. “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. In (T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press, 2006. Chalmers, D.J. “Two-Dimensional Semantics”. In (E. Lepore and B. Smith, eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 2006 Chalmers, D.J. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press, 2007. Chalmers, D.J. & Hajek, A. “Ramsey + Moore = God”. Analysis 67:170-72, 2007. Chalmers, D.J. “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism”. In (B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter, eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 313-335. Oxford University Press, 2009. Expanded version in The Character of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2010). Chalmers, D.J. “Ontological Anti-Realism”. In (D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, pp. 77-129. Oxford University Press, 2009. Chalmers, D.J. “Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions”. In (P. Grim, ed) Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press, 2009. Chalmers, D.J. “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:7-65, 2010. Chalmers, D.J. “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. In (A. Egan and B. Weatherson, eds) Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account”. Nous 45:595-639, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “Revisability and Conceptual Change in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. Journal of Philosophy 108:387-415, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence”. Mind 120:587-635, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “Actuality and Knowability”. Analysis 71:411-19, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “Verbal Disputes”. Philosophical Review, 120:515-66, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition”. Journal of Cognitive Science 12:323-57, 2011. Chalmers, D.J. “The Varieties of Computation: A Reply to Commentators”. Journal of Cognitive Science 13:211-48, 2012. Chalmers, D.J. “The Singularity: A Reply to Commentators”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19:141-67, 2012. Chalmers, D.J. “The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke, and Siegel”. Analysis 73:345-68, 2013. Chalmers, D.J. “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 2013. Also in (T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa, eds) Russellian Monism (Oxford University Press, 2015); and in (G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds) Panpsychism (Oxford University Press, 2016). Chalmers, D.J. “Strong Necessities and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply”. Philosophical Studies 3:785-800, 2014. Bourget, D.J. & Chalmers, D.J. “What do Philosophers Believe?”. Philosophical Studies 170:465-500, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. “Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense”. Philosophical Studies 171:535-44, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. and Rabern, B. “Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem”. Analysis 74:210-24, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. “Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89:249-269, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. “Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeder, and Stanley”. Analysis 74:676-97, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. “Mind Uploading: A Philosophical Analysis”. In (R. Blackford and D. Broderick, eds.) Intelligence Unbound. Wiley-Blackwell, 2014. Chalmers, D.J. “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?”. Philosophy 1:3-31, 2015. Chalmers, D.J. “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism”. In (G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds) Panpsychism. Oxford University Press, 2016. Chalmers, D.J. “Referentialism and the Objects of Credence”. Mind 2016. Chalmers, D.J. “The Virtual and the Real”. Disputatio, 2017. Chalmers, D.J. “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, August 2018. Chalmers, D.J. “Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism”. Journal of Philosophy, December 2018. Chalmers, D.J. “Idealism and the Mind-Body problem”. In (W. Seager, ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge, 2019. Chalmers, D.J. “Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness”. In (M. Colombo, E. Irvine, and M. Stapleton, eds.) Andy Clark and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming. Chalmers, D.J. and McQueen, K. “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. In (S. Gao, ed.) Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, forthcoming. Other Publications Review of Journal of Consciousness Studies. Times Literary Supplement, November 24, 1994. Review of R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind. Scientific American, June 1995. Reply to Searle. New York Review of Books, May 15, 1997. Reprinted in (J. Searle et al) The Mystery of Consciousness. New York Review Press, 1997. Reply to Mulhauser. Psyche, volume 2, 1996. “Consciousness in Philosophy, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Psychology 1970-1995: A Bibliography”. Co-authored with T. Metzinger. In (T. Metzinger, ed) Conscious Experience., pp. 507-54. Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995. “Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: An Annotated Bibliography”. PNP Technical Report 94-05, 1994. Review of J. Yli-Vakkuri and J. Hawthorne, Narrow Content. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018. Commentary by Others Book: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (J. Shear, ed.). MIT Press, 1997. (Keynote paper by author, 26 commentaries and developments by others, author’s response.) Journal symposia:
    • Journal of Consciousness Studies (four special issues on “Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem”, 1995-97, collected as above book).
    • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (four commentaries on The Conscious Mind, plus author’s precis and response; 1999).
    • Journal of the Learning Sciences (review symposium on The Conscious Mind; 1999).
    • Journal of Consciousness Studies (two special issues with 26 commentaries on “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”, 2012)
    • Journal of Cognitive Science (three special issues with 12 commentaries on “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition”, 2012).
    • Analysis (symposium on The Character of Consciousness, 2013)
    • Philosophical Studies (symposium on The Character of Consciousness, 2014)
    • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (symposium on Constructing the World, 2014).
    • Analysis (symposium on Constructing the World, 2014).
    • Disputatio (symposium on The Virtual and the Real, 2017).
    • Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on The Meta-Problem of Consciousness), 2018-20).
    Conferences:
    • Metaphysics of Consciousness: David Chalmers’ `The Conscious Mind’ in Historical and Contemporary Perspective. University of Buffalo, November 1999.
    • Phenomenal Consciousness and Conceptual Analysis: A Workshop on David Chalmers’ Philosophy. University of Cologne, September 2006.
    • Conference on Constructing the World. Bonn, May 2013.
    • Gottinger Philosophischer Kolloquium: David Chalmers. Gottingen, May 2014.
    • Conference on Constructing the World. Fribourg, May 2014.
    • Tuebingen Masterclass in Theoretical Philosophy: The Philosophy of David Chalmers. Tuebingen, January 2015.
    • Philosophy of Language and Mind Masterclass: David Chalmers’ Philosophy. Stockholm, June 2015.
    • Metaphilosophy in Carnap and Chalmers. Vienna, June 2018.
    • Mind Brazil Workshop: David Chalmers. Tiradentes, August 2018.
    Reviews of The Conscious Mind: in Times Higher Education Supplement, Nature, Times Literary Supplement, Economist, Foundations of Physics, Journal of Mind and Behavior, London Times, New Scientist, The Tablet, Psyche, Contemporary Psychology, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Physics Today, New York Times Book Review, Sydney Morning Herald, New York Review of Books, Choice, Library Journal, Minds and Machines, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Mind, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, American Journal of Psychology, Weekend Australian, Australian Review of Books, Origins and Design, First Things, Theory and Psychology, Psychological Medicine, Inquiry, Perspectives, Review of Metaphysics, Quarterly Review of Biology. Grants
    • Arizona Center for Consciousness Studies ($1,500,000). Fetzer Institute, 1999.
    • Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality [with David Hoy] ($180,000). National Endowment of Humanities, 2002.
    • Federation Fellowship: The Contents of Consciousness ($1,300,000). Australian Research Council, 2004-2009.
    • The High-Level Structure of Consciousness [with Ned Block and Susanna Siegel] ($300,000). Australian Research Council, 2008-2010.
    • Discovery Grant: The Basis of Conscious Thought [with Uriah Kriegel] ($800,000). Australian Research Council, 2010-14.
    • Discovery Grant: The Language of Consciousness [with Daniel Stoljar] ($292,500). Australian Research Council, 2017-19.
    Lecture Series and Named Lectures
    • Distinguished Alumni Lecture, Indiana University, 1996.
    • Leonard Lecture, University of Nevada, Reno, 1998.
    • Short-Term Fellow in the Humanities Lectures, Princeton University, 1999.
    • Gibbs Lecture, University of Florida, 2000.
    • John Dewey Lecture, University of Vermont, 2002.
    • Lansdowne Lectures, University of Victoria, 2003
    • Henry Bugbee Lecture, University of Montana, 2003.
    • Nature of Knowledge Lecture, University of Edinburgh, 2003.
    • John Locke Lectures, University of Oxford, 2010
    • George Myro Lecture, University of California Berkeley, 2010.
    • Harold Stoner Clark Lectures, California Lutheran University, 2010
    • Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, Amherst College, 2012
    • Rudolf Carnap Lectures, Ruhr University of Bochum, 2013
    • Burman Lectures, Umea University, 2013
    • Oslo Lecture on the Nature of Mind, 2013
    • Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, 2013
    • Donnellan Lectures, Trinity College Dublin, 2014
    • Sikora Lecture, University of British Columbia, 2014.
    • Royce Lectures, Brown University, 2015.
    • Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers University, 2015.
    • Jean Nicod Lectures, Nicod Institute, 2015.
    • Thalheimer Lectures, Johns Hopkins University, 2015.
    • Petrus Hispanus Lectures, University of Lisbon, 2016.
    • Harvard Review of Philosophy Lecture, Harvard University, 2017.
    • Symbolic Systems Lecture, Stanford University, 2017.
    • Merlan Lecture, Claremont Colleges, 2018.
    • Vienna Circle Lecture, Vienna Circle Institute, 2018.
    • Barry Taylor and David Lewis Lecture, University of Melbourne, 2018.
    • David Lewis Lecture, Princeton University, 2019.
    • Marc Sanders Lecture, American Philosophical Association, 2020.
    • Kretzmann Lecture, Cornell University, 2022.
    • Sprague and Taylor Lecture, Brooklyn College, 2022.
    • Eric T. Carlson Memorial Grand Rounds in Psychiatry, Weill Cornell Medicine, 2022.
    • Distinguished Philosopher Symposium, Siena College, 2023.
    Conference Presentations
    • “Consciousness and Claims about Consciousness”. First International Conference on Consciousness within Science, February 1990.
    • “What is Subsymbolic Computation?”. Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Society, March 1991.
    • “On the Evolution of Learning Mechanisms in Connectionist Networks”. International Conference on Genetic Algorithms, July 1991.
    • “The Role of Evolution in Cognitive Science”. Second Annual Midwest ConnectFest, October 1991.
    • “Connectionist Representation and Deep Systematicity” (commentary on Clark). Perspectives on Mind, Washington University, December 1991.
    • Symposiast: “Philosophical Aspects of Artificial Life”. Artificial Life III, June 1992.
    • “On Determining the Moment of Consciousness” (commentary on Hardcastle). Society for Philosophy and Psychology, June 1993.
    • “What is it Like to be a Thermostat?” (commentary on Lloyd). American Philosophical Association, March 1994.
    • “Explaining Consciousness Scientifically: Choices and Challenges”. Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness, April 1994.
    • “Has Consciousness Been Explained?”. Notre Dame Conference on Dennett’s Philosophy, April 1995.
    • “The Extended Mind”. International Conference on Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 1995.
    • “The Extended Mind”. Society for Machines and Mentality, December 1995.
    • “Two Concepts of Consciousness” (commentary on Guzeldere), American Philosophical Association, December 1995.
    • “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. Toward a Science of Consciousness, April 1996.
    • “The Problems of Consciousness”. Greater Philadephia Philosophy Consortium, November 1996.
    • “How can we Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Science and Consciousness, Mexico City, April 1997.
    • Symposium on The Conscious Mind (reply to Block and Loar). American Philosophical Association, April 1997.
    • “The Problems of Consciousness”. Consciousness at the Frontiers of the Neurosciences, Montreal, May 1997.
    • “Implicit Philosophy in Implicit Cognition Research”. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, June 1997.
    • “The Components of Content”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 1997.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Varieties of Dualism, Notre Dame, March 1998.
    • “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, June 1998.
    • “On the Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” World Congress of Philosophy, August 1998.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Perspectives on Consciousness, Arkansas, September 1998.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Conference on Consciousness, Santa Barbara, November 1998.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Consciousness and Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Mind, Sydney, January 1999.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” Consciousness and Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Mind, Sydney, January 1999.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), Berkeley, March 1999.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?” Perspectives on Consciousness, London, April 1999.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?” Toward a Science of Consciousness: Fundamental Approaches, Tokyo, June 1999.
    • “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” Mighty Midwestern Metaphysical Mayhem, Notre Dame, August 1999.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Wittgenstein Symposium (Metaphysics), Kirchberg, August 1999.
    • “In Defense of the A Priori (commentary on Horgan and Henderson)” The Empirical and the A Priori in Epistemology, Memphis, October 1999.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem.” Metaphysics of Consciousness: David Chalmers’ “The Conscious Mind” in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, Buffalo, November 1999.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?” Cajal Centenary Conference, Zaragoza, Spain, November 1999.
    • “The Tyranny of the Subjunctive.” Truth and Meaning, Moscow, Idaho, March 2000.
    • “What is The Unity of Consciousness?” Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Brussels, July 2000.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. Metaphysical Mayhem, Syracuse, August 2000.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. Language, Mind, and World, Tlaxcala, Mexico, March 2001.
