papers on epistemology and decision theory

Analysis 71:411-19, 2011. This paper argues against the common view that all propositions of the form [p iff actually p] are knowable a priori by arguing (via a simple logical proof!) that some are unknowable. Consequences for the correct understanding of apriority are discussed. [pdf] [philpapers]

Journal of Philosophy 108:387-415, 2011. This paper is more or less my defense of the a priori against Quine’s arguments from revisability and holding-true toward the end of “Two Dogmas”. I started off doing things in the 2D framework and then figured out that the arguments could be put more generally in a Bayesian framework, with standard Bayesian norms such as conditionalization making life pretty hard for the Quinean. There have already been quite a few responses to this one: e.g. by Gary Ebbs, Gurpreet Rattan, Damien Rochford, Robert Rupert, and Brett Topey. [pdf] [philpapers]

Mind 120:587-635, 2011. Uses Frege-style cases to argue that the objects of credence (that is, the objects to which credences are assigned) can’t be Russellian propositions or other reference-based entities, and argues for a 2D-ish Fregean account instead. Mind later published a reply by David Braun (see also this reply by Jesse Fitts) along with my reply in turn. [pdf] [philpapers]

In (A. Egan and B. Weatherson, eds) Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press, 2010. A monster paper on the framework of epistemically possible worlds. I think of this paper as laying the foundations for 2D semantics and also going into a lot of interesting issues that I don’t discuss much elsewhere (like transworld identity for epistemically possible worlds and Kaplan’s paradox of cardinality). [pdf] [philpapers]

Analysis 67:170-72, 2007. A micro-paper arguing that certain common formulations of the Ramsey test and Moore’s-paradox reasoning leading to accepting omniscience claims such as ‘If p, then I believe that p’. This was mostly published for cuteness (OK, mainly for the title) rather than impact, since it’s obvious that there are better formulations of the Ramsey test that avoid the result. Replies by David Barnett (“Ramsey + Moore ≠ God”), Hannes Leitgeb (“God – Moore = Ramsey”) and John Williams point out that there are better formulations of the Ramsey test that avoid the result and say other interesting things besides. [pdf] [philpapers]

A recent article using a structuralist view of the physical world to argue against global skepticism. Among other things this gives a sort of foundation for the argument in the Matrix paper below. [pdf] [philpapers]

This article started life as a serious-sounding article called “Envatment as a Metaphysical Hypothesis”. Then I received an invitation to write an article for the website of The Matrix and I decided it would work better this way. Despite the accessibility this is one of my most serious articles, with the first version of my structuralist reply to skepticism. [pdf] [philpapers]

In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Quentin Smith and Alexandr Jokic (Oxford, 2003). This long paper has two halves. The first half gives an account of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal beliefs, on which their content is partly constituted by the quality of an experience. The second half applies this account to epistemological issues: e.g. arguing for a limited incorrigibility thesis, defending a sort of foundationalism about phenomenal knowledge based on acquaintance with phenomenal properties, defending the phenomenal realist from certain epistemological problems, and addressing the “Myth of the Given”. The paper was published i. [pdf] [philpapers]

In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 145-200 (Oxford University Press, 2002). This paper distinguishes a number of notions of conceivability (ideal vs prima facie, positive vs negative, primary vs secondary) and argues for a link between some of them and metaphysical possibility. [html] [philpapers]

Fourth excursus in Constructing the World. The first half of Constructing the World contains a lot of epistemology, and a number of the excursuses have relatively self-contained discussions of epistemological topics. Here’s one on a warrant-based conception of justification fleshing out the idea of warrant as a sort of directed graph. [pdf]

Fifth excursus in Constructing the World. On epistemological issues arising from self-doubt (e.g. you have evidence that you’ve taken a drug that makes you reason badly) and how to handle these via a special sort of “insulated reasoning” idealization. [pdf]

Seventh excursus in Constructing the World. This fleshes out my conception of apriority on issues like sentences vs propositions, conclusive vs nonconclusive apriority, and so on, and contrasts it with other conceptions. [pdf]

Eighth excursus in Constructing the World. This focuses especially on recent challenges to the a priori by Tim Williamson and John Hawthorne.[pdf]

Tenth excursus in Constructing the World. On using the scrutability framework to construct a space of epistemically possible worlds. [pdf]

You’re given two envelopes, and are told that one contains twice the amount in the other, but you aren’t told which is which. You tentatively decide to take envelope A, but then reason that there is a 50% chance that B contains twice A’s amount and a 50% chance that it contains half A’s amount, with an expected value of 1.25 times A’s amount overall, so it is in your interests to switch. But of course the same holds in reverse. What is going on? I give a detailed analysis of this "two-envelope" paradox, including a few interesting subtleties that are sometimes overlooked. I didn’t publish this as I now think the analysis is incomplete; in effect it solves the “numerical” paradox but not the “decision-theoretic” paradox. [html] [ps] [philpapers]

Analysis 62:155-57, 2002. This is a subsequent short paper (2001) that fills in the gap in the paper above. It sets out a closely related scenario, which combines elements of the St. Petersburg paradox and the two-envelope paradox, and use this to diagnose where the decision-theoretic paradoxical reasoning goes wrong. [html] [philpapers]