papers on meaning and content

In Lepore and Smith’s Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. A review piece on various approaches to two-dimensional semantics, and especially on the epistemic two-dimensionalism that I favor. This is a good place for an overview. Forthcoming in Lepore and Smith’s Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. [pdf] [philpapers]

In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 16, 2002. This paper motivates (and gives a fairly gentle introduction to) a two-dimensional approach through the defense of a Fregean conception of meaning. I articulate some Fregean theses about sense, develop an intensional account of sense on which it is constitutively connected to epistemic possibility, and use this account to deal with various objections to Fregean views. Along the way, the two-dimensional framework as I understand it emerges. There have been discussions of this paper by Alex Byrne and Jim Pryor and Diego Marconi, among others. [pdf] [philpapers]

In Garcia-Carpintero and Macia, Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications (OUP 2006). This monster paper (written for the Barcelona conference on two-dimensionalism, is a sort of “compare-and-contrast” on the various versions of two-dimensional semantics. It starts by motivating this sort of framework, and then discusses in detail the two main sorts of available understandings of the framework: contextual and epistemic understandings. I argue that contextual understandings (e.g. that of Stalnaker) can’t do the work that is required, but that an epistemic understanding can. I set out my own understanding in detail, and then locate existing versions of the framework in the conceptual space as set out. I now think that while this paper is useful for the initial motivation in the first few pages and for the compare-and-contrast, “The Nature of Epistemic Space” is much better at systematically setting out the foundations. An abridged version of this paper appeared as “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics” in Philosophical Studies in 2004, with an interesting response by Laura Schroeter (who also has related critiques here and here). [html] [philpapers]

Nous 45:595-639, 2011. Develops the epistemic 2D paper into a Fregean account of propositions (as “enriched propositions” involving structures of primary intensions and referents) and gives an associated account of propositional attitude ascriptions. I use this framework to address many puzzles involving attitude ascriptions as well as various objections to the 2D framework. [pdf] [philpapers]

For a session at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, in April 2006. This is a response to Scott Soames’ book Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism. It focuses mainly on Soames’ broad critique and his own quasi-two-dimensional framework; other objections, especially concerning attitude ascriptions, are addressed in “Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions” and in “Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem”. Soames replied and I replied in turn. See also this earlier extended handout, Soames on Two-Dimensionalism, written for an exchange at Arizona State University in January 2004. [pdf]

Nous 45:595-639, 2011. Develops the epistemic 2D paper into a Fregean account of propositions (as “enriched propositions” involving structures of primary intensions and referents) and gives an associated account of propositional attitude ascriptions. I use this framework to address many puzzles involving attitude ascriptions as well as various objections to the 2D framework. [pdf] [philpapers]

An extended outline of a talk I gave a couple of times in the late 1990s. I argue for a parallel between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, on the one hand, and the two dimensions of possibility in the 2-D framework. The standard contemporary analysis of possibility and necessity is grounded in subjunctive conditionals. I suggests that this is entirely arbitrary, and has had a distorting effect on many areas of philosophy. [html] [philpapers]

Fourteenth Excursus in Constructing the World. This spells out the notion of an epistemically rigid designator: an expression that picks out the same object in all epistemically possible worlds. Closely related is the notion of a super-rigid designator, roughly one such is metaphysically rigid relative to all epistemically possible worlds. These notion plays a foundational role in epistemic two-dimensionalism and also have many applications. [pdf]

In (Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Issues (OUP, 2002). This paper tries to do for thought what some of the other papers do for language: give an account of the contents of thought on which content is closely tied to reason and cognition. I decompose content into epistemic and subjunctive content, both of which are truth-conditional. Epistemic content is generally internal to a cognitive system, and governs rational relations between thoughts, so it can play the role of "narrow" or "cognitive" content. I apply this framework to a number of puzzles (Frege’s puzzle, Kripke’s puzzle, the problem of the essential indexical, the mode-of-presentation problem, etc.) in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The unpublished 1995 version of this paper has been fairly widely cited; I later revised it for publication in my philosophy of mind anthology. The later version does some foundational things better, but in some respects the earlier version is more accessible. A closely related paper appeared as “The Nature of Narrow Content” in Philosophical Issues in 2003. Here are a couple of replies, by Stephen Schiffer (and my response) and by Alex Byrne. [pdf] [philpapers]

Philosophical Issues 13:46-66, 2003. This one overlaps heavily with the early sections of “The Components of Content” but has a little different material. [html] [philpapers]

In (A. Egan and B. Weatherson, eds) Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press, 2010. This paper takes a more foundational approach to some of the 2D issues, grounding some of the key ideas in a notion of epistemic possibility. The central idea is that of epistemic space: the space of maximal epistemic possibilities, or “scenarios”. I explore various ways of constructing this epistemic space — one tied to centered possible worlds, and one tied directly to epistemic notions. And I outline some applications of the framework from this perspective: e.g. to Fregean sense, narrow content, indicative conditionals, and hyperintensionality. This paper was online for 10 years or so before publication, and there’s an old html version which has some discussion of narrow content that didn’t make it into the published version. [pdf] [philpapers]

Mind 120:587-635, 2011. Uses Frege-style cases to argue that the objects of credence (that is, the objects to which credences are assigned) can’t be Russellian propositions or other reference-based entities, and argues for a 2D-ish Fregean account instead. Mind later published a reply by David Braun (see also this reply by Jesse Fitts) along with my reply in turn. [pdf] [philpapers]

Nineteenth Excursus from Constructing the World (extended edition). This paper develops the sort of inferentialist approach to meaning and content that I prefer — a sort of anchored inferentialism, where some expressions get their content by acquaintance and other by inferential role with respect to those. It also develops an associated notion of analyticity. [pdf[.

Twentieth Excursus from Constructing the World (extended edition). A discussion of the notion of “reference magnets”. I think they’re a lot more problematic than is often supposed. [pdf].

In The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited by Paul Spade. One of my few ventures into the history of philosophy. It was written when I was a graduate student in Paul Spade’s medieval logic class at Indiana. William of Ockham held that we think in a “mental language”, not unlike the language of thought that some contemporary philosophers believe in. The question arises whether the mental language can contain synonyms, or whether these are just artifacts of ordinary language. Most people have said no. Here I give some reasons to say yes. [html] [philpapers]

Journal of Philosophy 108:387-415, 2011. This paper is more or less my defense of the a priori against Quine’s arguments from revisability and holding-true toward the end of “Two Dogmas”. I started off doing things in the 2D framework and then figured out that the arguments could be put more generally in a Bayesian framework, with standard Bayesian norms such as conditionalization making life pretty hard for the Quinean. There have already been quite a few responses to this one: e.g. by Gary Ebbs, Gurpreet Rattan, Damien Rochford, Robert Rupert, and Brett Topey. [pdf] [philpapers]

Philosophical Review 120:515-66, 2011. An analysis of what it is to have a verbal dispute and of how to dissolve them. With applications to philosophical method and to a number of philosophical disputes. I also use the framework to draw out consequences about primitive concepts and analyticity. [pdf] [philpapers]

Twenty-First Excursus from Constructing the World (extended edition). On a number of issues at the heart of semantic internalism and externalism: especially, what it is for an expression to be “Twin-Earthable”, and what it is for content to be narrow. [pdf].