    • “Machine Consciousness: Problems and Prospects”. Banbury Workshop on Machine Consciousness, Cold Spring Harbor, May 2001.
    • “Epistemic Space and Possible Worlds”. American Philosophical Association (Central Division), Minneapolis, May 2001.
    • “How can we Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Conference on Consciousness, Amsterdam, June 2001.
    • “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Two-Dimensionalism, Barcelona, June 2001.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. Metaphysics of Human Beings, Syracuse, July 2001.
    • “The Nature of Narrow Content”. SOFIA Conference on Metaphysics of Mind, Veracruz, December 2001.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Consciousness Symposium, Cornell, January 2002.
    • “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Two-Dimensionalism Workshop, Australian National University, February 2002.
    • “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), Seattle, March 2002.
    • “Reportability and Consciousness”. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Barcelona, June 2002.
    • “Varieties of Representationalism”. “The Fregean Content of Perception”. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. NEH Summer Institute on Consciousness and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz, June-August 2002.
    • “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. Metaphysical Mayhem, Syracuse, August 2002.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Rocky Mountain Student Conference (keynote address), Colorado, March 2003.
    • “On Papineau’s Thinking about Consciousness“. Pacific APA, San Francisco, March 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Workshop on Consciousness, Rio de Janiero, May 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Language, Mind, and World, Buenos Aires, May 2003.
    • “On the Deeply Contingent A Priori”. Philosophy of Language Workshop, ANU, July 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, Adelaide, July 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. International Cognitive Science Conference, Sydney, July 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Workshop on Cosciousness, Taipei, July 2003.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. Workshop on Consciousness, Taipei, July 2003.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. Northwest Philosophy Conference (Necessity), October 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Oxford Graduate Student Conference, Oxford, November 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Conceivability, Explanation, and Physicalism, Copenhagen, November 2003.
    • “Color and the Fall from Eden”. The Ontology of Color, Fribourg, November 2003.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. Workshop on Modality, St. Andrews, November 2003.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. Concepts and Content, UC Santa Barbara, February 2004.
    • “Hey Joe: Comment on Levine’s Purple Haze“. Pacific APA, Pasadena, March 2004.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 2004.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Knowledge and Skepticism, Moscow, Idaho, April 2004.
    • “Concepts and the Scrutability of Truth”. Concepts and the A Priori, Konstanz, Germany, June 2004.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. Philosophy of Mind Workshop, Florence, June 2004.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. European Society for Philosophy and Psyuchology, Barcelona, July 2004.
    • “Perception and the Fall From Eden”. The Contents of Consciousness, ANU, October 2004.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. Aspects of Knowing, University of NSW, December 2004.
    • “Primitive Concepts”. Concepts and Conceptual Analysis, ANU, January 2005.
    • “How Self-Representational is Consciousness?”. Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Arizona, March 2005.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. Pacific APA, San Francisco, March 2005.
    • “65,536 Definitions of Physicalism”. Physicalism, Bowling Green (Ohio), April 2005.
    • “Ontological Indeterminacy”. Metametaphysics, ANU, June 2005.
    • “Terminological Disputes”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney, July 2005.
    • “The Puzzle of Consciousness”. Festival of Ideas, Adelaide, July 2005.
    • “Terminological Disputes”. Philosophical Methodology (Undergraduate Workshop), ANU, July 2005.
    • “The Skaneateles Project”. SPAWN Consciousness Conference, Syracuse, July 2005.
    • “Revelation, Humility, and the Structure of the World”. Revelation and Humility, ANU, November 2005.
    • “Ontological Indeterminacy”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, New Zealand Division, Dunedin, December 2005.
    • “Probability and Propositions”. Conference on Probability, ANU, March 2006.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Intermountain West Student Conference (keynote address), Salt Lake City, March 2006.
    • “Ontological Indeterminacy”. Intermountain West Student Conference, Salt Lake City, March 2006.
    • “Scott Soames’ Two-Dimensionalism”. American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, April 2006.
    • “Epistemic Space”. Epistemic Modality, ANU, June 2006.
    • “Conceptual Analysis Meets ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. Australasian Association of Philosophy, ANU, July 2006.
    • “Consciousness and Ethics”. Consciousness at the Beach, Kioloa, August 2006.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Phenomenal Concepts, Conceptual Analysis, and Metaphysics, Cologne, September 2006.
    • “Probability and Propositions”. Phenomenal Concepts, Conceptual Analysis, and Metaphysics, Cologne, September 2006.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. German Society for Analytic Philosophy, Berlin, September 2006.
    • “Conceptual Analysis Meets ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. Implicit Definitions and A Priori Knowledge, Berlin, September 2006.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, Milan, September 2006.
    • “Ontological Anti-Realism”. Arizona Ontology Conference, Tucson, January 2007.
    • “Ontological Anti-Realism”. Inland Northwest Philsophy Conference: Metametaphysics. Idaho State University, March 2007.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), San Francisco, March 2007.
    • “A Bayesian Critique of ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. Why Formal Philosophy?. Oklahoma, April 2007.
    • “Moral Relativism and Conceptual Analysis”. Norms and Analysis, Sydney, June 2007.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. Australasian Association of Philosophy (Presidential Address). Armidale, July 2007.
    • “X-Phi Meets A-Phi”. Experimental Philosophy Meets Conceptual Analysis. ANU, July 2007.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and Acquaintance”. American Philosophical Association, March 2008.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. American Philosophical Association (Barwise Prize lecture), March 2008.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. University of Texas Graduate Student Conference (keynote lecture), April 2008.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008.
    • “R&R”. Representational and Relational Approaches to Perception, ANU, July 2008.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. International Conference on Cognitive Science Seoul, July 2008.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. World Congress of Philosophy Seoul, August 2008.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. Wittgenstein Symposium on Reduction and Elimination, Kirchberg, August 2008.
    • “Is There Consciousness Outside Attention?”. SPAWN Conference on Perception, Syracuse, August 2008.
    • “The Critique of Pure Thought”. Consciousness and Thought, Dubrovnik, August 2008.
    • “Introspection for Great Apes”. Introspection and Consciousness, ANU, October 2008.
