guide to the philosophy of mind

Since 1997 I have been philosophy of mind editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, with coeditors Daniel Stoljar (since 2003), Susanna Siegel (since 2013), and Alex Byrne, Amy Kind, and Jeff Speaks (since 2015). By now we have accumulated enough entries in the philosophy of mind that it’s the equivalent of a pretty definitive reference work in the field. I have a certain pride in this, as the editors put a lot of work into the editing of each entry, and most of the entries are superb guides to their topics. I thought it would make sense to gather all these in one place, as a useful reference for those who are especially interested in the philosophy of mind.

The first list below includes the entries classified under “philosophy of mind” in the encyclopedia, edited by me or by one of the other philosophy of mind editors. The second list includes some relevant entries from other areas, especially philosophy of cognitive science (edited by Barbara von Eckardt and Shaun Nichols), but also metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of action. Note that the unlinked entries are still in progress.

SEP Philosophy of Mind entries

• anomalous monism (Steven Yalowitz)
• associationism (Eric Mandelbaum)
• attention (Christopher Mole)

• belief (Eric Schwitzgebel)
• bodily awareness (Frederique de Vignemont)

• Chinese room argument (David Cole)
• concepts (Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence)
• consciousness (Robert Van Gulick)
  • animal (Colin Allen and Michael Trestman)
  • higher-order theories (Peter Carruthers)
  • and intentionality (Charles Siewert)
  • neuroscience of (Wayne Wu)
  • representational theories (William Lycan)
  • temporal (Barry Dainton)
  • unity of (Andrew Brook and Paul Raymont)

• desire (Tim Schroeder)
• dreams and dreaming (Jennifer Windt)
• dualism (Howard Robinson)

• emotion (Ronald de Sousa)
• eliminative materialism (William Ramsey)
• epiphenomenalism (William Robinson)
• externalism and self-knowledge (Ted Parent)

• functionalism (Janet Levin)

• hope (Titus Stahl and Claudia Boeser)

• implicit bias (Michael Brownstein)
• intentionality (Pierre Jacob)
• imagination (Tamar Gendler)
• introspection (Eric Schwitzgebel)
• intuition (Joel Pust)

• language of thought hypothesis (Murat Aydede)

• meaning holism (Henry Jackman)
• memory (John Sutton)
• mental causation (David Robb and John Heil)
• mental content
  • causal theories of (Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa)
  • externalism about (Joe Lau and Max Deutsch)
  • narrow (Curtis Brown)
  • nonconceptual (José Bermúdez and Arnon Cahen)
  • teleological theories of (Karen Neander)
• mental imagery (Nigel Thomas)
• mind-brain identity theory (J. J. C. Smart)
• multiple realizability (John Bickle)

• neutral monism (Leopold Stubenberg)

• other minds (Alec Hyslop)

• pain (Murat Aydede)
• panpsychism (Philip Goff, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson)
• perception
  • auditory (Casey O’Callaghan)
  • the contents of (Susanna Siegel)
  • the disjunctive theory of (Matthew Soteriou)
  • epistemology of (Laurence BonJour)
  • action-based theories of (Rick Grush and Robert Briscoe)
  • perceptual experience and perceptual justification (Nico Silins)
  • perceptual learning (Kevin Connolly)
  • the problem of (Tim Crane and Craig French)
• phenomenal intentionality (David Bourget and Angela Mendelovici)
• physicalism (Daniel Stoljar)
• pleasure (Leonard D. Katz)

• qualia (Michael Tye)
  • inverted (Alex Byrne)
  • knowledge argument (Martine Nida-Rümelin)

• self-consciousness (Joel Smith)
  • phenomenological approaches to (Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi)
• self-deception (Ian Deweese-Boyd)
• self-knowledge (Brie Gertler)
• supervenience (Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin)

• touch (Matthew Fulkerson)

• zombies (Robert Kirk)

Other relevant SEP entries

• abilities (John Maier)
• action (George Wilson)
• animal cognition (Kristin Andrews)
• behaviorism (George Graham)
• Church-Turing Thesis (B. Jack Copeland)
• cognitive science (Paul Thagard)
• color (Barry Maund)
• computation in physical systems (Gualtiero Piccinini)
• computational theory of mind (Steven Horst)
• connectionism (James Garson)
• creativity (Berys Gaut)
• delusion (Lisa Bortolotti)
• emergence (Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong)
• epistemology of modality (Anand Vaidya)
• ethics of belief (Andrew Chignell)
• evolutionary psychology (Stephen Downes)
• experience and perception of time (Robin Le Poidevin)
• folk psychology: as a theory (Ian Ravenscroft)
• folk psychology: as mental simulation (Robert M. Gordon)
• formal representations of belief (Franz Huber)
• frame problem (Murray Shanahan)
• free will (Timothy O’Connor)
• innateness and language (Fiona Cowie)
• intention (Kieran Setiya)
• intentionality in ancient philosophy (Victor Caston)
• mental illness (Christian Perring)
• mental representation (David Pitt)
• mind in Indian Buddhist philosophy (Christian Coseru)
• modularity of mind (Philip Robbins)
• neuroscience, philosophy of (John Bickle and Peter Mandik)
• perception: epistemological problems of (Laurence BonJour)
• personal identity (Eric T. Olson)
• phenomenology (David Woodruff Smith)
• philosophy of psychiatry (Dominic Murphy)
• practical reason (Jay Wallace)
• propositional attitude reports (Thomas McKay and Michael Nelson)
• quantum approaches to consciousness (Harald Atmanspacher)
• reference (Marga Reimer)
• sense-data (Michael Huemer)
• seventeenth-century theories of consciousness (Larry Jorgensen)
• sounds (Roberto Casati and Jerome Dokic)
• speech acts (Mitchell Green)
• Turing test (Graham Oppy and David Dowe)