David Chalmers' Papers

This page includes all my published papers and a few unpublished papers, listed in reverse chronological order by date of writing, which is typically also date of first web publication (though not date of print publication). More detailed descriptions of some (mostly older) papers are available at my pages of papers on consciousness, meaning and modality, AI and computation, and miscellaneous. See also the master index and the page of responses to articles on my work.


Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem. In (W. Seager, ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge, forthcoming.


The Virtual and the Real. Disputatio, forthcoming.


Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun Mind 125:499-510, 2016.

Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience. In (A. Pautz and D. Stoljar, eds.) Themes from Ned Block. MIT Press, forthcoming.

Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter, and Stanley. Analysis 74:676-97, 2014 (symposium on Constructing the World).

Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89: 249-69 (symposium on Constructing the World), 2014.

Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy? Philosophy 90:1-31, 2015. Also in (T. Honderich, ed.) Philosophers of our Times (Oxford, 2015), and in (J. Keller, ed.) Themes from Peter van Inwagen (Oxford, 2017).


Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense. Philosophical Studies 171:535-44 (symposium on Herman Cappelen's Philosophy Without Intuitions).

Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem (with Brian Rabern). Analysis 74:210-224, 2014.

What Do Philosophers Believe? (with David Bourget). Philosophical Studies 170:465-500, 2014.

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism. Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, 2013. Also in (T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa, eds.) Consciousness in the Physical World: Essays on Russellian Monism (Oxford, 2015) and in G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds.) Panpsychism (Oxford, 2017).

The Combination Problem for Panpsychism. In (G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds.) Panpsychism. Oxford University Press, 2017.


Strong Necessities and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply. Philosophical Studies (symposium on The Character of Consciousness) 167:785-800, 2014.

The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke, and Siegel. Analysis (symposium on The Character of Consciousness) 73:345-68, 2013.

The Varieties of Computation: A Reply. Journal of Cognitive Science 13: 211-48, 2012.

The Singularity: A Reply to Commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19:141-67, 2012.


Actuality and Knowability. Analysis 71:411-19, 2011.

The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:7-65, 2010.


Verbal Disputes. Philosophical Review, 120:515-66, 2011.

Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108:387-415, 2011.


Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions. In (P. Grim, ed) Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press, 2008.

Foreword to Supersizing the Mind. In Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 2008.


Ontological Anti-Realism. In (D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Nous 45:595-639, 2011.


Ramsey + Moore = God (with Alan Hajek). Analysis 67:170-72, 2007.

Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. Mind 120: 587-635, 2011.

Scott Soames' Two-Dimensionalism. For a session at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, in April 2006.


The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism. Abridged version in (B. McLaughlin, ed) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In (T. Alter & S. Walter, eds) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Two-Dimensional Semantics. In (E. Lepore & B. Smith, eds) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press, 2006.


Perception and the Fall from Eden In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Soames on Two-Dimensionalism. Handout for talk at Arizona State University, January 2004.


How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? In (M. Gazzaniga, ed) The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press, 2004.

The Representational Character of Experience. In (B. Leiter, ed) The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2004.

The Matrix as Metaphysics. For the philosophy section of the official Matrix website. Also in (C. Grau, ed) Philosophers Explore the Matrix (Oxford University Press, 2005). Reprinted in (T. Gendler, S. Siegel, & T. Cahn, eds) The Elements of Philosophy (McGraw-Hill, 2007). Reprinted in (S. Schneider, ed) Science Fiction and Philosophy (Wiley, 2009).


Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In (P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar, eds) There's Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. MIT Press, 2004.

Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:182-90 (symposium on Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness), 2004. The online version includes an additional response to John Perry's reply.

Strong and Weak Emergence. In (P. Clayton and P. Davies, eds) The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press, 2006.

The Nature of Narrow Content. Philosophical Issues 13:46-66, 2003.


The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics. In (M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia, eds) Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications (Oxford University Press, 2006). Abridged as "Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics" in Philosophical Studies 18:153-226, 2004.

The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox. Analysis 62:155-57, 2002.

Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In (S. Stich & F., Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell, 2003. Also in (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, 2002). Reprinted (abridged) in( W. Lycan & J. Prinz, eds) Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 2007).

The Nature of Epistemic Space. In (A. Egan and B. Weatherson, eds) Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press, 2011. Revised in 2008 and 2010; original 2001 web version here.

What is the Unity of Consciousness? (with Tim Bayne). In (A. Cleeremans, ed) The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation. Oxford University Press, 2003.


On Sense and Intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16, 2002. Reprinted in (M. Davidson, ed) On Sense and Direct Reference: Readings in the Philosophy of Language (McGraw-Hill, 2007).

Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation (with Frank Jackson). Philosophical Review, 110:315-61, 2001.

The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2003.


Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, 2002.

What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In (T. Metzinger, ed) Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues. MIT Press, 2000. Reprinted in (A. Noe & E. Thompson, eds) Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception (MIT Press, 2003).

First-Person Methods in the Study of Consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin, University of Arizona, 1999.


The Tyranny of the Subjunctive. Unpublished.

Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, 1999. In a symposium on The Conscious Mind, which also included a precis.


The Problems of Consciousness. In (H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci, & S. Rossignol, eds) Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience (Advances in Neurology, Vol. 77). Lippincott-Raven Press, 1998.

On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A.Scott, eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press, 1998.


Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4(1), 1997. Reprinted in (J. Shear, ed.), Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press, 1997.


The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific American, 237(6):62-68, December 1995. Reprinted in (P. van Inwagen & D. Zimmerman, eds) Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1998). Reprinted in (T. Schick & L. Vaughn, eds) Doing Philosophy: A Guide Through Thought-Experiments (Mayfield, 1999). Reprinted in (A. Damasio, ed) The Scientific American Book of the Brain (Lyons Press, 2001). Reprinted in (W. Lawhead, ed Philosophical Questions (McGraw-Hill, 2003). Reprinted in (L. Bonjour & A. Baker, eds) Philosophical Problems: An Annotated Anthology (Longman, 2004). Reprinted in (B. Beedles & M. Petracca, eds) Academic Communities/Disciplinary Conventions (Prentice-Hall, 2001). Reprinted in (B. Gertler & L. Shapiro, eds) Arguing About the Mind (Routledge, 2007).

Minds, Machines, and Mathematics. Psyche, 2:11-20, 1995.

The Extended Mind (with Andy Clark). Analysis 58:10-23, 1998. Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual, 1998. Reprinted in (D.J. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, 2002). Reprinted in (B. Gertler & L. Shapiro, eds) Arguing About the Mind (Routledge, 2007). Reprinted in (W. Lycan & J. Prinz, eds) Mind and Cognition, third edition (Blackwell, 2007). Reprinted in (A. Clark) Supersizing the Mind (Oxford University Press, 2008). Reprinted in (R. Menary, ed.) The Extended Mind (Ashgate, 2008).

The Components of Content. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002. Revised in 2001; original 1995 web version here.


Review of Journal of Consciousness Studies. Times Literary Supplement, November 1994.

Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:148-9, 1997. Reprinted in (N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, eds.) The Nature of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1997).

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-19, 1995. Reprinted in (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A.Scott, eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1996). Reprinted in J. Shear (ed.) Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (MIT Press, 1997). Reprinted in J. Heil (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford University Press, 2003). Reprinted without attribution in (J. Vacca, ed) The World's 20 Greatest Unsolved Problems (Prentice-Hall, 2004). Reprinted in (R. Carter) Exploring Consciousness (University of California Press, 2002). Reprinted in (M. Eckert, ed) Theories of Mind: Introductory Readings (Rowman and Littlefield). Reprinted (as "The Hard Problem of Consciousness" and "Naturalistic Dualism") in (M. Velmans and S. Schneider, eds) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007).

The Two-Envelope Paradox: A Complete Analysis? Unpublished.


Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton? Synthese 108:309-33, 1996.

A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Journal of Cognitive Science 12:323-57, 2011. Section 2 was published as "On Implementing a Computation", Minds and Machines 4:391-402, 1994.

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In (T. Metzinger, ed.) Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995. Reprinted in (T. O'Connor & D. Robb, Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2003).


Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study (commentary on A. Goldman, The Psychology of Folk Psychology). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993.

Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 6:305-19, 1993.


Is There Synonymy in Ockham's Mental Language? In (P. V. Spade, ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room. In (J. Dinsmore, ed.) The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, pp. 25-48. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992.


High-Level Perception, Representation, and Analogy: A Critique of Artificial Intelligence Methodology (with Robert M. French & Douglas R. Hofstadter). Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4:185-211, 1992. Reprinted in (D. R. Hofstadter) Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies. Basic Books.

The Evolution of Learning: An Experiment in Genetic Connectionism. In Connectionist Models: Proceedings of the 1990 Summer School Workshop, 1990. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.

Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong: The Simplest Refutation. Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1990. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Consciousness and Cognition. Unpublished.


Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations. Connection Science 2: 53-62, 1990. Reprinted in (N. Sharkey, ed) Connectionist Natural Language Processing (Intellect, 1992).

Computing the Thinkable (commentary on R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 658-9, 1990.


For more unpublished proto-papers and commentaries from 1989-1994, see miscellaneous writings.

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