    • “Hyperintensionality and Impossible Worlds”. Hyperintensionality and Impossible Worlds: An Introduction, ANU, November 2008.
    • “Consciousness and the Vegetative State”. Consciousness and the Vegetative State, ANU, March 2009.
    • “Conceivability and the Mind-Body Problem: Comments on Balog and Yablo”. Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2009.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. Alaska Undergraduate Conference, Anchorage, April 2009.
    • “Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Philosophical Methodology, St. Andrews, April 2009.
    • “The Varieties of Self-Awareness”. Consciousness and the Self, CSU Fullerton, April 2009.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. Toward a Science of Consciousness, Hong Kong, June 2009.
    • “Attention First? Consciousness First?”. Attention and Consciousness, ANU, June 2009.
    • “Kaplan’s Paradox and Epistemically Possible Worlds”. Australasian Association of Philosophy. Melbourne, July 2009.
    • “What Can Experimental Philosophy Do?”. NEH Summer Institute on Experimental Philosophy. Salt Lake City, July 2009.
    • “Simulation and the Singularity?”. Singularity Summit, New York City, October 2009.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. From Experience to Thought, New Delhi, January 2010.
    • “Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account”. Propositions and Same-Saying, Macquarie, January 2010.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 2010.
    • “Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence”. Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, North Carolina, June 2010.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2010.
    • “Semantic Fragility and Propositional Content”. Propositions and Same-Saying II, Sydney, July 2010.
    • “Are All Knowable Truths Knowable from Core Evidence?”. Epistemology Workshop, ANU, August 2010.
    • Comments on Robin Jeshion, “Descriptivism and the Representation of Spatial Location”. Spatial Perception, Harvard, October 2010.
    • “Lewis’s Aufbau“. Pacific APA, April 2011.
    • “Arguments from Ordinary Languge in Philosophy”. The Epistemology of Philosophy, Cologne, June 2011.
    • “Inferentialism and Two-Dimensionalism”. Two-Dimensional Semantics and Conceptual Analysis, Cologne, June 2011.
    • “Emergence, Panpsychism, and Russellian Monism”. Emergence and Panpsychism, Munich, June 2011.
    • “Arguments from Ordinary Language in Philosophy”. Ordinary Language, Linguistics, and Philosophy, St. Andrews, June 2011.
    • “Kripke on Frege on Sense and Reference”. Conference on Saul Kripke’s Philosophical Troubles, CUNY Graduate Center, September 2011.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?”. Philosophical Progress, Harvard University, September 2011.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Phenomenality. Rice University, October 2011.
    • “Multisensory Perception and the Unity of Consciousness” (panel discussion). Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration. Brown University, November 2011.
    • “Constructing the World”. Psycho-Ontology. Shalem Institute, Jerusalem, December 2011.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Mind and Consciousness. University of Western Australia, February 2012.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Alan Turing Centenary Conference. De La Salle University, Manila, March 2012.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Phenomenal Qualities. University of Hertfordshire, April 2012.
    • “Physicalism and Supervenience” (commentary on Alter, Montero, Polger, and White). American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), April 2012.
    • “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. NEH Institute on Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. College of Charleston, May 2012.
    • “The Self and the Fall from Eden.” NEH Institute on Buddhism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. College of Charleston, May 2012.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Minds, Bodies, and Problems. Bilkent University, Ankara, June 2012.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Phenomenality and Intentionality. University of Crete, June 2012.
    • “The Nonmodal Conception of Propositional Apriority”. The A Priori. University of Aberdeen, June 2012.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Russian Cognitive Science Conference. Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, June 2012.
    • Commentary on Geoffrey Lee, “Toward an Unselfish Theory of Consciousness”. Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, June 2012.
    • “Two Conceptions of Metaphysical Possibility”. Australasian Association of Philosophy. Wollongong, July 2012.
    • “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism”. Panpsychism Workshop, Lady Elliot Island, July 2012.
    • “Attention and the Contents of Consciousness”. Workshop on Attention, University of Antwerp, September 2012.
    • “An Argument for Panpsychism”. Naturalistic Dualism, Fordham University, October 2012.
    • “Two Concepts of Metaphysical Possibility”. CRNAP Workshop on Modality, Princeton University, November 2012.
    • “A Minimal Defense of Intuition”. Philosophy Without Intuitions, London, December 2012.
    • “Reflections on Phenomenal Concepts”. Phenomenal Concepts, Rio de Janiero, January 2013.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?”. Arizona Ontology Conference, Tucson, February 2013.
    • “Two Concepts of Metaphysical Possibility”. Concepts and Modal Epistemology, Lyon, May 2013.
    • “Perception and Skepticism: From Eden to the Matrix”. Perception and Concepts, Riga, May 2013.
    • “Constructing the World”. Constructing the World, Bonn, May 2013.
    • “Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence”. Reference and Frege Puzzles. Umea, May 2013.
    • “Apriority in Constructing the World.” NYU Workshop on the A Priori, Florence, June 2013.
    • “A Puzzle About Left and Right”. Intentionality at the Beach, ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, July 2013.
    • “The Structural Mismatch Problem”. Panpsychism and Russellian Monism, Oslo, August 2013.
    • “Narrow Scrutability and Narrow Content”. Narrow Content, Oslo, August 2013.
    • “Two Concepts of Metaphysical Possibility”. Modal Epistemology, Lisbon, August 2013.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. Metaphysics Meets the Philosophy of Physics, Rochester, September 2013.
    • “Perception and Skepticism: From Eden to the Matrix”. Workshop on Epistemology, British Columbia, March 2014.
    • “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”. TED, Vancouver, March 2014.
    • “The Hard Problem of Consciousness: 300 Years On”. Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 2014.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. Consciousness and Intentionality, Mississippi, April 2014.
    • “Consciousness and Panpsychism”. Consciousness and Free Will, Greenland Cruise, June 2014.
    • “Fundamentality Structuralism”. Australasian Association of Philosophy. Canberra, July 2014.
    • “The Hard Problem of Consciousness: 300 Years On”. Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Brisbane, July 2014.
    • “What is Panpsychism”. Workshop on Panpsychism, Byron Bay, July 2014.
    • “Fundamentality Structuralism”. Bridges: American-German Conference on Formal Philosophy. New York, September 2014.
    • “Loar on Consciousness and Intentionality”. Memorial Workshop for Brian Loar. Rutgers University, October 2014.
    • “Frege’s Puzzle and Fine-Grained Content”. Frege’s Puzzle, Campinas, November 2014.
    • “Semantic Pluralism”. Semantic Pluralism. Konstanz, January 2015.
    • “The First-Person Perspective in Virtual Reality”. Toronto Graduate Student Conference on the First-Person Perspective, Toronto, May 2015.
    • “Broadly Verbal Disputes”. Verbal Disputes and their Role in Philosophy. Oxford, May 2015.
    • “Grounding and Emergence”. Emergence and Grounding, Glasgow, May 2015.
    • “Some Roles of First-Person Representation”. The First-Person Perspective, Athens, June 2015.
    • “The Structuralist Response to Skepticism”. The Interface between Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind. Bled, June 2015.
    • “Spatial Illusions: From Mirrors to Virtual Reality”. Masterclass on David Chalmers’ Philosophy. Stockholm, June 2015.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. Toward a Science of Consciousness. Helsinki, June 2015.
    • “The Problem of Consciousness”. The Return of Consciousness. Avesta, Sweden, June 2015.
    • “The Philosophy of Consciousness: The Last Ten Years”. SPAWN Conference on Consciousness. Syracuse, July 2015.
    • “Two Concepts of Metaphysical Possibility”. Mid-Atlantic Conference on the Philosophy of Language. University of West Virginia, August 2015.
    • “Philosophical Issues in Integrated Information Theory”. Integrated Information Theory: Foundational Issues. NYU, November 2015.
    • “Varieties of Bayesianism in Cognitive Science.” Is the Brain Bayesian?. NYU, December 2015.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. Metaphysics and Epistemology at the Ranch. Tucson, January 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. The Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. How the Light Gets In, Hay-on-Wye, Wales, May 2016.
    • “A Carnapian Approach to Grounding”. Metaphysics After Carnap, University of Leeds, June 2016.
    • “Grounding and Analyticity”. Consciousness and Grounding, University of Birmingham, June 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, Monash University, July 2016.
    • “Reflexivity and Transparency in Theories of Consciousness”. Reflexive Theories of Consciousness: A Crosscultural Workshop. ANU, July 2016.
    • “Could Hesperus Have Failed to be Phosphorus?”. Themes from Yablo. Australian National University, July 2016.
    • “Dirty Secrets of Consciousness”. Physics of the Observer (FQXI), Banff, August 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. A Night of Philosophy and Ideas, Brooklyn, January 2017.
    • “Perception and Illusion in Virtual Reality”. Perceptual Learning and Expertise, University of Pennsylvania, February 2017.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Metaphysics on the Mountain, Sun Valley, Idaho, March 2017.
    • “Perception and Illusion in Virtual Reality”. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, March 2017.
    • “Grounding and Analyticity”. American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), Seattle, April 2017.
    • “Digital Ontology and Structural Realism”. Structural Realism and the Metaphysics of Science, Rutgers, May 2017.
    • “Varieties of Idealism”. Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem, Shanghai, June 2017.
    • “Grounding and Analyticity”. Australasian Association of Philosophy, Adelaide, July 2017.
    • “Russellian Idealism”. Russellian Monism, Budapest, August 2017.
    • “Grounding and Analyticity”. The Question of Ontology, Madrid, February 2018.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Alvin Goldman Conference, Rutgers, February 2018.
    • The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Measurement of Consciousness. Neuroscience in Intensive Care Symposium on Consciousness, March 2018.
    • Consciousness and Intelligence in Humans and Machines. SXSW, Austin, March 2018.
    • Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism. USC/UCLA Graduate Conference, USC, March 2018.
    • Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism. Latin American Analytic Philosophy, Villa de Leyva, May 2018.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Philosophy of Mind Workshop, Medellin, May 2018.
    • Conceptual Engineering and Verbal Disputes. Carnap and Chalmers on Metaphilosophy, Vienna, June 2018.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Human Brain Project: Consciousness, Barcelona, June 2018.
    • The Virtual and The Real: Reflections. Virtual, Real, and Fictional, Copenhagen IT University, June 2018.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. ASSC 22, Krakow, June 2018.
    • Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot? (wrapup talk) Acquaintance and Direct Grasp, Paris, July 2018.
    • Armstrong on The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Armstrong’s Materialist Theory of the Mind, Sydney, August 2018.
    • Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function (with Kelvin McQueen). Causation and Complexity in the Conscious Brain, Monash, August 2018.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Mind Brazil 2018, Tiradentes, August 2018.
    • What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should It Be? Foundations of Conceptual Engineering, NYU, September 2018.
    • On Narrow Content. APA Pacific Division, Vancouver, April 2019.
    • Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism. The Structure of Reality and the Reality of Structure, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, June 2019.
    • Zeno Goes to Copenhagen. Toward a Science of Consciousness, Interlaken, June 2019.
    • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. The Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Mind and Action, Tubingen, July 2019.
    • Zeno Goes to Copenhagen. FQXi Conference on Intelligence and Agency in the Physical World, Tuscany, July 2019.
    Invited Colloquia
    • “The Evolution of Learning”. Memphis State University, April 1991.
    • “The Supervenience of Conscious Experience”. University of Chicago, January 1993.
    • “Why Cognitive Science Can’t Handle Consciousness”. Indiana University, April 1993.
    • “The Components of Content”. Washington University, February 1994.
    • “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. Ohio State University, May 1994.
    • “The Components of Content”. Princeton University, October 1994.
    • “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition”. University of Memphis, November 1994.
    • “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”. California Institute of Technology, December 1994.
    • “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”. University of Cincinatti, January 1995.
    • “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”. Johns Hopkins University, January 1995.
    • “The Components of Content”. Cornell University, January 1995.
    • “The Components of Content”. Rice University, January 1995.
    • “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”. UC Santa Cruz, January 1995.
    • “The Components of Content”. UC Los Angeles, February, 1995.
    • “Has Consciousness been Explained?”. Tufts University, February 1995.
    • “The Puzzle of Consciousness”. UC Santa Cruz (Psychology), October 1995.
    • “The Components of Content”. Yale University, February 1996.
    • “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. Stanford University, February 1996.
    • “Has Consciousness been Explained?”. Indiana University (Distinguished Alumni Lecture), March 1996.
    • “The Puzzle of Consciousness”. Yale University, September 1996.
    • “The Metaphysics of Consciousness”. Yale University, September 1996.
    • “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. UC Berkeley, October 1996.
    • “The Puzzle of Consciousness”. UC San Francisco, December 1996.
    • “Does a Rock Implement Every Computation?”. UC San Diego, February 1997.
    • “The Components of Content”. UC Santa Cruz (Linguistics), February 1997.
    • “Consciousness and Quantum Mechancs”. UC Santa Cruz (Chemistry), March 1997.
    • “Does a Rock Implement Every Computation?”. New York University, April 1997.
    • “Does a Rock Implement Every Computation?”. Colorado University, April 1997.
    • “The Components of Content”. University of Arizona, April 1997.
    • “The Extended Mind”. University of Arizona, April 1997.
    • “The Extended Mind”. Stanford University, April 1997.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. Australian National University, July 1997.
    • “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. Australian National University, July 1997.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem”. University of Nevada, Reno, April 1998.
    • “The Components of Content”. University of California, Santa Barbara, May 1998.
    • “Consciousness, Conceivability, and Conditionals”. Princeton University, October 1998.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Scrutability of Truth”. Princeton University, October 1998.
    • “Beliefs about Experiences”. Princeton University, October 1998.
    • “The Puzzle of Consciousness”. Cal Poly State University (San Luis Obispo), November 1998.
    • “The Tyranny of the Subjunctive”. Australian National University, January 1999.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Scrutability of Truth”. Australian National University, January 1999.
    • “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?”. Australian National University, February 1999.
    • “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?”. Sydney University, March 1999.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem”. University of London, April 1999.
    • “On the Search for a Neural Correlate of Consciousness”. University of Arizona (Psychology), May 1999.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Arizona (Cognitive Science), September 1999.
    • “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”. Arizona State University, September 1999.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Mississippi, September 1999.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. University of Arizona (Philosophy), January 2000.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. University of Utah, February 2000.
    • “Modal Rationalism and the Mind-Body Problem”. Stanford University, February 2000.
    • “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”. New York University, February 2000.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?” Skovde University, June 2000.
    • “The Philosophy and Science of Consciousness” (series of six lectures). Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich, July 2000.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. University of Fribourg, July 2000.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. Australian National University, September 2000.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. University of Florida, January 2001.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. University of Miami, January 2001.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. University of Miami, January 2001.
    • “Machine Consciousness: Problems and Prospects”. Central Intelligence Agency, February 2001.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. Wake Forest University, February 2001.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. University of Alabama, February 2001.
    • “How can we Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Northwestern University, February 2001.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. University of Michigan, February 2001.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. University of Arizona, March 2001.
    • “On Sense and Intension”. Southern Methodist University, March 2001.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. Institut Jean Nicod (Paris), April 2001.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Oxford, April 2001.
    • “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”. University College London, May 2001.
    • “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”. University of Antwerp, June 2001.
    • “How can we Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Starlab (Brussels), June 2001.
    • “How can we Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Center for Theoretical Studies (Prague), June 2001.
    • “Does a Rock Implement Every Computation”? University College Dublin, June 2001.
    • “The Science of Consciousness” (three lectures). University of Barcelona, June 2001.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. MIT, October 2001.
    • “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. UC Berkeley, October 2001.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Nebraska, November 2001.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. Cornell University, January 2002.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. Rutgers University, February 2002.
    • “It’s Not So Bad to be a Brain in a Vat”. Davidson College, March 2002.
    • “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. University of North Carolina, March 2002.
    • “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. Harvard University, October 2002.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. Brown University, October 2002.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Vermont, October 2002.
    • “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. Dewey Lecture, University of Vermont, October 2002.
    • “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. Dartmouth University, October 2002.
    • “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. University of Arizona, October 2002.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. University of Arizona, February 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Nevada, Las Vegas, February 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Texas Tech, February 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Texas Tech, February 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Texas A&M, February 2003.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Texas, February 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Montana, March 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Montana (Henry Bugbee Lecture), March 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of British Columbia, April 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”/”Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”/”The Matrix as Metaphysics” (Lansdowne Lectures). University of Victoria, April 2003.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Queensland, June 2003.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. Monash University, June 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Sydney University/Macquarie University (joint seminar), June 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Australian National University, June 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Australian National University, June 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. University of Wisconsin, October 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Wisconsin, October 2003.
    • “The Representational Character of Experience”. Iowa State University, October 2003.
    • “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap”. Birkbeck College (London), November 2003.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Sheffield, November 2003.
    • “Color and the Fall from Eden”. University of Nottingham, November 2003.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Leeds, November 2003.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Edinburgh (The Nature of Knowledge Lecture), November 2003.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. University of Arizona, January 2004.
    • “Soames on Two-Dimensionalism”. Arizona State University, January 2004.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Virginia, February 2004.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. University of Virginia, February 2004.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. New Mexico State University, March 2004.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. CSU Long Beach, March 2004.
    • “Soames on Two-Dimensionalism”. UCLA, March 2005.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. UCLA, March 2005.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. UCLA, March 2005.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. New York University, March 2005.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Bates College, April 2005.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Maui Community College, April 2005.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. University of Melbourne, May 2005.
    • “Ontological Indeterminacy”. University of Wyoming, March 2006.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Clark University, April 2006.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Queensland, May 2006.
    • “Conceptual Analysis meets ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. ANU, June 2006.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Cologne, September 2006.
    • “Ontological Indeterminacy”. Lund University, September 2006.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. University of Copenhagen, September 2006.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. University of California, Riverside, March 2007.
    • “Ontological Anti-Realism”. University of California, Riverside, March 2007.
    • “Probability and Propositions”. University of California, Davis, March 2007.
    • “Perception and the Fall from Eden”. Harvard/MIT Seminar, April 2007.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Yale University, April 2007.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Georgia State University, April 2007.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. University of Melbourne (Neuroscience Group), September 2007.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. University of Buffalo, March 2008.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. University of Toronto, March 2008.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. University of Toronto, March 2008.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. Brown University, March 2008.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Rutgers University, April 2008.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?”. Rutgers University, April 2008.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Rutgers University, April 2008.
    • “Probability and Propositions”. Beijing University, August 2008.
    • “Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Capital Normal University, Beijing, August 2008.
    • “The Science of Consciousness: An Overview”. University of Melbourne (Cognitive Science), October 2008.
    • “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?”. ANU (Neuroscience), March 2009.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness”. College of Charleston, April 2009.
    • “From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan”. Georgetown University, April 2009.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness”. MIT (Class Presentation), April 2009.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited”. Boston University, April 2009.
    • “Revisability and Conceptual Change in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. Claremont-McKenna College, May 2009.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. West Point Military Academy, October 2009.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. CUNY Graduate Center, November 2009.
    • “The Extended Mind, Revisited.” Jadavpur University, January 2010.
    • “Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Rabindra Bharati University, January 2010.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. ANU, March 2010.
    • “Constructing the World” (six lectures). University of Barcelona, April 2010.
    • “Constructing the World” (six John Locke lectures). Oxford University, May 2010.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. Oxford University, May 2010.
    • “Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. Reading University, May 2010.
    • “Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress”. University of Bristol, May 2010.
    • “Revisability and Conceptual Change in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism'”. UC Berkeley, November 2010.
    • “From the Matrix to the Singularity” (two Harold Stoner Clark lectures). California Lutheran University, November 2010.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Sarah Lawrence College, December 2010.
    • “Two Puzzles about the Contingent A Priori”. University of Colorado, April 2011.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. University of Colorado, April 2011.
    • “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. MIT, April 2011.
    • “The Hegelian Argument for Panpsychism”. University of Notre Dame, October 2011.
    • Seminar on Constructing the World. University of Michigan, October 2011.
    • “Inferentialism and Analyticity”. Ohio State University, October 2011.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. Queens College (CUNY), November 2011.
    • “The Hegelian Argument for Panpsychism”. Wesleyan University, November 2011.
    • “The Science of Consciousness”. Tel Aviv University, December 2011.
    • “The Nature of Epistemic Space”. New York University (Mind and Language Seminar), April 2012.
    • “The Two-Dimensional Content of Language, Thought, and Perception”. University of California, Berkeley (New Crop Visitor), April 2012.
    • “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. Bogazici University, June 2012.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. University of Aberdeen, June 2012.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?”. Fordham University, September 2012.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. University of Pittsburgh, September 2012.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. Indiana University, October 2012.
    • “An Argument for Panpsychism”. Amherst College (Amherst Lecture in Philosophy), October 2012.
    • “Constructing the World”. Princeton University (Metaphysics Seminar), December 2012.
    • “An Argument for Panpsychism”. University of Chile, January 2013.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. University of Chile, January 2013.
    • “Three Puzzles About Spatial Experience”. University of Arizona, February 2013.
    • “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. Stanford University (Center for Explanation of Consciousness), February 2013.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. National University of Singapore, May 2013.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. University of Cambridge, May 2013.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. University of Liverpool, May 2013.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. University of Birmingham, May 2013.
    • “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience”. University of Oxford, May 2013.
    • “Structuralism, Space, and Skepticism” (three Rudolf Carnap lectures). Ruhr University of Bochum, May 2013.
    • “Structuralism, Space, and Skepticism” (three Burman lectures). University of Umea, May 2013.
    • “Constructing the World”. University of Bologna, June 2013.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. ANU (Research School of Physics and Engineering), August 2013.
    • “How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness”. University of Oslo (Neuroscience), August 2013.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. University of Oslo (Mind in Nature Lecture), August 2013.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. CUNY Graduate Center, September 2013.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, October 2013.
    • “An Argument for Panpsychism”. Wesleyan University, October 2013.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. University of Otago, February 2014.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. Victoria University (Wellington), February 2014.
    • “Three Puzzles About Spatial Experience”. University of Auckland, February 2014.
    • “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy”. University of British Columbia (Sikora Lecture), February 2014.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. ANU, April 2014.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. University of Göttingen, May 2014.
    • “Structuralism, Space, and Skepticism” (three Donnellan lectures). Trinity College, Dublin, May 2014.
    • “Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function”. University of Geneva, May 2014.
    • “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. University of Fribourg, May 2014.
    • “An Argument for Panpsychism”. University of Curitiba, June 2014.
    • “Fundamentality Structuralism”. University of Virginia, October 2014.
    • “Spatial Illusions: From Mirrors to Virtual Reality”. University of Tubingen, January 2015.
    • “Spatial Experience and Virtual Reality” (three Royce lectures). Brown University, February 2015.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. Rutgers University (Mesthene Lecture), April 2015.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. Oxford University (Jowett Society), May 2015.
    • “Spatial Experience and Virtual Reality” (four Jean Nicod lectures). Institut Jean Nicod, June 2015.
    • “Spatial Illusions: From Mirrors to Virtual Reality”. University of Connecticut, September 2015.
    • “Finding Space in a Nonspatial World”. University of Connecticut, September 2015.
    • “Spatial Illusions: From Mirrors to Virtual Reality”. University of Western Ontario, September 2015.
    • “Spatial Experience and Virtual Reality” (three Thalheimer lectures). Johns Hopkins University, October 2015.
    • “The Matrix as Metaphysics”. State University of Rio de Janiero, November 2015.
    • “Perception and Illusion in Virtual Reality”. University of Kentucky, February 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Laguardia College, New York, March 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Skidmore College, New York, March 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. NYU (consciousness group), April 2016.
    • “Kripke and Two-Dimensionalism”. CUNY (Kripke seminar), May 2016.
    • “The Philosophy of Virtual Reality”. University of Lisbon (two Petrus Hispanus Lectures), June 2016.
    • “The Hard Problem of Consciousness: 300 Years on”. Moscow State University, June 2016.
    • “The Externalist and the Structuralist Replies to Skepticism”. Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, November 2016.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. New York University (University Professorship Inaugural Lecture), December 2016.
    • “The Externalist and the Structuralist Replies to Skepticism”. University of Sydney, January 2017.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Harvard University (Harvard Review of Philosophy Lecture), April 2017.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Stanford University (Symbolic Systems Lecture), May 2017.
    • “The Externalist and the Structuralist Replies to Skepticism”. ANU, July 2017.
    • “Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism”. NYU, September 2017.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. University of Adelaide, October 2017.
    • “Intelligence and Consciousness”. National Academy of Science, March 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Marist College (Stefanopoulos Lecture), March 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. University of Kansas, March 2018.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Upload VR, March 2018.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. Claremont-McKenna College (Berman Lecture), March 2018.
    • “The Carnap-Lewis Aufbau”. Vienna Circle Institute, June 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Copenhagen IT University, June 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. University of Melbourne (Taylor-Lewis Lecture), August 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. ANU (Philosophy of Mind group), August 2018.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Google New York, February 2017.
    • “Structuralism and Skepticism”. Princeton University (David Lewis Lecture), March 2019.
    • “The Virtual and the Real”. SUNY Farmingdale, April 2019.
    • “The Meta-Problem of Conscousness”. University of Fribourg, July 2019.
    Service Referee for: American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Cognition, Cognitive Science, Connection Science, Consciousness and Cognition, Dialogue, Dialectica, Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Mind, Mind and Language, Minds and Machines, Nature Neuroscience, Nous, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Psyche, Psycoloquy, Synthese, Theoria, Trends in Neuroscience, Blackwell, Broadview, Cambridge University Press, Edinburgh University Press, Harvard University Press, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press, Routledge, Westview. Editorial Boards
    • Abstracta
    • Advances in Consciousness Research (John Benjamins).
    • American Philosophical Quarterly (1999-2002)
    • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
    • Cognitive Science (2001-2005)
    • Cognitive Systems Research
    • Connection Science (Special issue on philosophical issues, 1992)
    • Consciousness and Cognition
    • Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Philosophy editor)
    • European Review of Philosophy
    • Facta Philosophica
    • Internal Journal of Philosophical Studies
    • Journal of Consciousness Studies
    • Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
    • Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
    • Philo
    • Philosophers’ Annual
    • Philosophical Papers
    • Philosophical Perspectives
    • Philosophical Psychology
    • Philosophical Studies
    • Philosophy Compass
    • Philosophy of Mind Series, Oxford University Press (Series Editor)
    • Polish Journal of Philosophy
    • Psyche (Associate Editor)
    • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Philosophy of Mind Editor)
    • Theoria
    • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (1996-2010)
    Conferences Organized
    • Midwest Connectionism Conference, 1990 (Chief Organizer)
    • 14th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1992 (Steering Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness II, 1996 (Scientific Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness III, 1998 (Scientific Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness IV, 2000 (Program Co-Chair)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness V, 2002 (Program Chair)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness VI, 2004 (Program Chair)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness VII, 2006 (Scientific Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness VIII, 2008 (Scientific Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness IX, 2010 (Scientific Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness X, 2012 (Program Co-Chair)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness XI, 2014 (Program Co-Chair)
    • Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1997 (Program Co-Chair)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 1998 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 1999 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2000 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2001 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2002 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2003 (Steering Committee)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2014 (Program Committee)
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness: Fundamental Approaches (Tokyo), 1999
    • Consciousness and Thought (Dubrovnik), 2008
    • Toward a Science of Consciousness: Investigating Inner Experience (Hong Kong), 2009
    • First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness (Arizona, October 2001)
    • The Contents of Consciousness (ANU, October 2004)
    • Concepts and Conceptual Analysis (ANU, January 2005)
    • Perception and the External World (ANU, February 2005)
    • Metametaphysics: Do Existence Questions Have Determinate Answers? (ANU, June 2005)
    • Revelation and Humility: Our Knowledge of Mental and Physical Properties (ANU, November 2005)
    • Epistemic Modality (ANU, June 2006)
    • Consciousness at the Beach (ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, August 2006)
    • Consciousness at the Beach 2 (ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, February 2007)
    • Experimental Philosophy Meets Conceptual Analysis (ANU, July 2007)
    • Hyperintensionality and Impossible Worlds (ANU, November 2008)
    • Consciousness at the Beach 3 (ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, February 2009)
    • Consciousness and the Vegetative State (ANU, March 2009)
    • Attention and Consciousness (ANU, June 2009)
    • Themes from John McDowell (ANU, July 2010)
    • The Predicative Structure of Experience (NYU, October 2010)
    • The Phenomenology of Synesthesia (NYU, November 2010)
    • Consciousness at the Beach 4 (ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, July 2011)
    • The Language of Consciousness (ANU, July 2011)
    • The Combination Problem for Panpsychism (Lady Elliot Island, July 2012)
    • The Evolution and Function of Consciousness (NYU, October 2012)
    • Subjectivism, Temporalism, and the Mind-Body Problem (NYU, December 2012)
    • Intentionality at the Beach (ANU Kioloa Coastal Campus, July 2013)
    • The Brain Mapping Initiatives: Foundational Issues (NYU, December 2013)
    • Measuring Borderline States of Consciousness (NYU, October 2014)
    • Finding Space (NYU Paris, June 2015)
    • Integrated Information Theory (NYU, November 2015)
    • Is the Brain Bayesian? (NYU, December 2015)
    • Reflexive Theories of Consciousness (ANU, July 2016)
    • Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (NYU, October 2016)
    • Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem (NYU Shanghai, June 2017)
    • Grounding and Consciousness (NYU Florence, August 2017)
    • Animal Consciousness (NYU, November 2017)
    • Foundations of Conceptual Engineering (NYU, September 2018)
    • Interpretable AI and Theories of Content (NYU, February 2020)
    • Language Models and AI (NYU/OpenAI, October 2020)
    • Philosophy of Deep Learning (NYU, March 2023)
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (NYU, June 2023)
    Professional Societies
    • Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (Chair, Board of Directors, 1997-2003; Executive Committee, 1997-2006, President, 2014)
    • Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Executive Committee, 1997-2000)
    • American Philosophical Association (Metaphysics Area Committee, 1999-2002)
    • Australasian Association of Philosophy (President, 2006-07; Council Member, 2006-2009)
    • PhilPapers Foundation (Co-Director since inception)
    Web Resources Maintained
    • PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy (2 million+ entries)
    • PhilJobs: Jobs for Philosophers
    • PhilArchive (30,000+ entries)
    • MindPapers: A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Mind and the Science of Consciousness (28000+ entries, now mostly replaced by PhilPapers)
    • People with Online Papers in Philosophy (2000+ entries, now replaced by PhilPapers)
    • Online Papers on Consciousness (7000+ entries, now replaced by PhilPapers)
    Students and Postdoctoral Fellows
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